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Greetings
Letter	of	welcome	to	the	readers		
of	EDB	Eurasian	Integration	Yearbook
It is my great pleasure to welcome readers to the first edition of the 
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook.
The Eurasian Development Bank was founded in January 2006 at the 
initiative of the Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan. The Bank’s mission 
is to promote economic development and integration in the Eurasian 
region. Having identified our fundamental goals, the founders of the EDB 
have forged swiftly ahead with the process of making our vision a reality. 
With credit and investment as its core activities, the EDB has already 
financed a number of development projects in our member states. 
The Eurasian Development Bank is a new bank, operating alongside 
other well-known international financial institutions in the field of 
economic development. Our aim, however, is not to compete but to build 
upon existing synergies which will enable us to respond more effectively 
to the needs of our member states. Our activities may be similar to other 
well-established multilateral development banks, but the EDB’s mission, 
strategy and corporate values are what make the Bank unique. Firstly, 
our belief that regional cooperation and integration are key to the future 
economic development of CIS countries means that we prioritise projects 
which will contribute to regional economic integration. Secondly, we are 
the “local” development bank, and have adapted our terms and conditions 
to the specific development context and needs of our member states.
In line with our strategic goals for 2008–2010 the Bank aims to become 
a centre of research excellence and a leading supplier of information on 
regional integration. We have recently set up a Technical Assistance 
Fund to support regional integration programmes, specialised inter-state 
initiatives and financial consultancy. Through its regular conferences, 
which bring together academics and representatives from the public 
and private sectors, the Bank provides a platform for the discussion of 
existing and emerging issues relating to the integration process, and for 
the formulation of recommendations. 
You are among the first readers of our Yearbook. The aim of this 
publication is to present to the international community the most 
authoritative articles and studies on economic and political integration 
in Eurasia written in Russian. The Yearbook’s editorial board is made up 
of well-known academics, practitioners and renowned experts on regional 
integration.
I believe that the EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook will become 
a popular and trusted source of information for all stakeholders in the 
integration process. 
Igor Finogenov
Chairman of the Board 
Eurasian Development Bank 
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Letter	of	welcome
It is a great pleasure to welcome readers to the Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook. This new volume of research and analysis aims to become an 
authoritative source of information on integration issues for academic 
researchers, university lecturers, experts, governmental and public 
organisations, businesses and indeed anyone with an interest in thriving 
economic and humanitarian cooperation in Eurasia.
The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was founded in 
October 2000 to promote and establish an institutional framework for 
economic integration in countries which are actively pursuing this goal 
– Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and, since 2006, 
Uzbekistan.
The EurAsEC is relatively new and is widely recognised as the most 
effective international structure in the post-Soviet space. Its main task is 
to foster economic integration through the creation of a free trade zone, 
a customs union and a common economic area.
To date, the EurAsEC has maintained a trade regime with no 
restrictions, customs duties or taxes on commodities produced in its 
member countries. Thanks to this regime, trade turnover in the EurAsEC 
increased by more than 3.4 times over seven years, exceeding USD 102 
billion in 2007.
Efforts to improve the investment climate and promote integration 
have also had a positive effect on the inward flow of investment capital 
in our countries. In the seven years to 2007, mutual investment between 
EurAsEC countries increased five-fold.
In response to these trends, in August 2006 the heads of the six 
member states decided to progress to the next phase of integration – the 
creation of a customs union and a common economic space. Initially, 
the customs union will comprise those countries in the vanguard of 
the integration movement, i. e., Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Other 
member countries will join them as their economies and legislation.
The EurAsEC’s remit also includes to the goals of sustainable 
economic development in each member country, environmental protection, 
transport, energy, water supply, agriculture, technological innovation, and 
cooperation in science, culture, information and humanitarian issues.
The creation of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) to finance 
integration projects is a turning point for EurAsEC, and brings with it 
the need to discuss the long-term prospects for integration. Recently, 
the Integration Committee of EurAsEC adopted a resolution granting the 
EDB observer status in the EurAsEC.
In addition to its participation in a number of important economic 
projects in EurAsEC countries, the EDB has gained experience in 
implementing research, analysis and consultation projects. It has 
Greetings
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hosted several roundtables and conferences on the problems of Eurasian 
integration and jointly organised the Astana Economic Forum and the 
founding of the Eurasian Economic Club of Scientists in June 2008.
The launch of Eurasian Integration Yearbook is without doubt a very 
significant contribution to ongoing debate surrounding integration. I 
am confident that the publication will become a much-valued source of 
information on these issues, and wish all its readers every success and 
prosperity!
Tair Mansurov
Secretary General 
Eurasian Economic Community
Greetings
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Greetings
Letter	of	welcome	
Dear friends,
The Commonwealth of Independent States has reached a stage in its 
history where we must build upon the success we have achieved in our 
cooperation and integration so far, and make this cooperation even more 
effective.
Today, all the Commonwealth’s countries are focusing their efforts on 
implementing the decisions adopted by their heads of state in Dushanbe. 
Perhaps the most important of the documents ratified there are the 
Concept for the Future Development of the CIS and the Action Plan 
for implementing the Concept. These strategic documents are aimed 
at adapting the CIS to present-day circumstances and increasing the 
efficiency of the union.
Work is under way to draft a CIS Economic Development Strategy 
until 2020, which will incorporate the 14 areas addressed in the Concept 
for the Future Development of the CIS. 
The focus of this Strategy is innovation – building a new economy 
based on our successful cooperation, and developing products and services 
for today’s world which will give Commonwealth countries a competitive 
advantage for many years to come.
The Executive Committee of the CIS welcomes the launch of Eurasian 
Integration Yearbook, a publication that will cover a wide range of issues 
relating to the Commonwealth. I hope that this outstanding volume 
will make a tangible contribution to the integration of the CIS member 
states.
With best wishes,
Sergey Lebedev
Chairman of the Executive Committee 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
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Eurasian	Economic	Integration:		
A	Global	Opportunity	for	the	21st	Century
The second half of the 20th Century saw powerful forces of global economic 
integration, led by the rapid expansion of trans-oceanic economic links 
among the major economic powers of the then “Western” world. The US 
and Europe expanded trade and capital flows across the Atlantic at an 
unprecedented speed, followed closely by the transpacific integration of the 
Japanese and South East Asian economies with the US. The developing 
countries of “South” (Africa, Latin America and South Asia) also participated 
in this process of globalization, albeit with less political influence and less 
economic success. In the meantime, the predominant powers of the “East” 
– the Soviet Union and China – faded economically and politically during 
the waning stages of the Cold War, suffering from self-imposed economic 
isolation and debilitating internal economic and political mismanagement. 
One of the key aspects of this period of globalization was that the economic 
space of the Eurasian supercontinent – stretching from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific Oceans and from the Arctic Sea to the Indian Ocean – lagged behind 
dramatically in the global economic integration process. Not only did the 
huge overland distances discourage land transport and continental trade, 
but political barriers – the Iron and Bamboo Curtains especially – and 
isolationist and dysfunctional economic policies in key countries discouraged 
the development of transcontinental transport and communications links and 
the expansion of trade and capital flows across the hard borders separating 
Eurasian neighbors.
All this began to change dramatically with the opening up of China in the 
1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. These historic 
developments meant that towards the end of the 20th Century the long-
standing barriers to economic integration and political cooperation across 
the Eurasian super-continental space started to tumble. As a result, we 
now, at the beginning of the 21st Century, see a transcontinental process 
of economic integration gather speed.  
The economic integration process is particularly rapid in the energy sector, 
as pipelines increasingly connect the oil and gas rich areas of Russia and 
the Caspian Sea Basin not only with Western Europe, but increasingly also 
with China and Japan towards the East and eventually also with Pakistan 
and India towards the South. Similarly Central Asian hydropower in the 
coming years will supply customers from Russia to China to South Asia. 
Non-energy trade between the emerging continental economies of Eurasia 
– especially China, India and Russia – is also rapidly expanding benefiting 
from and at the same time helping to support their exceptionally rapid 
growth. 
Transcontinental rail and road transport corridors are being expanded and 
upgraded providing opportunities for shipment of commodities overland and 
speeds and costs that will be increasingly competitive with the traditional, 
much longer sea routes. Rapid expansion of air traffic across Eurasia is 
proceeding at rates reminiscent of the growth of air transport across the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans in the decades after the 2nd World War. All 
parts of Eurasia are now covered by the footprint of communications 
satellites and are connected increasingly by high-speed telecommunications 
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and internet links, bringing the distant landlocked regions of Russia, China 
and Central Asia close to the hubs of commerce and knowledge everywhere 
in a way that could hardly be imagined even twenty years ago. Capital 
flows much more freely now among the countries of Eurasia, with not only 
European banks, but also Russian, Kazakh and Chinese banks investing 
across borders. China’s and Russia’s investments and aid flows are playing 
an increasing role in Central Asia. Tourism is expanding across Eurasia in 
ways that replicates the earlier waves from the US and Japan into Europe, 
as Chinese tourists begin to flock to Europe and other parts of Eurasia. At 
the same time the growing cross-continental illicit drug trade is a common 
threat to Europe, Russia, China and India and threats from the spread of 
communicable diseases, whether SARS, bird flu or HIV/AIDS are shared 
across Eurasia.
This process of Eurasian economic integration creates great opportunities 
for all countries of the super continent, and for the rest of the world, as the 
catch-up of the Eurasian integration process in overall globalization supports 
world-wide growth and as economic cooperation and prosperity in this region 
provides the basis for political stability, cooperation and peace. At the same 
time, this integration also presents challenges for governments and private 
investors. The development of infrastructure networks throughout the vast 
continental space requires huge investments as well as sustained efforts 
to maintain the infrastructure and create the regulatory and governance 
capacity that facilitates energy and non-energy trade and financial flows 
across Eurasia. Regional and sub-regional organizational structures must 
be created or strengthened to support the cooperative development of 
infrastructure and regulatory capacity, to attract the private investments 
needed and to help mediate the sometimes conflicting or competing 
interests of the many countries engaged in this historic process of economic 
integration of Eurasia.
The Eurasian Development Bank, together with other regional organizations 
in Eurasia, therefore has an important role to play in helping to create the 
economic links among businesses in Eurasia, to support investments in 
critical infrastructure, and to develop a better understanding of the role 
which economic integration plays in creating a prosperous and peaceful 
Eurasian economic and political space. I am convinced that the new 
Yearbook “Eurasian Economic Integration” will make a great contribution 
in encouraging and disseminating research on this important topic and thus 
will help create a knowledge base on which all participants in this historic 
process of the 21st Century can build.
Johannes F. Linn
Executive Director 
Wolfensohn Center for Development 
at Brookings Institute
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Introduction
The	Eurasian	Development	Bank	and	its	Mission
 The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) is an international financial 
institution with a mandate to facilitate economic growth and integration 
processes in the Eurasian region. The Bank was founded by an intergov-
ernmental agreement that was signed in January 2006. The initiative for 
establishing the Bank came from the Presidents of the Russian Federation 
and Kazakhstan. 
As a multilateral development bank, the EDB feels strongly about the 
creation of public goods. In the research sphere, we are focusing on the 
development of a wide range of research and analytical products, which 
will serve the needs of states, policy-makers, businesspeople, and expert 
society, providing them with reliable information as well as venues to 
discuss issues of economic development and integration. The Yearbook is 
just one product in the line that we offer to practitioners and researches, 
mostly in member states, but also to the global community. The EDB 
considers it a part of its mission to become a catalyst for regional in-
tegration. This function is anchored in its Charter. In particular, Article 
1 identifies the support of mutual trade and investments between Mem-
ber States as a primary objective. In pursuit of these commitments, the 
Bank not only finances projects with substantial integration impact but 
also collects and analyses data on development and economic integration 
(Article 2 and 11). 
Thus, in compliance with the Bank’s Charter, EDB research puts em-
phasis on the processes of the regional integration of its member states. 
The Bank holds conferences on the issues of regional integration twice a 
year – in spring and autumn. These conferences attract leading experts 
in the field, as well as representatives of public agencies, international 
organisations and businesses. In October 2008, the EDB started a quar-
terly ‘Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration’. This Russian-language 
journal intends to become the leading source of analytical support for 
the regional integration processes. In addition to this, the Bank has in-
troduced a series of Reports on selected countries in the post-Soviet 
space and particular industries, such as electric power, hydro- and nuclear 
power, the transport sector, aerospace, agriculture etc. Another series of 
Country Reports, focusing on the Central Asian republics, Russia, and 
other FSU countries, are currently being prepared. We also foresee the 
realisation of large research projects along the way. The first of these is 
the ‘EDB System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration’, а large-scale ap-
plied research project, which should result in the development of a valu-
able set of tools, suitable for measuring the state and dynamics of various 
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facets of regional integration. The Bank offers consulting to its clients and 
strategic partners. Administered by the Research Department, consulting 
services employs the expertise of various departments within the Bank, 
drawing on our extensive expert pool from the CIS countries.
On	the	concept	of	the	EDB	Eurasian	Integration	Yearbook
The ‘Eurasian Integration Yearbook’ publishes a wide range of articles 
and other materials on theory and practical aspects of Eurasian integra-
tion. The major part of the annual almanac consists of the English ver-
sions of selected articles published in the ‘Journal of Eurasian Economic 
Integration’ and other analytical publications of the EDB. Integration 
chronicles will supplement these for the previous years, book reviews, 
interviews etc. The Yearbook aims at improving access of the world 
community to the best articles published in the Russian language and 
providing a comprehensive and coherent view of regional integration in 
the ‘Eurasian’ area. Aside from articles published in the Journal, papers 
written specifically for the Yearbook in Russian and English languages 
are also welcome. 
 While it is largely focused on economics, the Yearbook publishes 
materials addressing a broad spectrum of urgent issues in Eurasian 
integration. This includes theories of integration, including its relevance 
to the development context; economic integration (trade, investment and 
financial institutions); institutional integration; other cooperation issues 
in the post-Soviet space as well as international experience of regional 
integration. 
We are happy to announce the formation of a reputable Advisory 
Council. The Council currently comprises twelve world-class experts on 
various integration issues from: Belgium, France, Kazakhstan, Russia, the 
U.S.A., and Ukraine. The Council will serve as a consultative body on the 
contents of the Yearbook and also on the Eurasian Development Bank’s 
research activities. 
This volume has been drafted for wide distribution among the interna-
tional community of researchers and practitioners. The book can also be 
downloaded free of charge at the EDB website.  
What	is	Eurasia?	What	is	Eurasian	economic	integration?	
What is ‘Eurasia’ in the context of ‘Eurasian integration’, as used 
widely on the pages of this volume? 
Since 1991 geographers, economists, political scientists and social sci-
entists have struggled with the terminological ambiguity concerning the 
states of the former Soviet Union. The term ‘post-Soviet space’ is largely 
used along with the ‘former Soviet Union’ (FSU). Another common-
ly used description is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
However, all of these denominators hold obvious deficiencies. To begin 
with, the former two terms are derivatives of the past, i.e. they draw on 
a non-existent political entity. Conversely, the CIS draws on an existing 
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political entity, which has only limited relevance to the politics and eco-
nomics of the region. Aside from this, all of these terms artificially bind 
the actual political and economic geography of the region. 
The straightforward solution to the problem would be to find an ap-
propriate geographical description of the territory in question. It would 
seem that, ‘Northern and Central Eurasia’ would be the closest to being 
correct. This sounds a bit awkward however, and would be far too long a 
phrase for practical use.
 In our ‘Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration’ and in the ‘Eur-
asian Integration Yearbook’ we focus predominantly on the post-Soviet 
states. When doing so, we can combine the emphasis placed on the 
internal integration process with the willingness to address any external 
integration considerations of the post-Soviet states. It is advisable to keep 
in mind what Johannes Linn, former Vice-Director for Europe and Cen-
tral Asia of the World Bank and current Executive Director of Brookings 
Institute, described as the ‘Eurasian Super-Continent’. Linn rightly points 
out that the break-up of the Soviet Union triggered the process of eco-
nomic integration on the whole Eurasian super-continent.  In the 11th to 
14th centuries Eurasia represented a relatively integrated economic space 
– undoubtedly relative to the overall levels of economic ties in other re-
gions of the world. The current geo-economic situation is favourable to 
the new round of economic integration on the Eurasian continent, this 
time in a qualitatively ‘smaller’ world. Due to its geographic location 
and national economic interests, Russia, Kazakhstan, and other FSU 
states are directly interested in Eurasian integration, which would 
spill over the tight bounds of the post-Soviet space. 
In conclusion, this Yearbook will focus on the regional integration 
processes of relevance to post-Soviet states, which means monitoring and 
analysing both internal and external developments. This is why, while be-
ing aware of the limitations, we opt for ‘Eurasia’ as a description of the 
region in question. 
What is Eurasian economic integration in the context of the volume? 
We imply a wide definition of economic integration in the sense of ad-
vanced regional economic cooperation. Functional scope is particularly 
important to us for three reasons. First, we regard it as both practical 
and suitable for the development bank to concentrate on. Second, it is 
theoretically, conceptually and statistically underresearched. Third, the 
fragmentary information for economic sectors and industries as well as 
specific issues (such as customs, rules of transit, migration, education, 
soft security etc.), which are available to Russian-speaking readers, might 
not be as readily available for the global English-speaking audience. The 
‘Eurasian Integration Yearbook’ is there to partially fill this gap. 
About	the	contents
The Yearbook’s contents comprise introduction, full-scale papers and 
reports as well as a regional integration chronicle and a number of supple-
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mentary materials. The core of the Yearbook is composed of seven papers 
and two reports, grouped into four sections. 
The first part is entitled ‘Institutional Integration’. It contains 
analysis of the institutional issues of regional integration in the post-
Soviet space. Chapter 2, written by Aleksandr Libman, ‘The Sustainabil-
ity of Regional Integration Projects in the Post-Soviet Space’, looks at 
the sustainability of integration groupings. Counterfactual analysis of the 
concept of integration as the regional union for EurAsEC shows that the 
size of this group is close to (but nevertheless higher than) its sustain-
able optimum considering quality of governance, and below the optimum 
in terms of economic development. Nevertheless, EurAsEC is closer to 
its sustainable size (in terms of the quality of governance) than all other 
integration projects in the former Soviet Union. 
 Following on from this is a discussion on the ‘The EurAsEC Integra-
tion: Opportunities and Obstacles’, written by Michail Golovnin. In the 
medium term, the creation of a customs union will play a key role in 
encouraging formal integration in the EurAsEC. It will face impediments 
that are both objective (disparities in the structure of member country 
economies) and political in origin (for instance, Russia’s self-serving ap-
proach fails to create attractive opportunities for partners prepared to 
make concessions from their side). The most likely basis for a customs 
union at the moment is the SES-3 (three countries of the Single Eco-
nomic Space – Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus); however, some major 
challenges continue to affect this association too. Golovnin comes to the 
conclusion that the potential for further integration is constrained by the 
need to coordinate many aspects of hugely varying national economic 
policies.
 The financial sector holds the most promise for further cooperation in 
the EurAsEC. It is linked neither with the troubles of the fuel and energy, 
nor with the inefficiencies of machine-building industry inherited from 
the Soviet economic system. Corporate integration between Russia and 
Kazakhstan can be strengthened through the expansion of their financial 
institutions into one another’s markets. Like Libman in Chapter 2, Go-
lovnin points out the crucial issue of Russia-Kazakhstan ties. These two 
champions of financial services development could share their experience 
with others to facilitate the development of banking systems and financial 
markets in other EurAsEC member-states. It would be expedient, there-
fore, to initiate a joint pilot project on development of a selected segment 
of financial markets of EurAsEC member states. Development of the 
corporate bonds market appears to offer the most potential. 
The next section, ’Economic Integration: Industries, Sectors, 
Issues‘, contains four papers, which look into various specific fields where 
the potential of integration might be revealed and realized – machine-
building, common electricity markets, financial integration, and transbor-
der cooperation. This part is indeed central to the Yearbook, as certain 
functional issues are both underresearched and promising in terms of real 
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economic gains. We intend to continue to emphasise functional integra-
tion in specific industries and sectors in future Yearbooks. 
 In Chapter 4, Yuriy Shishkov assesses an often-overlooked handicap 
pertaining to the efficiency of the CIS machinery sector –insufficient co-
operation between the CIS machine-building industry and their more ad-
vanced foreign partners. Drawing on foreign experience, Shishkov clings 
to the possibility of a technological leap in the sector, which can be based 
on a deeper economic cooperation. International cooperation, in particular 
within the CIS where there is a long history of strong mutual depen-
dence, would harmonise technical standards between countries, expand 
international scientific and technical cooperation, and reduce disparities 
in the legal regulation of economic relations in this sphere. In successfully 
integrated organisations (the EU, NAFTA and others) the intermediate 
machine-building sector in member countries exports 50-100% more than 
in the CIS, where a rapid contraction of exports threatens to dismantle 
the industrial foundations of integration.
The Yearbook continues with Chapter 5 by Leonid Vardomskiy, ‘Trans-
border Cooperation on the ‘new’ and ‘old’ Russian Borders’. Prospects of 
transborder cooperation of Russia with its CIS neighbours depend on 
whether it will manage to contain the ‘barrier function’ of its new bor-
ders. Vardomskiy concludes that the security factor still prevails over the 
cooperation factor. Also, the economic effects of transborder cooperation 
are insufficiently studied, thus the picture of potential gains is distorted. 
When there is more data and research on economic effects, a more bal-
anced decision-making on border policies and transborder cooperation will 
become feasible. 
Chapter 6 by Evgeny Vinokurov, ‘The CIS Common Electricity Mar-
ket’, starts with a detailed analysis of mutual trade and investments in 
the sector. As it turns out, trade has stagnated over the last few years, 
as economic growth dampens exports. Investments are one-sided, as only 
Russia invests abroad in energy generation and distribution. Vinokurov 
subsequently concludes that both trade and investment statistics are low 
and inadequate to the potential of the sector. After looking into both 
the CIS and EurAsEC initiatives, the paper argues that energy markets, 
i.e. hydrocarbons, coal, electric power, and uranium, should be treated 
and regulated as separate markets for the sake of functional integration. 
This does not preclude the need to work on the common fuel balance. 
Vinokurov further analyses barriers on the road to the common electricity 
market and singles out the unfinished liberalisation of the key CIS power 
market in Russia. Overall, although integration of electricity markets 
depends on the institutional structures, it can be feasible even with state 
monopolies dominating generation and distribution. Finally, the exciting 
prospects of enlarging the CIS Common Electricity Market are briefly 
outlined. The economic logic of electricity trade pushes the CIS countries 
toward establishing sub-regional common markets with other key mar-
kets of the broader Eurasia, for example the EU, China, India, Pakistan, 
Iran, and Turkey. Virtually all CIS countries would gain substantially if 
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real mechanisms of transborder trade are established both at the material, 
technological, and regulatory levels. 
Anna Abalkina starts her chapter, ‘Preconditions and Prospects for 
Banking Integration in the EurAsEC’ by pointing out that regional eco-
nomic integration in the EurAsEC countries is increasingly considered in 
terms of cooperation in trade and investment. Much less attention is paid 
to the activities of the banking intermediaries that fund these operations. 
Abalkina delves into the most interesting, yet not sufficiently explored, 
world of financial integration, focusing on banks. (A parallel can be drawn 
with Chapter 3 by Golovnin, which states that the financial sector holds 
the most promise for further cooperation in the EurAsEC). She analysed 
a number of indicators, including the share of foreign assets and capi-
tal owned by the CIS banks. Apparently we are witnesses of a wave of 
transactions between banks that leads the way to the formation of several 
CIS banking groups. Notably, Kazakh and Russian banks are particularly 
fervent in their pursuit to expand across the CIS. 
On an institutional level, Abalkina argues for a ‘stable, rather than a 
single’ financial market in the EurAsEC member countries. EurAsEC and 
CIS countries could look into experience of Asia Pacific countries, which 
chose to reduce the role of foreign credit by developing a regional bond 
market which is less exposed to global crises. In other words, the creation 
of a formal common financial services market may be premature at the 
moment. It would be more beneficial to take steps to increase stability 
within national financial systems, to increase their capitalisation and to 
develop a regional credit market.
The next section ‘Measuring Regional Integration and Economic 
Development’ features only one paper, written by Uljana Agibetova and 
Ivan Samson. This section has been deliberately singled out, as we will 
put signifcant emphasis on the issue of the measurement and assessment 
of integration in the future. One example of this is a large-scale research 
project entitled: ‘System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration’, which 
was initiated by the EDB Strategy and Research Department. Chapter 
8, entitled: ‘The Metropolisation of the FSU Area: Temptative Measure-
ment through the Method of Hyperlinks Notoriety’, delves into the mea-
surement of certain cities’ metropolisation in the post-Soviet space. The 
chapter starts with the question: “Does the FSU run patterns of Western 
metropolisation or it is a specific model marked by the historical legacy 
that emerges in the post-communist world?” In an attempt to answer this 
question, the paper starts with the presentation of the tools of observa-
tion and the measurement of studied processes, and then develops the 
analysis and the interpretation of results. Historically, the Soviet urban 
world has been built on other spatial principles than the Western ones, 
and its legacy is reflected through the existence of large industrial cities 
networks. Today the FSU still manifests itself as a space of mono-polar 
territorial activity, where Moscow is the only city recognised as a global 
city. However, this territory, being the largest in the world, can no longer 
operate from a single global city. The measurement of cities’ metropolisa-
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tion is not a simple task, especially in the post-Soviet context. The au-
thors set up a method of measuring metropolisation through the number 
of hyperlinks in Internet search engines. 
The next part of the volume, ‘EDB Reports’, logically relates to the 
collection of papers described above. EDB Industry Reports is a series 
that aims to provide in-depth analysis on sectors with substantial inte-
gration potential. These sectors notably include power generation and 
distribution, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, aerospace, and 
finance. In this Yearbook we present two EDB Reports, ‘Nuclear Energy 
Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan: Prospects for Development and 
Cooperation’ and ‘Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia: Develop-
ment and Utilisation Issues’. These reports represent case studies of two 
sectors with critical consequences for the regional integration. 
In particular, the first report deals with the growing cooperation be-
tween Russian and Kazakh nuclear sectors. Kazakh uranium has become 
a focus of attention and fierce competition between the world’s largest 
consumers, including France, Canada, USA, Japan, China, South Korea, 
and Russia. Early this decade, Russia’s substantial production capacity 
and highly competitive uranium ore conversion technologies added to 
calls for the country to renew its economic links with Kazakhstan in 
the uranium mining and nuclear industries. Given Russia’s ambitious 
plans to develop nuclear energy, and the fact that its uranium stocks are 
practically depleted, the benefits of closer cooperation with Kazakhstan 
are clear. However, Russia will have to compete with other players for 
Kazakhstan’s uranium market. The need to integrate the nuclear power 
complexes of Kazakhstan and Russia along the entire production chain is 
a logical response to their urgent need to reduce their energy deficit, and 
to increase the synergies which exist between their production capaci-
ties and technologies at each stage of the nuclear fuel production chain: 
uranium mining, uranium enrichment, production of fuel pellets and fuel 
elements, reactor design and production, the construction and operation 
of nuclear power plants, and nuclear waste processing and disposal. The 
first steps in these directions were undertaken through the act of join-
ing forces and assets in three Russian-Kazakh joint ventures (extraction, 
enrichment, and nuclear reactors). 
 The second Report looks into the most complex issue of interstate co-
operation and conflict in Central Asia: the water and energy nexus. Water 
is vital for Central Asian countries, and coordinating the shared utilisa-
tion of water is problematic to say the least as Central Asian countries 
are closely interdependent in their water utilisation. Most of the water 
in the Aral Sea Basin is from upstream river waters, whereas in Kazakh-
stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan water is mostly used for irrigation 
in downstream areas. Competing demands for water in the region have 
considerably exceeded supply for a long time. In the future, water short-
ages will only worsen in Central Asia because of the growing population, 
the development of industrial and agrarian production and the expansion 
of irrigation. In such circumstances, regulation of the hydrological models 
of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya is becoming critically important. 
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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have vast hydro-energy capacity, but heav-
ily depend on the supply of hydrocarbons from other countries in the 
region. During winter 2008, public electricity and heating was completely 
cut off in Tajikistan; production of aluminum at the Tajik aluminum plant, 
the country’s main source of foreign currency, fell dramatically.
Resolving the issues of shared utilisation of water and power resources 
in Central Asia has huge economic, ecological, political and international 
importance, as it is a major factor in preserving stability, economic pros-
perity and ecological security in the region. The most important issues in 
this regard are the management of water and energy resources and lever-
age of significant long-term investments in hydro-energy projects.
The last part of the Yearbook, ‘Chronicles, Digests and Book 
Reviews’, presents the Regional Integration Chronicle. The Chronicle 
serves the particular purpose of providing our readers with structured in-
formation on integration events throughout 2007. The first section of the 
Chronicle is grouped around institutional integration and covers, among 
other issues, the CIS, the EurAsEC, the SCO, and Russia-Belarus Union. 
The second section covers various sectors and issues, in particular inte-
gration initiatives in customs and transit, migration, energy, transport 
corridors, and education. 
It is supplemented by the review of ‘Activities of Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks’ in the region, written by Natalia Maqsimchook of EDB. You 
will also find information on the Round Tables conducted by the Eurasian 
Development Bank in November 2007 and May 2008 as well as a book 
review of the recent monograph by B. Kheifets and A. Libman on corpo-
rate integration in the post-Soviet space. 
We intend to continue publishing structured chronicles and reviews in 
the next Yearbooks, thus providing the global audience with a coherent 
and dynamic picture of Eurasian integration and economic development. 
Overall, the Yearbook intends to provide a dynamic overview of inte-
gration processes in the post-Soviet ‘Eurasian’ space and the challenges 
to which the Northern and Central Eurasian states will have to provide 
adequate responses. I genuinely hope that the EDB Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook will become a reliable companion to those studying regional 
integration. 
 I would particularly like to thank Vladimir Yasinskiy, head of Stra-
tegy  and Research Department at the EDB, for solid support and encour-
agement along the way. For exceptional assistance I am very grateful 
to Natalia Maqsimchook, a thoughtful, energetic and hard-working col-
league at the EDB Strategy and Research Department. Our permanent 
partner, publishing company ‘Ruan’, was most instrumental in providing 
professional services needed to produce this volume. 
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The Sustainability of Regional 
Integration Projects  
in the Post-Soviet Space
Alexandr 
Libman
The sustainability of integration groupings is extremely important 
in the selection of the most workable regional integration schemes. 
Quantitative analysis shows that of all integration projects in the 
former Soviet Union the EurAsEC-6 is closest to being what is 
considered a “sustainable size”. This stable integration structure is 
based on close cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Integration projects, which are being pursued in many parts of the 
world, emerge as the result of negotiations and coordination between 
various actors – both state (members and non-members of an integration 
group) and nongovernmental. This raises the question of when an emerging 
structure becomes relatively more sustainable, i.e. less susceptible to 
disintegration. Of all the factors influencing the sustainability of an 
integration project, its size must play an important role. It appears 
that, in terms of size, sustainability has both upper and lower limits 
(i.e., groupings are unsustainable if they become too large, but they can 
also be too small to survive). Small groupings are thus susceptible to 
practically unopposed “takeover” by their larger neighbours. Extremely 
large groupings face the constant threat of losing member countries.
Analysis of what constitutes a sustainable size for an integration 
grouping may be carried out from two angles. We may choose as 
our starting point the traditional understanding of regional economic 
integration, i.e., the creation of an international union between several 
countries. In this case its sustainable size may correlate to the number 
of countries of an integration grouping or to the size of its population. 
The latter approach may be the more useful, bearing in mind that the 
diversity within member countries may mean that their internal stability 
cannot be assumed. The second approach views an integration project 
as a network of agreements and accords reached by several regional 
countries. This approach is more flexible and to a greater extent reflects 
the reality of open regionalism models and tiered integration. In this case, 
when referring to the sustainable structure of an integration project, we 
define precisely which configuration of the framework of agreements is 
the most viable.
This article analyses the factors which influence the optimal size 
of an integration project and attempts to apply its conclusions to the 
former Soviet Union, in particular, the EurAsEC. We employ quantitative 
analysis techniques which generate unambiguous and non-contradictory 
results with regard to the sustainable size and structure of integration 
associations.
Institutional	Integration
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Factors	Influencing	the	Sustainable	Size	and	Structure	of	an	
Integration	Association
When considering integration as an international union, the 
sustainable size of an integration grouping is defined by the outcome of 
interaction between two “markets” operating in the region’s political and 
economic system. The first market is the “interstate political market” 
which involves transaction between countries. The second market is 
the “market of institutions and economic policies”, in which private 
structures (corporations and citizens) operate, creating demand for certain 
institutional schemes which states offer. Specific mechanisms include 
participation in political life, lobbying or “voting with feet” facilitated by, 
among other factors, the mobility of the means of productions. Under this 
scheme, a sustainable integration grouping should meet two requirements: 
it must be attractive to the states involved in it and generate positive 
economic benefits to private structures.
The stability of an integration grouping is influenced most of all by the 
diversity of its members. If members of an integration group are alike 
and their populations and elite groups display a certain homogeneity, 
these structures seem to be less susceptible to disintegration. Excessive 
diversity threatens consensus among members of a grouping on the 
common integration conditions and increases the time spent in negotiation 
and coordination1. In other words, diversity increases the “cost” of deals 
on the “interstate political market”, thereby reducing the attractiveness 
of integration. Diversity is defined by several component factors, for 
example, ethno-linguistic fractionalism; the circumstances of historical 
development and peculiarities of institutional systems; differences 
in living standards and the educational attainment of the population; 
and urbanisation. Where there is extreme diversity of preference, even 
efficient integration groupings (i. e., structures where the prosperity of 
all member countries is generally improved through integration) may 
become unsustainable2.
Another parameter defining the sustainability of an integration 
association is the efficiency of its institutional environment and 
management of the public benefits it makes available to all countries, 
such as reciprocal trade, security or a shared infrastructure. In other 
words, improving the efficiency of an integration grouping increases 
its sustainable size. This is especially related to the common benefits 
produced by integration groups. These influence the “market of 
institutions and economic policies”, improving the quality of the benefits 
states offer to private structures, thereby increasing their willingness to 
“pay” for these benefits. All other conditions being equal, the effective 
management of an integration grouping is directly related to the efficacy 
of governance within member countries. High quality governance in all 
1 Ruta M. (2005) Economic Theories of Political (Dis)Integration. Journal of Economic Surveys, 
Vol. 19.
2 Haimanko O., Le Breton M., Weber S. (2005) Transfers in a Polarized Country: Bridging the 
Gap between Efficiency and Stability. European Economic Review, Vol. 89.
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states involved in an integration union does not guarantee the efficiency 
of its supranational bodies or of the negotiations which establish the 
basis of the integration grouping. However, in the absence of efficient 
interstate institutions, it is unrealistic to expect partners to formulate 
efficient interstate regulation. Indeed, efficiency of government reduces 
the “technical” costs of holding international negotiations, the importance 
of which should not be underestimated.
A problem arises because of the contradictory influences of diversity 
and efficiency. A grouping of highly diverse member states will, as stated 
above, have a smaller optimal size. Its very diversity, however, may 
ultimately boost the efficiency of its operation. Thus an increase in the cost 
of transactions on the “interstate political market” increases the benefits 
available on the “market of institutions and economic policies”. Indeed, 
an evolutionary approach to economic policy supposes that diversity in 
integration is a form of “capital” and establishes the conditions for the 
evolutionary, competitive processes of knowledge generation, innovation 
and dynamic development. Furthermore, this diversity of preferences is 
not a static phenomenon but is generated by a dynamic development 
process in which transactions on the “interstate political market” play an 
important role3.
It is apparent that an evaluation of the situation will depend on the 
general level of governance within the group. Relatively more advanced 
institutions, which incorporate the preferences and reciprocity of different 
groups, cope better with diversity issues and exploit their creative energy 
(in the terminology of a new, comparative economic theory, they are 
located on a higher “curve of institutional possibilities”). Less developed 
institutional systems are more susceptible to this problem and are obliged 
to find a compromise between diversity and the advantages of integration. 
This conclusion reinforces the importance of efficient decision-making to 
the sustainability of a regional structure. For example, in the case of EU 
expansion, the diversity of preference, though important, plays much less 
of a role than the ability of EU bodies to adopt decisions at minimum 
cost4. If we consider time spent on decision-making, the potential for 
unilateral obstacles to be placed before an integration group’s member 
countries and non-egalitarian access to information supplied by various 
regions become much more significant. In the situation of non-egalitarian 
access to information, the method of its collection is also fundamentally 
important5.
The “sustainable size” of the integration group also depends on its 
member countries’ level of economic development. Economic development 
3 Herrmann-Pillath C. 2006  Heterogenität, Wachstum von Staaten und wissensschaffender 
politischer Wettbewerb. In: Vollmer U. (Hrsg.) Oekonomische und politische Grenzen von 
Wirtschaftsräumen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
4 Apolte Th. (2006) Gibt es eine optimale Grösse der Europäischen Union? In: Vollmer U. (Hrsg.). 
Oekonomische und politische Grenzen von Wirtschaftsräumen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
5 Behm M., Grüner H.P. (2002) Electoral College, Popular Vote and Regional Information. 
Mimeo.
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directly influences the development of “markets of institutions and economic 
policies”, determining the behaviour of participants. In economic theory 
there is no generally accepted explanation of the link between economic 
development and the optimal size of an integration group. According to 
some estimates, the link between economic development and integration 
follows a U-shaped curve: early on, integration formations encourage 
efficient economic growth, but once a certain level of development is 
reached, countries are capable of generating similar advantages without 
the need for formal integration structures created at the expense of 
their own “coping strategy”6. Other experts proceed from the existing 
linear link between economic development and inclination to integration7. 
However, the results of negotiation between states (on the “interstate 
political market”) may significantly alter results.
Naturally, this is not an exhaustive list of the factors which influence 
the sustainability of an integration project. For example, the scale of 
economic liberalisation in the global economy as a whole plays a 
significant role. Obviously, in order to be sustainable, an integration 
grouping should maintain the optimal size of its internal market, and 
take advantage of economies of scale. However, given that the regulation 
of global trade is relatively liberal (thanks to the WTO and other world 
organisations) the sustainable size of integration groups is getting 
smaller8. Indeed, domestic economic entities can benefit from access to 
each other’s markets without the need for complex inter-governmental 
negotiations. A reduction in the sustainable size of an integration group 
is thus brought about by changes in the “market of institutions and 
economic policies”, whose participants refuse to pay the costs exacted by 
the “interstate political market”.
There are more complex factors at work here, however. In particular, 
the global trade environment and the structure adopted by regional 
integration groups are defined by the same processes9; it is extremely 
difficult, therefore, to establish cause and effect between them. Former 
Soviet countries, for example, pursued regional integration and integration 
into the global economy in parallel. In addition, the global trade regime 
is itself created not only by the efforts of global organisations but also by 
numerous overlapping regional agreements which are increasingly based 
on the principle of “open regionalism” (and which have given rise to the 
concept of “integration by network” which is discussed below)10.
6 Casella A., Feinstein J.S. (2002) Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and 
Jurisdictions. International Economic Review, Vol. 43.
7 Bolton P., Roland G., Spolaore E. (1996) Economic Theories of the Break-Up and Integration of 
Nations. European Economic Review, Vol. 40.
8 Alesina A., Wacziarg R. (1999) Is Europe Going too Far? Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy, Vol. 51.
9 Etro F. (2006) Political Geography. Public Choice, Vol. 127; Blankart C.B., Koester G. (2006) 
Political Economics versus Public Choice: Two Views of Political Economy in Competition. Kyk-
los, Vol. 59.
10 Baldwin R. (2006) Multilaterising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocks on the 
Path to Global Free Trade. NBER Working Paper 12545, September.
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One important factor which influences “sustainable size” is the conflict 
of laws, i.e., the competition between states for mobile means of production. 
The conflict of laws affects the structure of regional integration in three 
ways. Firstly, it stimulates the desire for harmonised economic policy 
as a means of alleviating competitive pressures within the tax and legal 
regimes11. It also encourages the “joy-rider” phenomenon, whereby the 
violation of established harmonisation agreements has a disproportionate 
effect on the competition of jurisdictions. In addition, conflict of laws 
at the expense of ex post harmonisation reduces transaction costs on 
the “interstate political market”, creating the optimum conditions for 
negotiation. Finally, from the point of view of demand for integration 
projects in the “market of institutions and economic policies”, the conflict 
of laws makes “voting with the feet” relatively more attractive and reduces 
active opposition to the creation of an integration group, thus limiting the 
impact of the diversity of preferences12.
Finally, it is important in this analysis to discuss corporate integration 
(regionalisation), i.e., cooperation between states without the creation 
of formal international unions. There are numerous examples regional 
cooperation in the world, where formal integration trails some distance 
behind the development of informal economic cooperation. A classic example 
of this is the Asia-Pacific, where, in the absence of formal cooperation, 
Japanese multinational production chains and informal networks in the 
Chinese diaspora become vectors of regionalisation (i.e. formal deals on 
the interstate political market). Approaches to regionalisation may differ 
widely, depending on the degree to which a “shared identity” exists in the 
region’s countries and on the extent of their economic interdependence13. 
Regionalisation may reduce the cost of coordinating a common policy 
and encourage the formation of integration associations (thanks to the 
emergence of shared identity and intensification of the conflict of laws). 
The reaction of private structures is mixed: in some cases their desire for 
formal association increases, while in other cases the situation is more 
complicated (especially where there is a switch from negative integration, 
which culminates in the abolition of market barriers – to positive 
integration, which works towards the creation of common institutions). 
In countries where leading private structures pursue expansion into 
neighbouring markets, experience shows that there is a clear, positive 
link between regionalisation and formal integration (for example, NAFTA 
and integration projects involving the USA and Central America)14.
Analysis of integration by network is a relatively new area of 
research and findings relating to the sustainability of regional network 
11 Whincop J., Keyes M. (2001) Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws. Aldershot.
12 Olofsgard A. (2003) Incentives of Secession in the Presence of Mobile Ethnic Groups. Journal 
of Public Economics, Vol. 87.
13 Mattlin M. (2005) Structural and Institutional Integration: Asymmetric Integration and Sym-
metry Tendencies. Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40, No. 4.
14 Cox R.W. (1999) Explaining Business Support for Regional Trade Agreements // Frieden 
J.A., Lake D. (eds.): International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 
Taylor & Francis.
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agreements are limited15. Academic literature pays greater attention 
to the homogeneity or symmetry of countries. As far as it is possible 
to judge, sustainable integration cooperation networks are formed by 
relatively “similar” countries16, these similarities existing mainly in 
their institutional systems. Similarity of institutional environment 
reduces transaction costs, making business operations in such countries 
more attractive to commercial bodies. In addition, the “similarity” of 
institutional systems facilitates the identification of policies which are 
shared by the integration group’s member countries, reducing the effort 
required to uncover “shared” rules and institutions and adapt national 
policy to common standards.
Greater diversity between countries increases the scale of inter-
sectoral trade between them and makes integration more attractive. 
Generally speaking, many modern integration groups (in particular, most 
North-North projects) are based on intra-sectoral trade with relatively 
similar states. However, in North-South integration inter-sectoral trade 
plays a key role17. It is important here to distinguish between diversity 
of economic structure and diversity of economic institutions – the 
former allows economies to complement one another, while the latter, 
on the contrary, complicates integration. However, it is the economic 
institutions which define a country’s economic structure, and it is very 
likely, therefore, that countries with similar institutional systems develop 
similar economic structures. Empirical studies have in fact confirmed 
the link between sustainability, institutional homogeneity and successful 
integration18. The complementarity of foreign trade structures is also 
used in analysis of the sustainability of integration networks. Empirical 
calculations in this field have been carried out for CIS countries19.
It is important to stress that, from the point of view of integration, 
it is the homogeneity of institutional systems as a whole that is 
definitive, rather than individual institutions. Institutions themselves seek 
complementarity, creating sustainable systems in which individual rules 
and norms, both official and unofficial, are interlinked. This tendency 
poses further problems for quantitative analysis.
15 Furasawa T., Konishi H. (2007) Free Trade Networks. Journal of International Economics, 
2007, Vol. 72; Furusawa T., Konishi H. (2005) Free Trade Networks with Transfers. Japanese 
Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 2; Goyal S., Joshi S.(2006) Bilateralism and Free Trade. Interna-
tional Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 3; Mauleon A., Song H., Vannetelbosch V. (2006) Networks 
of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries. DP 2006-29 U Louvain Department 
of Economics.
16 Das S.P., Ghosh S. (2006) Endogenous Trading Bloc Formation in a North-South Global 
Economy. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3.
17 Borrmann A. (1997) Interregionale Integration von Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern. 
HWWA-Diskussionspapier Nr. 45.
18 Feng Y., Genna G. (2004) Domestic Institutional Convergence and Regional Integration: Fur-
ther Evidence. In: Salavrakos I.D. (ed.) Aspects of Globalization, Regionalisation and Business. 
Athens: ATINER.
19 Plekhanov D. (2005) Prospects for Development of Mutual Trade in SES. Ekonomicheskoye 
Obozreniye EEP, No. 2.
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Assessing	the	Sustainable	Size	of	Integration	Projects	in	the	
Post-Soviet	Space
Integration in the Form of International Union20
Let us begin by defining the optimal size of regional integration 
projects in the post-Soviet space where this concerns integration by 
international union. From the theoretical discussion above we conclude 
that improvements in the quality of governance within an integration 
grouping should encourage its growth by improving national aptitudes 
for coping with diversity. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that 
the quality of supranational institutions is a function of the quality of 
governance in individual member countries. This simplistic (but, we think, 
quite realistic) supposition allows us to conduct quantitative analysis of 
sustainability relating to the size of an integration grouping.
The sample group includes the 17 regional integration unions listed 
in a study by the European Central Bank in 200421. This list covers 
practically all institution-based integration associations in the world. 
To determine the size of an integration group we take the combined 
populations of all its member countries in 2007 according to the US 
Census Bureau. To indicate the quality of governance we take the average 
of six Quality of Governance indices published by the World Bank in 
2005. These indices are: the stability of the political system; the quality 
of economic policy; stage of development of a lawful state; the scale of 
corruption; the government’s accountability to citizens; and the quality 
of state administration. In order to define the quality of governance in 
regional integration group we calculate the average of indices for all the 
member countries.
A summary of the data obtained is shown on Figure 1. The data 
show that there is indeed a link between population size and the quality 
of governance: regions in which the quality of governance is higher 
create bigger integration unions (solid line). However, this relationship 
is quite weak (there is a correlation of about 30%), which is attributed 
to the inclusion of integration groups in the Caribbean basin (ECCU and 
Caricom), which have small populations but enjoy high-quality governance. 
It is notable that this region is very fragmented and that great number of 
countries participate in integration groupings in this region. If we limit 
our analysis to nine integration groupings with a combined population of 
over 100 million people (the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, ASEAN, the Andean 
Community of Nations, Africa’s SADC, Ecowas and ECCAS and the 
Middle East’s PAFTA), their interdependency becomes more sustainable 
(dashed line). The coefficient of correlation reaches about 65% in this 
20 This chapter is based on a joint work of the author of this article with Dr of Economy L. Zevin 
(Institute of Economics, the Russian Academy of Sciences). This issue is studied in detail in 
Zevin L., Libman A. Optimal Economic Space: Problems of Size. Mir Peremen, No. 4.
21 ECB Monthly Bulletin, 2004, October.
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case. For a paired regression analysis (the least-squares method) quality 
of governance is signal where the population of integration groupings 
changes by just 1%.
The results of the above analysis raises the question of whether or not 
it is possible to identify a “counterfactual” sustainable population size 
of an integration grouping based on the quality of its governance? This 
question is of great interest because of its relevance to the development 
of the post-Soviet space. The CIS has numerous regional and sub-regional 
integration structures. Should integration groups which include these 
countries target a sustainable population size based on the quality of 
governance in them, namely their ability to adjust to growing diversity 
and the efficiency of their decision-making? In order to define this indicator 
we calculated the average level of governance in post-Soviet groupings 
(using the approach outlined above) and employed it in a regression 
analysis of nine blocs with a population of over 100 million people. This 
procedure yielded a counterfactual indicator of sustainable population size 
for the countries in question.
We include four integration projects in our analysis: the CIS (where 
the mean level of governance is -0.86), the Single Economic Space (SES-
4, i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus: -0.71), the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC-6: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: -1.01) and EurAsEC-3 (Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan: -0.81). SES-4 is now a somewhat theoretical 
entity, but we have included it in our analysis to allow for the possible 
involvement of Ukraine in integration processes. EurAsEC’s indicator is far 
lower because the majority of its members are countries with a relatively 
low quality of governance. The counterfactual optimal populations of 
the relevant groupings calculated using the procedure described above 
are 218.5 million, 239.5 million, 225.5 million and 197.4 million people. 
The actual populations of these groupings in 2007, according to the US 
Census Bureau, were 278 million, 212.7 million, 206.6 million and 160.8 
million.
A similar analysis was carried out using the function of GDP per capita 
(purchasing power parity) as an indicator of the degree of development 
and the size of an integration group. As previously stated, this parameter 
is the subject of theoretical debate. Due to the limited sample size we 
have examined only linear dependence: (improved levels of development 
increasing the “sustainable size” of an integration grouping). We used 
the same sample, and took the CIA Factbook (2006) as the source of 
information on GDP per capita. For each integration grouping, GDP 
per capita was calculated using the average GDP of individual countries 
(Figure 2).
The graph shows that there is a linear relationship for all groups 
except the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – an association of Gulf 
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countries with small populations but which have substantial GDP due 
to their significant energy resources. All other regions fall into a linear 
dependence; the correlation coefficient is 42% for all groups and 62% 
for groups with a combined population of over 100 million people. In a 
paired regression, GDP is significant at 1% (for groups with a population 
of 100 million people) and 10% (for all groups). From regression analysis 
aimed at estimating the U-shaped dependence (which includes GDP per 
capita and squared GDP per capita as clarifying variables), all regressors 
are negligible.
Assessments of the counterfactual populations of the CIS, EurAsEC-3, 
EurAsEC-6 and SES-4 (GDP per capita is $5,775; $9,900; $5,717; and 
$9,150 respectively) calculated based on groups with a population of over 
100 million people are 256.2 million people, 297.6 million people, 255.6 
million people and 290.1 million people respectively.
We would stress that the proximity of results obtained to conclusions 
drawn on the basis of assessments of the efficiency of governance are 
unsurprising when we take into account the high correlation between 
GDP and the quality of institutions.
Figure	2.1  
The link between the 
quality of governance 
and the population of an 
integration group
Source: compiled by  
the author
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Aggregated results are shown on Figure 3. It is clear that, based on 
the criterion of the quality of governance, of all the integration groups, 
EurAsEC-6 is closest to its sustainable size. We can disregard the 
deviation, although the group is somewhat larger than its sustainable 
level. From the point of view of economic development, the EurAsEC 
indicator is significantly lower than its counterfactual sustainable size 
(which is less critical, however, than it being larger than its sustainable 
size, we deduce based on the aforementioned theoretical logic), but it is 
nevertheless closer to the counterfactual size than all other groups except 
for the CIS. The CIS is a little larger than its sustainable size, especially 
in terms of the quality of governance, which could call into question the 
group’s ability to contend with inequality and thus to preserve stability. 
SES-4 and EurAsEC-3 are significantly below their sustainable size.
Figure	2.2  
The link between GDP 
per capita and the size 
of population of an 
integration group
Source: compiled  
by the author
Figure	2.	3  
Deviation of 
counterfactual size from 
actual size, % (+ means 
the counterfactual size 
is larger than the actual 
size; – means than it is 
smaller)
Source: compiled  
by the author
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Integration as a Network
The most practical method of studying the comparative institutional 
inequality of countries is hierarchal cluster analysis – a way of grouping 
objects which are characterised by a vector of features according to their 
“similarity” as defined by an algorithm applied beforehand22. In this 
analysis we consider both structural and institutional characteristics of 
CIS countries. Structural characteristics are defined by the following 
13 indicators: (1) GDP per capita (as a percentage of the average CIS 
level); (2) industrial output per capita (as a percentage of the average 
CIS level); (3) agricultural output per capita (as a percentage of the 
average CIS level); (4) retail trade spend per capita (as a percentage 
of the average CIS level); (5) foreign trade per capita (as a percentage 
of the average CIS level); (6) gross fixed capital to GDP, in percentage 
terms (as an indicator of investment); (7) manufacturing industry’s share 
of gross value added; (8) services’ share of gross value added; (9) the 
mining sector’s share in industrial production; (10) the proportion of the 
population aged under 14; (11) the proportion of the population aged 
over 65; (12) unemployment as a percentage of the labour force; and 
(13) average annual population growth. The CIS Interstate Statistics 
Committee’s data for 2005 were the primary source for this analysis. We 
use four indices to define institutional systems (data for the latest year 
available): the index of structural reforms published by the European 
Bank for Development and Reconstruction; the World Bank index of the 
quality of governance, mentioned in the previous chapter; the Heritage 
Foundation index of economic freedom; and the Freedom House index 
of political freedom. Where the relevant organisations publish several 
indices, we used the arithmetic average of these indices. All indices were 
recalculated to allow their highest value to correspond to the relatively 
higher quality of institutions.
The results of the hierarchal cluster analysis of the economic and 
social structure of the post-Soviet countries are shown on Figure 4a. 
The data show that CIS countries fall into two groups. The first group 
includes Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which, our analysis shows, 
have relatively similar socio-economic structures. The second group 
includes other CIS countries. Some clusters comprise countries that are 
located geographically close to one another (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) 
or countries of similar size (Armenia and Moldova). In this case, there is 
clearly a “nucleus” of major countries: Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
(EurAsEC-3), which have similar economic structures.
The situation is different if we take the institutional systems of CIS 
countries as a basis for the hierarchal cluster analysis. The results of this 
cluster analysis are shown on Figure 4b. As in the previous analysis, CIS 
countries fall into two clear clusters. The first cluster incorporates two 
22 Methodological commentary on cluster analysis is given in: Libman A. (2007) Closest Neigh-
bours: Cluster Institutions of Economic Development and Integration Prospects in Post-Soviet 
Space // Information and Analytical Bulletin of the Centre for Problems of Globalisation and 
Integration of the Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, No 3.
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“post-colour revolution countries” (Georgia and Ukraine) and Moldova. 
This group corresponds the least to the economic and political institutional 
model established in the CIS. The second group comprises the other CIS 
countries, including politically similar ones, although it divides into three 
sub-groups. The first of these (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) includes countries 
with a relatively liberal economic regime: Armenia is, according to most 
evaluations, a clear in the CIS in terms of its economic institutions, 
while Kyrgyzstan has also been successful in consistently pursuing a 
policy of liberal reform. Another cluster comprises Belarus, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan – countries where the state plays the key role in 
effecting economic transformation, signalling almost complete rejection 
of liberal reforms and extremely limited privatisation. Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan make up the third cluster of countries which 
have pursued moderately liberal reforms. Moreover, three countries in 
this group are energy exporters. Hierarchical cluster analysis shows that, 
in these terms at least, Kazakhstan and Russia are the two countries 
closest to one another in the former Soviet Union.
These results show that EurAsEC member countries often fall into 
different clusters in the post-Soviet space. The cluster analysis covered 
only six EurAsEC countries. We analysed the indicators in terms of 
structure and institutions, reproducing the results of Graphs 4a and 4b. 
This enables us to try to define the “optimal structure” of an integration 
network in the EurAsEC, without resorting to the option of bringing other 
CIS countries into integration projects. Proceeding from the institutional 
structure, stable agreements may be reached between Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are 
close to these two pairings but are not identical to them. The economic 
structure supposes that agreements may be achieved between Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; the EurAsEC-3 nucleus 
also stands out (Graphs 4c and 4d). However, though the countries are 
structurally very similar to one another, they differ in terms of their 
institutions: the “nucleus” institutionally similar countries comprises 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
In conclusion, we would point out that, in addition to the “conditional 
clusters” discussed in this article, we also observed so-called dynamic 
clusters which are useful in assessing the degree of similarity not of the 
current economic status of the CIS countries but of their evolution. The 
results are surprising: Kyrgyzstan turned out to be the closest to Russia 
in terms of the evolution of the country’s institutions. Further research is 
needed to explain the results of this quantitative analysis.
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Conclusions
This paper attempts a quantitative analysis of former Soviet countries 
in terms of the “sustainable size” of a regional integration group. 
Counterfactual analysis of the concept of integration as the regional 
union for EurAsEC shows that the size of this group is close to, but 
nevertheless higher than its sustainable optimum in terms of the quality 
of governance and below the optimum in terms of economic development. 
Nevertheless, EurAsEC-6 is closer to its sustainable size (in terms of the 
quality of governance) than all other integration projects in the former 
Soviet Union.
We established pairs of countries that were capable of reaching stable 
agreements in terms of the concept of integration as a network. If we 
proceed from the supposition that the most sustainable integration groups 
are, generally speaking, those which include countries which are relatively 
uniform in terms of institutional structure, then the most “successful” 
integration project in these terms would be one based on cooperation 
between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Certain caveats must be mentioned. Firstly, our analysis has several 
technical limitations. In our regression analysis we considered only one 
indicator, and did not take into account all other factors which influence 
the stability and size of an integration groups (i.e., we violated the basic 
principle of econometrics – analysis based on the assumption that “all 
other conditions are equal”). The small sample size precluded the execution 
of a more precise study. Moreover, the cause and effect relationship is 
hard to discern: integration can be a factor that helps change GDP or 
Figure	2.	4  
Cluster analysis of the 
post-Soviet space
Source: calculations 
by the author based 
on data released by 
the CIS Interstate 
Statistics Committee, 
EBRD, Freedom House, 
Heritage Foundation and 
the World Bank
Note: AZ = Azerbaijan, 
ARM = Armenia,  
BEL = Belarus,  
GEOR = Georgia,  
KAZ = Kazakhstan,  
KYRG = Kyrgyzstan,  
RUS = Russia,  
UKR = Ukraine,  
UZB = Uzbekistan,  
MOLD = Moldova,  
TAJ = Tajikistan,  
TURK = Turkmenistan. 
The axis of ordinates 
shows the difference 
between the countries 
of the integration group 
analysed.
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the quality of governance (the problem of endogeneity). We could not 
apply methods to overcome the problem of endogeneity, again because 
of the small sample size. We should not forget that the very existence 
of regional integration projects which are covered by the media and 
discussed by the public has an impact on developing regional identity, 
which is an important factor in the regionalisation of an economic space 
and the sustainability of integration. In this regard, we believe that even 
the “unfavourable” conclusions of this analysis cannot be used as the 
basis for assertions that any particular group or network has no future. 
On the contrary, once past the point of unsustainability (owing to a lack 
of political will, for example), the integration structure may influence the 
structure’s member countries such that this automatically lead to the 
emergence of a sustainable economic configuration. However, it is hard 
to move through this phase with any speed.
There are also significant conceptual limitations to our analysis. 
Firstly, our conclusions do not necessarily mean that a certain project is 
the most likely to succeed: we can only say that where it is achieved, to 
all appearances it may become more sustainable. This is particularly the 
case in our analysis of networks. In our analysis we ignored, for example, 
the clearly significant factor of the geographical locations of countries. 
However, we do not think that our conclusions are unrealistic; for example, 
cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan has already become an 
important impetus to the development of integration initiatives. Political 
and economic issues were also ignored in this analysis. Nevertheless, 
the results of studies conducted show that, regardless of the similarity 
of institutions and preferences, interstate conflicts can have a significant 
impact on the type and extent of regional integration23.
It is also vital to stress that, in many cases, sustainability is not 
synonymous with efficiency. Often, the continued existence of an 
integration group is not linked to its progress towards integration. For 
example, in conducting the regression analysis we did not consider the 
level of integration within individual communities, which can vary hugely. 
Even the intra-regional trade indicator ranges from less than 10% to 
over 70%24. We believe that the factors described in this analysis have 
an equal influence on projects that may be very different in terms of 
their progress and integration aims; regionalism in its newly revived form 
makes it extremely hard to draw a clear boundary between the “degrees 
of integration” identified by Balassa (a free-trade zone, a customs union, 
a common market and an economic union): except, perhaps, for the EU, 
no other integration group fits this outline in terms of its development. 
Furthermore, we should bear in mind that the sustainability of a project 
and its progress towards integration are not the same as its effect on 
23 Vicard V. (2007) Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: Explaining the Heterogeneity of 
Regional Trade Agreements. Mimeo.
24 ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2004, page 69; Sa S., Strauss-Kahn M.-O., Bonzom Ph. (2006) 
Interaction between Regional Economic Integration and Institutional Integration: the European 
Experience. Banque de France Bulletin Digest , No. 145, January, p. 10.
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economic and especially institutional transformation; on the contrary, an 
integration project may become an obstacle to necessary reform.
One alternative to our analysis is the definition of an optimal (rather 
than sustainable) size of integration based on economic development 
issues and state policy. An example of this analysis is “optimal currency 
zones”. Studies of these zones focus on the correlation between the 
advantages of adopting single currency and the potential crises which can 
result from it. “Optimal legal zones” are those in which the advantages 
of relatively low external trade transaction costs are compared with the 
costs of expanding the area in which generic legal standards are applied25. 
These studies have also been conducted for CIS countries26. However, 
the sustainability of an international union also generates interest from 
a legislative point of view. Even if an integration grouping does not 
have a positive impact on the process of integrating national economies, 
it nevertheless forms a certain “institutional platform” upon which to 
base negotiations further down the line, which may then strengthen 
cooperation between countries as circumstances change. The experience 
of Latin American countries and the Arab world shows that integration 
groupings often “wake from slumber” and become highly effective actors 
in the international arena.
Finally, there have been cases in the world where the efficiency and 
sustainability of a union undermine one another. The problem is twofold. 
On the one hand, the attractiveness of an organisation may increase its 
sustainable size, boosting the number of members and their diversity. 
But it is precisely this factor that can reduces its efficacy (governance 
fails to cope with the increased diversity)! APEC is a classic example 
of this problem. On the other hand, “tiered integration” may lead to 
serious problems for the sustainability of an integration group if this is 
applied to the institutions within that group27. The implementation of 
a tiered project often results in the effective refusal to include “lower-
ranked” members in the integration process, even in the long term. In 
other words, unrestricted growth or extreme restriction of the number of 
members may undermine the efficiency and sustainability of integration 
in the long term, even though it appears to have been achieved now.
As well as being sustainable spatially, the structure of an agreement 
can also have temporal sustainability. This would apply to the formulation 
of open-ended agreements or the introduction into their content of 
23 Vicard V. (2007) Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: Explaining the Heterogeneity of 
Regional Trade Agreements. Mimeo.
24 ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2004, page 69; Sa S., Strauss-Kahn M.-O., Bonzom Ph. (2006) 
Interaction between Regional Economic Integration and Institutional Integration: the European 
Experience. Banque de France Bulletin Digest , No. 145, January, p. 10.
25  Schmidtchen D., Neunzig A. (2001) One Market, One Law. German Working Paper on Law 
and Economics, No 9; Seliger B. (2006) The Optimum Size of East Asian Economic Integration 
and the Role of Korea. Korea and World Affairs, 2006, No 5.
26 Drobyshevskiy S., Polevoy D. (2004) Problems of Creating a Single Currency Zone in CIS 
Countries. Moscow, Institute for the Economy in Transition.
27 Bordignon M., Brusco S. (2005) On Enhanced Cooperation. Mimeo.
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specific time limits, which allow for future revision resulting from new 
negotiations. The long-term nature of agreements is vital in providing an 
incentive for investment, while their short-term nature ensures greater 
flexibility in case of external disruption. The nature of goods supplied also 
influences the structure of agreements: long-term agreements are more 
attractive when benefits are very diverse28. Consequently, the structural 
sustainability of an agreement in temporal terms depends both on the need 
for investment to develop infrastructure and the agreement’s susceptibility 
to external disruption. On the one hand, long-term infrastructure projects 
(for example, in the transport, power engineering or water industries) 
play an important role in enhancing cooperation between former Soviet 
countries, and this requires long-term agreements to minimize risk. On 
the other hand, studies show that in the currency integration scenario, the 
financial systems of some CIS countries would not be able to withstand 
external disruption29. This issue needs to be studied further.
Nevertheless, from this analysis it is possible to draw certain 
preliminary conclusions which can inform policy making as it affects 
regional integration in the post-Soviet space. In the long-term, this 
study can be regarded as the forerunner of further studies conducted to 
establish the “size” and “structure” of an integration project which is best 
reinforces its sustainability, efficiency and ability to execute projects.
28 Guriev S., Klimenko M. (2007) Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements. Mimeo.
29 Drobyshevskiy S., Polevoy D. (2007) Financial Aspects of Currency Integration in the CIS. 
Moscow, Institute for the Economy in Transition.
Institutional	Integration
Aleksandr Libman “The Sustainability of Regional Integration Projects  
in the Post-Soviet Space”
 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
Opportunities and Obstacles  
to EurAsEC Integration*
Michail 
Golovnin
Analysis	of	the	Integration	Process	in	the	EurAsEC
The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) integration organisation 
is now the largest formal integration association in the post-Soviet space 
in terms of number of participants. It brings together countries which 
have made a concerted choice in favour of creating supranational bodies, 
paving the way for a customs union and single economic area. The group 
has evolved at some length from the Customs Union Treaty signed by 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in Moscow on 20 January 1995 (and 
which was later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). The Eurasian 
Economic Community was formally created in October 2000, and its most 
recent expansion came when Uzbekistan’s decision to join was ratified at 
an Interstate Council meeting in St Petersburg on 25 January 2006. The 
path to EurAsEC integration has not always been smooth. Although most 
customs duties had been harmonised by the mid-1990s, the consequences 
of the Russian financial crisis in 1998 led to the deterioration of trade 
relations and unilateral modification of import duties by Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. More recent examples of tension between EurAsEC 
member countries include the oil and gas conflict in early 2007, involving 
Russia and Belarus, and trade wars affecting agricultural products 
(notably, Kazakhstan’s restriction on sugar imports in February 2008).
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities have been showing a keen interest 
in integration. This was illustrated at a summit of CIS and EurAsEC 
heads of state held in Dushanbe on 5-6 October 2007, which adopted 
the Concept for Further Development of the CIS and other documents 
to create a customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
and set up supranational bodies. Another nine international agreements 
relating to the customs union and the Concept on Formation of the Single 
Transport Space in the EurAsEC were adopted at a EurAsEC Interstate 
Council meeting in Moscow on 25 January 20081.
We believe that there are several reasons for Russia’s renewed interest 
in integration. Firstly, Russia is striving to increase its political power 
in the international arena, for which it will require a group of countries 
prepared to align their foreign policies with Russia’s. At present, this 
group, albeit with certain reservations, comprises countries which are 
members of the EurAsEC. It should be noted that the EurAsEC had 
* Material prepared in cooperation with specialists of the Centre for Problems of Globalisation 
and Integration of the Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ushkalova D. 
and Dr. Libman A.
1 http://www.evrazes.org/ru/main/messagepage/723/, as of July 2008.
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drafted mechanisms to coordinate the interests of member countries and 
had adopted the principle of “weighted” voting, which is based on the 
pro-rata contribution of each country to the Community’s budget: Russia 
controls 40 per cent, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 15 per cent 
each and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 7.5 per cent each. Apart from Russia, 
this distribution of voting share by budget contribution gives more rights 
to each country than if other indicators had been used (for example, 
population, size of economy or industrial output2). In practice, of course, 
Russia has the strongest voice in the adoption of EurAsEC decisions, 
and Russia’s greatest weight is a problem in any association in the post-
Soviet space.
Secondly, objective economic interest in integration is linked to the 
synergistic effect resulting from the joint resolution of shared economic 
problems and the expansion of markets for goods produced in EurAsEC 
member countries, especially those with high value added.
The main economic problem which the EurAsEC must resolve is the 
structure of its member countries’ economies. It has to be improved in 
order to increase the competitiveness of these individual countries and 
that of the whole Community within the global economy. The existing 
structure of the EurAsEC economies, among which only Russia and 
Belarus can boast substantial manufacturing sectors, is an obstacle rather 
than an asset to integration.
In 2006, for example, the mining and metallurgy and metal products 
sectors accounted for 23 per cent and 15 per cent respectively of Russian 
industrial output; the fuel and energy sector accounted for 29 per cent 
of Belarus’s industrial output; the mining and metallurgy and metal 
products sectors accounted for 57 per cent and 17 per cent respectively 
of Kazakhstan’s industrial output. The fuel and energy and metallurgy 
sectors accounted for 27 per cent and 21 per cent of Uzbekistan’s 
industrial output; metallurgy and metal products and power, gas and 
water production and distribution accounted for 33 per cent and 21 per 
cent respectively in Kyrgyzstan; metallurgy accounted for 46 per cent 
of Tajikistan’s industrial output. Moreover, agriculture, forestry and 
fishery accounted for 33 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, 28 per cent of 
Uzbekistan’s GDP3 and 23.9 per cent of Tajikistan’s GDP4 in 2006. As a 
result, these countries compete in low-value-added sectors which are the 
economic foundations of many EurAsEC member countries.
These shared problems relate not just to the deterioration of the 
inherited structure of the economy but also to the need to create new 
and efficient sectors, for example, the financial sector. Banking systems 
and financial markets in EurAsEC countries, except for Russia and 
Kazakhstan, remain underdeveloped. Russia and Kazakhstan face large-
2 In 2006, according to the Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, Russia accounted for 69% 
of the EAEC’s population, 87.7% of GDP and 85.2% of industrial output (www.cisstat.com).
3 In 2005.
4 Source: Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS (www.cisstat.com).
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scale outflow of capital , which is preventing their domestic financial 
markets from developing properly. The joint resolution of these problems 
may inform the new “agenda” of integration.
Defining the objectives of integration is one of the major problems 
of the present day. Until recently, the approach has been to adapt the 
European integration model to the post-Soviet space and formulate 
long-term goals. The long delay in the process of achieving these goals, 
and countries’ unwillingness to surrender even part of their newly won 
sovereignty, have blighted the integration process.
EurAsEC does have, de facto, a free trade area and relative freedom of 
movement of people (the absence of visa controls between most member 
countries). The creation of a customs union is also a near-term ambition, 
and this issue is attracting particular attention at present because of 
its importance to formal integration process. The timely and successful 
resolution of this question will have an impact on the future of the 
EurAsEC, a body described as the most advanced integration association 
in the post-Soviet space. Without a customs union, EurAsEC will become 
indistinguishable from other, more amorphous, formations (for example, 
the CIS). Between 2000 and 2006, only 2 per cent of the import duties 
in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan had been unified. Out of 73 measures 
due to be implemented between 2003-2006 as part of the creation of 
a customs union, only 20 had been put in place by the end of that 
period5. This illustrates how efforts to harmonise member country import 
and export duties have been carried out ineffectually and the significant 
difficulties surrounding certain aspects of this initiative.
We think this situation, like other delayed integration initiatives in the 
post-Soviet space, is caused by a number of factors.
Reasons	for	the	Lack	of	Progress	in	post-Soviet	Integration
The key obstacles to integration include the varied structures of 
EurAsEC member country economies; the decline in trade and economic 
cooperation between member countries; and differences in their economic 
strategies and national models of economic development.
1) The EurAsEC member countries have tangible differences in 
the structure of their domestic economies. For example, Russia and 
Kazakhstan are major exporters of raw materials and produce a very wide 
range of goods (especially Russia), while Belarus specialises in producing 
finished goods from raw materials imported from third countries. 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which lag behind other EurAsEC 
member countries in terms of industrial production, are importers of a 
large number of industrial goods from non-CIS countries. Because of this, 
Russia is keen to protect its economy by using duties on a wider range 
of products than would its EurAsEC counterparts. In addition, since the 
average weighted rate of customs duties in Russia is falling, Russia levies 
5 Soyuznoye Veche, 2006, 25-31 May, p. 1.
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lower import tariffs on some goods than its partners do. Kazakhstan’s 
customs tariffs differ considerably from those of Russia and Belarus (the 
Kazakh economy is liberalised to a larger extent.
Except for Kyrgyzstan, which is a member of the WTO, the longer 
the country’s membership of the EurAsEC, the greater the level of 
harmonisation of customs duties. For example, 80 per cent of Tajikistan’s 
national tariffs had been harmonised with the EurAsEC’s Basic List of 
Common Customs Tariff (BL CCT) by 2007, while this figure stands at 
only 30 per cent for Uzbekistan, which was one of the last countries to 
join the organisation. Moreover, level of protectionism in Uzbekistan’s 
foreign trade policy is higher than in other EurAsEC countries.
The harmonisation of export duties is also causing considerable 
difficulties. Export duties, currently imposed by EurAsEC member 
countries on certain goods, contribute hugely to national budgets (for 
example, the oil export duty in Russia), which is why their abolition or 
reduction during the harmonisation of trade regulation instruments is 
almost impossible in the short term.
Disparities in the way national economies are structured also hinder 
implementation of joint projects. That is why activity in the energy 
sector, especially Russia’s, is particularly visible. It is important to note, 
however, that there is significant potential for conflict (mainly hidden) 
in this sector because of differences in EurAsEC member countries’ 
interests. For example, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are major oil 
and gas exporters, while Belarus is an importer and a transit corridor to 
the West. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to diversify 
their export routes.
Problems relating to these different national economic structures 
within EurAsEC member countries can be resolved by concerted efforts 
to define the priorities of their development; the implementation of a 
coordinated industrial policy; and a system of compensation from the 
EurAsEC’s budget to mitigate the losses of member states and certain 
producers in cases where shifting customs duties affect industries which 
are strategically important to a country’s economy.
However, EurAsEC member countries have not yet adopted a 
coordinated structural policy. The issue of compensation for budget losses 
resulting from customs tariff harmonisation has not been resolved since 
it entails substantial costs for Russia especially, which it is not ready to 
pay.
2) As well as the difficulties relating to the different interests of 
EurAsEC countries, linked to their economic structures, another problem 
stands in the way of foreign trade policy harmonisation and deeper 
integration, i.e., Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space. The Russian 
economy is considerably bigger than those of the other EurAsEC member 
countries. As a result, Russia falls into a kind of “trap”. On the one hand, 
it is regarded (and it sometimes behaves) as a powerful player, imposing 
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its rules on others. This raises concerns for other EurAsEC member 
countries, who fear that they will end up being dependent on Russia. 
They then recoil from processes which would involve them ceding part 
of their sovereignty to supranational bodies. This in turn hinders the 
development of integration. On the other hand, where necessary, Russia, 
as the largest player, is able to initiate integration processes in the post-
Soviet space and act as their “sponsor”6.
3) Since the break-up of the USSR, trade and economic cooperation 
between EurAsEC member countries have been diminishing in 
comparison to their cooperation with third countries. However, this trend 
is not constant: in 2000-2005, trade between member countries increased. 
In 2005-2006, it decreased once again. The dynamics of trade between 
EurAsEC member countries are largely defined by the nature of the goods 
traded, compared to those traded with third countries. For example, 
machinery makes up a substantial share of trade within the bloc and 
price increases for these products are below than for goods produced by 
the fuel and energy sector. Trade within the bloc is also declining because 
of a drop in the global competitiveness of goods made in the EurAsEC 
compared to goods from third countries. Another factor which impinges 
on trade is the continuing competition between EurAsEC producers in 
the Community’s market. Competition arises from similarities in the 
structure of their economies, and specifically the dominance of low-value-
added sectors (mining, agriculture and metallurgy). This provokes moves 
to raise barriers to intra-bloc trade and can lead to trade wars. Despite 
declarations that such barriers do not exist, in practice EurAsEC members 
(in particular, Russia and Belarus) have been waging trade wars more often, 
which have had a negative impact on trade and economic cooperation. 
Protracted debates between Russia and Belarus over conditions imposed 
on Belarusian sugar supplied to Russia and Kazakhstan’s imposition of 
sugar import quotas are immediate examples to this matter.
Protective measures do not only reduce trade but also undermine 
the basis of integration, creating barriers to foreign economic relations 
instead of removing them.
Such developments have slowed the growth of trade between EurAsEC 
member countries in recent years compared to trade with third countries, 
and led to a reduction in intra-EurAsEC trade as a proportion of member 
countries’ total foreign trade (Table 1). For Russia in particular, trade 
with EurAsEC countries declined from 9.5 per cent of total foreign trade 
in 2002 to 8.7 per cent in 2007. However, this figure did increase from 
8.3 per cent in 2006 to 8.7 per cent in 20077. This might be an indication 
that trade disintegration has passed its lowest point. One particularly 
6 Golovnin M. (2006) Prospects for Multilateral Cooperation in the post-Soviet Space from 
Russia’s Point of View. Information and Analytical Bulletin of the Centre for Globalisation and 
Integration of the Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences, No. 4 (8), p. 9.
7 From customs statistics (including data on Belarus) released by the Russian Federal Statistics 
Service (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d030/i030780r.htm. as of July 
2008).
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interesting trend is the continuing fall in EurAsEC imports from within 
the bloc, which are not affected the “VAT factor”8 or the dynamics of 
energy prices. Since Russia is the engine of trade in the EurAsEC, this has 
also reduced intra-bloc trade in the EurAsEC. The low share of EurAsEC 
trade in Russia’s total foreign trade would seem to indicate Russia’s lack 
of interest in advancing integration in the post-Soviet space.
Table	3.	1		
Trade with EurAsEC 
member countries as 
a share of total foreign 
trade for selected 
EurAsEC countries,  
per cent
Source: Calculations 
based on information 
released by the 
Interstate Statistical 
Committee of the CIS 
(http://www.cisstat.com)
2004 2005 2006
Belarus
Exports 48.1 37.0 36.5
Imports 68.2 60.7 59.0
Kazakhstan
Exports 16.0 12.8 12.1
Imports 39.5 41.4 41.6
Kyrgyzstan
Exports 34.7 43.4 46.5
Imports 53.5 56.5 54.6
Russia
Exports 9.0 7.5 8.0
Imports 13.4 10.2 8.9
Tajikistan
Exports 7.7 19.1 12.4
Imports 36.1 46.0 48.4
EurAsEC
Exports 12.2 9.8 10.1
Imports 25.6 20.9 19.5
8 In the beginning of 2005, VAT collection in Russian export to CIS countries was turned to a 
destination basis (for all countries except for Belarus it was applied to energy goods, for Belarus 
– to all goods). So, this measure had a one-time negative quantitative impact on the amount of 
Russian export to the CIS countries.
4) Differences in the economic strategies pursued by EurAsEC 
member countries have an adverse impact on the coordination of 
foreign trade policies and on integration process in general. During their 
transformation period, EurAsEC countries followed different models of 
transition to market economies. Some countries (Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan) based their models on more liberal principles, while others 
(Belarus and Uzbekistan) granted the state a greater role in the process 
of transformation and chosen a more gradual path to a market economy. 
These models also changed during the transition period (in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, for example). The resulting mix of economic and institutional 
systems continues to hinder the development of a single economic policy 
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and imposes serious obstacles to integration, the customs union in 
particular. This problem can be solved only if member countries draft a 
coordinated development strategy for the EurAsEC and, correspondingly, 
an agreed model for protecting their markets in the global economy. The 
other possible scenario would involve countries opting for a unified mode 
of development which encourages an active exchange of expertise and 
experience in the field of economic policy. In this scenario, differences 
in economic models play a positive role by offering greater scope for 
choice.
It is very hard to make a clear distinction between objective and 
subjective obstacles to integration. Modern objective factors (for 
instance, economic development models) may have developed as a result 
of subjective decisions and, conversely, objective trends create subjective 
influences. Nevertheless, in the context of this study, the most important 
subjective factors discussed are the lack of an effective means of 
coordinating interests and implementing decisions and differences 
in EurAsEC member countries’ capacities to create a customs union.
1) The lack of an effective means of coordinating interests and 
implementing decisions. We believe that the current mechanism for 
coordinating the interests of member countries, notwithstanding the 
fact that a number of provisions are already in place (in particular, the 
aforementioned principle of “weighted” voting), has several shortcomings 
which are preventing the implementation of adopted decisions. While 
the key player – Russia – is not always willing to cede its national 
interests to a supranational association, other countries are trying hard 
to escape Russia’s influence. This is one of the negative manifestations of 
Russia’s dominant role in the post-Soviet space. In case of foreign trade, 
Russia would prefer other countries adapting its own regulatory system. 
As a result countries may face losses owing to differences in economic 
structure, which Russia will not compensate them for.
Integration is largely limited to foreign trade. Until recently, other 
aspects of integration have received inadequate attention. For example, 
hardly any major joint investment projects have been implemented. The 
situation has changed since Russia and Kazakhstan set up the Eurasian 
Development Bank (which we discuss later), but it will be some time 
before this institution is able to fund large-scale projects.
All this reduces the motivation to implement agreements and thereby 
hinders the creation of a customs union and other integration procedures. 
In practice, “disadvantageous” decisions are not implemented resulting 
in “integration on paper”. A typical “integration on paper” works as 
follows: first, the basic integration decisions are taken and corresponding 
measures are drafted and started to implement; the implementation of 
these measures is then delayed, with some elements even rolled back. After 
this, new integration documents and new measures are drawn up (many 
of which are, in essence, inherited from the previous un-implemented 
documents), but their implementation is then delayed once again.
Institutional	Integration
Eurasian Development Bank
It is obvious that successful implementation of agreements depends 
entirely upon countries’ vested interests, i.e. the degree to which the 
negotiated result corresponds to an agenda of interest groups involved. 
That is why efficacy in implementing decisions could be enhanced 
significantly if integration partners (particularly Russia) pay greater 
attention to the interests each EurAsEC member has in the agreement, 
and take account of each country’s individual circumstances.
Barriers to the creation of a customs union are typified by the failure 
to coordinate EurAsEC member country positions vis a vis accession to 
the WTO.
In 1997, signatories to the Customs Union Treaty agreed to coordinate 
negotiating positions in their progress towards WTO membership. 
Although Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan agreed in 2002 to 
adopt Russia’s position in these negotiations, in practice the coordination 
mechanism is not working perfectly. Kyrgyzstan’s separate accession to 
the WTO is an example of the EurAsEC partners’ poor coordination of 
their activities regarding WTO membership. One of the latest solutions to 
this problem of coordination over a customs union and WTO membership 
has been offered by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Naryshkin: 
“The heads of states of a future customs union have agreed that Russia 
will be first to join the WTO, after which the customs union will start 
functioning, and ultimately other member countries, as members of the 
customs union, will join the WTO”.9 
Obviously, this approach has practical merit but it also postpones the 
creation of a customs union indefinitely. Moreover, Russian conditions for 
WTO membership may turn out to be unacceptable to other countries, 
and this will either hold up the process of building a customs union for 
several years or will halt it completely.
2) Differences in EurAsEC member countries’ capacity to join 
a customs union and to progress to the next stages of integration. 
In terms of preparedness to become a member of customs union (i.e. the 
level of custom tariff harmonisation), EurAsEC countries clearly fall into 
two groups:
1. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (most prepared);
2. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (least prepared).
These groupings shaped up historically: the first group was negotiating 
on cooperation for a longer time, while the second group joined them later. 
However, the underlying reason for this division is the difference in the 
level of their economic development (Table 2) and the structure of their 
economies. Such a differentiation challenges feasibility of an effective 
customs union among 6 member states concerned and raises an issue of 
modes of economic integration in EurAsEC. 
9 Prime-TASS, 16 October 2007.
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Table	3.	2  
GDP per capita in EurAsEC 
member countries
Sources: the Interstate 
Statistical Committee  
of the CIS  
(www.cisstat.com); 
Human Development 
Report 2007/2008. 
United Nation 
Development Programme, 
2007
GDP per capita at the 
official exchange rate 
(2006, dollars)
GDP per capita in pur-
chasing power parity 
(2005, dollars)
Russia 6 915 10 845
Kazakhstan 5 045 7 857
Belarus 3 793 7 918
Uzbekistan 643 2 063
Kyrgyzstan 542 1 927
Tajikistan 402 1 356
Modes	of	Integration
Geographic expansion of the Agreement on Customs Union and 
subsequently of the EurAsEC itself, created preconditions for strengthening 
political status of the organisation. At the same time, however, it diluted 
the economic foundation of the Community.
Comparison of countries by GDP per capita clearly shows two groups 
of countries within the EurAsEC: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus that 
are relatively better off, and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that 
are less advanced in terms of market transition (Table 2). Disparity is 
also seen in both the analysis of GDP per capita at the official exchange 
rate and in purchasing power parity.
Membership of relatively poorer countries in the EurAsEC was a 
lesser problem when it included only Kyrgyzstan with a population of 
5.19 million people (as of end 2006) and Tajikistan with a population 
of 7.07 million people (as of 2006, preliminary data). But in early 2006, 
Uzbekistan with a population of 26.7 million people (preliminary official 
data) joined the organisation.
Comparison of average wages by country provides similar observation. 
In 2006, the nominal average wage in Russia was slightly over $391.1, 
in Kazakhstan and Belarus it was $323.5 and $271.2 respectively. In 
Kyrgyzstan nominal average wage recorded at $81 and in Tajikistan – at 
$3510.
With Uzbekistan’s accession to the EurAsEC, the polarisation of 
levels of social development between the member countries has increased 
considerably. The same observations apply to the status of economic 
reforms, with Uzbekistan being at a much earlier stage compared to many 
other EurAsEC member states11. Therefore, opportunities to implement 
formal integration projects shrunk.
The solution to this situation was the proposed leadership of the three 
founding states (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) within EurAsEC, so 
10 The Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS (www.cisstat.com). Data is unavailable for 
Uzbekistan in 2006.
11 EBRD (2007) Transition Report 2007. EBRD: London.
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called “troika”. Following the decisions ratified in Dushanbe on 6 October 
2007, these countries would form the basis of a customs union. EurAsEC 
documents were amended to this end, since they did not envisage a 
possibility for member states to inegrate at different pace. A formal 
decision was thus adopted creating an “integration nucleus” within the 
EurAsEC made up of the abovementioned countries, which are already 
part of another integration grouping – the Single Economic Space. SES 
includes Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan plus Ukraine. For the purposes 
of this paper, we suggest to define them as SES-3 countries. Other 
countries will join this core group as and when prepared. At the first sight, 
this scenario may speed up integration, since it decreases the number of 
parties in negotiations, and focuses on countries with more developed 
negotiating capacity and comparable levels of economic development. 
However, the issue of differing economic systems remains. Higher 
convergence is theoretically possible though given recent liberalisation 
in Belarus, increased state involvement in the economy in Russia and 
Kazakhstan. These structural differences are very significant even among 
the countries that form the core of customs union. The Russian economy 
is diversified to a greater extent; mining sector dominates in Kazakhstan 
and in Belarus machine-building plays a key role.
It should not be forgotten that integration nucleus includes another 
association – the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Despite a recent 
cool-down in relations between the two countries and a gap between real 
integration and its declared goals, progress in cooperation between Russia 
and Belarus is quite significant compared with other CIS countries. High 
level of customs duty harmonisation and absence of customs barriers 
between the two countries are immediate examples to this end.
In the variable-pace model of integration, keeping other EurAsEC 
members in the troika’s sphere of influence seems a serious problem, 
as delays in implementing integration initiatives may reduce the non-
core members’ interest in cooperation. It is extremely important to 
involve them in mutually beneficial projects which could bring tangible 
economic effects. These include the development of hydro power sector 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and machinery in Uzbekistan, addressing 
migration issues, and so on.
Obviously, Russia does not intend to limit integration potential of the 
post-Soviet space to the EurAsEC only. Hence, it attempts to involve 
Ukraine, CIS second largest economy with enormous industrial potential, 
in the integration process by means of Single Economic Space and offer 
to join the EurAsEC. However, it should be noted that Ukraine, and other 
countries whose integration policies target Europe, will not be keen to 
build a customs union with predominant Russian influence. Therefore, 
in pursuit of this goal it is important for Russia to offer incentives 
and attractive initiatives to such countries, rather than provoke their 
resistance by imposing unacceptable decisions. One such initiative might 
be the creation of an integration group according to the principle of 
“open regionalism”, as the third “concentration circle” of post-Soviet 
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integration after SES-3 and EurAsEC-6. Russia must not present this 
project as an alternative to EU. Moreso, Russia ought to seek collective 
solutions to common problems of countries that are part of this group. 
CIS could provide a foundation for such a regional grouping. A free trade 
zone within the group could be an option for formal integration, provided 
that all positive and negatives effects for Russian economy are carefully 
examined. It is perhaps more important to adopt a project approach and 
seek opportunities for a joint project financing, for instance, by establishing 
a regional development bank with a mission to facilitate mutual trade and 
favourable trade environment. Many CIS countries are now bearing costs 
of their trade wars to Russia and redirecting their foreign trade flows 
to other destinations, hence growing even further apart from economic 
cooperation in post-Soviet space.
Finally, the future of the integration nucleus (SES-3) poses some 
important questions, too. Growth of cooperation beyond customs union 
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Gradual abolition of restrictions 
on the movement of goods and services would require coordination of 
economic policies, and currently member-states are just not prepared for 
this. Therefore, attention should be focused on the creation of a customs 
union and implementation of mutually beneficial projects reaching to as 
many CIS countries as possible, including EurAsEC member countries. 
One of the most promising projects, we believe, is the strengthening of 
financial cooperation between the EurAsEC member states.
Financial	Cooperation	among	EurAsEC	Member	States
Preconditions for financial cooperation in the EurAsEC are gradually 
emerging owing to active expansion of Russian and Kazakh financial 
institutions into other member countries’ markets In the EurAsEC banking 
system Russian banks are mostly targeting markets of Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. For instance, Sberbank bought an 80 per cent stake in Texakabank 
(Kazakhstan); Vneshtorgbank has a majority ownership in Slavneftebank 
(Belarus); Alfa Bank has a subsidiary bank in Kazakhstan and is entering 
the Belarusian market; Rosbank and Gazprombank have subsidiary banks 
in Belarus. Kazakhstan’s banks spearhead their investments even wider:
•Kazkommertsbank has two subsidiary banks in EurAsEC member 
countries (Moskommertsbank in Russia and a bank in Kyrgyzstan), 
and is establishing a subsidiary bank based on a representative office in 
Tajikistan;
•Kazakhstan’s BTA Group includes Slavinvestbank, Omsk Bank, BTA 
Kazan, Agroinkom Bank (all in Russia), Astanaeximbank (Belarus) and 
Investment Export Import bank (Kyrgyzstan);
•Halyk Bank has subsidiary banks in Russia (NBK Bank in Chelyabinsk) 
and Kyrgyzstan (Halyk Bank Kyrgyzstan);
•ATF Bank owns 94.17 per cent of shares in ATF Bank Kyrgyzstan, 100 
per cent in Sibir Bank and 75.1 per cent in Sohibkorbank (Tajikistan).
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However, the share of EurAsEC member states banks’ in the 
banking systems of other countries is insignificant with an exception of 
Kazakhstan’s equity in the banking system of Kyrgyzstan12). For example, 
as of 1 September 2007, Russian capital accounts for mere 1.8 per cent of 
the total capital of the Belarusian banking system even though Russia is 
the largest foreign investor in the Belarusian banking system.
Investment companies are also entering neighbouring markets. This 
mainly concerns Russia and Kazakhstan:
• The KIT Finance company of St Petersburg has set up a KIT Finance 
subsidiary in Kazakhstan;
• Renaissance Capital demonstrates active presence in trade sector 
in Kazakhstan . For example, Renaissance Capital acquired a 15 per cent 
stake in Kazkommertsbank during an assault on the bank’s shares on the 
Kazakh and London stock exchanges in February 2008 (on behalf of its 
client)13.
• Russia’s Troika Dialogue enters the Kazakh market through 
acquisition of Almex Asset Management14.
• The Aton Investment Group has been active on the Kazakh stock 
market for some time. In April 2007, it offered investors a new index for 
the Kazakh stock market.
• East Capital, operating in Russia, is part of an investment and banking 
holding within Moskommertsbank. This company has representative 
offices in all the EurAsEC countries.
• Russia’s Centras Capital investment company is a member of the 
Kazakh Centras Investment Group. The company has begun to expand 
into Kyrgyzstan.
• The Kazakh BTA Group includes Russian companies TuranAlem 
Finance, BTA Finance and BTA Capital.
• NBK Finance, owned by Kazakh Halyk Bank, is operating on the 
Russian market.
Financial systems of EurAsEC member-states are generally 
underdeveloped, with the exception of the Kazakh banking system and 
the Russian stock market (Table 3). Banking systems of Belarus and 
Uzbekistan are under strong state regulation, while Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan have the least developed banking systems among EurAsEC 
member-states. Tajikistan does not have an organised stock market, and 
stock markets in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are very weak, although 
they have been growing rapidly15. The Kazakh stock market, despite 
12 The share of Kazakh banks in the Kyrgyz banking system is about 37%. http://www.24.kg/
economics/2008/03/04/78359.html.
13 Central Asia Monitor, 7 March 2008.
14 Delovoy Kazakhstan, 7 March 2008. This deal has been finalised in summer 2008.
15 In 2005, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP was close to 0 in Uzbekistan and 1.7% 
in Kyrgyzstan.
Institutional	Integration
Michail Golovnin “EurAsEC Integration: Opportunities and Obstacles”
0 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
* Data for 2004
These trends suggest potential directions of financial integration, 
including assistance from more advanced countries (Russia and 
Kazakhstan) in establishing financial markets in less developed countries. 
Although this is unlikely to yield sizeable profits in the short run, long 
term benefits will accrue from strengthened strategic positions on these 
markets. This is particularly the case in conditions of fierce competition 
for foreign markets and their infrastructure. For example, the Deutsche 
Börse, Scandinavian OMX Group and the Warsaw and Istanbul stock 
exchanges are all showing great interest in the CIS market and this poses 
serious challenges16. Russian and Kazakh companies have already made 
most of their IPOs on foreign trading floors (mainly on the London Stock 
Exchange and its AIM segment). The Russian stock market increased its 
share in Russian companies IPOs from 36 per cent in 2006 to 44 per cent 
in 2007 owing to Sberbank placing all of its shares and Vneshtorgbank 
placing 35 per cent of its shares in Russia (in total, these two IPOs 
accounted for 48 per cent of all deals in 2007)17.
The institutional basis of financial integration model suffers of same 
weakness as integration initiatives in other spheres, i.e., a gap between 
ambitious declared aims and low enthusiasm for formal cooperation and 
weak preconditions for implementation. These problems become more 
acute, because in traditional integration process financial integration 
comes as a final stage of economic integration. The EU, for example, 
has not yet established a single financial services market and is currently 
implementing new integration initiatives as part of the White Policy Paper 
on Financial Services for 2005–2010.
Transfer of European experience on post-Soviet space is merely possible 
because integration in other spheres shows only moderate progress, while 
regulations of financial markets in member states differ significantly. 
Table	3.	3  
Financial development 
indicators in EurAsEC 
countries  
(per cent of GDP)
Sources: Kommersant 
Bank, 5 April 2007; 
Transition Report 2007. 
Life in Transition. EBRD, 
2007.
Banking systems  
(as at 1 January 2007)
Stock market 
(2006)
Assets Loans Capital Capitalisation
Russia 52.8 29.6 6.4 104.4
Kazakhstan 101.7 68.7 13.4 54.7
Belarus 36.7 26.2 6.6 …
Uzbekistan 34.7 … 5.2 4.3
Kyrgyzstan 26.7 11.4 4.8 3.1
Tajikistan 19.8* 15.3* 2.7* -
dynamic progress in recent years, is lagging behind Russia’s market in 
terms of capitalisation and liquidity.
16 For example, the Istanbul Stock Exchange is already a major shareholder of the Kyrgyz Stock 
Exchange.
17 IPO in Russia: liquidity in the financial markets is slowing down growth. ReDeal Group, 2008.
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We believe that it is premature to define establishement of a common 
financial services market or common stock market as a key objective of 
the EurAsEC, especially in the short to medium term. Learning from Asian 
experience of financial integration, which focuses on specific challenges 
of financial markets development and efforts to address those, could be 
of benefit. Asian integration model is similar to post-Soviet context in a 
way that it is also implemented in the framework of numerous parallel 
integration organisations covering different groups of countries (APEC, 
ASEAN, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Executives’ Meeting of East 
Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMAP) and others).
Creation of a regional bond market is an excellent example of a project 
implemented by Asian integration associations in the framework of 
financial integration18. Achievements are many, including: establishment 
of two Asian bond funds dealing with government securities in foreign 
and domestic currency; abolition of certain foreign exchange restrictions; 
joint efforts to address issues associated with the development of national 
financial markets (for instance there are six working groups in ASEAN 
established in the framework of the bond market initiative), etc. Such 
an initiative on development a specific segment of financial market 
– be that government securities, corporate bonds, stock or financial 
derivatives – could be implemented in the EurAsEC. This would be a way 
of demonstrating real benefits of integration to member-states, but would 
require financial resources from initiating countries (mainly Russia, and 
possibly Kazakhstan). We believe that development of a corporate bond 
market would generate particular interest. In some EurAsEC member 
countries, the state controls major enterprises, thus corporate bonds 
would allow them to attract additional investment without changing their 
ownership structure, including from member countries which have excess 
capital.
The first step in developing EurAsEC’s financial integration could 
include the gradual abolition of regulations which restrict mutual access 
to financial markets and movement of capital between countries. In 
this regard, on-going foreign exchange liberalisation, which in Russia 
culminated with the abolition of restrictions on capital operations on 1 
July 2006, is of particular significance. Kazakhstam liberalised its foreign 
exchange regime from 1 January 2007. This process is under way in 
other EurAsEC countries, but tight restrictions remain in countries with 
relatively strict foreign exchange regimes (Belarus, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan). In Belarus, for example, resident legal entities and individuals 
must seek approval from the National Bank in order to conduct the 
certain operations, including: direct or portfolio investment in the charter 
capital or securities of a non-resident company19); purchase of property 
18 Golovnin M. (2007) Multilateral financial cooperation in the post-Soviet space: a new agenda 
for integration. Problemy Teorii I Praktiki Upravleniya, No 4.
19 In general, any operations with securities issued by non-residents are conducted by permission 
of the country’s National Bank; if a resident issues securities, they circulate without any restric-
tions.
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abroad; depositing money in foreign banks; and issuing loans with a 
maturity of over 180 days20.
Gradual abolition of mutual restrictions (specifically preferential 
liberalisation) will increase the presence of companies from EurAsEC 
member-states on the markets of other countries and strengthen their 
support for integration “from below”.
There are some indications that countries are searching for alternatives 
to integration projects within the EurAsEC. For example, Kazakhstan 
has set up a regional financial centre in Almaty to attract funds from 
Central Asian countries, the Urals and Siberia. This regional financial 
centre is an alternative to EurAsEC projects. Announced project on 
international financial centre in Russia can also be an alternative, but 
the opportunity still remains to direct it to the development of EurAsEC 
financial integration. 
A separate, and in our opinion extremely important, factor in promoting 
financial integration is the creation of a funding mechanism for integration 
projects. In many international integration organisations this function 
belongs to multilateral development banks (i.e. Asian Development Bank 
for several Asian integration groupings, European Investment Bank for the 
EU, the Andean Development Corporation for the Andean Community of 
Nations, etc.). A bank which could perform such a function in EurAsEC 
region already exists – the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB). Thus far, 
however, the EDB, formally remains a bilateral bank (involving Russia 
and Kazakhstan only), which limits its integration potential.
The EDB has already selected and partially financed its first 
commitments, including development of the Zarechnoye uranium field (a 
joint project of Russia’s Techsnabexport and Kazatomprom, the project 
will last for five years and has been fully funded in the amount of $63m); 
the Voskhod project to construct environmentally friendly chromite 
production and processing lines which will supply Russian enterprises 
(the project engages Western banks – WestLB and HVB; EDB has fully 
funded its share of $60m); the reconstruction of production capacity 
at the Ekibastuz hydro power plant-2 (the project is for 10 years and 
will cost $93.5m)21. As could be seen, these projects mainly relate to 
bilateral cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan. In addition, the 
EDB is participating in syndicated lending to selected Russian and Kazakh 
banks.
Negotiations are under way to increase the number of the EADB’s 
shareholders. The most possible next participant would be Tajikistan. 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and, noteworthy, Armenia (which is not a member 
of the EurAsEC) are among potential shareholders. Uzbekistan, with its 
sizeable economy, remains beyond the reach of the bank’s activities.
20 Centre for Globalisation and Integration Problems (2007) Preconditions, Problems and Pros-
pects for Financial Cooperation in the post-Soviet space. Scientific and analytical reports by the, 
Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, No 1, page 34.
21 http://www.eabr.org/rus/projects/portfolio/, as of July 2008. 
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We think that a regional development bank, such as EDB, could 
potentially facilitate integration processes in the EurAsEC through viable 
projects.
***
In the medium term, the creation of a customs union will play a key 
role in encouraging formal integration in the EurAsEC. In our view, 
it will face impediments which are both objective (differences in the 
structure of member country economies) and political in origin (Russia’s 
self-serving approach which fails to create attractive opportunities for 
partners prepared to make concessions from their side). We believe that 
potential for further integration is constrained by the need to coordinate 
many aspects of hugely varying national economic policies.
Nevertheless, aspirations for customs union should not be dropped off 
and concerns of stakeholders should be addressed with due consideration 
The most likely basis for a customs union at the moment is the SES-
3 (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus); however, some major challenges 
continue to affect this association, too. Other EurAsEC member countries 
may gradually increase their involvement in the integration process, but 
their interest in joining this organisation must be courted. In a shifting 
to multi-paced scheme of integration, it would be beneficial to consider 
system of interaction between Russia and its regional partners on a wider 
scale. The EurAsEC may ultimately be “built-into” integration associations 
in the former Soviet Union, including the Union State of Russia and 
Belarus, the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, 
it is extremely important that it retains a “niche” role. This niche would 
most likely be in the move to formal integration and establishment of 
supranational bodies in common areas of interest of the member-states 
(primarily, but not exclusively, foreign trade).
We believe that financial sector holds the most promise for further 
cooperation in the EurAsEC. It is linked neither with the troubles of 
cooperation in fuel and energy, nor with the inefficiencies of machine-
building industry inherited from the Soviet economic system. Corporate 
integration between Russia and Kazakhstan can be strengthened through 
the mutual expansion of their financial institutions. These two champions 
in financial services development could share their experience with others 
and facilitate development of the banking systems and financial markets 
in other EurAsEC member-states. It would be expedient, therefore, 
to initiate a joint pilot project in one of the sectors of the EurAsEC 
member countries’ financial market. Development of the corporate bonds 
market would appear to offer most potential. We would also stress the 
importance of establishing a regional development bank to act as a catalyst 
of the EurAsEC integration process. Achieving this goal would require 
membership of all EurAsEC members-states in the Eurasian Development 
Bank.
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Cooperation in the CIS 
Machine-Building Sector: 
Decreasing Rather than 
Increasing 
Yuriy 
Shishkov
Introduction
In most CIS countries the machinery sector falls short of international 
standards both in terms of its share of the manufacturing sector and 
the quality of machines and equipment produced. This results from the 
difficulties involved in transforming a command economy into a market 
economy, the abundant energy resources which reduce the incentive 
to innovate in the mechanical industries, and other factors, including a 
shortage of engineers. This article discusses another deficiency which is 
usually overlooked – insufficient cooperation between the CIS machine-
building industry and more advanced foreign partners.
International cooperation has enabled South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, China and Mexico to make a phenomenal technological leap 
forward in the past few decades, increasing their GDP and improving 
the living standards of the population. Cooperation also promotes the 
integration of national economies. It harmonises technical standards 
between countries, expands international scientific and technical 
cooperation, reduces disparities in the legal regulation of economic 
relations in this sphere, etc. In successfully integrated organisations (the 
EU, NAFTA and others), the intermediate machine-building sector in 
member countries exports 50-100% more than in the CIS, where a rapid 
contraction of exports threatens to dismantle the industrial foundations 
of integration.
In modern times, machine-building and the production of equipment 
and components has formed the foundations of the manufacturing sector 
in all countries and have largely determined the rate and quality of 
economic growth as a whole. According to the UN Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO), machinery created 55.4% of new value added 
in the manufacturing sector in developed countries in 2005, 35.4% of 
new value added in countries with transitional economies and 34.8% in 
developing countries1. For various historical reasons, the machinery sector 
in most CIS countries lags significantly behind international standards. 
This sector’s share of value added in the CIS manufacturing sector is 
also lower than average world indicators. For example, in 2004 it did not 
exceed 25.2% in Ukraine, 23.5% in Russia and was even lower in other 
CIS countries.
1 UNIDO (2007) Statistical Database, August.
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This has various negative socioeconomic consequences. We will briefly 
discuss two of these: the hindrance of technological progress in CIS 
countries and the disincentive to regional integration.
International	Cooperation	in	Machine-building	and	
Technological	Progress
Machine-building even in the highly industrialised countries of Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine is technologically some distance behind that of 
other post-industrial Western countries, many of which are enjoying 
a technological revolution based on recent advances in micro- and 
nanoelectronics, genetic engineering, renewable energy engineering and 
information technology. Research, development and computerisation of 
the production of goods and services now account for 75% to 90% of 
GDP growth in developed countries. In Russia, most production lines 
utilise the technologies of the 1930s-1960s, an era associated with mining 
waste, chimneys, toxic effluent in rivers and lakes, poor infrastructure and 
mass poverty. The hi-tech production lines of Russia’s defence industry are 
the exception that proves the rule, but they are isolated from the rest of 
the economy by a veil of secrecy and the industry’s privileged status. It is 
hardly surprising that, according to analysts, the contribution of advanced 
technologies to Russian GDP growth does not exceed 10%, losing the 
country an estimated $12bn-14bn in potential national income2.
In addition to these structural economic deficiencies, industrial facilities 
and equipment are also largely obsolete in CIS countries. In Russia in 
2004, for example, 86.3% of machines and industrial equipment had been 
in operation for more than 10 years, 74% for more than 15 years and 
51% for more than 20 years3. The situation in other CIS countries was no 
better. Is technical progress a realistic aspiration when machine-building 
remains so far behind the standards set by the leading innovators of the 
world?
UNIDO’s estimates of the share of medium and hi-tech products in 
this sector and in total exports do increase our understanding of the 
impact that machinery has on the technological achievements of the 
manufacturing sector in general.
It is clear that such products make unequal contributions to the 
sector and to exports. The first indicator reflects the competitiveness of 
these products within a country’s domestic market, and the second their 
competitiveness in world markets. In almost all post-industrial countries 
(except for Sweden) the second indicator is far larger than the first, 
suggesting strong international competitiveness. A similar situation can 
be seen in newly industrialised countries, e.g., South Korea, Malaysia and 
Mexico. But in Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, medium and hi-tech 
products’ share of total exports is much smaller than their contribution 
2 United Russia (2006) Industrial Policy: Creation of Innovative Economy. United Russia’s 
Keynote Policy, 2 December 2006; Lenchuk Y. (2007) Technological Quasirent, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 23 May.
3 Rosstat data.
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to the domestic manufacturing sector; moreover, in all of the bottom six 
countries this share is significantly lower in absolute terms. The seems 
to be a clear indicator of the technological deficiencies of former Soviet 
countries.
Why are these countries unable to match the achievements of the 
first and subsequent generations of new industrial countries? There are 
several reasons: the complexities involved in transforming the command 
economy into a market one; the CIS’ huge energy and raw material 
resources which draw attention away from problems of competitiveness 
in the machinery sector; and a shortage of engineers and scientific 
specialists, etc. All these issues have been discussed at length in other 
papers, and therefore we will not examine them here. However, there is 
another important factor which receives little attention, namely the lack 
of international industrial cooperation in the machinery sector both within 
the CIS and with non-CIS partners.
Table	4.	1  
Selected manufacturing 
indicators in 12 
countries in 1995  
and 2005
Calculated based on: 
UNIDO. World Industrial 
Development 2005, 
pages 158-163;
UNIDO. Industrial 
Statistics Database, 
2007; CIS Turns 15  
(1991–2005).  
Statistics Selection, 
pages 100-101.
* 2004
Mechanical advances allow production processes to be divided into 
separate operations and facilitate the exchange of goods at different 
stages of the technological cycle (i.e. semi-finished products). There is, 
in essence, a qualitatively higher level of economic cooperation between 
countries when the traditional division of labour is transformed into a 
division of the production process. In the 1900s-1930s, international 
cooperation developed on this basis. Technologically and economically 
integrated production chains, whose separate links were located in 
different countries, performed according to a common schedule and in an 
agreed way, as if they were workshops in the same factory. Components, 
Country
Machinery;’s share 
of manufacturing 
%
Medium and hi-tech products as a 
percentage of total manufacturing
in the sector, % in exports, %
1995 2005 1990 2002 1990 2002
USA 37.4 67.0 60.0 63.7 67.3 74.4
South Korea 40.8 61.5 55.1 64.1 52.9 70.6
Japan 37.8 57.1 66.5 68.1 83.9 86.3
Sweden 36.5 51.2 56.5 66.2 58.1 63.6
Germany 42.0 46.2 66.3 63.2 68.7 74.9
Malaysia 42.4 44.5 52.3 65.1 50.6 76.2
France 34.8 44.1 53.9 50.8 59.2 69.2
Mexico 23.2 29.6 40.9 42.8 64.1 77.1
Turkey 18.0 29.5 35.9 40.3 22.4 32.7
Ukraine n/a 25.2* 45.3 47.9 n/a 47.2
Russia n/a 23.8* 46.3 61.0 n/a 26.7
Georgia n/a 4.3* 43.5 27.4 n/a 45.7
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parts and assemblies moved between them according to a strict timetable, 
ensuring the continuity of the entire technological process right through 
to the relevant finished product.
Some newly industrialised countries have demonstrated that the active 
involvement of enterprises in the technological production processes of 
certain finished goods have enabled them to improve their mechanical 
technology, and bring entire industries up to world standard. Involvement 
in international industrial cooperation begins, of course, with the simplest 
operations performed by local workers. These operations are not isolated 
but integral to an entire production process, and must be performed in 
accordance with strict technological standards in terms of quality, supply 
and many other features, in order to ensure that the particular finished 
product can compete internationally. A foreign parent company must 
not jeopardise the quality of its products, otherwise its competitors will 
eliminate it, and its brand will be irreparably damaged. This encourages 
suppliers of spare parts, components and finished products to attain 
international standards by producing increasingly scientifically and 
technologically advanced products.
China, for example, has made amazing technological advances in 
the last two decades. Initially, this country specialised in producing and 
exporting labour-intensive goods, but in the 1990s it began to specialise 
in the technology-intensive production of shoes and clothes. Chinese 
enterprises began to produce parts and components and to assemble 
finished products for the automotive and IT sectors. By engaging in 
international industrial cooperation, China has mastered with astonishing 
speed the advanced technologies of the electronics, machinery, automotive 
and other medium- and hi-tech sectors. This has made it one of the 
leading exporters of electronic machines (10.7% of the world’s exports), 
office equipment (14.2%), telecommunications equipment (16.4%) and 
computers (26.1%)4. Presently, hi-tech goods constitute 37.2% of China’s 
finished goods exports.5
Previously, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines had used these methods to speed up their modernisation 
and diversification. The results of this strategy are shown in Table 2 
below, which shows foreign trade in machinery and vehicle products 
(since comprehensive customs statistics are available in these sectors). 
International industrial cooperation has been at its most intensive in 
these sectors in particular. The figures clearly show that hi-tech exports 
from these countries correlate quite closely with the imports and exports 
of parts and components (as a proportion of total machinery and vehicle 
imports and exports). The more actively a country participates in 
international production chains, the higher the share of hi-tech products 
in its manufacturing and exports.
4 UNCTAD (2007) Handbook of Statistics 2006-07, p 159.
5 High-tech exports. May 2007 (http://www.Global-production.com)
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*The share of hi-tech products in total manufacturing exports in 2006
Cooperation between machinery enterprises in CIS countries is very 
weak. Statistics indicating the degree of international cooperation in 
machine-building are available for only nine CIS countries. These show 
that imports of parts and components (at current prices) increased from 
$5.4 billion in 1996 to $21.5 billion in 2006, while exports increased from 
$4.6 billion to $9.1 billion. However, their share of machinery and vehicle 
imports is significantly lower on average than in the newly industrialised 
countries (Table 3). Moreover, by 2006 this share had fallen sharply 
compared to 1996. This hinders the flow of semi-finished products from 
developed countries to finished product assembly lines in CIS countries.
Semi-finished machinery forms a declining percentage of imports 
due to a sharp decrease in their imports from other CIS countries. It 
is increasing with non-CIS countries. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine 
and Russia are making significant moves towards trade with non-CIS 
countries. This reinforces the expectation that their engagement in 
international cooperation will fuel their technological progress.
A similar redirection of international supplies may be observed in the 
exports of parts and components from Ukraine, Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 
This implies that their machinery companies are becoming integrated 
into the production chains of non-CIS enterprises as suppliers of semi-
finished products. Their involvement in the earlier stages of the production 
cycle, as mentioned above, helps manufacturers raise the quality of their 
products to international standards. Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan are 
losing these opportunities by scaling down their parts and component 
exports to CIS and non-CIS countries.
Table	4.	2  
Parts and components 
as a percentage of 
machinery and vehicle 
imports and exports in 
11 countries
Calculated based on:  
UN COMTRADE 
Database; the share 
of hi-tech products 
in exports: High-tech 
Exports. May 2007 
(http://www.global-
production.com)
Country
As a proportion of 
machine and vehicle 
imports, %
As a proportion of 
machine and vehicle 
exports, %
Hi-tech 
exports, 
%*
1995 2005 1995 2005
Philippines 62.9 87.0 75.3 88.0 79.4
Malaysia 60.3 74.2 57.6 59.2 70.8
Singapore 63.7 75.7 63.4 73.1 62.4
South Korea 50.9 60.9 50.3 44.1 47.2
Thailand 54.1 60.3 52.6 47.8 41.5
Hungary 39.0 59.4 58.1 49.8 39.5
China 35.9 67.1 33.8 36.5 37.2
Mexico 59.5 59.3 39.9 40.3 30.8
Indonesia 48.4 52.6 41.4 46.9 25.5
Czech 
Republic
41.2 56.0 56.2 49.8 21.2
Brazil 42.3 36.9 56.0 35.5 15.3
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No	Cooperation,	No	Integration
Involvement in international manufacturing cooperation not only 
raises the technological standards of national industries and the quality 
of their finished goods, it also plays an important geo-economic role 
– helping national economies to integrate. International cooperation 
harmonises technical standards across partner countries, develops 
international scientific and technical cooperation, unifies the regulation 
of economic relations in this sphere and so on. Thus producers in these 
countries become integrated into international production and economic 
systems, which in turn promotes the convergence of their legal, fiscal and 
customs regulations. This undoubtedly strengthens the links between the 
economies of these countries.
One of the main indicators of the level of integration between countries 
is their intra-regional trade as a proportion of their total foreign trade. 
In 2005, the majority of intra-regional exports in the EU – 57.9% – 
Table	4.	3  
Parts and components 
as a percentage of 
machinery and vehicle 
imports and exports in 
nine CIS countries (%)
Calculated on basis:  
UN COMTRADE 
Database.
Country In total From/to CIS 
countries
From/to non-
CIS countries
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
Imports
Russia 27.5 19.3 91.9 32.5 16.8 18.4
Ukraine 42.6 32.5 67.2 40.3 27.1 30.0
Belarus 51.2 37.3 64.1 47.2 38.2 25.1
Kazakhstan 33.8 24.9 47.7 30.6 15.2 22.6
Azerbaijan 33.2 35.3 59.2 12.1 23.6 45.2
Armenia 35.7 28.3 36.3 31.2 35.5 27.1
Georgia 30.0 22.3 39.5 37.7 26.7 19.4
Moldova 19.6 25.8 40.3 39.3 14.3 22.9
Kyrgyzstan 44.4 39.6 37.4 48.3 46.8 36.0
CIS-9 33.2 23.0 66.5 34.8 20.1 21.2
Exports
Russia 35.7 37.4 56.6 36.5 16.4 38.2
Ukraine 18.7 44.2 55.7 36.6 7.6 61.3
Belarus 42.2 31.1 41.8 39.4 44.5 17.5
Kazakhstan 28.7 33.9 33.3 50.8 8.6 15.8
Azerbaijan 28.8 15.0 26.8 9.1 47.1 26.7
Armenia 33.5 35.2 32.5 32.2 34.9 42.4
Georgia 30.5 13.6 33.3 12.6 22.2 15.0
Moldova 17.1 31.8 19.4 36.2 13.5 16.0
Kyrgyzstan 38.4 59.3 41.5 20.5 20.4 60.0
CIS-9 42.6 37.5 60.0 38.2 22.9 36.9
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were within EU-15 (i.e., the countries which formed the EU prior to 
the accession of the 12 new Central European member countries). In 
NAFTA, 55.8% of exports were intra-regional and in ASEAN 26.2%. In 
“stagnant” integration groups, this figure was even less: 18.9% in the 
Central American Common Market (CACM), 12.9% in Mercosur and 
8.2% in the Andean Community. We also examine machinery trading 
within these associations and their cooperation in the machinery sector 
(Table 4).
Table	4.	4	 
Intra-regional exports 
of machines, parts and 
components in seven 
integrated supra-
national blocs in 1995 
and 2005 (%)
Calculated using the  
UN COMTRADE Database 
and UNCTAD Handbook 
of Statistics 2006/07, 
p. 49.
* 1996; ** 2006
We note that, as a rule, the bigger the share of machines and vehicles 
in intra-regional exports, the higher the level of integration between 
partner countries. This is true even when the share of machinery in total 
exports in relatively small (e.g., CACM). A reduction in machinery as a 
proportion of exports within a bloc is usually seen when there is also a 
reduction in the level of integration in that bloc (EU-15, Mercosur and 
CACM). As with any other general rule, there are exceptions to this, 
often as a result of external influences. For example, despite the rapid 
international spread of modern production processes, ASEAN’s machinery 
sector still experiences less integration than the EU or NAFTA.
How does the CIS fare in this context?
Firstly, machinery and vehicle exports as a proportion of total intra-
regional exports in the CIS, despite having increased since 1996, are half 
of the level seen in the other three successfully integrated trade blocs. CIS 
countries trade with one another mainly in fuel, raw materials, foodstuffs 
or consumer goods, and here the integration effect is negligible. Secondly, 
the share of parts and components in intra-CIS machinery exports has 
fallen by a quarter since 1996. As a result, parts and components for 
machines and vehicles have fallen from 8.3% of total intra-regional trade 
to 6.3% over the same period, which is three times lower than in the 
EU or NAFTA and six times lower than in ASEAN. Opportunities to 
Trade bloc Machinery as 
a proportion of 
total exports
Parts as a 
proportion of 
machinery 
exports
Intra-regional 
exports as a 
proportion of 
total exports
1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
EU-15 36.5 37.1 42.6 40.1 62.4 57.9
NAFTA 50.0 45.1 48.7 46.3 46.2 55.8
ASEAN 52.5 51.1 72.9 75.3 24.5 26.2
CACM 7.1 5.6 48.6 41.4 21.8 18.9
CIS 15.1* 15.2** 55.0* 51.5** 28.6* 17.5**
Mercosur 27.9 36.6 51.7 34.5 20.3 12.9
Andean 
Community 
14.2 15.7 17.9 20.7 12.0 8.2
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advance integration between partner countries in the CIS are therefore 
being lost.
Attempts have been made in the past to take advantage of such 
opportunities, however. In 1993 and 1994, Russia signed bilateral 
agreements “on industrial and scientific and technical cooperation in the 
defence sector” with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan6. The Ashgabat agreement on 
industrial cooperation between CIS countries, which exempted businesses 
involved in the joint production of certain finished products from taxes and 
cross-border trade tariffs, was signed in December 1993. This agreement 
came into force in February 1998. It has encouraged cooperation in 
aircraft building and other hi-tech sectors. For example, the AN-48 short-
haul aircraft, which is being built jointly by the Voronezh aircraft-building 
association and the Kiev-based Antonov Aircraft Company, is made with 
Russian components (69%) and Ukrainian components (3%). About 
70 Russian companies cooperated with Ukraine in 20047. In fact, most 
supply relationships between defence companies continued to operate in 
the CIS as they had in Soviet times.
However, even this limited degree of cooperation, inherited from 
the USSR, was distributed very unevenly in the post-Soviet space. In 
2005, Russia accounted for 32.4% of total exports of machine parts 
and components and 48.8% of total imports of these goods within the 
CIS, Ukraine accounted for 26.1% and 31.2% respectively, Belarus for 
13.8% and 14.8% and Kazakhstan for 15.1% and 3.6%8. Thus, 86.3% 
of all intra-regional machine-building exports and 98.3% of imports were 
concentrated within these four countries. The share of other CIS countries 
was negligible.
Opportunities for industrial cooperation, even in this specialist field, 
have been dwindling in recent years. The ”bonds” between machine-
builders in different CIS countries, are weakening. Other manufacturing 
sectors are similarly affected. In May 2005, the Russian government 
unilaterally abolished Resolution No. 205, which provided tax breaks 
for enterprises engaged in cooperation in accordance with the Ashgabat 
agreement. This presumptive step was perhaps motivated by Russia’s 
desire to concentrate defence production in Russia, a goal referred to 
more than once by President Vladimir Putin. However, this implicates 
Russia in the destruction of an important element of unity between the 
economies of partner countries9.
Attempts have been made in the last two or three years to avert the 
disintegration of the CIS by increasing economic cooperation between 
CIS countries in the energy sector: leaders of the EurAsEC member 
6 The Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, 16 October 2003
7 The Kommersant newspaper, 1 January 2006
8 Calculated based on: UN COMTRADE Database.
9 However, in September 2006, the Russian government adopted two resolutions (Nos 566 and 
589) on duty-free imports of components and spare parts, but only for producing car and aircraft 
engines.
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countries reached agreement on this issue at a Sochi summit in 2006. The 
agreement envisages the construction of a system of oil and gas pipelines 
to supply energy resources from the CIS to Europe. Under this system, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would become suppliers of 
gas through Russian pipelines, with Ukraine and Belarus as the transit 
countries. The basis of this energy union is that the countries involved sell 
their energy or transport assets to Gazprom or exchange them between 
one another. Turkmenistan, for example, agreed to sell its gas to Europe 
through Gazprom. Russian companies are developing energy fields in 
Uzbekistan. Gazprom has bought a pipeline which brings gas to Armenia 
from Iran, and has become a co-owner of Moldova’s gas-distribution 
system. Ukraine was invited to produce gas in Russia in exchange for 
transferring the Ukrainian transit gas pipeline to Gazprom management10. 
This is all good for the energy companies but such interdependency does 
not guarantee stronger links between national economies or progress 
towards integration. Moreover, in practice these relationships are fraught 
with conflict.
Integration in the former Soviet Union, both within the EurAsEC 
and beyond, can acquire solid foundations and be self-sustaining rather 
than a factor of externally imposed conditions. However, this can happen 
only when CIS countries develop their hi-tech machine-building sectors. 
The EU, NAFTA and ASEAN have succeeded as integration associations 
precisely on this basis. It is impossible to side-step this imperative, by 
choosing to develop the service sector, for example. Nevertheless it will 
take some time to strengthen these high-tech foundations. 
The aforementioned redirection of trade flows in semi-finished 
machinery products from CIS countries to non-CIS countries is allied to 
the realignment of the integration preferences of certain CIS countries 
towards Western or Asian economic centres. In 2006, Ukraine supplied 
67% of its exports to non-CIS countries, Armenia 79%, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan 85%, Russia 86% and Tajikistan 87%11. The CIS economic 
area is gradually but steadily weakening. Since international industrial 
cooperation is not an option for the near term, this process will undoubtedly 
continue, influenced by various external factors.
10 The Vedomosti newspaper, 6 February 2007
11 CIS Interstate Statistics Committee (2007) Foreign Trade of CIS Countries in 2006, Moscow,  
p. 35.
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Cross-border Cooperation  
on Russia’s “Old”  
and “New” Borders
Leonid  
Vardomsky
1.	The	nature	and	purpose	of	cross-border	co-operation
Cross-border cooperation is an early form of international activity 
engaged in by regions. The need to expand economic relations across 
borders has historically determined, and continues to determine, how 
border areas function. In recent decades, the co-operation which has existed 
between border regions has also been recreated within internal regions. 
Today, cross-boarder co-operation is seen as a particularly important form 
of international activity in border areas. Due to its political and economic 
significance, it will always play a leading role in international co-operation 
between regions. 
International activity in border regions typically consists of three 
elements. The first element comprises the relationships which are 
essentially local, e.g., social and cultural interaction between the 
populations of border regions; border trade; shared utilisation of natural 
resources and environmental problems; health, educational and cultural 
services, etc. These components largely determine the nature of cross-
border co-operation.
The second element is the co-operation between border regions in 
the joint execution of responsibilities generally in the hands of the state, 
such as transport, border control, protection of national economic space, 
prevention of and response to natural disasters, etc. 
The third element consists of direct and intermediate foreign trade 
between border regions. The nature of this trade depends on the economic 
potential and structure of the border regions and the state of their 
transport infrastructure.
International economic contact is pivotal to the development of border 
regions, since it enables them to outgrow their status as “peripheral” to 
the national economy. 
The factors that shape the structure and dynamics of cross-border 
co-operation are a combination of the contact and barrier functions of 
national borders; the socio-economic, ethnic and cultural peculiarities of 
border areas; the status of regional governments vis-а-vis international 
affairs; and the level of development of border infrastructure, including 
border control posts.
The nature and dynamics of cross-border co-operation are also 
determined by the degree of co-operation between the neighbouring 
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countries and the associated problems of national security, in its widest 
sense. However, all other things being equal, cross-border co-operation 
is more prevalent where the most developed parts of the two countries 
are close to the boundary which divides them. The level of socioeconomic 
development of border regions also has a significant bearing on the nature 
and diversity of cross-border co-operation, which in turn becomes a major 
force driving the development of the regional economy. 
Experience of international regional co-operation suggests that “high-
level” and “peripheral” integration are inseparable. High-level economic 
contact between countries encourages increased contact between their 
border areas, whilst close links between the border areas can pave the way 
for closer inter-governmental relations and the emergence of integration 
groups.
This is best illustrated by the evolution of national borders between 
EU countries. As European integration strengthened, these borders were 
gradually transformed into administrative borders. The disappearance 
of national barriers within Europe is largely attributable to the 
progress of cross-border co-operation facilitated by the 1980 European 
Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Co-operation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities. The adoption of this Convention was, in 
turn, made possible by the creation of a customs union. Eventually, the 
activities of border regions and cross-border structures, such as the Euro-
regions which are now widely recognised, began to catalyse European 
integration1. 
In contrast to Europe, the disintegration of the USSR resulted in 
the proliferation of new national boundaries that partitioned its common 
economic space. The borders of the former Soviet republics, fully 
traversable in the past, were transformed into barriers between countries. 
The emergence of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space, such as 
the CIS, EurAsEC, the Russia-Belarus Union State and others, could not 
reverse this trend. Ultimately, the fact that these new borders essentially 
serve as barriers demonstrates the high value the newly created states 
place on upholding their national identity, unity and organisation.
Nevertheless, in an environment of general enthusiasm for the 
preservation of national identity, the new border regions of CIS countries 
play a key role in decelerating the trend towards disintegration.
The progress of high-level integration enhances cross-border 
links. Importantly, for this mechanism to be effective, the country’s 
administrative and territorial authorities must have the power to engage 
in international affairs. Today, all federal and most unitary states grant 
such powers to their regions. However, the special rights granted to 
regions in relation to international activities, and the extent of control 
central governments exercise over such activities, vary greatly between 
nations. Accordingly, the influence of peripheral integration on high-level 
1 Granberg A.G. (ed.) (2001) The International and Foreign Trade of the Subjects of the Russian 
Federation. Moscow, Nauchnaya Kniga, pp. 238-270.
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integration is much stronger in countries that are highly decentralised 
and have well developed local self-government systems.
As the EU evolves into a unified socio-economic space, the cross-
border co-operation in this region can be supported upon a uniform legal 
framework. Once national boundaries fade away, cross-border co-operation 
becomes virtually identical to the co-operation between a country’s 
internal regions. The formation of a common economic, social and legal 
space within a group, and the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity2, 
allows cross-border co-operation to diversify dramatically. Once economic 
and legal frameworks are unified, the various institutions that emerge in 
different social sectors and at different administrative and territorial levels 
become the engines of co-operation. The main functions of cross-border 
co-operation in the EU are to enhance the competitiveness of its border 
regions in the global economy, to support their sustainable economic 
development, and to even out the levels of socioeconomic development 
of the co-operating regions. The cross-border co-operation in which such 
institutions play a leading role can thus be described as the institutional 
or partner model of co-operation. 
Where unequally developed countries begin to interact, cross-border 
co-operation is driven by the disparities principally in their consumer 
prices, salaries, unemployment levels, and business environment. Under 
such conditions, trade (including “shuttle” trade) and labour migration 
become central to cross-border co-operation. This model of cross-border 
co-operation is defined as the trade or traditional model. 
In reality, TBC in any particular border area is characterised by a 
unique combination of both the institutional and trade models. As socio-
economic development, national legal frameworks and the barrier and 
contact functions of state borders continue to evolve, so does the structure 
of TBC and, accordingly, its role in the development of border areas.
2. Institutions 
Of all the factors that influence TBC, the most variable are those 
which relate to the border regime – for example, borders may be closed 
or opened just for several hours, if necessary. The balance between the 
contact and barrier functions of borders depends on the laws and regula-
tions pertaining to the economic interaction between Russian regions 
and their foreign neighbours. Together, these regulations, and the bodies 
in charge of enforcing them, constitute TBC institutions. They form the 
operational framework for regional and non-government organisations in-
volved in, or facilitating, cross-border interaction. The institutions which 
are especially important for cross-border co-operation include various na-
tional initiatives aimed at stimulating the development of border regions. 
These institutions, according to modern definitions of the term, also in-
clude local traditions and the populations’ relationships and beliefs, since 
local communities play an important role in border regions. 
2 The principle of subsidiarity means that management functions are transferred to a level at 
which they can be performed to maximum economic effect. 
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The international activities of local governments and communities in 
Russia are regulated by a system of laws and regulations which can be 
divided into three categories. The first category comprises federal laws. 
The most important of these are the laws On the International Trea-
ties of the Russian Federation (1995); On Co-ordination of the Inter-
national Relations and Foreign Trade of the Subjects of the Russian 
Federation (1999); On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the 
Russian Federation (2002); On the Basis of State Regulation of For-
eign Trade (2003); On the State Border of the Russian Federation; 
the Concept of Transboundary Co-operation in the Russian Federation 
(2001), and others. 
The most important regulations in this category are those which 
determine the powers of regional and local governments with regard to 
international affairs. In Russia, such powers are set out in the Constitution 
and the federal laws On the General Organisational Principles of State 
Legislative and Executive Bodies in the Russian Federation and On 
the General Principles of Organisation of Local Self-government in 
the Russian Federation (2003).
It should be noted that cross-border and inter-regional co-operation 
are not governed by any one federal law. Current legislation does not 
confer any preferential status upon border regions. The only exceptions 
to this, in certain regards, are federal laws on the special economic 
zones in Kaliningrad and Magadan Oblasts. Therefore, of particular 
importance to cross-border co-operation are passport, visa, currency, 
customs and migration laws regulating cross-border movement of people, 
money and products, and Federal Target Programmes (FTP) relating 
to the development of border regions. At present, a number of FTPs 
entitled Reducing Disparities in the Socio-economic Development of 
the Regions of the Russian Federation in 2002-2010 and until 2015 are 
being implemented in south Russia, Russia’s Far East, the Trans-Baikal 
region, Kuril Islands and Kaliningrad Oblast. FTPs specific to the transport 
and communications sectors and border and customs infrastructure are 
also important to border regions. Indeed, the 2008 federal budget allocates 
10.5 billion roubles to the State Border FTP. 
The second category comprises inter-governmental documents and 
agreements which outline the objectives, mechanisms and arenas of Russia’s 
co-operation with international organisations and individual countries. 
This category was expanded when, in the summer of 2003, Russia joined 
the European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Co-operation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities. Under this Convention, TBC is 
subject to the powers of territorial communities and authorities which are 
determined by the national laws of each country. The Convention defines 
cross-border co-operation as co-operation between the governments and 
populations of neighbouring regions of different countries. By contrast, 
the definition provided in the Concept of Transboundary Co-operation in 
the Russian Federation places emphasis on well co-ordinated activities 
of the governments of neighbouring countries and focusing on particular 
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co-operation goals. In other words, in the Russian document, cross-border 
co-operation is construed primarily as co-operation between authorities. 
This restricts by definition the social basis of cross-border co-operation 
and raises the prospect that the interests of businesses and populations in 
border regions will be neglected in the process of adopting of federal laws 
or establishing customs, migration and border services.
In Autumn 2006, Russia signed the Supplementary Minutes and 
Appendix No.2 to the European Outline Convention. The Supplementary 
Minutes regulate the legal status and legal personality of cross-border co-
operation bodies (Euro-regions). Appendix No.2 extends the provisions of 
the Convention and the Supplementary Minutes to regions which do not 
border each other directly. Both these documents still need to be ratified 
before they enter into force.
Other important elements of this category are the bilateral agreements 
between Russia and other CIS countries relating to free trade, and the 
agreements made under the aegis of the Russia-Belarus Union State and 
EurAsEC. The legal basis for co-operation between regions in the CIS 
is laid down primarily by the 2004 Concept of Inter-regional and Cross-
border Co-operation of CIS Member Countries. In addition, a number 
of bilateral agreements were adopted by CIS governments to regulate 
inter-regional and cross-border co-operation. These include the agreement 
between the Governments of Russia and Ukraine on co-operation 
between border areas; the programme of inter-regional and cross-border 
co-operation between Russia and Ukraine in 2001-2007 and 2008-2010; 
agreements between the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan on cross-
border co-operation in 1999-2007 and 2008- 2011; agreements between 
the governments of Russia and Ukraine on the procedure for persons 
from border areas crossing the Russo-Ukrainian border; and a similar 
Russo-Kazakh agreement adopted in 2006. The latter documents must be 
ratified before coming into force.
After withdrawing from the Bishkek Agreement on visa-free travel in 
the CIS in 2000, Russia entered into agreements with each of the CIS 
countries on passport and visa requirements for crossing borders.
Russia’s relations with EU countries, including cross-border co-
operation, are regulated by the Agreement On Partnership and Co-
operation with the EU. In addition, Northern European countries and 
Russia established the Barents Euro-Arctic Region in an agreement of 
January 1993. This includes the first-order political bodies of Norway, 
Russia, Finland and Sweden. The regions of Russia and other member 
countries all participate in the Barents Euro-Artic Council founded in 
1992. In 1997, under a Finnish initiative, the Northern Dimension was 
founded to develop co-operation both at country and regional levels. 
Russia is represented in the Northern Dimension by the regions of its 
Northwest Federal District. 
The documents which form the basis of cross-border co-operation 
between Russia and China are the 2001 Agreement On Neighbourliness, 
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Friendship and Co-operation; the 1994 Agreement On the Russo-
Chinese Border Regime, and the 1997 Agreement On the Principles 
of Co-operation between the Administrations (Governments) of the 
Russian Federation and the Governments of the Provinces of China. 
The third (institutional) category comprises co-operation agreements 
which regional and local governmental bodies are authorised to make 
with their foreign counterparts. 
The border regions of Russia and its neighbouring countries have been 
entering into trade and economic co-operation agreements since 1996. 
These agreements were necessitated by the continuing disintegration 
of traditional manufacturing and technological links, which were in 
turn caused by defaults on payments, dwindling working capital, the 
introduction of new currencies and the weakness of banking systems. 
Agreements between regions were expected to assist the relevant 
economies in bypassing the insuperable settlement and payment problems 
of the mid-1990s by encouraging barter practices. 
A significant role in co-operation in this region has been played by 
the Council of Heads of Border Regions of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, 
which was founded in 1994 and which now comprises 19 political units 
(7 Russian, 9 Ukrainian and 4 Belarusian).
Since the mid-1990s, Russian border regions have participated in the 
establishment and operation of Euro-regions – complex regional projects 
funded by various sources, including the EU. 
The border regions of Russia and other CIS countries are now seeing 
the emergence of business associations and clubs aimed at promoting co-
operation with neighbouring countries. These institutions help companies 
launched since the transition to the market economy and the creation of 
new national boundaries, to penetrate each other’s markets.
The laws and regulations which fall into the first of the three categories 
described above are decisive in shaping cross-border co-operation. However, 
they do not provide any specific legal mechanisms for cross-border co-
operation. The federal laws which relate to cross-border co-operation 
apply equally to all the subjects of the Russian Federation. The efficacy 
of the laws which are included in the second category is determined 
by the extent to which the provisions of national laws are adjusted to 
comply with international treaties. The significance of the third category 
of regulations stems entirely from the operability of the laws described in 
categories one and two, since all new regional cross-border co-operation 
organisations operate in accordance with federal laws and international 
treaties. However, regulations in this third category relate to initiatives of 
regional and local authorities and business associations which also strike 
agreements and establish structures at their respective levels. 
The institutional environment of cross-border co-operation has 
been changing since the beginning of this decade. These changes are 
attributable to the growth of the Russian economy and individual income, 
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economic adaptation to new geopolitical conditions, changes in domestic 
and foreign policy in response to new threats to Russia’s security, and 
new opportunities to pursue a more expansive foreign policy.
The growth of the Russian economy and individual prosperity has made 
Russia’s labour market very attractive for immigrants from neighbouring 
countries to the south and east. This in turn has led to problems of 
illegal labour migration, terrorism and drug trafficking. In some regions, 
uncontrolled immigration is seen to have fuelled the proliferation of 
powerful cartels and criminal groups organised on ethnic lines. These 
undesirable developments led to the adoption of stricter passport, visa 
and immigration requirements. In 2006, in order to restrict illegal cross-
border movement, Russia extended its border zone from 5km to 30 km of 
its border. Travel and business activity in this zone are strictly controlled 
by the Federal Security Service.3 
The centralisation of power and financial resources in a federal entity, 
the redistribution of power between administrative levels and departments, 
and increased administrative control over international activities in regions, 
all have a negative impact on cross-border co-operation in Russia’s regions, 
although no direct restrictions are in force. The expansion of cross-border 
co-operation is hindered in particular by the limited financial resources 
of regions whose expenditure must be commensurate with their power, 
as stipulated by Law No.122-F3, dated July 2004. This law, for example, 
prevents Russian border regions from participating in cross-border co-
operation projects which require co-financing.
3.	Scenarios	of	cross-border	co-operation
Russia borders many countries with different economic and political 
systems, and therefore the institutional and economic conditions for cross-
border co-operation vary from one border area to another. Moreover, these 
conditions continue to change, reflecting developments in national legal 
systems, the overall dynamics of economic interaction between Russia 
and its neighbours, globalisation, regional co-operation, and external 
and internal threats. These diverse conditions affecting cross-border 
co-operation, and the different ways in which cross-border co-operation 
operates, allow us to define three main cross-border co-operation scenarios: 
European, Chinese and post-Soviet.
The European scenario
That the EU is adjacent to Russia, albeit at its periphery, is certainly 
beneficial for Russia’s border regions. Russia borders the EU at its most 
economically advanced northwestern part, which bears much of the 
responsibility for the full-scale modernisation of Russia’s economy and 
social sector, and the spatial redistribution of its economic forces and 
population. Russian border regions are able to avail themselves of EU 
technology and the financial resources they need in order to resolve 
their social and economic problems, whilst the EU benefits from cross-
3 Gudko N. (2006) Russia Restores the Borders of the USSR. Kommersant, 02 August 2006.
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border co-operation with Russia through the accelerated the development 
of Baltic and Northern areas and, as a consequence, a reappraisal of their 
“peripheral” status. Finland is northern Europe’s most fervent advocate 
of co-operation with Russian border regions. 
Brussels also attaches great importance to the adoption of EU standards 
in neighbouring countries, viewing this not only as a geopolitical but also 
an economic step towards a “wider Europe”. 
The European scenario of cross-border co-operation is characterised 
by the presence of strong development institutions and relatively strict 
customs and border regimes. For example, in 2007, visa requirements for 
the inhabitants of Russian regions bordering Poland and the Baltic states 
were tightened significantly as the latter joined the Schengen Agreement. 
Until July 2007, Russian people from these regions were able to travel 
to Poland and Lithuania with free singe-entry or multi-entry visas. The 
new procedure made cross-border movement more difficult, also affecting 
people in the border areas of Poland and Lithuania4.
Another characteristic feature of this scenario of cross-border co-
operation is that the executive and local autonomous governing bodies 
of Russian regions take an active part in cross-border co-operation by 
entering into formal agreements with their counterparts from neighbouring 
countries. Co-operation involves not only transport and trade, but also 
environment, education, culture, information technology and innovation, 
and is dependent upon jointly developed and approved programmes 
and projects. Thus, the European scenario of cross-border co-operation 
exemplifies the institutional model of cross-border co-operation. Until 
2007, European partners had provided technical and financial assistance 
to Russian regions through the TASIS and INTERREG programmes. 
The Baltic region merits particular attention with regard to cross-border 
and inter-regional co-operation between Russia and the EU. Two major 
programmes, the Baltic Sea Region INTERREG III B Neighbourhood 
Programme, and Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010 
(VASAB), are being implemented here. The latter project focuses on cities 
and municipal economics. Other institutions active in the Baltic region 
include the Union of Baltic Cities and the Baltic Marine Environment 
Protection Commission (Helsinki Commission). Together, these regional 
and sub-regional institutions form levels of the Northern Dimension.5 
Euro-regions also play an important role in cross-border co-operation 
between Russia and the EU. The municipal and regional authorities of 
4 Lithuania proposes to eliminate this barrier by issuing special permits to individuals residing 
within the 30km border zone. However, this will not be sufficient to satisfy Kaliningrad Oblast, 
as the city of Kaliningrad lies 50 km from the border. Smirnov V. (2008) People of Three Quality 
Classes. Vremya Novostei, 19 February 2008, p. 4.
5 Busygina I.. Deryagina A. (2007) EU Strategy towards Russia and Trans-border Co-operation 
in the Northwest. Research and Co-ordination Council for International Studies of Moscow State 
Institute of International Affairs, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Analytical Notes. Issue 7, 
August.
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Kaliningrad Oblast co-founded the Neman Euro-region in 1997, the Baltic 
Euro-region in 1998 and the Saule Euro-region in 1999. In 2000, the Republic 
of Karelia and a number of neighbouring Finnish provinces co-founded the 
Karelia Euro-region. In 2004, Pskov Oblast and the neighbouring regions 
of Estonia and Latvia co-founded the Pskov-Livonia Euro-region. The aim 
of Euro-regions was to expand cross-border contact, to improve living 
standards in border regions, and to support the modernisation of border 
control posts. However, until 2007 the Euro-regions were largely reliant 
upon EU funding, which was somewhat modest. As a result, most of the 
commitments declared at the inception of these cross-border institutions 
have remained at the planning stage only. 
On the whole, Russia has consistently been the weak link in this 
co-operation. In financing small projects, the EU sought principally to 
strengthen its influence in the neighbouring regions of Russia, and to 
secure supplies of fuel and raw materials from them. In this sense, co-
operation between Russia and the EU was not equal.
The 2003 EU strategy with regard to relations with neighbouring 
countries following the dramatic expansion of the EU in 2004 envisaged 
that an Action Plan would be adopted by each new accession country, 
and that these Action Plans would later be incorporated into the “New 
Neighbourhood Programme”. These Plans were launched in 2004, and 
until 2006 they were financed by TACIS and INTERREG III. In 2007, 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument was founded to 
replace the latter two programmes. Six Neighbourhood Programmes were 
created for Russia: 1. North (Kolarctic), incorporating Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk Oblasts and the Nenets Autonomous Territory; 2. Karelia; 
3. Southeast Finland, Russia (Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg); 4. 
the Baltic Sea (Karelia, St. Petersburg, Murmansk Oblast, Leningrad 
Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Arkhangelsk 
Oblast and the Nenets Autonomous Territory); 5. Estonia, Latvia, Russia 
(Leningrad and Pskov Oblast, St. Petersburg); and 6. Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia (Kaliningrad).
In 2005, under the INTERREG III B programme, the Developing 
Excellence (DEX) project was initiated aimed at broadening co-operation 
between the regional authorities of central Finland and northwest Russia 
on the development and implementation of regional business support 
strategies. The Centres of Excellence to be set up under this project 
were expected to assist the authorities in developing and promoting 
co-operation projects as part of the Neighbourhood Programmes in 
five regions: Leningrad, Murmansk and Pskov Oblasts, Karelia and St. 
Petersburg. 
However, Russia did not welcome these EU initiatives, since it does 
not consider itself to be a target of the New Neighbourhood policy. 
Russia refused to draft an Action Plan, and the proposed Neighbourhood 
Programmes were rejected by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Instead, Russia insisted that its strategic partnership with the EU should 
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develop in a special way which far exceeded the scope of “neighbourhood” 
politics.6 
The deadlock was broken at the end of 2006 with the reorganisation 
of the Northern Dimension. The key provision of the new Northern 
Dimension policy is that this organisation will be responsible for 
implementing roadmaps for the four Russia-EU Common Spaces. The 
EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland will each have the status of partner 
within the reorganised Northern Dimension. The partners will have equal 
rights in decision-making and may co-finance approved projects. 
At present, the Northern Dimension has two partnerships: the Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership and the Northern Dimension 
Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being. During its four-year 
existence, the Environmental Partnership has established itself as an 
effective multilateral mechanism of co-operation. The European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development funds the Partnership and also acts as 
its project manager. The Partnership has a total EUR 1.8 billion at its 
disposal, and finances fifteen projects, typically through loans. Some of 
these funds are being allocated in the form of co-financing grants from the 
so-called NDEP Support Fund, which presently totals some EUR 204.7 
million of donated funds (EUR 148.7 million for nuclear safety projects 
and EUR 56 million for non-nuclear environmental projects). Approval 
was granted for financing eight projects in northwest Russia. Since Russia 
is the largest recipient of NDEP aid, the Russian Government decided to 
donate an additional EUR 10 million to the Support Fund in 2006-2010. 
The reorganisation of the Northern Dimension facilitated the launch of 
a number of cross-border co-operation projects. Russia intends to allocate 
about EUR 25 million for co-financing cross-border co-operation projects 
being implemented jointly with EU countries up to the year 2013. This 
accounts for about 10% of the total value of programmes proposed by 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for Russia 
(EUR 255 million). It should be noted that EU regions bordering Russia 
receive much heavier subsidies from EU structural funds as compensation 
for economic losses linked to their marginal position in the Union. This 
support brings the eastern regions of the EU to average national levels, 
but widens the gap between them and the adjacent Russian regions. 
Nevertheless, inter-regional and cross-border co-operation between the 
Russian and EU regions is relatively effective. cross-border co-operation 
with the EU, in its various forms, enables Russian regions to access 
finance provided by European partners under co-financing schemes and, 
just as importantly, to access new technology. The approved projects 
all have specific targets; they are aimed at improving socioeconomic 
conditions and promoting investment opportunities in border regions. 
Although the existing multi-level system of cross-border co-operation 
between Russia and the EU is not sufficient to support full-scale economic 
6 I. Busygin, ibidem, p. 12-13.
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modernisation in this part of Russia7, it creates the institutional conditions 
and infrastructure for the redevelopment of regional economies, and 
generates new thinking on how to steer this redevelopment.
The prospects for cross-border co-operation between Russian and 
the EU border regions will depend principally on the scale and general 
direction of future Russian-EU co-operation. To a certain extent, these 
prospects will be defined by the agreement made with the Council of 
Europe establishing a European centre for inter-regional and cross-border 
co-operation in Russia. 
The Chinese scenario
The Chinese integration scenario is characterised by the prevalence of 
trade in the cross-border co-operation structure. Cross-border co-operation 
with China is critical to Russian border areas since it compensates for the 
disruption of economic relations between these areas and the European 
part of Russia, the Urals, and West and East Siberia which resulted from 
soaring transport tariffs. Cross-border co-operation provides China with 
a market for its rapidly growing consumer goods industry, and access to 
Russian raw materials. Cross-border trade also allows both countries to 
maintain good employment levels in their border areas.
In its relatively early stages, Russo-Chinese cross-border trade boomed, 
thanks to significant disparities in the prices of consumer and industrial 
goods and the relaxed border controls that allowed visa-free travel. This 
initial boom began to level off in 1993 following the introduction of new 
visa requirements and restrictions on barter and shuttle trade. 
Since 1993, day-return, visa-free travel has been increasingly popular 
in border areas. Interestingly, Russian visitors to China have by far 
outnumbered Chinese visitors to Russia. Buoyant shuttle trade has 
boosted the entire regional economy, and has provided the impetus for 
the development of local infrastructure, the building of new roads and the 
emergence of a huge number of new hotels in border towns. 
In recent years, this spontaneous trade has become much more 
established. Trading estates have been built close to the main border 
control posts, primarily on China’s initiative, to facilitate small-scale, 
wholesale trade. In 1998 and 1999, inter-governmental agreements were 
signed which simplified border crossing procedures for Russian and 
Chinese nationals visiting trading estates on both sides of the border. 
Generally, cross-border co-operation between Russia and China does 
follow the traditional model.
Unlike Russia, China pursues a systematic policy to exploit the potential 
of cross-border co-operation, granting its border areas preferential tax 
and customs status and extensive powers with regard to cross-border 
co-operation. These privileges apply only to certain border districts 
7 Economic modernisation is viewed by the author as structural change with an emphasis on 
higher-value-added industries and ongoing renewal of product ranges based on new technology.
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and territories. In 1992, under State Council resolutions, large special 
economic zones and smaller provincial-level zones were founded in Inner 
Mongolia (Manzhouli), Heilongjiang (Heihe and Suifenhe) and Jirin 
(Hunchun). The government of Heilongjiang in turn adopted a number 
of resolutions to encourage cross-border trade, granting border districts 
certain privileges normally granted only at provincial level.
On 1 January 1999, the so-called “zero-rate” import duty on timber 
was introduced, and since then virtually every Chinese business licensed 
for import and export has been able to import timber. As a result, Russian 
timber has increased from 14% of China’s total timber imports in the late 
1990s to nearly 50% at present. The massive trade in timber began to 
threaten the future of forestry in Russian border areas, whilst an oversized 
wood-processing industry emerged on the other side of the border.
Labour migration is another important component of the Chinese 
cross-border co-operation scenario. China exploits the “Russia factor” 
to counter unemployment in its border provinces, and Chinese workers 
help to ease the labour shortages of Siberian and Far Eastern oblasts of 
Russia.
In recent years, border trade has become somewhat less lucrative 
for China, following the introduction of a unified customs tariff and 
the abolition of the 50% tax exemption for border trade. Since China’s 
accession to the WTO, it is no longer able to apply liberal regional regimes 
to foreign trade. 
It is increasingly apparent that the capacity of border and shuttle 
trade to act as levers of economic development is all but exhausted, and 
new mechanisms and opportunities have failed to develop fast enough 
to prevent a slowdown in cross-border co-operation. China is seriously 
concerned about this loss of momentum and is seeking ways to revive 
cross-border co-operation in the new economic conditions. One of the 
weaknesses to have been identified is the absence of an adequate financial 
infrastructure. Although leading Russian and Chinese banks have forged 
a number of agreements on the servicing of inter-governmental treaties, 
banks in Russia’s Far East still have no direct clearing system to cater 
for the proliferation of border businesses. 
Co-operation between banks began to increase rapidly in Autumn 
2003, when the Central Bank of Russia and the People’s Bank of China 
agreed upon the use of Russian roubles and Chinese RNB in border 
commercial transactions.
The Chinese authorities launched the concept of free trade border 
zones (FTBZ), formed under the umbrella of border trade and economic 
complexes (BTEC). This concept promises to revitalise cross-border co-
operation despite the disparities which persist between the institutional 
frameworks of Russia and China. FTBZs could be regarded as an “oriental” 
form of the Euro-region: as in Europe, the emergence of these entities 
will be preceded and steered by the creation of an equal institutional 
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framework for cross-border co-operation on both sides of the border. 
However, it would appear that, so far, Moscow has failed to acknowledge 
the potential of FTBZs and BTECs. An example of this is the relatively 
poor trading in the Pogranichny-Suifenhe BTEC, which was co-founded by 
the administrations of the Primorsky Territory and Heilongjiang province. 
The Russian part of this BTEC has been situated in a border zone behind 
engineering lines, and access to it is restricted for both Russian and 
Chinese nationals.
China has focused on co-operation in investment; it invests in facilities 
being built in Russia and provides incentives for Russian investors in its 
border regions. China is a leading co-founder of JVs in Russia’s Far East, 
but its cumulative investments account for a mere 5% of all foreign 
capital in the region. The investment climate in Chinese border regions 
is far more competitive than it is in Russia, hence the stark inequality in 
foreign investment flows. For example, the ratio of Russian investments 
in Heilongjiang to Chinese investments in Russia’s Far East is four to 
one. 
China is mainly interested in creating new enterprises in industries 
such as retailing, hotels and catering, gambling, forestry, wood processing, 
and construction.
On the whole, the Chinese scenario of cross-border co-operation, 
comprising mainly trade and export of labour to Russia, preserves the 
raw-material orientation of the economy of Russian border regions, but in 
the sectors which produce the lowest added value.
At the beginning of 2008, Russia and China signed an inter-
governmental agreement on the efficient utilisation and protection of 
transboundary waters, thus adding an environmental aspect to the future 
agenda of cross-border co-operation.
Moscow is apparently running out of ideas on how to modify cross-
border co-operation and use it to further improve prosperity in Siberia 
and the Far East, which still falls short of the national average. The 
development of border trading complexes has virtually come to a standstill, 
since no attempt is being made to provide a suitable legal framework for 
these.
Hopes for a renaissance in the regional economy are being pinned 
on the expansion of fuel and energy infrastructure. The most significant 
projects being undertaken in this field are the Bureiskaya Hydroelectric 
Plant; a new power transmission line from Boguchanskaya Hydroelectric 
Plant, a gas pipeline to northwest China and an oil pipeline from Taishet 
to Skovorodino, Amurskaya Oblast, with a spur to China. New transport 
networks and modern border control posts will all be built under a high-
budget FTP for the Far East and Trans-Baikal region.
The post-Soviet scenario
The main facilitators of cross-border co-operation between Russia 
and other CIS countries are visa-free travel (except in Georgia) and the 
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various foreign trade concessions established under bilateral free-trade 
agreements and multi-lateral co-operation agreements. Until recently, the 
chief concern of Russian and other CIS border areas was the mitigation of 
the effects of disintegration. The partitioning of the post-Soviet economic 
space dealt a blow to all border regions. Most traditional supply and 
marketing channels were rendered uneconomic; new customs and border 
procedures, spiralling transport costs, and high financial and customs 
risks compelled businesses in border regions to restrict their output 
and seek new trading opportunities. Informal attempts to recoup the 
losses resulting from the new border controls ranged from commonplace 
smuggling to elaborate schemes to minimise transaction costs and 
commercial risk. These are the factors which have rendered cross-border 
co-operation within the CIS very different from cross-border co-operation 
elsewhere in the world.
Cross-border communication became very difficult, disrupting the 
lives of many inhabitants, particularly where communities are split across 
borders. In Belgorod oblast, for example, 40% of families have relatives 
or friends in Ukraine. Formerly, it was not unusual for people in border 
areas to have a job over the border from where they lived. But now, 
keeping such jobs, even where it remains possible, is beset by legal 
problems. 
Historically, the larger cities of the Soviet republics served the needs 
of the neighbouring “foreign” economies. For example, Kharkov and 
Donetsk – the major industrial, research and cultural centres of eastern 
Ukraine – were just as important to adjacent Russian oblasts. Likewise, 
Novosibirsk, Omsk and Barnaul in Russia once maintained reciprocal 
relationships with large stretches of Kazakhstan. Regrettably, these 
extensive traditional links have been eroded, and with them the potential 
they had for diversifying the socioeconomic development of the cities in 
question.
In 1993, local government in the border regions of Russia and Ukraine 
proposed the establishment of a Council of Border Oblasts, and achieved 
this goal in 1994. The Council was intended as a means of assisting trade, 
economic and cultural co-operation between Russia and Ukraine, limiting 
the adverse impact of the new border regimes. It was also conceived as 
a lobbying body, exerting pressure to gain preferential tax and customs 
treatment for technologically interdependent companies divided by 
borders. From this point onwards, cross-border co-operation institutions 
began to emerge in Russia and neighbouring CIS states. This process was 
encouraged by the 1996 agreements on trade and economic co-operation 
between border regions, which have become integral to the institutional 
framework of cross-border co-operation.
The border regions of Russia and its neighbouring countries have been 
entering into trade and economic co-operation agreements since 1996. 
These agreements were necessitated by the continuing disintegration 
of traditional manufacturing and technological links, which were in 
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turn caused by defaults on payments, dwindling working capital, the 
introduction of new currencies and the weakness of banking systems. 
Agreements between regions were expected to assist the relevant 
economies in bypassing the insuperable settlement and payment problems 
of the mid-1990s by encouraging barter practices.
As Soviet-era supply and marketing channels became more and more 
expensive, and import substitution gathered pace, marketing became 
central to every border economy. Border regions promote their products 
in each other’s markets through exhibitions, fairs, trading houses and 
specialised trading companies. The direct links between CIS regions have 
enabled small- and medium-sized businesses to enter foreign markets, 
whilst regional-level agreements have afforded them some protection 
against the risk of possible interference from local executive bodies. The 
latter is especially important, given the weakness of other protection 
mechanisms available to participants in cross-border co-operation. Until 
now, cross-border co-operation between Russia and other CIS countries 
has been dominated by elements of the traditional model.
The prevalence of the traditional model in cross-border co-operation 
paid dividends in terms of its contribution to economic recovery, but its 
efficacy has proved increasingly inadequate in the face of new challenges. 
The post-Soviet cross-border co-operation scenario promises little in the 
way of economic modernisation in border regions – moreover, its pace has 
slowed palpably. The potent catalyst of the traditional model, i.e., regional 
disparities in the prices of products and services, has dissipated, as price 
patterns incorporated transport costs and became more or less uniform 
across the CIS. In addition, the economic benefit of the increase in sales 
outlets and new sources of cheaper products and services has waned. Now, 
the remaining economic potential of the traditional model stems from 
differences in wage and unemployment levels and business environment. 
However, whether or not these differences play a constructive role is 
principally a question of border, migration and customs controls, and 
tariffs and taxes on exports and imports, i.e., the degree of liberalisation 
of cross-border movement. Ironically, the general trend is still towards 
tighter regulations, and there are few means available to restrict the 
ensuing losses. The Convention on cross-border co-operation between 
CIS has still to be adopted, although in draft form it has been under 
consideration by CIS bodies since 2005. The approval process for the laws 
On Inter-regional Co-operation and On Trans-border Co-operation 
drafted by the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of CIS Members Countries 
is similarly protracted. The cumbersome approval procedures of Russia’s 
federal ministries are largely responsible for these delays.8
Russia’s diplomatic relations with its neighbours in the CIS vary 
greatly, and these variations are manifest in cross-border co-operation 
patterns. cross-border co-operation is practically non-existent along the 
8 CIS Executive Committee (2007) On the Socioeconomic Condition of CIS Member States in 
2006 and Development Trends in 2007. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Fed-
eration, Moscow, p. 311-313.
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Russo-Georgian border. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although most 
inhabitants hold Russian passports, the development of cross-border 
co-operation has been hindered by the lack of a legal framework. This 
situation is likely to change following Russia’s withdrawal, in March 
2008, from the 1996 Agreement of the Heads of CIS States On Measures 
for Settling the Conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia). Russia does not intend 
to observe the ban on trade and other economic relations with Abkhazia 
which is imposed by that Agreement. Russia and Georgia still have to 
reach agreement on a number of cross-border regulatory issues. Control 
posts on the Russo-Georgian border are poorly organised and equipped, 
and their operability depends not only on political changes, but also on 
weather conditions. The development of cross-border co-operation between 
Russia and Azerbaijan is limited by the poverty of their border regions, 
the permanent threat of inter-ethnic clashes9 and periodic disputes over 
the utilization of water from the Samur border river.
The highest level of economic interaction can be seen on the Russo-
Belarusian border, thanks to a successful bilateral customs union and fully 
harmonised migration control procedures. Simplified access to Russian 
markets is probably the most important benefit for Belarusian border 
regions. However, systemic inequalities between the two economies 
appear to have had a negative impact on cross-border co-operation. In 
addition, Belarusian oblast governments are less powerful than their 
Russian counterparts vis-а-vis international affairs.
Cross-border co-operation between Russia and Ukraine reflects their 
comprehensive commitment to the concept of Euro-regions. Several 
Euro-regions are now in existence, including Dnepr (Bryansk, Gomel 
and Chernigov Oblasts), Yaroslavna (Kursk and Sumy Oblast) and 
Slobozhanschina (Belgorod and Kharkov Oblasts); the Donbass Euro-
region (Rostov and Lugansk Oblasts) is in the pipeline. It is fair to say 
that Ukraine’s input to the cross-border co-operation legislative work 
has been far more constructive, perhaps due to Ukraine’s enthusiastic 
approach to European integration and proven EU instruments. The fact 
that Ukraine uses the concept of Euro-regions so extensively demonstrates 
the importance Kiev attaches to cross-border co-operation with Russian 
border areas.
Euro-regions do not function properly, however, in the context of 
Russian and Ukrainian border areas. The success of the EU Euro-regions 
model rests largely upon the powers granted to regional authorities, 
development initiatives and institutions created for local communities 
and financial support from the centre. Such conditions are not typical 
in highly centralised states such as Russia or Ukraine. The activities 
engaged in by cross-border structures “alarm state authorities, who fear 
that independent foreign trade and policies applied by Euro-regions may 
undermine the influence of the centre”10 and threaten national territorial 
integrity. Finally, an absence of trust at the highest level – the sources 
9 Territories along the Russo-Azeri border are populated by the Lezgins. See also: Alenova O. 
(2007) Not Far from Here. Vlast, No.14, 2007, p. 26-31. 
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of which are well known – makes the outlook for deeper integration 
of Russia and Ukraine, including cross-border co-operation, somewhat 
poor. 
Cross-border co-operation between Russia and Kazakhstan is quite 
extensive and has a sound institutional framework including inter-
governmental agreements, bilateral inter-regional agreements, the Forum 
of Heads of Border Regions of Russia and Kazakhstan, etc. Trade fairs 
and exhibitions are held on a regular basis. Both Russia and Kazakhstan 
have highly-developed industries located along the border, pursue similar 
political and economic reforms and lead the CIS in terms of the diversity and 
scale of their governmental interaction. However, a persistent weakness 
of cross-border co-operation with Kazakhstan is that the financing of 
cross-border projects is uncoordinated and regarded as separate from the 
national and oblast budgets. Recently, Russian and Kazakh banks have 
begun showing an interest in financing these projects, and Kazakhstan 
has come up with a proposal to establish a number of bilateral cross-
border co-operation centres. It is envisaged that the first such centre will 
be built near a border control post between Taskala, West Kazakhstan, 
and Ozinki in Saratov Oblast11.
So far, post-Soviet cross-border co-operation has not been able to boast 
a profound effect on economic modernisation, reciprocal investment or 
exchange of technology. But its social component is nonetheless important 
to many Russian border regions in that labour migration helps them to 
reduce deficits in the permanent and seasonal workforce. However, this 
benefit is limited by the overly centralised and costly work-permit system 
in Russia. Permit procedures are very lengthy, and prospective employers 
are required to pay a deposit to the immigration authorities which is 
not returned to them if their employee is deported for any offence under 
Russian law. The 2007 amendments to Russia’s new immigration law 
(adopted on 15 January 2007) cut immigrant labour even further in 2008. 
The new quota for foreign CIS nationals who may be officially employed 
in Russia is 1.2 million.12 These amendments complicate matters for 
border regions which had heavily relied on the so-called labour migration 
“pendulum”. 
Besides the new passport and immigration restrictions, cross-border co-
operation in the CIS is seriously impeded by delays in the harmonisation 
of national laws. For example, the continuing differences between Russia 
and Belarus on tariff and non-tariff regulation and export and import 
licences have prompted these two countries to restrict bilateral trade 
in certain products, causing economic losses to both parties. Another 
obstruction to trade within the CIS is the lack of uniformity in product 
10 Vendina O., Kolosov O (2007) Partnership that Bypasses Barriers. Russia in the Global Poli-
tics, January-February.
11 Reshetnikova N. (2007) The Russo-Kazakh Forum Widens Co-operation between the Two Coun-
tries. Kontinent Partnerstva, Eurasian Development Bank. October, p. 17-23.
12 Vykhovanets O. (2008) Labour Migration: the 2007 Results and 2008 Scenarios. Eurasian 
Heritage Fund, Moscow. 06.June 2008. http://www/euarasianhome.org./hml/t/expert=ru&nic=
expert&pid=1425
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certification requirements. Obtaining the necessary certificates is often 
a lengthy and expensive process, and sometimes small- or medium-sized 
businesses abandon the process altogether.
Many roads to border control posts are poorly maintained; the 
responsible regional authorities have limited budgets and have proposed 
that the duty to maintain these roads be transferred to Russia’s federal 
Ministry of Transport. The Ministry, for its part, argues that increasing 
the number of border control posts and access roads to them serves the 
interests of the regions and therefore the latter should maintain them 
with their own funds.
Similar friction arises where regional authorities propose to establish 
new border control posts to simplify customs and control procedures for 
local inhabitants. Apart from the financial and technical considerations, 
such initiatives typically face insurmountable problems associated with 
the proper registration and monitoring of the movement of people, goods 
and vehicles across borders, and in reaching agreement with the foreign 
counterpart.
The future of cross-border co-operation between Russia and other CIS 
countries will depend primarily on their ability to counteract the disruption 
caused by new border controls. At present, mainstream political opinion in 
the CIS clearly prioritises border security over cross-border co-operation. 
However, the current speed of development of CIS economies requires a 
more decisive approach to wider co-operation.
The place of cross-border co-operation in Russia’s economic 
development strategy is still to be determined, and there is a failure 
to perceive fully the effect that cross-border co-operation has on the 
economy. These appear to be the most pressing challenges for Russian 
co-operation with CIS countries. Finally, the emphasis on the security 
and defence functions of border regions limits the potential for cross-
border co-operation even further.
Economic	Integration:		
Industries,	Sectors,	Issues
Eurasian Development Bank
The CIS Common  
Electric Power Market Evgeny  
Vinokurov
1.	Introduction
 An effective electric-power industry represents a crucial infrastruc-
tural foundation for economic growth. In turn, developed mechanisms 
for transborder trade and investments can considerably increase the total 
effectiveness and reliability of the electric-power industry. Work on the 
introduction of such mechanisms is carried out within the framework of 
creating the Common Power Market of the CIS. The following chapter 
covers the CPM’s prospects and potential obstacles to overcome.
 The 1990s passed without much trace of activity and consequently 
mutual trade and investment levels in the CIS are very low today. Energy 
transmission between CIS countries has decreased by three to four times 
compared with the 1980s. Nowadays, statistics demonstrate the stagna-
tion of energy flows between CIS countries. Imports and exports between 
them account for 5-6% of internal energy consumption. Overall, the 
CIS is a net exporter of electric power, however the absolute figures for 
both imports and exports are not significant. They do not reflect existing 
potential: with substantial deposits of coal and gas, huge hydro-energy 
potential and competitive advantages in power engineering, CIS countries 
should be realistically able to increase supplies.
The situation in the post-Soviet area is unique. Unlike the EU, North 
America, South America, South-East Asia and other macro-regions who 
wish to create a CPM, the USSR already had a single system, which was 
founded on a central administration. The CIS countries inherited a single 
set of technical standards from the USSR, as well as developed trans-
border capacity for transmission of electric power. Currently, the subject 
under consideration is creating an effective common electricity market 
based on market principles. 
In its formation, the CPM may pass through four stages: (1) from indi-
vidual national energy markets, (2) to a market, where transborder trade 
plays an important part, (3) to a regional market with common rules and 
finally (4) to a regional secondary or futures market.
Today, due to the serious measures taken to provide uninterrupted 
work in the parallel mode and increasing mutual energy flows, CIS coun-
tries are nearing the second stage, with the main drivers of the inte-
gration being Russia and Kazakhstan. However, the CPM can only be 
considered complete after the third stage – a regional spot market with 
common rules. On the way to creating such a market, CIS countries will 
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have to overcome a number of obstacles. In our opinion, the most obtru-
sive barrier is the incomplete liberalisation of the large Russian market 
system. The complete liberalisation of the Russian energy market, which 
is expected in 2011, will enable considerable progress to be made in form-
ing a CPM for the CIS. Of course, a number of other issues should also 
be solved. E.g. the effective functioning of the Central Asian water and 
energy system represents a complex problem. Other issues are related to 
transit tariffs, customs controls and technical standards. Without solving 
these issues, the full participation of the region’s nations in a CPM is 
impossible. 
Finally, an interesting issue is extending the CPM beyond the post-
Soviet area. We believe that the economic logic of the CPM urges its 
creation and expansion. 
This chapter begins by considering the condition and dynamics of mu-
tual trade and investments in the electric power industry of CIS countries 
and EurAsEC, which forms the basis for consideration and estimation of 
integration initiatives within the framework of the CIS and EurAsEC. 
Following this is an analysis of systematic, economic, legal and technical 
barriers, which set obstacles to the development of a common electric 
power market. In the following section we prove the expediency of going 
beyond the boundaries of the post-Soviet area and the creation of the 
Eurasian common electric power market. The conclusions of this review 
are summarised at the end. 
2.	Mutual	Trade	and	Investment	in	the	Electric	Power	Sector		
of	the	CIS
The intensiveness of the formation of common electric power markets 
can be characterised by the dynamics of trade in electric power and level 
of mutual investment in the sector. Using these indicators, one could 
track the level of regional integration in this sector. Within this, mutual 
investments are the most significant and sustainable indicators because 
of their long-term conditions, and also because trans-border investments 
in generation and distribution often create sustainable trade flows be-
tween countries. One example is the Ekibastuz thermal power plant-2 
(TPP-2), 50 percent of which belongs to INTER RAO. A significant part 
of the energy generated in this plant was exported to Russia.
However, volumes of trade in electric power can adequately character-
ise overall levels of integration. In fact, the volume of electric power ex-
change between CIS countries has fallen 3 to 4 times compared to 1980s 
levels. At the present time, the volume of export and import between 
countries is 5 to 6 percent of domestic consumption of electric power.
Tables 1 to 3 cover the four years from 2004 to 2007 and demonstrate 
a decrease in the overall volumes of imports and exports of the CIS 
and EurAsEC. There are two basic explanations for this. Firstly, for the 
past few years, the rapid growth of the economies of the member states 
of these organisations resulted in increased current internal consumption, 
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Exportin 
Countries
Total
To countries Importing countries
CIS EurAsEC Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
2004
Belarus 798 0,4 - - - - - -
Kazakhstan 7403 7403 7403 - - - 7403 -
Kyrgyzstan 3382 3381 3381 - 1258 - 1800 323 0,1
Россия 19201 6683 3784 1511 2272 - - -
Tajikistan 4451 4423 4423 - - 54 - - 4369
2005
Belarus 901 19 19 - - - 19 -
Kazakhstan 3978 3978 3978 - - - 3978 -
Kyrgyzstan 2685 2684 2684 - 1531 - 936 217
Russia 22568 9212 6599 4680 1919 - - -
Tajikistan 4258 4219 4219 - 68 4 - - 4147
2006
Belarus 1120 55 55 - - - 55 - -
Kazakhstan 3286 3286 3286 - - - 3286 - -
Kyrgyzstan 2509 2508 2508 - 2086 - - 422 -
Россия 20927 5942 4214 2345 1869 - - - -
Tajikistan 4231 4183 4183 - - - - - 4183
2007
Belarus - - - - - - - - -
Kazakhstan 3528 3528 3528 - - - 3528 - -
Kyrgyzstan 2388 2387 2387 - 1217 - - 301 868
Russia 18468 5386 4824 2653 2171 - - - -
Tajikistan 4259 4208 4208 - - - - - 4208
that, in turn, resulted in decreased exports. At the same time, the long 
investment cycle and underinvestment in the electric power industry 
did not allow for an increase in generated and exported electric power. 
Secondly, an increase in exports is impeded by the existence of weak 
mechanisms for foreign trade. Additionally, in the Central Asian region 
any essential expansion of trade in electric power is impeded by the sub-
standard regulation of the water and energy complex. 
With regard to imports, we can note a decrease in total imports of 
electric power and stagnation in imports from the CIS and EurAsEC 
states. One of the important peculiarities of the trade structure of electric 
power within the EurAsEC countries is that practically all of the imports 
(92%) come from CIS countries, whereas only half (54%) of exports is 
directed toward CIS countries. The other half goes to such countries as 
China, the EU (importers are Finland and the Baltic states), Iran etc. 
Table	6.	1		
Export of electric power 
to CIS countries and 
EurAsEC in 2004–2007 
(according to data from 
exporting countries; 
million kWh)
Source: Statistic 
Committee of the CIS
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Importing 
Countries
Total
Exporting countries
CIS EurAsEC Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
2004
Belarus 4050 1511 1511 - - - 1511 - -
Kazakhstan 5234 5234 5234 - - 2949 2285 0,8 0,0
Kyrgyzstan 54 54 54 - - - - 54 0,3
Russia 12154 7367 7116 - 5316 1800 - - -
Tajikistan 4810 4810 4810 - - 329 - - 4481
2005
Belarus 4936 4684 4680 - - - 4680 - -
Kazakhstan 4552 4552 4552 - - 2508 1976 68 -
Kyrgyzstan 0,2 0,2 - - - - - - 0,2
Russia 10292 7021 3917 19 2962 936 - - -
Tajikistan 4508 4508 230 - - 230 - - 4278
2006
Belarus 5479 4847 2345 - - - 2345 - -
Kazakhstan 4057 4057 4057 - - 2127 1930 0,02 -
Kyrgyzstan 0,2 0,2 0,2 - - - - - 0,2
Russia 5171 4600 3785 55 3730 - - - -
Tajikistan 4839 4839 4839 - - 425 - - 4414
2007
Belarus 4344 3405 2653 - - - 2653 - -
Kazakhstan 3665 3665 3665 - - 1287 2378 - -
Kyrgyzstan 0,2 0,2 0,2 - - - - - 0,2
Russia 5670 5151 3308 - 3308 - - - -
Tajikistan 4361 4361 4218 - - 303 - - 3915
2004 2005 2006 2007
Export, total 35235 34390 32073 28643
Export, CIS 21890 20112 15974 15509
Import, total 26302 24288 19546 18040
Import, CIS 18976 20765 18343 16582
Table	6.	2  
Imports of electric power 
from CIS countries and 
EurAsEC in 2004–2006. 
(according to data from 
importing countries in 
million kWh)
Source: Statistics 
Committee of the CIS
Table	6.	3		
Import and export of 
electric power by the 
CIS, million kWh
Source: Statistics 
committee of the CIS
The CIS is a net exporter of electric power. However, the volumes are 
insignificant. The “Chinese” project alone, commenced by INTER RAO, 
will increase the volumes of CIS electric power exports by 200%. Given 
that they have the largest reserves of coal and gas, a huge energy poten-
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tial, and the competitive advantage in power mechanical engineering, the 
CIS countries are capable of increasing supplies. 
The “champions” of the integration processes within the CIS are 
Kazakhstan and Russia. The parallel work achieved since 2001 allowed 
expansion of mutual trade in electric power. During 2001 to 2005 electric 
power exports from Kazakhstan to Russia reached 17.1 billion kWh. Aside 
from this, the countries managed to organise the transit of power from 
Kyrgyzstan to Russia (3.6 billion kWh over 2003-2005). 
Russia is the most substantial player. Russian export peaked in 2005 
but had decreased by 10% by 2007 due to increased domestic consump-
tion.
Figure	6.	1  
Russian electric power 
exports in 2002–2007 
(billion kWh)
 Source: http://www.
interrao.ru/busines/
export/, available as  
of June 2008.
The main importers of Russian energy in 2007 were Finland (more 
than 54%), Belarus (about 14%), Kazakhstan, Latvia and Lithuania (over 
11%, 7% and 5%, respectively). The leading role of Finland in 2006-07 
can be explained by favourable pricing in the NordPool market. Energy 
exports to Norway and northern regions of Finland were made from the 
the hydro power plants “Borisoglebskaya”, “Rayakoski” and “Kaytakoski” 
under the terms of border trade.
Figure	6.	2		
Russian energy exports 
in 2007 
Finland
(54,4%)
Norway
(1,1%)
Mongolia
(1%)
Ukraine
(0,2%)
Kazakhsatn
(11,9%)
Belarus
(14,6%)
Georgia
(1,5%)
Azerbaijan
(1,4%)
latvia
(7,8%)
Lithuania
(5,9%)
China
(0,2%)
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In 2007 the total import of energy by the INTER RAO UES was 5.6 bln 
kWh which is 0.5 bln kWh (about 10%) more than in 2006. In general, 
last two years witnessed a considerable decrease in imports compared to 
2004-2005. The reasons are quite evident: growing economies of Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan require more of its own energy supplies. Besides, Lithu-
ania is preparing to dismantle Ignalina Nuclear power station. 
Figure	6.	3		
Russian imports of 
electric power in 2003 
– 2007 (billion kWh)
Source: http://www.
interrao.ru/busines/
import/, as of June 2008
 In 2007, the share of imports from Kazakhstan in the total structure 
of electric power imports was 58 %, imports from Ukraine and Lithu-
ania accounted for 17% and 7% of imported power, respectively, while 
imports from Azerbaijan and Georgia were approximately 5.5%.
In 2007 Russia imported 3263.3 mln kWh of electric power from the 
Kazakhstani supply network, which is 413,57 million kWh less than in 
2006, due to increased consumption in Kazakhstan.
The structural imbalance between the production and consumption of 
electricity in Kazakhstan has pushed the country to intensify international 
trade. Of course, the planned construction of the Balkhash HPP with 4 
Figure	6.	4		
Russian energy imports 
by country, 2007
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units producing 660 MW each and the construction of a North-South 
transmission line partially solves the problems. However, the need for 
international cooperation is rational and pertinent. We would mention, 
firstly, the optimisation of energy flows with Russia (import from Rus-
sia to the West region of Kazakhstan and export from the North region 
to Russia), secondly, the participation in the development of the water 
and energy complex of the Central Asian Region (CAR) with the view of 
covering the deficit of the South region with the hydro-energy produced 
by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and, thirdly, the increase of the transit 
potential from these countries to Russia via the territories of Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. The economic viability of these solutions makes them 
promising in the long term.
Let’s consider mutual investment. After the ruinous 1990s, mutual in-
vestments in the electric power of the CIS became a reality in the 2000s. 
However, there are only Russian investments in the CIS countries. 
During recent years, RAO UES has acquired assets in Armenia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan and Moldova. One of the biggest projects is the construction 
of the 670 MW Sangtudin Hydro power plant (HPP-1) in Tajikistan. The 
first unit was successfully launched in January 2008, the second in July 
2008. 
Additionally, after reforms in the RAO UES, INTER RAO will operate 
foreign assets. Table 7 illustrates the foreign assets of the company in 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine. 
Table	6.	4		
Kazakhstan: production, 
export and import 
of electric power in 
2000–2007, billion kWh
Source: Ministry of 
energy and mineral 
resources of the RK
Figure	6.	5		
Import and export of 
energy in Kazakhstan, 
2000–2007
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Production 51.6 55.4 58.3 63.9 66.9 67.8 71.7 76.3
Import 2.8 3.7 2.4 3.5 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.4
Consumption 54.4 57.4 58.7 62.4 64.8 68.4 71.9 76.4
Export 0.0 1.7 2.0 5.0 7.3 4.0 3.8 3.3
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Acquirer Acquired entity Share, %
Amount, 
$ mln
Year Notes
Inter RAO UES
Distribution company Telasi 
(75%), AES Mtcari (100%), 
AES Transenergy (50%) 
(Georgia)
57 2003
JSC Ekibastuz Centre 
(RK) and Inter RAO EES
JSC Ekibastuz TPP-2,  
Kazakhstan
JV 
(50/50)
90 2003
Inter RAO UES
Sevano-Razdan cascade of 
7 HPPs, “Armenian electric 
networks” (Armenia)
2003
JSC International Energy 
corporation, EMFESZ 
(Hungary) 
Moldova thermal power  
station (Moldova, 
Transnistria)
39,2 2003
In July 2008, INTER RAO 
acquired further 49% from 
the Hungarian EMFESZ, 
thus consolidating 100% 
of shares.
JSC RAO UES 
JSC Sangtudin HPP-1, 
Tajikistan
JV 
(50/50)
500 2005
2007 – $142 million, 
planned for 2008 – $164.3 
million. Total amount of 
investment in the project 
– $720 million.
JSC Tekhsnabeksport, 
JSC Atomstroyexport, 
JSC NAK Kazatomprom
JSC Centre of Uranium 
enrichment
JV 
(50/50)
2006
In 2008, Armenia entered 
the project 
JSC Tekhsnabeksport, 
JSC Atomstroyexport, 
JSC NAK Kazatomprom 
JV Nuclear Power Plants 
JV 
(50/50)
2006
Development and market-
ing of the nuclear reactor 
VBER-300
 An interesting project is the participation of INTER RAO in the con-
struction of the cascade of Kambarata HPPs in Kyrgyzstan. On 29 De-
cember 2007 the results were announced for the bidding for the prepara-
tion of a feasibility study for the construction of the Kambarata HPP-1 
and HPP-2. The winning bid was a joint proposal made by Electricité de 
France and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Russian and Kazakh power compa-
nies will finance the $3 million feasibility study. The bidding was con-
ducted in accordance with decisions adopted at inter-governmental level 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. For organisational purposes 
a simple partnership between JSC Inter RAO UES, JSC Electric Power 
Plants (Kyrgyzstan) and the JSC KazKuat (Kazakhstan) was formed. 
Among the large-scale initiatives of other players, we should note 
Rusal’s attempt to construct the Rogun HPP in Tadjikistan. Within the 
project, the Russian aluminum company planned to invest as much as 
$1.5-2 billion, but Rusal was unable to agree with the Tajik government 
on the technical and economic parameters and, consequently, had to 
abandon the project. Nevertheless, Russia is still very interested in fi-
nancing and constructing the Rogun HPP. This was confirmed during the 
latest meetings between Russian and Tajik government officials. 
Table	6.	5  
Trans-border investment 
in the electric power 
industry in the CIS
Sources:  
Kuznetsov (2007); 
Kheifets, Libman (2008); 
author’s database 
Economic	Integration:		
Industries,	Sectors,	Issues
Eurasian Development Bank
Table 5 provides information on trans-border investments in the elec-
tric power industry of the CIS. Despite considerable revival during recent 
years, mutual investments are at a low level and are characterised by 
unilateral structures. Practically all of the investments are made by the 
Russian INTER RAO. To sum up, insignificant volumes of mutual trade 
in the electric power sector and a low level of mutual investment do 
not reflect the huge potential of the sector and represent an obstacle 
to the creation of a common electric power market.
Table	6.	6  
Foreign assets of INTER 
RAO
Source: Inter RAO data
Assets Country Type Capacity, length Comments
Sevano-Razdan cascade of 
HPPs (in operation) 
Armenia Generation 560 MW Includes 7 HPPs
Razdan thermal power station 
(in operation)
Armenia Generation 1110 MW Russian state property
JSC Electric Networks of 
Armenia 
Armenia Distribution 29600 km
Acquired by Midland Group 
for $73 mln 
JSC Armenian nuclear power 
plant (in operation)
815 MW Managed by INTER RAO 
Mtkvari Energetika (9th and 
10th blocks of the Tbilisi HPP) 
Georgia Generation 600 MW 2 units of 300 MW 
Telasi (75%) Georgia Distribution 5658 km
Khrami HPP-1 and Khrami  
HPP-2 (in operation) 
Georgia1 Generation 220 MW Of 110 MW
Sandgudin HPP-1 Tajikistan Generation 670 MW
1st power unit launched in 
2008 
INTER RAO Ukraine Ukraine   
Equipment 
supply 
-
Moldovan ТPP Moldova Generation 2520 MW
49% sold to unknown buyer 
(supposedly Gazprom) in 
2007
Ekibastuz TPP-2 (50%) Kazakhstan Generation 1000 MW
2 units of 500 MW; it is 
planned to construct a 3rd 
energy unit of 500 MW
RAO Nordic Oy Finland Trade - Trader in NordPool 
TGR Enerji Turkey Trade - Trader
1 Georgian assets of INTER RAO may suffer (nationalisation is one option) as a consequence of 
the Russian-Georgian war (August 2008).
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3.	Integration	Initiatives	in	the	CIS	and	EurAsEC	
The re-integration of the CIS electric power industries was begun on 
the 14 February 1992 when the Council of the Heads of States signed the 
Agreements on Coordination of Interstate Relations in the Electric Power 
Industry of the CIS. The first legal document, which created the legal 
basis for the functioning in parallel mode, was the Agreement of Parallel 
Work of Electric Power Systems of the CIS member countries, signed at 
the meeting of the Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS on 
25 November 1998. At present, eleven CIS member countries work in 
parallel mode. 
Within the CIS, active work has been done by the Electric Power 
Council (EPC, Electroenergeticheskiy Sovet) of the CIS, chaired from 
2000 to May 2008 by Anatoliy Chubays. The EPC is considered the most 
effective of all the industry councils of the CIS. 
The leading role of the CIS in the formation of the CPM can be 
explained by a number of factors. The predominant reason was a real 
need for coordination in the 1990s. It was necessary to maintain coop-
eration and parallel work on the energy complexes of the newly inde-
pendent states that had previously formed a single energy system. At 
that moment, the EPC was the only platform for the coordination of 
several urgent technical issues. The work of the electric power council 
was gradually becoming more effective, and was in high demand by the 
energy companies of post-Soviet countries. Personnel factors also played 
a significant role – Anatoliy Chubays is one of the most effective manag-
ers in the post-Soviet area. 
In the 2000s, the following important documents were adopted by the 
CIS:
• Strategy (main directions) of Interaction and Cooperation of the 
Member States of the CIS in the sphere of electric power until 2020, ap-
proved by a decision of the EPC on 26 May 2005; 
• The Concept of the Formation of the Common Power Market among 
the Member States of the CIS, adopted at the Council of the Heads of the 
CIS Governments on 25 November 2005; and
• The Agreement on Formation of the Common Power Market be-
tween the Member States of the CIS of 25.05.2007.
 The Concept of the Formation of the Common Power Market rep-
resents a coordinated approach to the formation of the common power 
market of the CIS. The concept takes into account the main principles 
of integration and liberalisation of the European energy markets. In ac-
cordance with the Concept, the following types of relations between its 
subjects determine the functional structure of the CPM of the CIS:
• First, wholesale trade of electric power with independent determina-
tion of prices based on bilateral agreements (between buyers and sellers 
of electric power);
• Second, a centralised market of electric power;
• Third, a balancing market;
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• Fourth, a market for systemic and auxiliary services, including the 
mechanism of utilisation of the capacity reserves.
 Each of the above-mentioned segments of the market are to be in-
troduced as soon as countries are ready, taking into account the state of 
technical equipment and national legislations.
  In order to provide the freedom to choose a power supplier to 
consumers, the CIS member states have agreed on conditions for the 
formation of markets on the basis of bilateral contracts, spot markets and 
a common CIS electric power trade platform, the status and powers of 
which are defined by the Concept. The CIS member states provide grad-
ual liberalisation of internal electricity markets, decrease barriers for con-
sumers’ access to the CPM and integrate energy markets in accordance 
with the schedules of the main activities of joining the CPM. The Concept 
includes the protection of investments and the possibility of investment 
activity in the electric power industry of member states, as well as the 
possibility of sale of the generation, network and other types of assets 
on the basis of contracts between owners. The Electric Power Council of 
the CIS executes the general coordination of the formation of the CPM. 
Members of the CPM and the Electric Power Council determine the spe-
cial body on the coordination of the functioning of the CPM. At the end 
of May 2007, the Agreement of the Formation of the Common Electric 
Power Market was signed at the meeting of the Council of the Heads of 
CIS Governments in Yalta. Only 6 parties signed the document: Russia, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This result 
once again confirms that some CIS countries have different attitudes 
with respect to integration processes in general and energy in particular. 
Consequently, V.Luchnikov, Ukrainian Vice-minister for fuel and Energy, 
declared that as long as the unified basic conditions are not created for 
all countries to work in a common electric power market, Ukraine will 
not join it and will not sign an agreement concerning the creation of the 
market.2
 The states will have to make a list of trans-border transmission lines. 
The capacities of these lines are going to be auctioned, and the winners 
will be those suppliers and buyers that propose the best price per 1 MW. 
These auctions will be held over varying periods, ranging from a few 
months to several years. The first interstate sales of electricity using 
market prices should be held at the Russian-Kazakh border. 
The Eurasian Economic Community started its own work on develop-
ing integration within the power sector later than the CIS. According to 
S.D. Primbetov, Vice-Secretary General of the EurAsEC in 2002-2007, 
the CIS and the EurAsEC do not fulfil the same role.3 The EurAsEC does 
not claim to possess the leading role in the complicated organisational 
and technical issues of power network integration that are solved by the 
Electric Power Council of the CIS, but rather it facilitates the practical 
2 Smirnov (2007). 
3 Primbetov (2006).
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implementation of the decisions adopted there and ensures coordination 
between various energy markets. 
The documents developed by the EurAsEC:
• The Concept of Effective Utilisation of Water and Energy Resources 
of the Central Asian Region (CAR).4 Optimal modes for the utilisation 
of the hydro energy potential of the region are pertinent not only for the 
CAR, but also for Russia and other states, such as China, India, Afghani-
stan, and Iran.5 The Concept of the Formation of the Common Power 
Market of the EurAsEC member states is being developed taking into 
account the issues related to the formation of a single fuel and energy 
complex of the EurAsEC member states as well as international experi-
ence.6
The EurAsEC is also working on the Concept of the Energy Mar-
ket, which theoretically comprises various energy sources. Therefore, the 
members of the working group of the EurAsEC are primarily oil and gas 
experts as well as employees of the economic ministries of the member 
states. The Principles of the Concept of the Common energy market of 
the EurAsEC are the following:
• Development of a balanced, mutually advantageous, regulated pow-
er market and coordinated power policy. 
• Equality, mutual benefits and common interests. It sets as a goal 
the development of an optimum pricing scheme in the CPM based on a 
transparent market mechanism of pricing and supposing the creation of 
the most favourable treatment in the delivery and transit and unification 
of the national legislations. 
• Single norms and rules of functioning of the technological infra-
structure.
• Balance of production, supplies and consumption of power resourc-
es.
• Gradual liberalisation of the power sector, introduction of market 
principles and creation of a competitive environment.
 The implementation of the Concept of the Common Energy market of 
the EurAsEC member states is based on the following priority programs 
of the development of the power sector:
• Construction of new hydro power plants in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz-
stan. This should be executed in compliance with rational river mode 
regulation.
• Intensive development of the system of power transmission lines 
between the EurAsEC member states.
• Interconnection of the energy systems of the CIS and Baltic coun-
tries with the energy systems of Central and Western Europe, repre-
4 Development of the Concept is made in accordance with the decision of the EurAsEC Interstate 
Council (No 314 and No 315 of 16 August 2006).
5 Vinokurov (2007). 
6 The Concept is developed in accordance with the Foundations of the Energy Policy of the EurA-
sEC Member States, approved by the decision of the Interstate Council, February 28, 2003, No 
103, and in compliance with the decisions of the EurAsEC Interstate Council, January 25, 2006, 
No 269 and August 16, 2006, No 314.
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sented by the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity 
(UCTE).
• Creation of common programs for the realisation of energy saving 
potential.
• Development of joint ventures to provide nuclear fuel to nuclear 
plants in EurAsEC countries (with participation of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Belarus).
The all-embracing approach of the EurAsEC is somewhat artificial. 
(We must remember, however, that the idea of the formation of a com-
plex EurAsEC energy market originated from the Byelorussians, who 
have specific interests, particularly with regard to access to oil and gas 
infrastructure). There is no doubt that, at the level of the concept, the 
energy markets should be considered as intertwined, which will allow the 
implementation of the principle of comparative advantages for the states 
involved in the process of integration. At the same time, the energy sec-
tors can form separate markets with their own specific regulations. The 
implementation of the idea of a common energy market, which defines 
the systematic work of the EurAsEC, inadequately deals with specifics of 
energy sectors. In our opinion, it is necessary to work on the creation 
of a number of common markets, namely: a common electric power 
market; a common oil and gas market and a common coal market. After 
this a common uranium market could follow. In spite of the visible inter-
relation, the specifics of these markets demand independent regulation.  
The common market for oil and gas is formed on the basis of inter-
governmental agreements; its future is connected to the solution of the 
transit tariff problem and the development of oil and gas transport infra-
structure. A common coal market already exists; in order to increase its 
efficiency, it is necessary to prioritise the optimisation of railroad tariffs. 
Also we should emphasise that the development of a common electric 
power market with the elimination of structural skews in the thermal 
power sector should result in further optimisation of the common coal 
market. 
In the future, CIS countries may start forming a common uranium 
market. This is unthinkable without the partnership of Russia and Kazakh-
stan.8 Other countries could be interested in a common market, including 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
International experience of energy market integration demonstrates 
that the pace of integration of electricity markets is faster than the inte-
gration of gas markets. This is another supporting point for considering 
these markets as relatively autonomous. 
4.	Barriers	to	the	CIS	Common	Power	Market	
The creation of a common electric power market faces a number of 
problems. In our opinion, the basic precondition of the development of the 
8 See Vinokurov (2008).
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CPM is full liberalisation of the largest – the Russian market which forms 
the base for the CIS system. 
1. In general, in CIS countries there are various models of markets 
for electric power with different degrees of liberalisation. The creation of 
the CPM is possible only after liberalisation of the prices, at least in the 
system’s base market of Russia. The liberalisation of prices for electric 
power is expected by 2011. It represents the basic precondition of the 
CPM. 
2. The barrier to the creation of common markets is the specific 
structure of the electric power sector, namely the natural monopolies, 
along with high levels of political regulation. If a state owns transmis-
sion networks and basic generation capacities, it will not be inclined to 
import cheap electric power while domestic power stations lie idle – no 
matter whether they are competitive or not. Therefore the development 
of regional trade in electric power demands separation of the commercial 
interests of generators and distributors9. 
Nevertheless, the experience of NORDPOOL and the integrated elec-
tric power market of the three Scandinavian countries, demonstrates that 
the more dominant national companies do not need to be an insurmount-
able obstacle. The Scandinavian electricity market is the most efficient 
integrated regional energy market in the world, dealing with both spot 
and futures trade. Its experience proves that, if the regulation is efficient 
enough, a common market may be created even with public companies 
dominating generation and distribution.10 
 3. Membership of the WTO also seems likely to facilitate the creation 
of a CPM, as it provides a legal foundation for member countries. The 
accession of Russia and Kazakhstan to the WTO will be a positive factor. 
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine are already members of the WTO. On 
the contrary, the progress of Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan towards 
membership is limited. In the meantime, the development of a legal base 
for the CPM will be smoothed by consideration of the requirements of 
the WTO. 
4. There are also a number of technological barriers to the develop-
ment of a CPM, although, due to the common technological base cre-
ated in the Soviet Union, these barriers are less significant than in other 
regions. In particular, the development of a common methodology for 
9 ADB (2005: 18). 
10 The establishment of a legal framework is a key element of a CPM. Absence of this framework 
can lead to serious structural problems. The incident cited below vividly illustrates the dan-
ger and economic losses, which may occur when rules are not observed. In June 2007, Ukraine 
declared its intention to construct a new transmission line around Moldova to provide energy 
to Odessa region. This decision was related to the 2002 conflict with MoldElektrika, which, as 
UkrEnergo believed, consumed Ukrainian energy without sanction and refused to buy energy 
at new prices. UkrEnergo also alleged that there were charges for failing to observe schedules 
for transit of energy to Odessa region, refusal to regulate the remainder of the energy flow and 
refusal to follow the instructions of the dispatcher of the Ukrainian company during accidents. 
www.fin.org.ua/news.php&i=508492, available as of July 2008. 
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calculating the cost of transit of power is urgent not only in the electric 
power sector but also in other power markets.
Let us compare the CIS to Central Europe where the creation of a 
CPM is also pertinent. Research carried out for this region’s power in-
dustry describes in detail various technical barriers to the construction 
of an effective system for trans-border trade in the region11. Among them 
there are the following: insufficient capacity for trans-border transmission 
of electricity; initial creation of the networks using the principle “local 
generation – local consumption”; absence of a common methodology for 
coordination and planning, absence of a regional coordination centre; and 
technical complexities of trading the energy produced by thermal power 
plants (TPPs) using gas (more expensive energy source) and wind parks 
(unpredictable volumes of generation).12 Comparing these problems to 
post-Soviet realities, we can see a more promising situation. From the 
very beginning, the Soviet system was developed as a single network. 
This creates suitable preconditions for the rapid expansion of trade in 
electric power within the CIS.13 
Nevertheless, for a CPM to work effectively, a number of technical 
barriers and obstacles of legal character should be eliminated, including: 
customs control of interstate overflows of electric power, inappropriate to 
the requirements of a parallel mode; absence of uniform methods of cal-
culation of tariffs for transit of electric power; discrepancy in some items 
of national tax legislation with respect to bi- and multilateral contracts 
and agreements on the development of integrated cooperation of states in 
the electric power industry. 
The draft of the Concept of the Common Energy Market of the EurA-
sEC defines the following additional obstacles:
- Utilisation of agreements for the division of production leads to a 
process whereby regional integration should be coordinated with foreign 
power companies;
- Regional disagreements of a political nature, in particular, on the 
problem of the Caspian Sea; 
- Powerful considerations concerning national energy security and 
sovereign energy policies (as a rule, targets for national energy security 
prevail over integration goals). 
An integral part of the formation of the CPM of the Central Asian 
states and Russia is development of the water and energy complex of 
Central Asia, comprising (a) construction of hydro energy plants in Ta-
jikistan and Kyrgyzstan, (b) construction of transmission lines, and (с) ef-
fective regulation of water flows in all Central Asian countries. EurAsEC 
11 LaBelle, Kaderjak (2006: 24).
12 The real capacity of German wind parks in 2006 fluctuated between 300 MW and 5000 MW. 
This leads to complexity not only in planning but also in regulating capacity of the system to 
absorb all generated energy during production peaks.
13 LaBelle, Kaderjak (2006). 
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is trying to solve the disagreements surrounding the water and energy 
network in Central Asia.14 We see the key to the solution of this very 
complicated problem in combining availability of large financial sources 
(for the construction of additional generating capacities, water reservoirs 
and effective infrastructure for energy transit) and the creation of effec-
tive mechanisms for regional cooperation, which would take into account 
the vested interests of all countries in the region.15
Creation of a CPM does not necessarily require the conclusion of a 
uniform agreement covering the whole region. As an alternative, a net-
work of agreements between the region’s states could be possible. This 
network would be “woven” using two kinds of arrangements: bilateral 
agreements and multilateral agreements covering sub-regions. The most 
vivid example of this is Central Asia and Russia. Another power sub-re-
gion could be formed between Russia and the Caucasian states. However, 
we are referring to the technical and economic aspects of the problem, 
with the understanding that political issues may make both regional proj-
ects difficult to implement.
5.	Eurasian	Integration:	Objective	Conditions	for	Going	Beyond	
the	Boundaries	of	the	Post-Soviet	Space
As a rule, discussion of a potential CPM stops at the boundaries of 
the post-Soviet space. However, the economic logic of a CPM speaks in 
favour of the geographic extension of the concerned area. 
Let us outline some of the perspectives of potential interest to the 
CIS nations: 
•  Azerbaijan – connection to Iran;
•  Armenia – connection to Iran;
•  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
other South Asian countries; 
•  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – cooperation with China, Iran, India 
in developing hydro-electric potential; exporting electricity to Pakistan, 
India, Iran, China, Afghanistan, (as well as CIS countries);16 
•  During the coming years, Russia is planning to execute a gigantic 
project in the Eastern Siberia, developing coal-fired generation and build-
ing transmission lines to China, which may lead to annual exports of 60 
billion kWh; 
•  Connecting the common regional energy system with that of the 
EU, with the view of creating a common market from Lisbon to Vladi-
vostok. This project may be of great importance for Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova. 
14 The specific context of the water and energy network of the CAR is described in ADB (2005) 
and EABR (2008).
15 Vinokurov (2007).
16 The most recent example is an agreement signed by Pakistan, Afganistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan on August 4, 2008, which foresees construction of a transmission line “Central Asia 
– South Asia 1000” (CASA-1000) connecting Central Asia upstream countries with their South 
Asian neighbours by 2014. 
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INTER RAO will be responsible for executing a gigantic project of 
electric power export from Russia to China. The project is divided into 
three stages, the first of which should begin in 2008. The Russian com-
pany plans to increase the export of electric power to China to 4.5 billion 
kWh per annum, using the capacities of the Far East power plants, which 
requires $450 million of investments into transmission capacities. 
The two following stages, scheduled to last until 2015 will require 
more investment, totalling $17 billion in Russia alone. Additional genera-
tion capacity created shall provide annual exports of 18 billion kWh from 
the Urgal coal deposit, where a TPP with the capacity of 3600 MW will 
be built. Following this, export will be increased to 60 billion kWh with 
three new plants in Buryat Region and Chita Region (3600, 1200, and 
2400 MW). Cash flow generated by this project will amount to $1.2-1.7 
billion yearly, depending on the dynamics of electric power prices. 
 In the western direction, the leading role is attributed to the proj-
ect of the synchronisation of the energy systems of the CIS and Baltic 
countries with the energy systems of Central and Western Europe, rep-
resented by the Union on Coordination, Production and Transmission of 
Energy (UCTE). RAO UES was planning to complete a feasibility study 
on uniting the energy systems of the CIS and Europe in 2008.
 Among promising possibilities, the UCTE is considering several op-
tions: the first includes Turkey, the second is an outlet for Tunisia and 
Figure	6.	6 
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Libya which suggests further outlets to the Middle East; thirdly, UCTE 
is interested in working on synchronic unification of energy systems with 
the CIS.
Let us note that any Eurasian CPM would assume gradual develop-
ment grounded in a number of bi- and multilateral agreements. 
J. Linn points out that neither Russia nor the rest of the world have 
realised that the fall of the USSR triggered the process of economic inte-
gration throughout Eurasia.17 We fully subscribe to this view. Due to its 
geographical position and national economic interests, Russia is directly 
interested in Eurasian integration, which would not be constrained by 
the boundaries of the post-Soviet space. Kazakhstan will become a direct 
ally of Russia in creating Eurasian institutions for economic and politi-
cal integration. In fact, Kazakhstan’s economic future is directly related 
to common Eurasian markets, transport corridors and security systems. 
In our opinion, Kazakhstan is the most “Eurasian” country in the whole 
continent. The EU, China, India and Iran may become the key partners of 
the CIS countries in the process of creating a real Eurasian CPM. 
One of the most valuable lessons we can learn from the global experi-
ence of regional integration is the understanding that les grands projets 
géopolitiques do not create a reliable foundation for integration. Rather, 
specific integration projects in particular sectors could trigger progress 
of real economic and political value. Regional economic integration can 
begin in key sectors and then expand to the level of institutional integra-
tion. These sectors in the Eurasian context may be electricity, transport, 
telecommunications or agriculture. Undoubtedly, common power mar-
kets are among the most promising integration projects due to the 
strong economic rationale for creating Eurasian common power markets. 
Moreover, a common electric energy market may turn out to be one of 
the bases of a continent-wide security system. 
6.	Conclusions
1. Trade in electric power and mutual investments are at a low level 
and do not correspond with the sector’s potential. The CIS is a net ex-
porter of electric power, but the actual volumes of import and export 
are small. CIS countries are capable of more, having large coal and gas 
reserves with huge potential for energy production, vast hydropower po-
tential, and competitive advantage in power engineering. 
In spite of the considerable revival during recent years, mutual in-
vestments remain at a low level and are characterised by a one-sided 
structure. In fact, Russia has made all the investment. Small volumes of 
mutual trade in electricity and low levels of mutual investment do not 
correspond to the huge potential of the sector.
2. The CIS and its Electric-Power Council play a leading part in the 
work to instigate a Common Power Market (CPM). This can be explained 
17 Linn (2006); Linn, Tiomkin (2006). 
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by a number of factors. The urgent need originating in the early 1990s 
led to cooperation and parallel work on energy networks in the newly 
independent states, formally a single energy system. At that moment, 
the Electric-Power Council of the CIS was the only body able to address 
the many technical issues that had to be solved urgently. Gradually the 
Electric-Power Council’s work became more and more effective, and es-
sential for the power companies in post-Soviet countries.
3. Power markets (power industry, hydrocarbons, coal, uranium) are 
specific: it is necessary to combine a complex approach to fuel and energy 
balance with functional integration in these unique markets. In the 2000s, 
the EurAsEC began work on creating a common power market (CPM). 
It goes without saying that, at the level of conception, power markets 
must be regarded as interrelated, which allows the implementation of the 
principle of comparative advantages in the process of integrating different 
countries. Alongside this, power industries may form separate markets 
with their own specific regulations. The idea of a common power market, 
which is the basis of the systematic work of the EurAsEC, inadequately 
reflects the peculiarities of the power industry. In our opinion, the sub-
ject that should be considered is the creation of a number of common 
markets, such as: an electric power market, an oil and gas market, and a 
coal market. The creation of a uranium market may then follow. In spite 
of their evident dependence on each other, each of these markets is very 
specific and consequently should be regulated independently
4. Creating a common power market entails a number of solvable 
problems. The completion of the liberalisation of the Russian market, 
which is the biggest, networked market of the CIS, is one of the most 
important preconditions for the development of a common power mar-
ket. In general, the integration of the power market is dependant on 
the institutional peculiarities of the national electric-power industry in 
the key countries. Despite this, if an optimal regulative environment is 
established, a common power market can still be created even with the 
preservation of a considerable presence of public companies in the genera-
tion and distribution of energy. 
5. Advancement towards a continental Eurasian common power mar-
ket is economically rational. Russia and its neighbours are interested in 
Eurasian integration, which would not be constrained by the boundaries 
of the post-Soviet space. The very logic of a CPM urges us to go beyond 
the boundaries of the post-Soviet area. Russia and Kazakhstan are keen 
promoters of the CPM, as are a number of other CIS countries including 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Belarus. Practically all of the CIS countries could gain real 
advantages as exporters and transmitters of electric power if real electric 
energy market mechanisms are introduced, thereby dealing with coun-
tries of Eurasia such as China, Iran, India, Turkey and EU countries. A 
CPM for Eurasia would develop gradually, founded on a number of bi- and 
multilateral agreements. 
Economic	Integration:	
Industries,	Sectors,	Issues
Evgeny Vinokurov  “The CIS Common Electric Power Market ”
00 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
Literature	
Documents
CIS (1992) Agreement on Coordination of Intergovernmental Rela-
tions in Electric-Power Sector of the CIS. Approved by the Council of 
the Heads of the CIS State, February 14, 1992.
CIS (1998) Agreement on Provision of Parallel Work of Electric 
Power Systems of the CIS countries. Council of the Heads of the CIS 
States, November 25, 1998. 
CIS (2005) Strategy of Interaction and Cooperation of CIS Member 
States in the Electric Power Sector for the period until 2020. Approved 
by Electric Power Council of the CIS, May 26, 2005.
CIS (2005) Concept of Common Power Market of the CIS Member 
States. Adopted by the Council of the Heads of the CIS States, Novem-
ber 25, 2005.
CIS (2007) Agreement on Forming the Common Power Market of 
the CIS Member States, May 25, 2007. 
EurAsEC (2007а) Draft Concept of the Common Energy Market.
EurAsEC (2007b) Draft Concept of Effective Utilization of Water 
and Energy Resources of the Central Asian Region. 
Other resources
ADB (2005) Electricity Sectors in CAREC Countries. A Diagnostic 
Review of Regulatory Approaches and Challenges. Мanila: ADB. 
EDB (2008) Water and Energy Resources of Central Asia: Utilisa-
tion and Development Issues. Industry Report. Almaty: EDB. Available 
at www.eabr.org
Heifetz B., Libman A. (2008) Corporate Integration: an Alternative 
for the Post-Soviet Space. Moscow: LKI Publication.
Kuznetsov A. (2007) Internationalization of the Russian Economy: 
Investment Aspect. Moscow: ComBook. 
LaBelle M., Kaderjak P. (2006) Towards More Integration of Cen-
tral and Eastern European Energy Markets. Regional Centre for Energy 
Policy Research, Budapest: Corvinus University of Budapest.
 Linn J., Tiomkin D. (2006) The New Impetus towards Economic In-
tegration between Europe and Asia. Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 
1 (April): p. 31-41. 
Linn J. (2006) Liberal Eurasianism. Kommersant No. 220(3551) 
dated 24.11.2006
 Primbetov S. (2006) Speech at the SPECA Economic Forum, 25-26 
June, Baku. www.unescap.org/oes/SPECA/Meetings/EconomicFo-
Economic	Integration:		
Industries,	Sectors,	Issues
0Eurasian Development Bank
rum/2006/documents/Russian/EF_Statement_EurAsEC.doc, available 
as of June 2008.
 Smirnov S. (2007) Energy Empire CIS, Trade and Industry News, 
23 October. 
UNECA (2006) Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II. Rational-
izing Regional Economic Communities. Addis Ababa: UN Economic Com-
mission for Africa. 
Vinokurov E. (2007) Investments and Cooperation in Hydropower 
Sector of Central Asia. The Continent of Partnership, September, pp. 
42-52. Available at www.eabr.org/media/img/rus/publications/vest-
nik/kontinent-septem.pdf, available as of June 2008.
Vinokurov E. (2008) Nuclear Energy Complexes of Russia and Ka-
zakhstan: Development and Cooperation Prospects. April. Almaty: EDB. 
Available at http://www.eabr.org/rus/publications/Analytical Re- 
ports/, available as of June 2008.
Vlasova O. (2008) Somebody must pay. Interview with the Michael 
Lilius. Expert No.5, February 10. 
Economic	Integration:	
Industries,	Sectors,	Issues
Evgeny Vinokurov  “The CIS Common Electric Power Market ”
0 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
Preconditions and Prospects 
for Banking Integration 
in the Eurasian Economic 
Community
Anna 
Abalkina
Regional economic integration in the EurAsEC member countries is 
increasingly often considered by academics from the point of view of 
cooperation in trade and investment. Much less attention is paid to 
the activities of banking intermediaries which fund these operations. 
The expansion and strengthening of cooperation in the region is 
accompanied by a growing demand for banking services. In the 1990s, 
cross-border banking operations were practically the only international 
system available. In the past few years, financial organisations have 
set up networks in EurAsEC member countries to service their regular 
clients, whose economic interests extend beyond national economic 
boundaries.
The development of mutual cooperation between their banking 
systems includes a commitment by EurAsEC member countries to 
create an integrated financial market as part of the regional bloc, 
in line with the EurAsEC member countries’ Blueprint for Monetary 
Cooperation. Given this situation it becomes expedient to examine 
the level of banking interaction in the member countries and identify 
existing preconditions for the creation of a single banking and 
financial services market.
The	Characteristics	of	Banking	Systems	in	EurAsEC		
Member	Countries
Although the development of banking systems in EurAsEC member 
countries (and in the entire post-Soviet space) has been successful in 
many ways, it is nevertheless not without certain persistent problems.
The banking systems of EurAsEC member countries have evolved 
significantly over the past 15 years. In particular, market reforms in 
the banking sphere have established two-tier banking systems and the 
legal framework for central banks and financial institutions. Financial 
institutions have been increasing their capitalisation in the EurAsEC 
member countries in recent years. In 2006 alone, their combined assets 
increased by over 60%.
Some member countries have switched to International Financial 
Reporting Standards, which are seen to facilitate risk-assessment and 
increase the transparency of banking operations. Banking regulation 
is largely conducted in line with international standards. Following 
recommendations from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
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most member countries have increased the minimum size of authorized 
capital to €5m, thus ptoviding the increase of the capitalisation of financial 
institutions. Some countries have adopted deposit guarantee scheme, 
which is, of course, a significant step forward in the evolution of banking 
systems.
Another positive trend concerns the growing transparency of the 
national banking systems and the increasing role of foreign capital, which 
have helped to boost competition in the market and improve standards in 
banking. IPOs by Russian and Kazakh banks have become more common 
in recent years.
Nevertheless, despite considerable improvement in EurAsEC member 
countries’ banking systems, regional banking markets are quite poorly 
integrated and differ widely in terms of the structure and size of their 
operations. For example, the combined assets of all EurAsEC banking 
systems stood at $625 billion as at 1 January 2007. Moreover, these 
assets are distributed unevenly between EurAsEC member 
countries: Russia accounts for over 85% of the total assets. The second 
biggest banking system – Kazakhstan – accounts for about 11%. Belarus 
and Uzbekistan account for 2% and 1% respectively, while the Kyrgyz 
and Tajik banking systems’ combined share is less than 1%1.
A considerable concentration of banking assets is also apparent 
within national banking systems. Most assets and capital are shared 
by a limited number of financial organisations, which in Soviet times 
were, most often, regional branches of Sberbank or Vneshtorgbank. 
For example, Uzbekistan’s National Bank of Foreign Economic Activity 
accounts for 70% of the country’s total banking assets.
Despite quite high growth rates in banking assets in the six countries, 
their role in servicing the economy is still insignificant. The 
coefficient of financial intermediation, calculated as the ratio of assets to 
GDP, is extremely low in most of the countries in comparison both to 
developed and developing countries (Table 1). The role of the banking 
system is greatest in Kazakhstan where assets account for 86% of 
GDP.
Table	7.1		
Banking sector 
indicators in EurAsEC 
member countries as at 
1 January 2007
Source: Interfax-1000: 
Banks of CIS Countries. 
2006; World Economic 
Outlook Database, 
October 2007
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Number of 
banks
1189 28 33 28 21 15*
Assets, billion 
dollars
533.4 13.6 69.9 5.8 0.7 0.6**
Capital, billion 
dollars
64.3 2.4 9.2 0.9 0.1 0.1**
Assets/GDP 54.2 36.8 86.3 34.1 24.8 21.4
1 Interfax-1000: Banks of CIS Countries. 2006
* Excluding non-banking organisations and micro-credit institutions
** As at 1 April 2007
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The limited role of banking systems in the economies of the EurAsEC 
member countries makes them considerably dependent on global 
financial markets. Around half of all loans in Russia are issued by 
foreign banks. Cross-border loans now constitute as much as 52% of 
the liabilities of Kazakh banks2. The Kazakh banking system suffered the 
adverse impact of this dependency in 2007 when, owing to the US sub-
prime mortgage crisis and the liquidity crunch that followed it, ratings 
agencies downgraded Kazakhstan’s sovereign rating. This was prompted 
by the anticipation of liquidity shortfalls for Kazakh banks which have 
debt liabilities of around $10 billion.
The structure of each EurAsEC member’s banking system has a 
significant impact on its development. The role of state capital is still 
quite high in some member countries. For example, state-owned banks 
account for over 70% of total banking assets in Belarus, 44.6% in Russia 
and more than 90% in Uzbekistan where the banking system is least 
transparent. This high proportion of state capital affects the banks’ ability 
to perform their financial intermediation function and distorts competition. 
Many state-owned banks enjoy preferential status in connection with 
state-funded projects, and major state-run enterprises hold their accounts 
in these banks. State-owned banks also rely on government support in 
times of difficulty.
Despite the significant development of these banking systems, they 
remain highly vulnerable. According to international ratings agencies, 
risks in the CIS banking system are among the highest in the world, due 
to the existence of the grey economy, the considerable debt liabilities of 
financial organisations, widespread distrust of banks, the poor quality of 
loan portfolios and the existence of “protected” banks.
There is no doubt that the banking systems of EurAsEC member 
countries are at different stages of development. Kazakh and Russian 
banking systems are playing a significant role in this region. However, 
the banking systems of the member countries are highly disparate and 
there is huge variance in their scale, structure, extent of operations and 
level of development.
Interstate	Cooperation	in	Banking	Sphere
 “Formal” interaction within the banking sector is one of the financial 
integration initiatives formulated in 2004 by the heads of state of five 
EurAsEC members. In identifying priorities for EurAsEC development in 
2003-2006 and beyond, the heads of state highlighted the creation of a 
common financial market as a key cooperation priority.
Plans to create a common financial market within EurAsEC were 
incorporated in 2005 in the member countries’ draft blueprint for 
cooperation in the monetary sphere. The blueprint included proposals 
2 Kazakh banks’ high dependence on global capital markets is particularly noticeable in the 
global liquidity squeeze, Standard & Poor’s, 2007.
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for cooperation within the monetary, credit and financial sectors and 
envisaged the step-by-step creation of a common financial market. The 
first stage (2005-2007) was aimed at bringing the banking legislation 
of EurAsEC member countries in line with the Basel Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision; creating conditions for free access 
to national financial markets for legal entity residents in the member 
countries; and concluding bilateral agreements on the establishment of 
national treatment.
The second stage (in 2007-2010) envisages the unification of financial, 
banking and monetary legislation.
The third stage (from 2010) should see the creation of a common 
financial market and ensure free capital movement. 
The success of this plan to create a common financial market largely 
depends on the extent of regional banking cooperation. Close cooperation 
in the sector creates the basis of national financial systems and may help 
to strengthen and accelerate the formal process of economic integration.
In general, a common financial market can only function when certain 
institutional, quantitative and pricing conditions are met. The first of 
these is the abolition of restrictions on the capital movement. Secondly, a 
fair and equal business environment must exist for financial organisations 
setting up foreign branches and offering cross-border services. Thirdly, 
consumers must have free access to services within the regional financial 
market.
The present parameters of national banking markets can be 
quantitatively assessed by analysing the level of mutual provision and 
consumption of financial services through cross-border operations and 
subsidiaries in local markets, and price differentiation. Institutional 
reviews consider existing restrictions on service providers’ and users’ 
mutual access to one another’s markets.
Restrictions	on	equal	access	for	market	players. When post-Soviet 
countries gained independence, local banks became foreign to one another. 
As a rule, the national legislation of EurAsEC member countries 
and bilateral and multilateral agreements between them do not 
establish preferential banking regulations for owners of banks 
who originate from EurAsEC countries, despite the declared 
objectives of regional integration. Therefore banking entrepreneurs 
from EurAsEC member countries are treated like shareholders from any 
other foreign country.
Most favoured nation treatment (MFN) is now granted to bank 
founders from EurAsEC member countries, as it is to other non-resident 
shareholders, but MFN allows to apply restrictions for foreign financial 
organisations. These include exemption from national treatment, and 
thereby create different conditions for domestic and foreign financial 
organisations, including those from EurAsEC member countries.
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These restrictions include limits on aggregate ownership by non-
residents, certain stipulations regarding staffing policies and a ban on of 
the use of certain administrative and contractual business practices.
The most common exemption from national treatment is the imposition 
of a quota on foreign capital. It used to be applied in almost all EurAsEC 
member countries and varied from 12% of total banking authorized 
capital in Russia, to 50% in Kazakhstan (and was also applied to capital 
from EurAsEC member countries). However, member countries have 
been abolishing quantitative restrictions as part of a policy to liberalise 
access for foreign banks. This limit is still applied in Belarus, where 
non-residents do not have the right to own more than 25% of the total 
authorized capital of the banking system.
CIS countries are still imposing restrictions on the staffing policies of 
banks with foreign ownership. These apply both to bank management and 
ordinary staff members. For example, Russian legislation demands that 
at least 50% of managers of a foreign bank should be Russian citizens, 
because they are better acquainted with the specific banking conditions of 
the national market. At least 75% of employees of any bank with foreign 
investment must be Russian citizens.
In some countries legislation limits competition between foreign and 
local banks by applying restrictions on the opening of accounts by legal 
entities. In Belarus, for example, a legal entity has the right to open 
an account only in one bank. As a result, an enterprise is denied the 
opportunity to try other banks and will almost never opt to transfer its 
accounts to another bank.
Also exempt from national treatment are those measures which prevent 
foreign banks exploiting all available forms of service provision. The most 
widespread restriction is a ban on the opening of new branches as a means 
of expansion. A branch of a non-resident bank is not an independent legal 
entity or resident, therefore its activities are regulated by the laws of the 
country of origin of the parent bank. Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Uzbekistan do not allow non-resident banks to open branches.
The policy of some countries regarding branch banking services has 
changed. For example, a branch of an Iranian bank has been set up in 
Tajikistan. The liberalisation of access to Kyrgyzstan’s banking system as 
a result of the country’s accession to the WTO has allowed the National 
Bank of Pakistan to open a branch there.
In addition to the existing legislative restrictions on mutual access 
for market players, post-Soviet countries may also use administrative 
measures and adopt a selective approach in relation to foreign investors. 
This applies particularly to mergers and acquisitions. However, it is fair 
to say that, since buyouts of existing banks in the EurAsEC are few in 
number, these operations are subject to fewer administrative restrictions 
than they tend to be in other sectors of the economy.
In addition, the current inaccessibility of some banking systems 
(Tajikistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan) to foreign investors is a considerable 
obstacle to the integration of markets within the EurAsEC.
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The openness of national banking systems has increased immensely 
in the past few years. Generally, however, the liberalisation of access for 
foreign capital has taken place not under the auspices of the EurAsEC 
but as the result of national banking systems’ integration into the global 
financial market and their preparation for WTO membership.
One of the few documents which EurAsEC member countries have 
adopted which does give preference to its own banking systems concerns 
resident bank access to currency markets of EurAsEC countries. Although 
member countries have ratified this agreement, no specific steps have 
been taken for its realization. Moreover, there are doubts about how 
successfully such measures could be implemented in some countries 
since, according to Paragraph 44 of this document, priority is given to 
obligations under other international treaties.
We believe that, from the point of view of legislating for cooperation 
in banking, it is still too soon to focus on the existence of tangible 
preconditions for the creation of an integrated market. Existing national 
legislation can only confer most favoured nation treatment, while the 
modern trend of reducing exemption from national treatment and 
encouraging banking interactivity is mainly connected with the integration 
of banking systems into the global market, rather than with one another. 
Moreover, the accessibility of national banking systems differs widely 
and, therefore, existing regulatory systems governing banking activity 
have not been harmonised.
These disparities in the regulation of financial institutions create 
serious obstacles to their integration. It is possible that cooperation will 
increase in the future, for example, through unilateral access for EurAsEC 
member country banks to various sectors of the financial market, but this 
cooperation will be somewhat asymmetric in nature.
The	 scale	 of	 bank	 participation	 in	 EurAsEC.	 EurAsEC member 
country banks have been actively penetrating each other’s markets in the 
past few years. In 2007, banks’ investments in the authorized capital of 
the banking sector stood at $522 million, with total assets for controlled 
financial organisations standing at more than $3.8 billion. The investment 
of EurAsEC member country banks in each other’s authorized capital had 
doubled since 2005. This significant growth was facilitated mainly by an 
increase in the size of these banks’ subsidiary branches rather than by the 
establishment of new financial organisations.
The entry of EurAsEC banks into foreign markets has been fairly 
characteristic. Firstly, until recently, their foreign activities tended to 
be one-off ventures, whereas now regional banks have emerged 
whose development strategies involve expansion into post-Soviet 
countries (for example, Kazakhstan’s BTA Bank)3. Secondly, there have 
3 It should be noted that Vneshtorgbank has also developed its regional development strategy and 
focuses its activities in Ukraine and Caucasian countries, and still does not have a single branch 
in the EurAsEC member countries. However, it plans to finalise a deal to integrate Belarus’s 
Slavneftebank into the VTB Group.
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been many cases of banks in the EurAsEC being purchased by but not 
integrating with parent companies, continuing instead to operate under 
existing brands4. For example, BTA Bank has several subsidiaries in Russia 
which did not change their brands after BTA replaced their shareholders. 
Thirdly, EurAsEC member country banks have asymmetric involvement 
in each other’s markets. Russian and Kazakh banks have the greatest 
competitive advantage. In addition, banks in these countries concentrate 
their foreign banking assets in very few countries. For example, 
Kazakh banks have prioritized partnerships within the EurAsEC (Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan), while Russia’s main banking assets are in Belarus and 
outside the EurAsEC (namely, in Ukraine).
We have counted at least 13 banks in EurAsEC member countries 
which are expanding within the community (by comparison, there 24 
such banks in the CIS). Usually, the greatest presence of foreign 
assets is in the form of a small number of leading banks, while 
other banks have only one branch in the region. For example, four Kazakh 
banks – BTA, Kazkommertsbank, ATF Bank and Halyk Bank – account 
for 75% of total investment in the authorized capital of banks in EurAsEC 
member countries. BTA has four subsidiary branches in Russia and one 
each in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. The other three Kazakh banks each have 
one branch in Russia and one in Kyrgyzstan.
Russian banks are the main foreign banking presence in Belarus, where 
there are subsidiaries of Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow, Rosbank and 
others. In 2007, the role of Russian banks in the Belarusian banking system 
grew as a result of several acquisitions. For example, Belvnesheconombank 
was bought out by Vneshtorgbank, while Mezhtorgbank was taken over by 
Alfa Bank. Ownership of Slavneftebank, formerly controlled by a Russian 
oil company, will also be transferred to Russia’s Vneshtorgbank.
The Kazakh banking system, which is the second largest in the 
EurAsEC, has seen less inward investment by Russian and other EurAsEC 
banks. For some time, only Alfa Bank had a presence in the Kazakh 
market. However, Sberbank recently moved into Kazakhstan through its 
purchase of Texakabank, which in turn owns Russia’s Metrobank, a retail 
banking specialist.
Several Russian banks – Renaissance Capital, for example – are 
operating in Tajikistan. Russian shareholders are present in Kyrgyzstan 
only as minority owners.
With regard to other EurAsEC countries, a major Uzbek bank – Asia-
Invest – has one branch in Russia. Banks in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Belarus have not expanded into foreign markets, partly due to the 
relatively small size of their banking systems.
Despite the quite high concentration of foreign assets held by certain 
banks, foreign markets are not the primary target of these 
financial organisations (Figure 1).
4 Buzdalin A. (2006) CIS Banks Increasing Presence in CIS, Kommersant Bank, 21 September.
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 This graph shows Kazakh banks have the most significant foreign 
banking operations. For example, more than 10% of BTA Bank’s assets 
and 14% of its capital are in EurAsEC countries. However, it should be 
noted that most banks which are expanding abroad either set up or buy 
small banks which account for an insignificant share in the country’s total 
banking assets.
Subsidiary banks in the EurAsEC are playing a negligible 
role in national banking systems. Banks from EurAsEC countries 
are a significant foreign presence only in certain countries. For example, 
Kazakh banks are the most active banks in Kyrgyzstan and they have 
bought several Kyrgyz banks. As a result, the share of EurAsEC banks in 
the total capital of the Kyrgyz banking system exceeds 30% (Figure 2).
Figure	7.1		
Foreign network in 
EurAsEC as a share 
of bank’s assets and 
capital at the beginning 
of 2007, %
Figure 7.2  
Share of foreign capital, 
including from EurAsEC 
member countries, in 
the banking system, %
The graph shows that foreign capital is a dominant presence in the 
banking system only in Kyrgyzstan, while its role in other EurAsEC 
countries is minimal.
In general, the level of mutual involvement of EurAsEC banks is 
slowly growing, but relative indicators are still low. For example, the 
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share of EurAsEC bank subsidiaries in the total assets of the EurAsEC 
banking system does not even reach 1% (whereas it stands at 1.2% in 
the CIS and 17% in the EU).
Banking interaction indicates to a certain extent the development of 
economic relations between countries, while asymmetric involvement of 
banks is often explained by the absence of significant bilateral economic 
cooperation. Furthermore, the low capitalisation of EurAsEC banks and 
the continuing high risk of banking activities are tangible obstacles to the 
development of foreign banking activities.
Banks usually expand into foreign markets to service their traditional 
clients and their trade and investment operations. This strategy is called 
“follow the client”, which means that banks create branches only in those 
countries where they have clients. This motivation for foreign expansion 
is typical in the initial stages of the transnationalization of banking and is 
now affecting EurAsEC member countries.
This thesis is borne out by analysis of the correlation between Russian 
and Kazakh banks’ penetration in EurAsEC member countries and trade 
relations in the region. There is a high interdependency in the expansion 
of trade and banking capital. For example, the correlation coefficient 
between banks’ investments and the country’s trade with the EurAsEC 
countries is about 0.99 for Kazakhstan and 0.89 for Russia, indicating 
high direct dependence. However, this correlation for CIS countries is 
lower (0.98 and 0.77 for Kazakhstan and Russia respectively). As a result, 
Russian and Kazakh banks’ expansion in the EurAsEC is proportional to 
the level of bilateral trade.
However, there is not necessarily an economic imperative behind every 
bank’s foreign investments. Russian banks’ very limited involvement 
in Kazakhstan serves as a good example of this. Despite the extensive 
trade relations between Kazakhstan and Russian, economic cooperation 
is mainly in the form of cross-border transactions. Kazakhstan accounts 
for the bulk of correspondent accounts opened by Russian banks in the 
post-Soviet space.
The volume of banking operations between the EurAsEC countries is 
currently growing at lower rates compared to the growth of assets in the 
banking system. That is why investment between banks is minimal and 
cannot be a precondition for the creation of an integrated regional financial 
market. Moreover, banking cooperation is developing asymmetrically 
and the level of unilateral integration of some countries (for example, 
Kyrgyzstan) into the regional banking services market is quite high.
Price	 differential.	 One precondition for creating an integrated 
banking services market is the harmonised cost of loans, which results 
from competition in national and regional markets.
Certain standardisation in the cost of loans can be established by the 
dynamics of the interest rates on loans issued to non-financial sector and 
estimations of their fluctuations (Figure 3).
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The graph shows that interest rates on loans issued to non-financial 
sector have stabilised to a degree since 2004, and that they have 
fallen somewhat in the past five years. At the same time, interest rate 
fluctuations are quite small in Russia and Kazakhstan, but a little greater 
in Tajikistan and Belarus.
Another indicator which allows us to assess price differential in the 
EurAsEC member countries is the dynamic of the banks’ margins between 
interest rates on loans and deposits (Table 2).
Figure	7.3	
The dynamics of 
monthly interest rates 
on loans issued to 
non-financial sector in 
EurAsEC countries
Source: Central banks 
of the EurAsEC member 
countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Беларусь 30.1 12.8 10.0 6.6 4.2 2.2 1.1
Кыргызстан 33.5 24.8 18.9 14.1 22.6 20.8 17.6
Россия 17.92 13.06 10.75 8.5 7.61 6.69 6.41
Таджикистан 24.33 15.86 4.99 6.9 10.57 13.52 14.17
Table	7.2	
Interest rate margin 
in EurAsEC member 
countries
Source: International 
Financial Statistics, 
2007, October
The dynamics of the banks’ margin in EurAsEC countries point to an 
insignificant convergence in its rates. Banking margin is relatively high in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of weak competition in their markets 
and the poor development of their banking systems. Vernikov (2006) 
believes that significant differences in money circulation parameters are 
due to the small amount of capital moving between post-Soviet countries5. 
Thus, according to price parameter financial markets of EurAsEC member 
countries are quite divergent. 
The prospects of creation of integrated financial market. In principle, 
the prospects for cooperation between the banking systems of the 
EurAsEC member countries are very favourable. The increase in banks’ 
5 Vernikov A. (2006) Multinational Banks in CIS. Published in a collection of articles, entitled 
“Contradiction of processes of currency and financial integration in CIS”, Moscow.
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penetration of each others’ markets confirms that banking cooperation 
between countries has increased and this is an indirect indicator of a 
growth in trade and investment between them. Integration “from the 
bottom up”, i.e., by the increase in cooperation between business 
structures, normally signals to the authorities that they should create 
favourable institutional foundations to encourage cooperation. However, 
the region’s countries have not yet created the framework for attracting 
banking capital from EurAsEC member countries because there are often 
institutional restrictions to this. The market’s infrastructure has not 
developed to the degree that is necessary in order to boost cooperation 
in the banking sphere.
Currently, banking systems are developing by integrating into the 
global, rather than into the regional banking services market. This has a 
dual impact on mutual cooperation within the EurAsEC. On the one hand, 
it facilitates the liberalisation and harmonisation of banking regulations 
necessary for creating an integrated banking services market. On the 
other hand, global financial markets are diverting the banks’ focus away 
from regional cooperation.
A further substantial obstacle to cooperation is the expected takeover 
by Western financial organisations of EurAsEC banks which are expanding 
into neighbouring markets. For example, Kazakhstan’s ATF Bank, which 
has branches in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, was taken over by the Italian 
UniCredit Group in 2007. We believe that BTA Bank is also a likely 
takeover target for a Western bank.
The fact that integration initiatives in the former Soviet space have 
stalled is further hindrance to the formation of a common policy for the 
banking sector. In such conditions, a paradox emerges: integration is 
delayed, but business interaction has been growing. We believe this is 
because the facilitation of bilateral and multilateral banking cooperation is 
not the key factor in ensuring the growth of this cooperation.
The promotion of investment and trade and relative stability in the 
national banking systems, the competitive advantage of major banks in 
less developed EurAsEC banking markets and prospects for economic 
growth all play a huge role in developing banking cooperation. In 
the future, cross-border operations and the establishment of regional 
networks, including through takeovers, will increase banking cooperation 
in the former Soviet space. Major Kazakh and Russian banks that wish to 
become regional banks with network in all CIS countries will make the 
greatest contribution to the development of banking cooperation.
It is possible that the future model for cooperation in the CIS will 
be based on the spheres of influence of Russian and Kazakh capital. For 
example, Russian interests will not be focused in countries that belong 
to a certain supra-national integration organisation but in the European 
countries of the CIS (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). Central Asia will 
be Kazakhstan’s sphere of influence, while the Caucasus will fall into the 
spheres of influence of both Russia and Kazakhstan (Figure 4).
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However, this development model does not preclude the presence of 
Russian banks in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example. It envisages that 
Kazakh capital will play a dominant role in the banking systems of these 
countries.
It is also expected that banking cooperation will develop mostly on a 
bilateral basis. For example, Russia’s financial cooperation with Belarus 
and Ukraine will increase (even though the latter is not member of the 
EurAsEC). Since domestic financial markets are not well developed, it is 
expected that stock-market players as well as banks will be implicated in 
the cooperation process. For instance, Russian banks will help Belarusian 
and Ukrainian companies enter the Russian stock market.
Kazakhstan is also adopting a similar strategy and has set up a regional 
financial centre in Almaty (RFCA) based on the Kazakh Stock Exchange 
(KASE). The RFCA’s major advantage is its international status, which 
allows foreign issuers and investors to enter the market. It is anticipated, 
for example, that a list of potential issuers of the RFCA will include 
large- and medium-sized Kazakh companies and medium-sized Russian, 
Ukrainian and Central Asian enterprises.
The pursuit of formal integration through the creation of an integrated 
financial market and the abolition of restrictions is being addressed in 
two ways. The 2005 blueprint for cooperation between EurAsEC member 
Figure	7.4	 
The spheres of influence 
of Russian and Kazakh 
banking capital
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countries in the monetary sphere involves measures relating to financial 
and banking cooperation. The three-stage implementation of this blueprint 
will result in the abolition of restrictions on the movement of capital and 
the harmonisation of banking legislation. However, this will fall short of 
creating a fully integrated (i.e. reciprocally linked) financial market.
Adopting similar standards for the activities of banks and financial 
organisations will not encourage markets to converge and will not 
eradicate disparities. A possible outcome of this blueprint will be the 
uneven development of national markets with similar standards and 
the absence of restrictions on the movement of capital, but it is very 
likely that the deficient development of local banking services markets 
will persist. Domestic demands for a common financial market are not 
sufficient, but the system should not be imposed by external authority, 
since the integration process results logically in financial integration at 
a later stage.
Taking into account the current level of financial cooperation in the 
EurAsEC, we believe that it would have been more profitable to create 
a regional capital market which would reduce dependency on foreign 
sources of funding. To achieve this would require the establishment of 
a stable, rather than a single financial market in the EurAsEC member 
countries.
EurAsEC and CIS countries could look to the example of Asia Pacific 
countries, which chose to reduce the role of foreign loans by developing a 
regional bond market which is less exposed to global crises.
We believe that this is a very effective mechanism which reduces 
exposure to currency risk and keeps resources within the region in the 
long term. However, there are certain obstacles to its achievement, for 
instance, the absence of sovereign ratings for some countries. Also, this 
mechanism could be launched only in a limited number of countries 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus).
Given their present status, a substantial role in the model of CIS 
financial markets could be played by multilateral development banks 
(the Eurasian Development Bank and the CIS Interstate Bank). Capital 
markets can be developed only through the redistribution mechanism 
operated by multilateral development banks (raising funds through bonds 
and transforming them into loans). As a result, post-Soviet countries 
would be able to place their funds not on the global financial markets 
but in the former Soviet space, helping not just to retain capital in the 
region but also to boost economic growth. This mechanism of developing 
economies and financial markets will have a wider geography (compared 
to the development of the bond market).
As a result, we believe that the creation of a formal common financial 
services market is premature. It would be more beneficial to take steps 
to increase stability within national financial systems, to increase their 
capitalisation and to develop a regional capital market.
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The Metropolisation  
of the FSU: Temptative 
Measurement via the Method 
of Hyperlinks Notoriety
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With the collapse of the USSR it was assumed that Russia, like 
the rest of the CIS, would not adopt the logic of metropolisation in 
terms of spatial organisation. Historically, the Soviet urban world has 
been built on spatial principles other than occidental ones, a legacy 
which is reflected by the existence of large industrial city networks. 
Advanced services, considered as unproductive, are conspicuous by 
their absence. Today the FSU still manifests itself as an area of 
monopolar territorial organization, with only Moscow qualifying as a 
global city. However, this territory, being the largest in the world, can 
no longer operate from a single global city. 
The measurement of cities’ metropolisation is not a simple task, 
especially in the post-Soviet context. On the basis of Brunn (2003) 
we devised a new method of measuring metropolisation according 
to the number of hyperlinks in Internet search engines. The aim of 
this paper is to tackle the question: Does the FSU follow Western 
patterns of metropolisation, or is it a specific model marked by the 
historical legacy that has emerged in the post-communist world? To 
answer this question the paper starts with the presentation of our 
tools of observation and the measurement of studied processes, it then 
develops the analysis and interprets the results.
1.	INTRODUCTION	
Historically global economic activity has been controlled by the 
established global cities, whose geographic distribution by continents 
is unbalanced. These global cities, concentrating advanced services of 
international level, also have decision-making abilities and represent a 
dimension of global economic command. It has even been written that, 
today, the power of a State is measured by the influence of its cities 
(Claval, 1997; Scott, 1998, 2001). 
One of the geopolitical lessons of the world cities hierarchy conducted 
by the Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network GaWC 
(Beaverstock, 1999, 2000; Taylor, 2001; Fossaert, 2001) is that under 
equal conditions, countries with multipolar urban networks are much 
better represented than countries with a monopolar network and tradition 
(P. Marchand, 2008). Within the Former Soviet Union (FSU) only 
Moscow achieves this ranking (Saint Petersburg, Almaty and Tashkent 
Measuring	Regional	Integration	
and	Economic	Development
8
 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
are considered as potential world cities), whereas five German cities and 
eleven in the USA are ranked as such. 
Undoubtedly, since 1992 the CIS has begun to adapt to the process 
of globalisation. Consequently, this territory, being the largest in the 
world, can no longer operate from a single global city. In other words, 
structurally, the territorial configuration of the CIS is not adapted to the 
current phase of globalisation. In fact, the entire area of the CIS has 
not yet been introduced to the economic logic of metropolisation. As 
shown by P. Marchand (2007) for Russia, at least at regional level, the 
CIS is still organised by politico-administrative capitals with “vampire” 
behaviour towards their environment (Marchand, 2007). 
The measurement of a city’s metropolisation is not a simple task, 
especially in the post-Soviet context. A number of studies have been 
devoted to Western cities and those in the Central European Committee 
of Construction Economists (Friedman, 1986; Samson, 1996; Sassen, 
2001; GaWC, 1999, 2000, 2001; Cicille and Rozenblat, 2003; Bourdeau 
– Lepage, 2003; Brunn, 2003; Duféal, 2004; Agibetova, 2008). However, 
measurement methodologies are still rather vague. As for major cities of the 
FSU, they are currently a void in the global analysis of metropolisation1.
2.	THE	QUESTIONS	RAISED	
This paper focuses on the evaluation of metropolisation throughout the 
FSU (twelve republics of the CIS, plus three Baltic States),2 represented 
by an observed sample of 583 large cities. 
The general aim is to tackle the following question: Does this region 
follow Western patterns of metropolisation, or is it a specific model 
marked by the historical legacy that has emerged post-communism? 
Indeed, with the collapse of the USSR, the territory of Russia as well 
as that of the whole CIS, did not adopt the logic of metropolisation in 
terms of spatial organisation (Marchand, Samson, 2008). There are five 
characteristics that deprive the post-Soviet cities from any metropolitan 
function (Marchand, 2007; Marchand, Samson, 2003): cities as clusters 
of factories with internalised services; under-development of economics 
1 Let us not forget that among the international studies devoted to the hierarchy of world cities 
no one is devoted to the FSU space. The exception is the recent work of Marchand (2007) «The 
Geopolitics of Russia», where the author raises for the first time the issue of metropolisation in 
major Russian cities. Among others, there has been an ambitious project on the “Big Cities and 
Metropolisation in Russia and Western Europe: similarities of processes, convergence of paths?”, 
funded by CNRS (2003-2005), led by the team CIRUS-Cieu (Interdisciplinary Centre of Urban 
and Sociological Research - Interdisciplinary Centre of Urban Studies), University of Toulouse, 
under the coordination of D. Eckert and V. Kolossov, but no result has emerged.
2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Ukraine.   
3 Ashgabat, Almaty, Astana, Astrakhan, Baku, Barnaul, Bishkek, Chisinau, Dnepropetrovsk, 
Donetsk, Douchanbe, Yekaterinburg, Yerevan, Irkutsk, Izhevsk, Karaganda, Kazan, Khabarovsk, 
Kharkov, Kiev, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Krivoy Rog, Lipetsk, Lvov, Mariupol, Minsk, Moscow, 
Naberezhnye Chelny,  Nizhny Novgorod, Nikolaev, Novokuznetsk, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Omsk, 
Orenburg, Ufa, Ulyanovsk, Penza, Perm, Riga, Rostov on the Done, Ryazan, Saint-Petersbourg, 
Samara, Saratov, Tallinn, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Chelyabinsk, Tyumen, Tolyatti, Vilnius, Vladivostok, 
Volgograd, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Zaporozhye.
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and finance; innovation under the tight control of the political and security 
services; under-development of services; and regional discontinuities. 
The main issue to be addressed includes six sub-issues which will 
serve as reference in the interpretation of observations. 
1) Are we witnessing a unipolar or multipolar metropolisation 
across the FSU?
2) Considering the pre-eminence of Moscow, is the city’s polarization 
strengthening or fading? 
3) Are the dynamics of metropolisation converging towards 
certain privileged centres? 
4) Is the metropolisation we can observe driven by economic 
or political forces? In other words, are the cities that emerge national 
capitals, or not? 
5) What are the metropolisation areas appearing in the FSU?
6) What global areas are associated with FSU sub-spaces? The 
question of the geopolitics of the CIS anchoring into the global world is 
gaining in importance. In particular, we will try to identify areas that 
could help the large post-Soviet space to open up to the world. Eurasian 
integration comes on to the agenda, benefiting not only Russia but also 
the entire CIS (Mikami, 2005). However, the issues of CIS integration 
with Western and Eastern Europe, with Asia (China, Korea, Japan) and 
the South (India, Gulf), through energy policies, outsourcing operations 
and transportation, seem to have an impact on the Eurasian hypothesis 
(Linn, Tiomkin, 2005; Samaganova, 2008).
Figure	8.1	 
The population of Big 
Cities in FSU (2005)
Eurasian Development Bank
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To answer these questions we will proceed, firstly, to the presentation 
of our tools of observation and measurement of studied processes, and 
then to analysis and interpretation of results.
  3.	TOOLS	OF	MEASUREMENT	AND	ANALYSIS	
Throughout history cities have emerged and increased in economic, 
cultural, and political stature based on the number and extent of their 
linkages to other places. We are witnessing today in the urban world in 
many regions of the planet new urban geographies and geometrics or 
networks. These are “electronic” linkages and they are connecting ancient 
and new, large and small, cities (Brunn, 2003; Dodge, 2001). These 
linkages are attributed to advances in information and communications 
technology (ICT) and they form the backbone of knowledge economies 
(Janelle et Hodge, 2000). These specific technologies include Internet and 
World Wide Web resources. Most parts of the world have been affected 
by the wired and wireless innovations in ICT during the past decade 
(Kolarova et al, 2006). Few large cities in the world have not been linked 
or wired, at least to some extent. 
     The observation of these urban linkages or ICT networks within 
any country or region would demonstrate the degree to which these 
places are linked to others, either on a global or regional scale (Brunn 
and Dodge, 2001; Brunn et al., 2002). 
      Additionally, in the context of the FSU, we can get an understanding 
of the diffusion of internet technologies by considering the number of web-
pages or hyperlinks which exist for major cities. For Brunn (2003), the 
founder of this approach, data sources as an instrument of measuring the 
number of hyperlinks for any city can be obtained by using Internet search 
engines. In our case, we used Google and Yahoo (global engines), Yandex 
and Rambler (local Russian engines). The number of hyperlinks obtained 
by entering the single city name as a key word represents its “Simple 
Notoriety”. Entering a pair of cities measures their “Joint Notoriety”. 
So, what does it mean for a city to feature in the WWW network via a 
hyperlink? What information do Simple and Joint Notorieties provide? 
For a city, being quoted represents the level of its engagement in the 
global economy. The two Notorieties are the two levels of the modern 
city’s world-articulation. The “Simple Notoriety” is the capacity of a city 
to impose its notoriety within the world space as a centre of command. 
The “Joint Notoriety” is the degree of “connectivity” between two cities 
which evaluates their ability to work as a commuter with the global 
network of world-cities. At the same time, it is also an indicator of the 
city opening towards the global economy and its integration level on the 
international scene. In the context of the FSU space, the city’s notoriety 
obtained via global engines is qualified as its external notoriety. The 
same obtained by regional engines is its internal notoriety. 
Therefore, following Brunn (2003), we have been trying to develop 
a new indicator of metropolisation – an “Internet-Notoriety” indicator, 
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which has proven to be a good instrument of the metropolisation 
measuring process, adding to the list of hierarchy indicators of world cities 
in the context of a knowledge economy. Moreover “Internet-Notoriety” 
perfectly reflects the cognitive function or reputation hub of a city, where 
people and activities agglomerate in order to benefit from the clustering 
of advanced services, such as finance, information, research or culture. 
In the urban context, cyberspace has contributed to the reconstruction 
of urban space by creating the social environment in which “being 
digital” is a factor increasingly crucial for knowledge, wealth, status 
and power (Wheeler, Aoyama, Warf, 2000). In this era of the “City of 
Bits” (Mitchell, 1995) when social life is mediated through computer 
networks, the reconstruction of interpersonal relationships around spaces 
and virtual societies gains the upper hand. In addition, at a time when the 
quantity of available information makes economic intelligence a strategic 
resource, the ability to exist in cyberspace is increasingly a condition for 
the exercise of economic command. For all these reasons, we believe that 
“Internet-Notoriety” is an indicator well-suited to the approaching reality 
of metropolisation. 
The results of our investigation into the dynamics of the period 
2004-2007 have demonstrated that global and regional search engines 
represent two different visions of the world (Agibetova, 2008). Global 
search engines provide a “global vision” that considers the state of the 
opening-up of the CIS “as seen by the outside world”, whereas regional 
search engines illustrate the vision from “the small world” perspective 
– opening-up to the world as viewed through internal “glasses”. In what 
measure do these two visions differ? Both are characterized by cultural 
polarization, which includes history, language, and cognitive proximity. 
The Russian search engines Rambler, headquartered in Moscow, and 
Yandex, headquartered in Moscow with subsidiaries in Saint Petersburg, 
Yekaterinburg, Kiev, Odessa and Simferopol are extremely regional, 
reflecting trends that affect processes happening only within Russian 
territory. They “magnify” Russian and FSU cities with an “optical 
effect” that marginalises other FSU spaces. We are shown an image of 
metropolisation altered in favour of Russian cities whilst the Internet-
Notoriety of other areas is understated.
Besides, the second feature of regional search engines, discovered 
thanks to the construction of regression charts and the ratio of connectivity 
(Agibetova, 2008), is that in the measurement of metropolisation they 
are significantly affected by the size of a city’s population. This distortion 
can be corrected via the global search engines, Google and Yahoo, whose 
“global vision” of the integration and liberalization processes helps 
to provide balance. Analysis of global search engines’ data (including 
the construction of ratios, regression charts and zone typologies) has 
demonstrated their heuristic power. 
The analysis of the phenomena of metropolisation through the prism 
of the Internet represents, in our opinion, a double improvement. It is 
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important to take into account the real importance of the knowledge 
economy in the contemporary world and its spatial organisation. It is also 
a new form of “subjectivity” that appears through cyberspace, structured 
here by the search engines: the indirect capture of metropolisation through 
the Internet and the occurrence of hyperlinks produces a “reflected” 
image produced by one of the communities that make up cyberspace, 
as described by a search engine. In other words, we start analysing 
the relations between the immediate areas of the spatial economy and 
the replicated or “reflected” dimensions of cyberspace. In this sense 
the use of “regional” search engines is able to provide new information 
reflecting the specificity of the post-Soviet space of intermediation. It 
proved to be quite efficient for reflecting the complex Russian gravitation 
and influence within the FSU, difficult to capture with other tools. The 
hyperlink notoriety thus provides an original contribution to the analysis 
of globalisation, and to describing the relationship between regional 
integration and globalization. 
Like any tool, the use of Internet hyperlinks contains biases that must 
not be neglected. There are homonyms of some cities, such as Samara, 
for example, which is a Russian city and a car model, or Odessa4, which 
is a Ukrainian port and a district of New York. Results may also be 
affected by breaking news such as elections and a referendum in Belarus 
(October 17, 2004) or Transnistria (December 6, 2006). As our tool is a 
measurement of occurrence of the names, these phenomena artificially 
boost the presence of some cities in cyberspace at a given moment. These 
biases were corrected. 
4.	THE	OVERALL	DEFICIT	OF	METROPOLISATION	IN	THE	FSU
      The analysis of all rankings shows that post-Soviet cities, mostly 
leaving the USSR after seventeen years of transition to adopt a market 
economy and democracy, have failed to integrate into the modern world 
order and to win a worldwide reputation. This observation is valid even 
for Moscow, a global city of beta-category according to the classification 
of GaWC (Taylor, 2001). In fact, it was found that the number of regional 
search engines’ hyperlinks is double that of global search engines. It 
means that in 2007 the simple notoriety of FSU cities has a regional 
character.
Thus, taking into consideration the specificities of the post-Soviet 
mono-centred economy we can say that the FSU space does not follow 
the classic patterns of metropolisation. In order to be “metropolised” it 
needs some impulses from the top. Here, we distinguish the notion of 
economic metropolisation (“bottom-up”) and political metropolisation 
(“top-down”). The first, known also as “western-like metropolisation” 
is initially caused by the market, driven by economic processes via 
local actors. The second is primarily an administered process where 
4 Nova Odessa in Brazil, 2 cities named Odessa in Canada (in Ontario and Saskatchewan), 8 
cities and a lake named Odessa in USA (in Delaware, in Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New York, Texas, Washington and Michigan). 
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metropolisation, hampered by spatial discontinuity and various conflicts, 
must be supported by the top – the government (Marchand, Samson, 
2008). This metropolisation “from the top” may or may not favour the 
construction of a homogenous economic space, and promote, or not, 
economic metropolisation ensuring the space-market continuity. 
On the whole, the post-Soviet urban space shows some zonal 
distortions. In particular, the polarity which “East-West” imposes and the 
“North-South” divide dominates. The “East-West” polarity dominates the 
post-Soviet space. It is due to the seemingly highly pronounced attraction 
of Europe to nearby Western cities such as Moscow, St-Petersburg, Kiev, 
Odessa, Minsk, Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. The further we go East, the 
less FSU space is “metropolised”. The “North-South” divide is the logic 
by which the weight of Russia slows down the metropolisation of the 
Southern CIS. Central Asia, Caucasus and some Russian and Ukrainian 
cities seem to be poorly integrated into the global space. In this divide 
we observe, however, three Southern cities – Baku, Tbilisi and Odessa 
– with a relatively significant simple notoriety. 
Table	8.1		
The First Ten Cities of 
the FSU with Strong 
Simple Notoriety, Global 
and Regional Search 
Engines, 2007
Source: www.google.
com , www.yahoo.com , 
www.rambler.ru , www.
yandex.ru , February-
April 2007
Rank Global Search 
Engines
City Category Rank
Regional Search 
Engines
City Category
1
   63 700 000   Moscow 
Russian 
Capital
1     283 107 018   Moscow 
Russian 
Capital
2
   29 200 000   Kiev 
FSU 
Capital
2        72 598 323 
 Saint-
Petersburg 
Russian  
Non-capital
3
   24 435 000   Tallinn 
FSU 
Capital 
3        45 870 520  Kiev FSU Capital
4
   19 735 000  
Saint-
Petersburg 
Russian 
Non-
capital 
4        38 935 087  Novosibirsk 
Russian  
Non-capital
5
   19 100 000   Riga 
FSU 
Capital
5        26 716 641  Yekaterinburg 
Russian  
Non-capital
6
   16 150 000   Vilnius 
FSU 
Capital
6        24 604 706  Saratov 
Russian  
Non-capital
7
      8 775 000  Minsk 
FSU 
Capital
7        23 743 651  Lvov 
FSU  
Non-capital
8
      8 700 000  Perm
Russian 
Non-
capital
8        22 281 839  Penza 
Russian  
Non-capital
9
      8 385 000  Odessa 
FSU non-
capital 
9        21 813 066  Astrakhan
Russian  
Non-capital
10
      6 870 000  Baku 
FSU 
Capital
10        21 489 200  Orenburg 
Russian  
Non-capital
The Leader-City
The First Three
The First Ten
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5.	THE	PRE-EMINENCE	OF	MOSCOW	
Moscow is the absolute leader according to regional and global search 
engines. It is in the forefront of all rankings. Its values are far above other 
cities, which is no longer the case for any other observed city (tab.1). 
This leads us to talk about “monocentrism”. The “jealous” Russian 
capital city is strongly monopolising almost all advanced services, and 
through this most connections with outside channels. The conclusion is 
that the overwhelming weight of Moscow is blocking the influence of any 
other centres. In fact, the advanced services of other cities are limited 
to within their own territory. Moscow’s advanced services companies 
have financial bargaining power in negotiations with regional authorities 
in developing their activities throughout the territory of the whole CIS. 
This “feudalisation” is prolonging the centralisation which promotes the 
economic expansion of Moscow groups and blocks the development of 
metropolitan services in the biggest post-Soviet centres (P. Marchand, 
2007). We are currently witnessing a unipolar metropolisation across 
the CIS space. Nevertheless, a very light diminishing of Moscow’s pre-
eminence occurred during the period of 2004-2007. 
6.	A	CONVERGENCE	OF	METROPOLISATION	TO	WHICH	CENTERS?	
During the period 2004-2007 we examined whether or not alternative 
candidate cities to Moscow are emerging, either in Russia or elsewhere in 
the FSU. One issue of interest is the measure of resilience to administrative 
metropolisation. We will analyse the results using the various different 
methods which we developed, and shall begin by measuring the Simple 
Notoriety.
As a basis for our rankings, a typology of integration ratios has been 
developed. It gives us a valuable interpretation, including a general 
overview of the metropolisation process within the FSU space. The 
observed cities are grouped according to the strength of their simple 
notoriety into 4 categories:
1. Confirmed candidate global cities: strong in external and internal 
   notoriety
2. Extraverted candidate global cities: strong in external notoriety
3. Introverted cities: strong in internal notoriety 
4. Cities with weak simple notoriety 
     For better classification purposes two metropolitan trajectories have 
been identified. The first is the dynamic where a city owns, or earns over 
time, a strong simple notoriety, both internal and external. We will say 
that this city is a candidate global city in the strict sense that the city 
installs its command on its territory (the hinterland) while highlighting 
its connection (hub) with the global space. The second trajectory is the 
dynamic where a city opens, first of all, with a strong external notoriety. 
Thus, it is an extraverted candidate global city. In this case, it is possible 
that over time, it also opens internally, winning a strong internal notoriety. 
What are the engines of such logic of metropolisation? We consider that 
a city which is already open to the outside world will use these resources 
to integrate into its own regional environment afterwards. 
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Table	8.2		
Integration Ratio 
Typology, 2004–2007
Source: www.google.
com , www.yahoo.com , 
www.rambler.ru , www.
yandex.ru, February-
April  
2004–2007
GLOBAL ENGINES
REGIONAL ENGINES
Strong Weak
Strong Confirmed Candidate- me-
tropolises:

 Moscow
 Kiev
 Saint-Petersburg
 Odessa
 Minsk (negative bias)
 Novosibirsk
 Vladivostok
 Kazan (p+n bias)
 Samara (positive bias)
Introverted Cities:
 Yekaterinburg
 Nizhny Novgorod
 Chelyabinsk
 Krasnoyarsk
 Rostov-on-the Done
 Saratov
 Lvov (negative bias)
 Penza
 Astrakhan
 Orenburg
 Ulyanovsk
Weak Extraverted  
Candidate-metropolises:
 Chisinau  
     (negative bias)
 Riga
 Perm
 Baku
 Kharkov
 Tallinn
 Vilnius
 Tbilisi (n+p bias)
 Tashkent
 Yerevan
 Almaty
Cities with Weak Simple 
Notoriety:
 Astana
 Omsk
 Irkutsk
 Bishkek
 Volgograd
 Donetsk
 Yaroslavl
 Duchanbe
 Dnepropetrovsk
 Voronezh
 Krasnodar
 Khabarovsk
 Tyumen
 Ufa
 Nikolayev
 Lipetsk
 Ryazan
 Mariupol
 Barnaul
 Ashgabat
 Tolyatti
 Zaporozhye
 Izhevsk
 Karaganda
 Krivoy Rog
 Novokouznetsk
 Naberezhnye Chelny
Let us divide the cities into 4 sub-categories: Russian capital-cities and 
FSU capital-cities; Russian non-capital-cities and FSU non-capital-cities.
Ascending Cities
Descending Cities
White:  
Cities with  
no Changes
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Confirmed Candidate Global Cities 
In the category of “confirmed candidate global cities” among capital-
cities and non-capital-cities we find, firstly, two Ukrainian cities, Kiev the 
capital and Odessa a port city and second economic centre of Ukraine, 
whose rankings have proven their metropolitan potential (Agibetova, 2008). 
Minsk’s ranking is altered by bias caused by the presidential elections 
(March 19, 2006). Baku is placed here thanks to its oil resources and 
its strategic position on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which benefits 
global players (Samson, 2008). Nevertheless, dynamics cause it to drop 
in ranking. Riga, which dropped in the hierarchy due to dynamics, is 
the only Baltic capital-city which appears as an influential city both in 
the CIS space and Europe, despite its integration into the EU and the 
disintegration of the FSU.
As for Russian non-capital-cities, Saint-Petersburg is in the lead 
position. Speaking of metropolitan functions, by its demographic weight, 
its cultural status, its advanced services, functions of command, and its 
nodal position in the flows, the city is in a favourable situation compared 
to other Russian cities (Agibetova, 2008). The impetuous development of 
its software cluster contributes to its strength (Samaganova, 2008). On 
the post-Soviet scale, the question that arises is the future of its influence 
in the Baltic area, especially because of the rivalry between Riga and 
Tallinn. 
Russian non-capital-cities of the regions of Ural-Siberia and Volga, 
as Yekaterinburg (descending in dynamics), Novosibirsk, Kazan, Samara 
(ascending in dynamics)5 and Perm (descending in dynamics) are also 
situated in this category. Their good internal and external integration is 
confirmed by all available analytical tools, which designate them without 
hesitation as candidate global cities. The presence of Russian Eastern non-
capital-cities, such as Vladivostok and Irkutsk (descending in dynamics), 
also attracts attention. Our multivariate territorial analyses dedicated 
solely to Russian cities have shown that those Eastern cities situated far 
from Moscow in terms of geographical location, currently influence their 
Asian neighbourhood and have increasing success in their rivalry with 
Western Russia (Agibetova, 2008). 
Extraverted Candidate Global Cities 
The first observation to be made with regard to the extraverted cities 
sub-group is the absence of a Russian city. The second is that most are 
FSU capitals. This conforms to the precedent of the capital-city opening 
to the world space primarily, followed by the rest of the country (Samson, 
1996). 
Tallinn and Vilnius, strongly integrated into Europe due to EU 
membership, are not a surprise in this category. Tbilisi, with the pro-
Western orientation of the government, combined with a bias related to 
the cyclical conflicts with Russia in 2007, demonstrates a strong external 
5 A positive bias must be stressed, the EU-Russia summit on May 15, 2007.
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notoriety. Yerevan, the pro-Russian capital-city boosted by its global 
diaspora, is also found in the category of extraverted cities. The presence 
of Chisinau is due primarily to cyclical bias: the presidential elections and 
tensions surrounding Transnistria. 
The major capitals of Central Asia, such as Tashkent, Astana 
(descending in dynamics) and Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan 
persisting today as an economic, financial and scientific centre, demonstrate 
openness to the world space. Let us not forget that Tashkent, Almaty 
and Saint-Petersburg are the only cities across the CIS space which are 
designated as potential global cities by GaWC (Taylor, 2001). 
The only city in the non-capital category is Kharkov, which despite 
its geographical location and pro-Russian policy orientation, manages 
to integrate outside of the CIS space. This shows a certain general 
disintegration of the Ukraine from the CIS space and an orientation towards 
Europe due to a change of political course by President Yuchenko.
Introverted Cities 
In this category we find only large Russian cities: Nizhny Novgorod, 
Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Rostov, and Omsk (descending in dynamics). 
These are the towns which are in rivalry to become global cities with 
a Russian dimension, as a consequence of their vocation as historical 
regional centres during the Soviet era, and they manage to keep a 
strong internal command over a relatively narrow section of the country 
(Agibetova, 2008). In order to integrate into the globalised world, much 
remains to be done for these cities compared to extraverted cities. 
The arrival in dynamics of five Russian cities (Saratov, Penza, 
Astrakhan, Orenburg, and Ulyanovsk) is not surprising. Thanks to their 
economic development, they gained strength in 2007 and imposed greater 
command. Noting that the category of introverted cities serves as a link 
between candidate global cities and cities weak in simple notoriety, the 
question of their future integration remains open. 
Taking into account the pro-western orientation of Lvov, its ascension 
to the introverted cities subgroup does not conform to reality. First, this 
is conditioned by the presence in Ukraine (Kiev, Odessa, Simferopol) of 
Yandex’ subsidiaries. Second, the test showed the presence of strong 
negative bias due to the multiple spellings of this city, which have not 
been counted in all our observations. 
In conclusion, we can say that despite the strong rule of Moscow, a 
convergence process towards candidatures to the metropolitan function 
is beginning in the post-Soviet space. It deals more with capital-cities. 
This reflects the strong legacy of the Soviet mono-centred system which 
distinguishes this territory from the Western world in terms of territorial 
organisation and metropolitan articulations. It is quite logical that capital-
cities by their vocation of centres (administrative, economic, political, 
commercial, and cultural) open-up to the global space first. Thus, almost 
all FSU capitals are involved, with the exception of Minsk, Chisinau and 
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some Central Asian capitals (Bishkek, Dushanbe and Ashgabat). Capital-
cities able to compete with Moscow over the long term are likely to 
be Kiev and Riga. Among FSU non-capitals (non-Russian) which may 
function both as command centres and hubs, we identify the Ukrainian 
city of Odessa. Most Russian non-capital-cities appear as regional cities 
in conception whose influence does not extend beyond the Russian space. 
Among those managing to enter the ranking of confirmed candidates global 
cities are large cities like Saint-Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, 
Samara, Kazan and Vladivostok.
7.	WHAT	ARE	THE	INTEGRATION	AREAS	OF	FSU	CITIES?	
   The measurement of the Joint Notoriety associates the name of a 
FSU city with that of another city, FSU or non-FSU, when counting the 
number of occurrences in search engines. It helps indentify the areas of 
integration to which the sample cities are anchored.
    The Joint Notoriety is discussed in two environments – the regional 
environment (RE) and the global environment (GE) – always measured 
by two types of search engines. The first is provided by the association 
of the cities to 20 cities in the observed FSU area, most of which are the 
capitals of the 15 relevant countries (Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Chisinau, 
Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius, Baku, Tbilissi, Yerevan, Tashkent, Astana, Bishkek, 
Ashgabat, Dushanbe) plus four Russian cities, the largest in population 
(Saint-Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod) and 
the former capital of Kazakhstan (Almaty). These twenty cities are seen 
as centres of command in the regional environment, to which is anchored 
the process of regional integration. Thus, this environment will help us to 
question the process of convergence and to identify city networks in the 
light of the integration process.
The global environment is reproduced by the association of FSU cities 
to 18 world cities of alpha, beta and gamma category according to the 
GaWC (Shanghai, Delhi, Beijing, Seoul, Istanbul, Tokyo, New York , 
London, Hong Kong, Los Angeles, Singapore, Chicago, Toronto, Paris, 
Milan, Zurich, Dubai, Frankfurt) plus Cyprus which is regarded as an 
off-shore area of Russia. The choice of this particular list of world cities 
was based on the importance of their potential command on the space of 
the CIS. The geographic proximity, as well as geopolitical trends within 
the CIS space towards global cities, and vice versa, were also taken 
into account. The global environment is used to estimate the degree of 
commitment of CIS cities within the network of global cities, as well as 
to reveal potential candidate-cities. 
To characterise the phenomena, large matrix tables of city-pairs were 
constructed (Agibetova, 2008). For better visibility, the data was sorted 
so that we could focus on cities demonstrating a strong joint notoriety. 
The terms of “opening” and “integration” will no longer be used as 
synonyms. “Opening” will deal with the global environment, “integration” 
– the regional one, presuming that “opening” refers to “integration” in 
the global economy. 
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We will rely mainly on the results of global search engines because 
according to our observations regional ones have demonstrated poor 
performance in the measurement of joint notoriety. 
Regional Environment 
For simplicity a zonal typology was used. In 2004, we observed a split 
into two sub-zones between the Slavic-European” zone (Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine plus the Baltic states) with a strong joint notoriety, and the 
zone of “Southern Caucasus and Central Asia” where the processes of 
integration are occurring to a lesser degree. This zonal divide clearly 
demonstrates a delay in terms of integration into the regional environment 
for the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Thus, internal integration processes are concentrated in the Slavic-
European zone of the CIS territory. All cities are relatively well integrated, 
and the Baltic region, followed by Kiev and Minsk, influence by their 
command. In contrast to its simple notoriety rankings, Saint-Petersburg 
has a very low degree of integration. This means that the city has an 
international image, but it does not act as a command centre in its 
region. 
Because of ethno-territorial conflicts (the conflict of Nagorno-
Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and their remote location 
(Central Asia to the East)6 from the Slavic-European area, the integration 
processes in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are much less strong. 
The heterogeneous Southern Caucasus7 is moving towards integration 
with the Slavic-European zone, while Central Asia, more homogenous8 
being land-locked and isolated from other regions, is focusing on internal 
integration processes in this region only. 
6 It must be said that the region of Central Asia manifests the largest deficit in the process of me-
tropolisation. Thanks to a strong industrial base built during the Soviet era and the presence of 
oil resources, Tashkent and Almaty fit well within the CIS by inertia expressing a regional com-
mand. Bishkek and Ashgabat are the two capitals of the FSU space which are the less involved 
in metropolisation. As we indicated earlier, Turkmenistan (Ashgabat) is a special case despite its 
wealth in oil resources, it is a country absolutely introverted under the authoritarian political re-
gime. Regarding Bishkek, its integration and economic development have suffered from an acute 
political instability since the Tulip Revolution. Dushanbe, leaving the war (1992-1997) having 
just recovered from the military disaster, gradually integrated with the countries of Central Asia 
as with the CIS. 
7 Baku and neighbouring Yerevan barely  integrate together, while Tbilisi is open to both. This 
disintegration of Azerbaijan and Armenia is explained by the territorial conflict over the Arme-
nian enclave Nagorno-Karabakh. 
8 Unlike the Southern Caucasus, the process of integration in the central Asian network between 
countries of this region is sufficiently strong and homogeneous. We can see that all the capitals 
of Central Asia integrate well among themselves, except Ashgabat the Turkmen capital. This is 
because of the introverted politics of Turkmen-Bachy. The closure of the real space and cyber-
space, as we see, is quite pronounced even within this region. It is worth noting that the first 
Internet cafe in Ashgabat was opened on February 16, 2007 at the request of the new President of 
Turkmenistan, Berdymuhammedov (www.centrasia.ru, 2007). Today, their number is growing at a 
moderate pace, but they are not popular. It should be noted that one hour of Internet connection 
costs about three euros (average monthly wages did not exceed 30 € in 2005), and most compre-
hensive information sites are blocked by the sole Internet server. In addition, the presentation of 
an identity document is required and the name of the Internet user goes straight into the archives 
of the Ministry of Communications. 
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In 2007, the zonal break of the regional environment into two clubs, 
the “high” and “low” in terms of level of integration, became obsolete, 
distortion decreased and integration was widespread. In contrast to the 
year 2004, values rebounded and converged towards a relative balance: 
Moscow is losing some joint notoriety while, conversely, some other cities 
have seen an increase. This trend reflects a decline in the pre-eminence 
of Moscow on the one hand and the convergence of metropolisation to 
the FSU capital cities and some major Russian cities on the other hand. 
The relational integration between cities becomes more visible over the 
Internet via the global search engines: indeed regional integration can be 
viewed as part of the globalization process. 
In addition, the rate of ‘internetisation’ of central and eastern regions 
of Russia, as well as in the rest of the CIS, increased significantly 
between 2004 and 2007 (Agibetova, 2008). This increased penetration of 
the WWW system into the FSU space has a certain impact on the image 
of convergence.
At the end of 2007, some centrifugal forces were in operation in the 
territory of Russia, despite Moscow’s resistance. The Baltic capitals lost 
much influence in the CIS after their integration with, and eventual 
accession to, the EU. The Southern Caucasus region is experiencing 
an attractive trend in intra-regional9 integration while Central Asia is 
opening-up more towards Russia10. 
   Reading the observations in turn, it is still the category of FSU 
capital-cities (as per the analyses of simple notoriety) which shows the 
convergence of metropolisation towards certain privileged centres. Baltic 
capital-cities are leading as the strongest gravitational cities. As for 
non-capital cities, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Vladivostok and 
Irkutsk dominate this sector. 
In conclusion, the results of analysis of the regional environment 
demonstrated the presence of certain centrifugal forces à la Krugman 
(1991) affecting both Russia and the whole FSU territory, despite the 
resistance of jealous Moscow. The latter, as a result of centripetal forces, 
is still a leader, but facing a rise in opposing forces penetrating the CIS. 
They come primarily from capitals, which are in a favourable situation in 
terms of metropolisation. The metropolisation area taking shape in the 
FSU is the Slavic-European zone, with Kiev, Minsk, Odessa and the Baltic 
capitals commanding the post-Soviet space. The Caucasus is experiencing 
attractive dynamic trends in integrating more at an intra-regional level 
and with the Slave-European area. Central Asia manifests the largest 
deficit of metropolisation, but cooperation in energy and aerospace drives 
the recent dynamism of integration between Central Asia and Russia. 
9 The three capitals are better integrated and more open to the Slavic-European zone with the 
leadership of Baku. 
10 The dynamism of the recent integration of Central Asia with Russia is especially marked by 
the integration process in the fields of energy and aeronautics (Vinokurov, 2007 a,b). In 2006, 
the Eurasian Development Bank with its headquarters in Almaty was inaugurated by Putin and 
Nazarbayev.
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Global Environment 
The 19 cities forming the global environment of CIS cities can be 
divided into four geographical areas: Europe, Pacific (East Asia + West 
of the USA), Atlantic (East USA + Canada), and the Middle East-South 
Asia. 
The issue of convergence towards capital-cities is still relevant in this 
global environment. Among the nineteen cities ranked, ten are capitals. 
This confirms that the trend towards the dominance of capitals strongly 
marks the FSU space. Moreover, if we compare the list of cities of both 
environments, it is almost the same, except for Astana and Irkutsk which 
disappear from the global environment. 
It is interesting to note that the triad of Sassen (2001) – London, 
New York, Tokyo – does not have equal influence within the CIS: the 
first two have strong links with this space whereas Tokyo has only a 
slight presence there. The behaviour of the Japanese global city in terms 
of hyperlinks coincides with the geopolitical strategies whereby Tokyo is 
turning towards the Pacific area, with little involvement in “CIS-World” 
networks. In terms of dynamics the triad improves its cohesion. 
The Atlantic zone also has a very stable situation where Chicago 
and Toronto have strong links with the post-Soviet gravitational cities. 
Despite somewhat complicated “USA-Russia” relations, North America 
exerts a strong influence in the FSU. 
Europe reinforces its influence in the post-Soviet space via Paris, 
defined as a “soft global city” that is catching up with London and New 
York (Sassen, 2001). But in terms of dynamics, Frankfurt, Milan, Zurich 
and Cyprus appear as the least active. Europe is in the process of being 
overtaken by the Pacific. 
The Pacific zone marks a very pronounced presence due to the high 
command of Singapore, Hong Kong, Beijing, Seoul and Los Angeles. In 
2007, Hong Kong showed a very considerable increase in influence on the 
space of the CIS, which even surpassed that of the triad. Shanghai, which 
in 2004 was one of the weaker centres of world command, in 2007 reached 
the level of Beijing. Henceforth, the Pacific as a whole wins in influence, 
reaching the levels of the Atlantic and Europe. This logic reflects the 
recent development trends of China and Southeast Asia. This should be 
considered as a major geopolitical turning point where the attraction of 
the FSU of the East becomes stronger than that of the West. 
The Middle East-South Asia area (Istanbul, Dubai and New Delhi) has 
the least influence in the CIS. Nevertheless, this area increases via trade 
flows with the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East of Russia. 
Reading the matrix in rows allows us to identify in the FSU area the 
gravitational centres which are beginning to anchor to world growth 
poles. In turn, Moscow has started disintegrating from the Pacific and the 
Middle East, which opens a small window of opportunity for the rest of 
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the FSU space to catch up. The profile for the integration of the Russian 
capital-city is aimed primarily at the European triad, Paris, and then the 
Atlantic zone (Chicago) and the Pacific zone (Hong Kong and the Los 
Angeles).
 Kiev and Riga as gravitational cities are the most open to the global 
space. Slightly less open are Tallinn, Odessa, Vilnius, Saint Petersburg 
and Samara. Let’s not forget that the opening of the Baltic capitals is 
conditioned by their membership of the EU. Among the Russian non-
capitals significant cities are Novosibirsk and Vladivostok. The orientation 
of their international opening is marked by their immediate neighbours. 
Novosibirsk fits better with the zones of Europe and Atlantic while 
Vladivostok turned to the Pacific. 
Therefore, it appears that the opening of post-Soviet metropolisation 
areas is strongly marked by their geographical neighbourhood and 
geopolitical trends. The Slavic-European zone anchors to Europe and 
Atlantic, while the Far East of Russia, Southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia are turning increasingly towards the Pacific and Middle East. The 
proximity of the EU, with its enhanced integration across the European 
continent and with its recent enlargement of the CEECs and extension 
of neighbourhood policies seems, to exert a strong attraction for some 
members of the CIS. Thus, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, without mentioning 
the Baltic countries which are already a part of the EU, and Western 
Russia as far as Siberia (Irkutsk) are open to Western Europe. 
The “East-CIS” zone is attracted by Asian proximity and influence. 
In this sense, the concept of Eurasia (Linn, Tiomkin, 2005) appears to 
be seriously questionable, or considerably reduced for the Asian side. In 
any case the CIS is under the double attraction of the West and the East, 
through which it is being integrated into the global economy. One of the 
challenges of the metropolisation of this immense space is the design of 
its internal organisation, namely the internal extension of the benefits of 
economic integration in the context of extraversion. 
8.	GENERAL	CONCLUSION	
Metropolisation is a key-issue, which is essential to the CIS for its 
contemporary economic modernization and its opening to the world 
space. 
The method we developed based on the enumeration of occurrence 
of hyperlinks in global and regional search engines for potential global 
cities, and analysing their simple and joint notoriety, produced valuable 
tools for measuring the situation in 2004 and 2007. It helped enrich the 
knowledge of the studied phenomena by providing new information which 
proved to be robust. 
It also helped to develop two new concepts of analysis of regional 
economic integration. The first one is a new reading of economic 
integration in the context of a knowledge economy through the concept 
of the image reflected by the virtual community in a cyberspace formed by 
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“regional” search engines, namely Russian ones. This regional specificity 
of the representation of the world, be it global or CIS, is identified 
by comparison with the images reflected by global search engines. 
Furthermore, analysing the joint notoriety linking two cities allows a new 
measurement of economic integration. This approach, which paves the 
way for an alternative to existing gravity theories, is promising because 
it is more relevant to economic processes dominated by information and 
knowledge flows. 
Our analysis showed that currently, marked by the Soviet legacy, 
the CIS space still functions as a mono-centred space, where the only 
commuter into the world is Moscow. Moscow cannot be the only centre 
of such an immense territory and the deficit in metropolisation is therefore 
clear and measurable. In dynamics, both simple and joint notorieties in 
the regional environment show a slight decline in Moscow’s pre-eminence 
and some convergence of the metropolisation process towards certain 
privileged cities. 
These cities are primarily capital-cities such as Kiev, Riga, Tallinn, 
Vilnius, Baku, Tbilissi, Erevan, Tashkent, and “Almaty”, but they are also 
large urban centres such as Saint-Petersburg, Odessa, Yekaterinburg, 
Novosibirsk, Samara and Vladivostok. There is thus a simultaneous 
movement from the top and from the bottom of the metropolisation 
process, in other words administrative-political and economic. However, 
the discontinuity of the economic space in the vast territory could 
endanger the trend to economic gestation of metropolisation and create a 
post-Soviet specificity with dominance of movement from the top. 
The analysis of the joint notoriety in the global environment provided a 
new grid for analysis of international integration with a twofold anchoring 
of the CIS with Europe and Asia. Located in the middle of the “super-
continent” of Eurasia, the CIS, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, is 
experiencing geopolitical change. At the regional level the ambitions of 
Russian domination are in place. Regional integration with Central Asia is 
increasingly expanding, unlike with Southern Caucasus. However, from 
a global point of view, Russia seems a little lost in its immensity and is 
not yet able to generate its own metropolisation through its homogenous 
economic space. For metropolisation as well as for the integration of 
global areas, the Russian territory is divided into two zones: West and 
East. The dream of building a large Eurasia is not necessarily ill-fated if it 
is the path towards CIS metropolisation. However, Russia is now facing 
the challenge of its own metropolisation, with the need to develop and to 
preserve its unity. 
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Nuclear Energy Complexes 
in Russia and Kazakhstan: 
Prospects for Development  
and Cooperation.  
EDB Industry Report no.1
1	Summary
1. 2005–2006 was a critical period in the development of the nuclear 
complexes of Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
These years have ushered in a “nuclear renaissance”. Russia’s nuclear 
sector was subject to a total systemic review; the Federal Target Program 
(FTP) allocated to it funds totaling more than USD 55 billion. A decision 
was taken to consolidate all nuclear assets within one state corporation. 
Kazakhstan implemented the “15000 tons uranium by 2010” state 
development program. Its development programs for reactors and nuclear 
power plants are worked out jointly with Russia. Closer cooperation is 
also being pursued with other leaders in the field, primarily Japanese 
companies. Cooperation agreements between the two countries were 
adopted. The foundation of three joint ventures (JV) was the first tangible 
outcome of above agreements.
2. Meanwhile Kazakh uranium has become a focus of attention and 
fierce competition between the world’s largest consumers, including 
France, Canada, USA, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia. 
Early this decade, Russia’s substantial production capacity and highly 
competitive uranium ore conversion technologies added to calls for the 
country to renew its economic links with Kazakhstan in the uranium 
mining and nuclear industries. Given Russia’s ambitious plans to develop 
nuclear energy, and the fact that its uranium stocks are practically 
depleted, the benefits of closer cooperation with Kazakhstan are clear. 
However, Russia will have to compete with well-established players on 
Kazakhstan’s uranium market.
3. Kazakhstan has aspirations to become a world leader in uranium 
mining and to focus production at the highly processed end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. This was the backdrop for a recent transaction which will have 
a significant impact on the country’s nuclear industry. In the autumn of 
2007, KazAtomProm purchased Toshiba’s 10% share in Westinghouse 
Electrics, a leading producer of nuclear reactors, for USD 540 million. 
This transaction has secured a permanent nuclear alliance between 
KazAtomProm, Toshiba and Westinghouse Electrics. For Kazakhstan, 
this creates new opportunities to develop a hi-tech nuclear industry and 
Evgeny 
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to market its output in the West. Supplying high-end nuclear products 
to Western markets is one of KazAtomProm’s development priorities, 
along with continued cooperation with Russia in supplying Soviettype 
reactors.
4. The need to integrate the nuclear power complexes of Kazakhstan 
and Russia along the entire production chain is a logical response to their 
urgent need to reduce their energy deficit, and to the synergies which 
exist between their production capacities and technologies at each stage 
of the nuclear fuel production chain: (1) uranium mining, (2) uranium 
enrichment, (3) production of fuel pellets and fuel elements, (4) reactor 
design and production, primarily 300 MW VBER-300 power reactors, (5) 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants, and (6) nuclear waste 
processing and disposal.
5. Kazakhstan has plans to develop its own nuclear power industry 
and is likely to base this on 300 MW Russian-Kazakh reactors and, in the 
longer-term, 1000 MW Westinghouse reactors.
6. The development of this capital-intensive sector will require extensive 
financing based on credit from a number of sources. International and 
national development banks are one promising potential source of such 
funding. The ability to secure this capital from international and national 
development banks rests entirely upon the nuclear energy industry’s 
potential for development, innovation, diversification and integration. The 
Eurasian Development Bank, VEB (Russian Development Bank) and the 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan have indicated their recognition of this. 
E.g., the EDB has extended credit to the Russian-Kazakh Zarechnoye 
JV.
2.	Global	Development	Trends	in	Nuclear	Energy	and	Uranium	
Mining
Nuclear power plants generate every sixth kilowatt of electricity 
produced in the world. Nuclear is third largest source of energy after 
coal (39%) and hydro energy (19%). Today 440 nuclear reactors in 31 
countries generate a total 370 GW, which is double Russia’s thermal and 
electric energy output. 
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Canada, Australia, South Africa and Kazakhstan are the world’s major 
suppliers of natural uranium. Russia has almost no uranium production 
but generates uranium under the warheads disposal program. 
Russia’s TekhSnabExport, USEC of America, AREVA of France and 
the Anglo-German company Urenco are leaders in uranium enrichment.
Moreover, Russia has a 20% per cent share in the fuel elements 
market, specifically fuel pellets for reactors. It is a leading builder of 
nuclear reactors, alongside America’s General Electric and Westinghouse, 
AREVA of France and the Franco-German company Siemens-Framatom. 
In 2005–2006, nuclear energy sector saw a global renaissance. After 
two decades of environmental protest and most projects being frozen in 
the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the USSR and Three Mile 
Island in the USA, many countries are set to increase the share of nuclear 
energy in their national power supply. The safety and economic viability 
of this form of energy at a time of record high and still rising hydrocarbon 
prices have played a significant role in decision-making process.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has predicted that there will be 
a 53% increase in global energy consumption by 2030. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the cost of nuclear energy 
development will exceed USD 200 billion by 2030. Finland, Switzerland, 
Spain, India and the USA have specific plans to ramp up their nuclear 
capacity. Vietnam, Egypt and Turkey are considering building nuclear 
power plants. Ambitious plans for the construction of nuclear power plants 
may be introduced in South Korea, China and Japan and it is evident that 
developing Asian economies will be responsible for considerable growth 
in the nuclear energy sector.
AREVA has estimated that some 500 nuclear reactors will be 
commissioned by 2030 (20 new reactors annually). The expansion 
of nuclear capacity will be curtailed to some extent by the relatively 
small number of companies capable of building the reactors. Given the 
predicted rate of growth, the concept of competition between companies 
may prove to be redundant. At a conference on International Cooperation 
in NPP Construction Projects held in Moscow in late October 2006, 
representatives of Westinghouse, a nuclear reactor producer which 
controls 25% of the market, emphasized that a shortage of engineering 
capacity was a major problem. The company has received six orders 
for new AP-100 reactors, which takes Westinghouse to the limit of its 
existing capacity. AREVA also has a full order book and plans to build 
five nuclear reactors by 2010.
The leading consultancy firm, Ux Consulting, has predicted that 
global uranium mining and consumption are set to increase dramatically 
(see tables 1 and 2). Significant growth is expected in Kazakhstan and 
Russia. However, Russia ranks third in terms of uranium stocks, and 
since deposits are hard to access, will have to make huge investments in 
order to develop uranium mining.
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3.	Nuclear	Energy	Demands	in	the	Republic	of	Kazakhstan	and	
Russian	Federation
Kazakhstan: On the Way to No.1 Uranium Producer, Striving 
to Add Value
There are a number of factors prompting Kazakhstan to develop its 
nuclear energy sector:
• The country’s generating capacity is rapidly ageing. By 2012-
2014, production capacity will be 80-90% obsolete, compared to 60-70% 
currently.
Reports
2005 2010 2015 Average  
annual growth, 
2005–2015, %
Canada 13713 16500 21772 4.7
Kazakhstan 5144 14800 19200 14.1
Russia 3921 6400 8000 7.4
Africa 8154 12445 12645 4.5
Australia 11222 10874 16654 4.0
other 7123 8943 8122 1.3
Total  
recovery:
49277 69962 86393 5.8
HEU supply1 7258 9072        - -
Other 
recoverable 
resources
18733 13744 11703 -4.6
Total supply 75267 92778 98096 2.7
Table	9.1	 
Global Uranium 
Recovery, 2005–2015, t.
Source: Uranium Market 
Outlook. Ux Consulting, 
2007
2005 2010 2015 2030
USA 24765 25086 25923 30916
Canada 2118 1931 1931 2370
EU 27195 24593 24156 19376
Japan 9651 9908 13084 16940
South Korea 3551 4247 5910 7983
Taiwan 1126 2211 1562 1593
Russian  
Federation
4020 6880 8069 10427
China 1594 3378 3806 15771
India 414 474 1229 4177
Worldwide 
consumption:
78818 84786 91719 117193
Table	9.2  
Largest Uranium 
Consumers, 2005–2030, t. 
Source: Uranium Market 
Outlook. Ux Consulting, 
2007
1 HEU – highly enriched uranium
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• Generating capacity is poorly diversified. Over 80% of all electricity 
is produced by combined heat-and-power (HPP) plants. The sustainability 
of Kazakhstan’s grid would be improved if more generating capacity was 
built in southern and western parts of the country.
• The production and consumption of electricity are geographically too 
divided. The largest generating capacity is in Pavlodar Oblast in the north 
of Kazakhstan, whereas core consumption is in the south. The annual rate 
of growth of electricity consumption in southern Kazakhstan is 12-13% 
compared to 6-7% for the country as a whole. To avert a widening of 
energy deficit in the south, an extra plant needs to be built. The Balkhash 
power plant is one planned way of spreading energy production more 
evenly across the country2.
• The growth in electricity consumption is outstripping the rate 
of supply increase in western Kazakhstan (the Mangistau and Atyrau 
oblasts).
• Constructing new capacity in southern and western Kazakhstan 
will allow the country to increase its energy exports to Russia. Currently, 
energy exports are generated mostly in northern Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s ambitious plans to expanding nuclear power generation 
reflect Kazakhstan’s desire to forge ahead in world energy markets and to 
avoid a force-majeure situation in the domestic energy market. Kazakhstan 
is at risk of changing from an energy-abundant country into one with a 
significant energy deficit. Against an annual rate of growth in GDP of 
9%, the average annual rate of energy consumption stands at 6%. There 
are 71 power plants in the country, half of them built before 1980. The 
maximum generation capacity of these plants is currently below 73 billion 
kilowatt hours, yet annual energy consumption is predicted to reach 74 
billion kilowatt hours by 2008.
The uneven development of the national grid has exacerbated the 
situation. Major generating capacities are located in the northern part of 
the country. Three oblasts – Pavlodar, Karaganda and East Kazakhstan – 
account for over 70% of total power generated, but power loss in transit 
amounts to 20% of the total, on average. The construction of small- and 
medium-capacity power plants is one way of reducing power loss and 
geographical inequality. The greater the distance between generating 
capacity and feedstock supply, the lower the cost effectiveness of the 
power plant; it is very costly to transport coal across the entire country 
or to lay a dedicated gas pipeline.
Developing hydro-electric generation in some Kazakh regions will not 
be a significant factor in reducing the energy deficit. Nuclear power 
plants are a more effective solution to this since nuclear reactors are 
refueled every five years. Also, Kazakhstan is able to supply nuclear fuel 
for all its domestic requirements. According to KazAtomProm’s president, 
Reports
2 Earlier discussions have envisaged construction of a 2 GW NPP on Balkhash but final decision 
has been taken in 2008 in favour of an HPP (600x4 MW) on Ekibastuz coal.
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Mr. M. Dzhakishev, a new nuclear power plant should be ready for 
commissioning in 2014–2015. The design and feasibility study for the 
plant will take three years, and its construction will take a further five 
years.
Russia: Breaking the “Infrastructural Bottleneck”
The development of nuclear energy in Russia is particularly expedient 
for the following reasons:
1. Russia’s anticipated near-term energy deficit is a major 
“infrastructural bottleneck”.
2. The development of nuclear energy will allow for further growth in 
gas exports.
Russia’s existing technological capacity and the fact that energy 
deficits may soon become (have already become in some regions) a major 
infrastructural barrier to economic development, make the development 
of nuclear power in the country a particularly urgent priority. In addition, 
there is significant potential for Russia to increase gas exports if nuclear 
plays a larger role in domestic energy supply.
Nuclear energy capacity is currently exploited to its maximum 
limit. Current feedstock reserves are only sufficient to supply existing 
generating capacity. In Russia the ratio of reserves to capacity is just 
over 70%, compared to the average European level of 83-85%. Large-
scale investment is required to increase this ratio. It is expected that 
up to USD 10 billion will be invested in a program to extend uranium 
mining; 60-70% of Russia’s uranium needs will be met domestically and 
30-40% by uranium mined by joint ventures in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
other states.
Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Energy Development
The relatively limited environmental impact of nuclear energy is 
another factor favoring NPP development in Russia and Kazakhstan. It is a 
more important factor for Kazakhstan than for Russia, since Kazakhstan’s 
existing domestic generating structure means that over 80% of its energy 
is produced in combined heat and power plants.
According to statistics from the AES Сorporation, it costs USD 800 
for each new kilowatt hour of generating capacity from a co-generation 
plant compared to $1600-$1800 for each new kW of nuclear capacity 
(preliminary estimates for the Russian-Kazakh VBER-300 reactor are 
around $1000-$1200. However, both estimates were subject to high 
inflation over the last years. Our current estimates are in the range of 
$2000-3000/kW, depending on the type and location). However, it is a 
lot cheaper to operate a nuclear power plant and the environmental cost 
is also smaller. Generating 1 gigawatt hour in a coal-fired plant produces 
766 tonnes of carbon dioxide, compared to 3 tonnes from a NPP (Table 3). 
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Nuclear plants are regarded as one of cleanest sources of energy. 
The economic indicators of nuclear plants bear comparison with fossil 
fuel plants. As an illustration, the operating parameters of 4,000 MW 
co-generation and nuclear power plants are given below (the table shows 
typical data for the USSR).
Reports
Description
Quantity (tons)
CHP NPP
Fuel consumption * 12 000000 4
Atmospheric oxygen intake 32 000 000 0
Carbon dioxide waste 36 000 000 0
Sulphur dioxide waste     800 000 0
Nitrogen oxide waste 400 000 0
Solid wastes 8 000 000 200
Particulate emissions 400 000 0
Environmental heat discharge 
capacity, MW 
6 000 8 000
4.	Russian	Nuclear	Industry
Table	9.3	 
Quantitative Indicators 
for Operating 4,000 
MW coal-fired HPP and 
Nuclear Power Plants
Source: T. Zhantikin, 
A. Bladov, S. Koltyshev 
(2005), Report. Nuclear 
Energy Development 
in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.  
See also Appendix 4.
Note: Fuel consumption 
is expressed in 
conventional fuel 
tonnes; the actual 
quantity of fuel 
consumed depends 
on its calorific value 
and varies for coal, 
depending on grade,  
by 15-20 MM t/y.
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NPP 
Name
Unit # Reactor Type
MW, 
gross
Power 
Unit  
Generation
Operation
End of Ser-
vice Life, yr
Beloyarsk 3 BN600 600 II 1980 2010-2020**
Bilibinsk 1 EGP-6 12 I 1974 2004-2014**
2 EGP-6 12 I 1974 2004-2014**
3 EGP-6 12 I 1975 2005-2015**
4 EGP-6 12 I 1976 2006-2016**
Balakov 1 VVER-1000 1000 II 1985 2015
2 VVER-1000 1000 II 1987 2017
3 VVER-1000 1000 II 1988 2018
4 VVER-1000 1000 III 1993 2023
Kalinin 1 VVER-1000 1000 II 1984 2014
2 VVER-1000 1000 II 1986 2016
Kolsk 1 VVER-440 440 I 1973 2003-2013**
2 VVER-440 440 I 1974 2004-2014**
3 VVER-440 440 II 1981 2011
VVER-440 440 II 1984 2014
Kursk 1 RBMK-1000 1000 I 1976 2006-2016**
2 RBMK-1000 1000 II 1979 2009-2019**
3 RBMK-1000 1000 III 1983 2013
4 RBMK-1000 1000 IV 1985 2015
Leningrad 1 RBMK-1000 1000 I 1973 2003-2013**
2 RBMK-1000 1000 II 1975 2005-2020**
3 RBMK-1000 1000 III 1979 2009-2019**
4 RBMK-1000 1000 IV 1981 2011
Novovo-
ronezhsk
3 VVER-440 417 I 1971 2001-2011**
4 VVER-440 417 I 1972 2002-2012**
5 VVER-1000 1000 II 1980 2010
Smolensk 1 RBMK-1000 1000 II 1982 2012
2 RBMK-1000 1000 II 1985 2015
3 RBMK-1000 1000 II 1990 2020
Crucial 2006
2006 was a crucial year for the Russian nuclear industry. Reforms 
were introduced throughout the industry in that year, and the attitude of 
the Russian authorities and the public towards nuclear industry changed. 
V. Gagiyev, General Director of Russia’s Union of Nuclear, Energy 
and Scientific Industry Employers, described some of more notable 
achievements of Russia’s nuclear industry in 2006:
Table	9.4	 
Description of Operating 
NPPs 
* First and second 
generating units 
of above NPP have 
been shutdown for 
decommissioning 
** A 10 year extension 
of service life taken into 
account
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• The regulatory framework for nuclear industry reform was 
established. The Government of Russian Federation approved a Federal 
Target Program (FTP), entitled “The Development of Russia’s Nuclear 
and Energy Complex in 2007–2010 and Potential Development to 2015”. 
In 2007, a Federal Law on “Management and Disposal of Property and 
Assets of Organizations Active in the Nuclear Energy Sector and on 
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Russian Federation” was 
adopted.
• In 2006, work began on the construction of a fourth generating 
unit at the Beloyarsk BN-800 fast-neutron reactor nuclear power plant. 
Construction work began on a fourth generating unit began at the Kalinin 
NPP, and on the first offshore KLT-40S ice-breaker reactor.
• In 2006, Russian nuclear engineers bid successfully for the contract 
to build the Belene nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, the first post-Soviet 
nuclear construction project in Europe to be awarded to Russian engineers. 
The contract was awarded to AtomStroyExport, which is also building 
five generating units at nuclear plants in China, India and Iran.
• Zarechnoye, the Russian-Kazakh JV, began mining uranium and has 
planned capacity of 1000t/y U. Russia’s first overseas uranium mining 
project is financed by a five-year, USD 63 million loan from the Eurasian 
Development Bank
• Kazakh uranium will be enriched at a dedicated site at the Angarsk 
Electro-chemical Complex.
• TVEL Corporation expanded its exports of nuclear fuel, bidding 
successfully to supply the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech 
Republic.
• Joint ventures were established with engineering companies 
producing equipment for nuclear power plants. Social progress was made, 
too.
• Finally, public attitudes towards the nuclear power industry changed 
radically; the sector regained its priority status3.
FTP “Development of Russia’s Nuclear Power Complex in 
2007–2010 and Potential Development to 2015”
On October 4, 2006, the Government of Russian Federation approved 
the Federal Target Program entitled “The Development of Russia’s 
Nuclear Energy Complex in 2007–2010 and Potential Development 
to 2015”.4 The program establishes the timetable for the startup of 
new nuclear power generation units serving the ‘hotspots’ of Russian 
economic growth (Moscow Oblast, European Russia, Russia’s Far East 
and the Urals). It envisages that ten new generating units with a total 
capacity of over 11 gigawatts will be commissioned by 2015. Today, 
Reports
3 http://www.rosatom.ru/comments/3437_16.01.2007, as at October 2007
4 http://www.government.gov.ru/government/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentplans/8123133.
htm, as at October 2007
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ten nuclear power plants are operating in Russia and these have a total 
output of 23.3 gigawatts; nuclear power accounts for 15.5% of Russia’s 
total power generation. As a result of this FTP, nuclear’s share of total 
power generation will increase to 22% according to the baseline scenario, 
and up to 30% according to the optimistic scenario.
Overall funding for the program totals 1.47 trillion roubles (USD 55 
billion), including 674.8 billion rubles from the federal budget and 796.6 
billion rubles from the industry. It is assumed that the nuclear power 
industry will not require central funding after 2015 since the foundations 
built over the next eight years are designed to ensure the industry 
becomes self-financing. The unit cost of nuclear power plant construction 
is expected to fall by 10% and the net cost of power generation by 
20%.
Due to the insufficient funding of a previous project, the “The Safety 
and Development of the Nuclear Power Industry”, which received only 
70.6% of its planned budget, the Federal Target Program “Energy 
Effective Economy for 2002–2005 and Potential Development until 
2010” is behind schedule. Only two generating units were commissioned, 
adding two gigawatts of new capacity, out of a planned three new units 
which were due to bring on stream three gigawatts of new generating 
capacity.
The government-approved FTP does not concern itself with 
RosAtomProm’s development. The industry’s organizational development 
is addressed in the Federal Law on the Management and Disposal of 
the Property and Assets of Organizations Active in the Nuclear Energy 
Sector, which came into force on February 20, 2007.5 The main premise 
of this law is to consolidate nuclear assets in a single corporation, i.e., 
AtomEnergoProm. The corporation will control the entire nuclear energy 
production chain, including uranium mining, power and fuel production, 
domestic and overseas power plant construction, nuclear machine building, 
and design and research organizations6. AtomEnergoProm’s assets are 
estimated at USD 40-50 billion.
In the second half of 2007, the decision was taken to consolidate 
nuclear assets in the state firm RosAtom. This company will comprise the 
industry’s scientific base, nuclear safety facilities and 100% of the assets 
of AtomEnergoProm, which, in turn, will manage all the civic entities 
within the nuclear industry. The relevant draft law was passed by State 
Duma by the end of 2007.
Finally, in April 2007, Russia began constructing the first offshore 
nuclear power plant in the world. The 70 MW plant is scheduled for 
completion by 2010. Its output will mainly be consumed by Sevmash, 
and around 20% will be sold. Project costs stand at USD 200 million. 
Reports
5 Federal Law on Factors for Management and Disposal of Property and Assets of Organizations 
Operating to Use Nuclear Energy as of February 5, 2007.  
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, #4291 of February 9, 2007.
6 http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=40957&idChannel=73 as of June 2008.
Evgeny Vinokurov  “Nuclear Energy Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan:  
Prospects for Development and Cooperation”
 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
The investment will pay for itself in less than seven years. A total of 
seven offshore nuclear power plants, including high-capacity plants, are 
due to be commissioned by 2016. Offshore nuclear power plants may be 
positioned in any coastal area to generate power and heat and also to 
desalinate sea water. These plants are considered safer and have a re-
fuelling interval of 12-15 years.
A Swing of Public Opinion
Public opinion towards nuclear power in Russia is changing, and 
attitudes are becoming more positive. In a survey, 45% of respondents 
answered “yes” to the question, “Do you think new nuclear power 
plants or nuclear generating units should be constructed in Russia?”; 
28% said “no” and 27% gave no answer.
Those who supported nuclear expansion gave the following reasons. 
“They are more environmentally friendly than fossil fuel heat-and-power 
plants and hydro-electricity plants”; “Nuclear power has no cheaper 
alternative as yet”; “Wind power is still a ‘futuristic’ option”; “Nearly all 
Western countries rely on nuclear power whereas we produce only 12% 
of our energy in nuclear power plants”; “It is inevitable given current 
energy demand”; “Natural resources have limits; sooner or later oil and 
gas will run out”; “Nuclear power is the future, whether we like it or 
not”.7
 5.	Nuclear	Power	Industry	of	Kazakhstan:	Current	Situation	and	
Development	Prospects
KazAtomProm after the Year 2000
In 2006, KazAtomProm’s position in world markets supplying the 
nuclear power industry was as follows:
- It supplied 8% of the world’s mined uranium, putting KazAtomProm 
in fourth place in the world compared to 16th place in 1999;
- It supplied 29% of the world’s beryllium products (3% in 1999), 
putting it in second place globally;
- It supplied 8% of all tantalum products (0.4% in 1999) and was 
fourth in the world. After a long crisis in the world’s uranium industry, 
KazAtomProm commissioned three new mines: South Moinkum, South 
Karamurun and Akdala.
In 2002, the High-Technology Institute was founded to conduct 
scientific follow up on KazAtomProm’s projects.
In 2003, KazAtomProm purchased, by tender, the former Mangistau 
Nuclear Power Plant and established the MAEK-KazAtomProm 
company.
In 2004, management of the Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine 
(Tselinny Mining & Chemical Co.) was handed over to KazAtomProm.
Reports
7 http://www.rosatom.ru/news/3348_09.01.2007 as of October 2007.
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Today, the KazAtomProm holding manages six areas of activity: 
geological exploration; uranium mining; metallurgical engineering; energy; 
scientific support for production and staff training; and social security. 
KazAtomProm owns shares in several uranium mining joint ventures: 
KatCo (with French company Cogema/Areva); Inkai (with Canadian 
company Kameko); Zarechnoye (with Russian TekhSnabExport): and 
UKR TVS (producing nuclear fuel with Russian-Ukrainian partners).
In 2004, KazAtomProm highlighted the global uranium production 
crisis. Company experts suggested that the global uranium shortage 
would grow to 16,000 tonnes in six years. By 2010, KazAtomProm plans 
to produce 15,000 tU, making it a leading player in the world’s industry. 
Its confident predictions are based on the solid commercial relationships 
it has forged with the world’s largest energy and commercial companies, 
and upon its financial stability, advanced scientific knowledge base and a 
strong network of peer enterprises.8 
The company’s management estimates that Kazakhstan’s uranium 
stocks amount to around 900,000 tonnes.
Program “15 000 tU by 2010”
Having identified growing world demand and hence competition for 
uranium fuel, KazAtomProm drafted its “1500 tU by 2010” development 
program. If the program is implemented successfully KazAtomProm will 
become a world leader on the uranium market.
The Program includes: 
1. Upgrading and extending uranium extraction and production of 
uranium fuel.
2. Constructing and commissioning new mines.
3. Constructing and optimizing power distribution, and new road and 
rail infrastructure
4. Financial reorganization.
5. Uranium extraction will increase to a planned 15 000 tU to meet 
increasing demand for uranium fuel.
Program’s Investment Needs
KazAtomProm requires USD 700 million in order to implement the 
“15 000t U by 2010” program.
The program’s financial sources were initially identified as follows:
1. KazAtomProm’s own funds: USD 170 million;
2. Uranium pre-payments: USD 220 million;
3. Bank loans: USD 210 million;
4. Eurobonds: USD 100 million.
Reports
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Reports
Mines 2005 2006 2007P 2008P 2009P 2010P
Planned 
Capa-
city
Uvanas 420 300 300 300 300 300 300
East Mynkuduk 633 500 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Central 
Mynkuduk
- - 200 600 1200 2000 2000
Akdala  
(JV, Canada)
726 700 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
South Inkai 
(JV, Canada)
176 308 508 300 1970 2000 2000
Inkai - - 100 300 600 1000 2000
Kanzhugan 440 400 400 400 400 400 400
West 
Mynkuduk  
(JV, Japan)
- - - 100 300 600 1000
Budenovskoye 
(JV, Russia)
- - - 100 300 600 1000
South  
Moinkum
502 500 500 500 500 500 500
Moinkum  
(JV, France)
39 400 500 500 500 500 500
Tortkuduk  
(JV, France)
- 100 350 750 900 1000 1000
North  
Karamurun
700 750 800 980 980 1000 1000
South  
Karamurun 
214 200 200 150 250 250 250
Irkol  
(JV, Japan)
- - 100 250 500 750 750
Kharasan  
(JV, Canada)
- - 100 300 600 1000 2000
Zarechnoye 
(JV, Russia)
- 250 500 500 1000 1000 1000
SMCC mines 507 525 545 645 815 450 500
Total : 4357 4933 7103 8675 13115 15350  18200
Later in September 2005, a more precise estimate for the program 
was announced, totaling USD 660 million. By then, KazAtomProm had 
already raised USD 210 million in loans and USD 60 million in pre-
payments for uranium; the company’s own contribution will eventually 
total USD 224 million. It is expected that the remaining USD 166 million 
will be raised by a Eurobond issue.9
9 To implement the program “15000 tU by 2010”, Kazakhstan will require $660 Million”.  
M. Dzhakishev. Kazakhstan today. September 14, 2005.
Table	9.5	 
Uranium Recovery by 
Mine
Source: KazAtomProm
Note: according to 
preliminary data, 
KazAtomProm produced 
6637t U in 2007. The 
production target for 
2008 is 9600t U. The 
2007 data for mines is 
as follows: 0.6 million 
pounds at Inkai; 871t at 
South Moinkum; 300t 
at Irkol in 2008, 500t 
in 2009 and 750t in 
2010, and 0.5 million 
pounds planned for 
South Inkai in 2008 
(Ux Consulting, January 
2008). Zarechnoye has 
produced 100 tU in 2007 
but is expected to see 
substantial increase in 
2008.
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Given Kazakhstan’s success to date in raising funds there seems little 
reason to doubt that the company will raise the full amount required 
to fund its program. The national company enjoys credit ratings at the 
sovereign level for Kazakhstan.
The Development of Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Complex in 2000–
2006
In mid-June 2001, KazAtomProm’s President, M. Dzhakishev, stated 
that Kazakhstan could become a world leader in the world’s uranium 
market within ten years.10 Uranium prices had slumped in recent years, 
he said, after the market was flooded with military uranium after the end 
of the cold war. These stocks, however, would run out some time between 
2005 and 2008, and prices would increase rapidly, making uranium 
effectively ’priceless’ by 2010, in that there would be “no uranium at 
any price”. His estimate was based on the development targeted by the 
nuclear states.
In 2002, the Kazakh government published its “Development Strategy 
for the Uranium and Nuclear Energy Industries 2002–203011. The plan 
was conceived to transform the country’s nuclear energy complex into 
a hi-tech, dynamic and progressive sector that would be the keystone 
of vigorous and sustainable economic development. It emerged as the 
result of KazAtomProm’s crisis management and in response to the rapid 
growth of the Kazakh economy.
The strategy targeted production of 15,000t/y U by 2028, which 
would make Kazakhstan the world’s largest producer. To implement the 
project would cost USD 540 million. The uranium produced would be 
worth USD 82-85 million annually, and the national budget would receive 
USD 2 billion annually in tax revenues.
In 2004, the Uranium Industry Development Strategy for the Republic 
of Kazakhstan 2004–2015 was approved.
In recent years, the company has been increasing uranium extraction. 
In 2002, KazAtomProm was the fourth largest uranium producer in the 
world (accounting for 8% of global uranium ore production), according 
to statistics from the World Nuclear Association. Uranium production 
volumes were increased by revamping old mines (Uvanas, East Mynkuduk, 
Kanzhugam, South Moinkum, North Karamurun) and exploiting new 
deposits (South Karamurun and South Moinkum). Further increases in 
uranium production would be achieved by developing deposits which had 
been discovered but which had not, up to now, been exploited (Zarechnoye, 
Ilpak, Irkol, Central Mynkuduk, Budenovskoye and part of the Inkai deposit 
which was estimated to contain 473,000 tonnes uranium). In pursuit of 
its goals, KazAtomProm increased uranium production from 794 tonnes 
in 1998 to 2,850 tonnes in 2002. In 2003, Kazakhstan increased uranium 
recovery to 2,952 tonnes. In 2004, Kazakhstan produced 3,719 tonnes 
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uranium and became the third largest producer in the world. Interim data 
estimates uranium production in 2005 totaling 4,300 tonnes. This rapid 
production growth prompted KazAtomProm to issue more optimistic 
forecasts. In March 2005, the company announced its development 
strategy aimed at increasing uranium recovery to 15,000t/y U by 2010, 
making Kazakhstan the world’s top producer. 
To achieve this ambitious growth rate, the company pursued radical 
measures to rehabilitate and develop Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. As 
well as revamping its infrastructure, KazAtomProm expanded by acquiring 
nuclear enterprises. In late April 2003, the Mangyshlak Nuclear Power 
Plant, which had been placed in bankruptcy a month before, was sold to 
KazAtomProm for USD 800,000. The plant was a strategic enterprise 
engaged in the entire production cycle, supplying constant heat and 
power from a safe reactor. The new company, MAEK-KazAtomProm, 
was registered on May 1, 2003.
Competition for Kazakh Uranium
Kazakh uranium is becoming the focus of fierce competition between 
the world’s large consumers, primarily France, Canada, Japan, China, 
South Korea, and Russia. External investors are poised to “conquer” the 
market through direct investment, loans and trade funding to guarantee 
supply. In such circumstances, KazAtomProm has no worries about 
raising capital.
In late September 2004, KazAtomProm and Kazsabton Ltd. (Cyprus) 
signed a contract placing Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Plant under 
trust management. At the time, the uranium mines in northern Kazakhstan 
were producing some 100t U. Although production was due to rise to 
600t/y uranium ore (the maximum possible production from the northern 
deposits), for two years the Stepnogorsk complex could only work at full 
capacity for two months in a year. KazAtomProm worked out a plan to 
enable the plant to operate using ore supplied from southern deposits. 
However, because of the high estimated cost of implementing this project 
(USD 75 million), the company temporarily delayed any investment in it 
while it pursued its “corporate strategy to increase uranium production 
five-fold by 2010”. A year later, the company announced plans to invest 
over USD 180 million developing Stepnogorsk in 2005–2007.
In late February 2004, a new uranium refining plant was commissioned 
in Taukent in the Suzaksk Region of the South Kazakhstan Oblast. The 
project cost was USD 4.3 million, and plant capacity, 1500-1700t/y U.
In August 2005, KazAtomProm declared that it intended to build a 
molybdenum ore processing plant in Stepnogorsk within three months. 
The plant was to produce 1,000 tonnes of molybdenum oxide a year. A 
Kazakh-British JV enterprise, Moliken, was set up to supply ore to the 
enterprise by developing the 21,000 tonne estimated deposit at Shorskoye. 
During 2005–2007, around USD 180 million would be invested in the 
plant.
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KazAtomProm has been very successful in leveraging finance from 
the banks in recent years. In June 2005, the company signed a three-year 
pre-export financing contract with a syndicate of 11 of the world’s largest 
banks (organized by Natexis Banques Populaires and Citibank) in the 
amount of USD 150 million. KazAtomProm intended to use these funds 
to finance geological exploration, mining and the production of natural 
uranium concentrate. In September the same year, a USD 60 million pre-
export loan was extended to KazAtomProm by Mizuho Corporate Bank 
Ltd for a tenyear period. Collateral for the loan was an export contract for 
the supply of uranium oxides (natural uranium concentrate) which had 
been struck with Itochu Corp.
KazAtomProm has been actively developing new deposits. In 2006, it 
commissioned the East Mynkuduk mine, which has a design capacity of 
1000t/y U. In 2007, similar mines with on-site leaching facilities were 
due to be commissioned, as follows: Central Mynkuduk (2,000t/y), South 
Inkai (2,000t/y), Irkol (750t/y) and Kharasan (2,000t/y). In 2008, there 
are plans to begin ore extraction at West Mynkuduk (1,000t/y) and 
Budenkovskoye (1,000t/y). Kazakhstan’s total uranium resources amount 
to 900,000 tonnes, around 600,000t of which, according to estimates, can 
be extracted at the current level of commercial technology.
France boasts the world’s largest nuclear and energy complex and 
most up-to-date nuclear technology. In 2001, the French-Kazakh joint 
venture KatCo was founded (АRЕVА holds 51% and KazAtomProm 49%) 
and will consist of an experimental uranium plant at the Moinkum deposit 
in South Kazakhstan. Development of the deposit will require investment 
of nearly USD 90 million which will be provided by the AREVA group. 
Reserves at Moinkum are estimated at 43,700t U.
Canada has a well-established uranium industry and is the largest 
uranium producer in the world. It made its first foray into the Kazakh 
market back in the 1990’s, but was initially unsuccessful. In 1996, the 
Government of Kazakhstan and Canada’s World Wide Minerals signed 
a contract to take over the joint management of the Northern Uranium 
Production Plant and the Tselinny Mining and Chemical Combine. A 
year later, WWM applied to the Kazakh government for a license to 
sell uranium to the USA, but was refused, since there are strict quotas 
governing such imports into the USA. As a result, the company halted 
production, citing poor sales. The Kazakh government therefore took over 
the management of the complex and terminated the contract with WWM 
since the latter had failed to fulfil contract obligations. The government 
transferred the complex to KazAtomProm. WWM filed numerous suits with 
the US courts but all were dismissed. In February 2003, the US Supreme 
Court finally ruled in Kazakhstan’s favor. In March 2006, however, the 
company filed a suit with the International Arbitration Court, claiming 
USD 3.8 billion in compensation. Cameco, another Canadian company 
and one of the world’s largest uranium producers, was more successful 
in its business ventures in Kazakhstan. In 1998, it founded the Inkai 
joint venture KazAtomProm to develop uranium deposits in the Suzaksk 
Region of South Kazakhstan Oblast.
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The USA is the largest investor in Kazakhstan’s economy overall. It 
accounts for more than one third of the direct investment in Kazakhstan 
since independence, amounting to USD 40 billion.12 However, large-scale 
joint projects in the nuclear power industry between the US and Kazakhstan 
are currently limited to one joint venture involving KazAtomProm and 
the US Nuclear Energy Ministry. Based at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, 
the company refines scrap containing uranium into fuel pellets for nuclear 
power plants. The second stage of this project includes plans to increase 
capacity and revamp production of beryllium bronze alloy. The USA is 
represented in this project by Brush Wellman and RWE NUKEM, which 
invested USD 4 million. The US Government invested USD 1.5 million 
and provided consultants’ reports on the project. The Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant invested USD 4.5 million. Analysts expect this project to make 
profits of around USD 10 million per year.
In March 2004, the ground-breaking ceremony took place at the BN-
350 liquid metal reactor coolant refinery. Project cost is estimated at 
USD 3 million which is being supplied in full by the US State Department 
in accordance with nuclear non-proliferation agreements. The plant will 
refine spent liquid-metal coolant into a concentrated alkaline solution.
Japan’s influence will continue to grow in Kazakhstan in the years 
to come in terms of uranium recovery. Nuclear energy accounts for one 
third of the Japan’s energy complex, and the country has several leading 
nuclear industry enterprises.
In September 2005, Itochu Corp and KazAtomProm signed a ten-year, 
USD 60 million loan agreement under which the Kazakh company would 
supply Itochu with 3,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate. In January 
2006, KazAtomProm concluded an agreement with Japanese companies 
Sumitomo Corporation and Kansai Electric Power Co. on the development 
of West Mynkuduk field. The Japanese partners will invest in the APPAK 
JV founded by KazAtomProm with KazAtomProm, Sumitomo and Kansai 
taking 65%, 25% and 10% shares respectively. This project is being 
financed with USD 100 million.
In May 2007, various contracts were agreed relating to the supply 
of uranium concentrate to Japan. In the longer term, Kazakh may begin 
exporting some 8,000 t/y uranium to Japan, which would be equivalent 
to 30% of total Japanese import market. The agreements also envisage 
the opening of a USD 500 million trade insurance credit line funded by 
Japan’s NEXI, and, in the medium term, the supply to NEXI of refined 
uranium products such as fuel pellets produced at the Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant. These agreements alone will double or triple the added value of 
uranium products made in Kazakhstan.
Three months after the above agreements were concluded, 
KazAtomProm took the ambitious step of buying out Toshiba’s 10% share 
in Westinghouse Electric, the leading US producer of nuclear reactors, 
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for USD 540 million. This transaction sealed a long-term alliance between 
KazAtomProm, Toshiba and Westinghouse Electric in the nuclear energy 
industry.
For Kazakhstan, this step constitutes a major step forward in creating 
new opportunities to develop its hi-tech nuclear industry and increase 
its presence on western markets. Supplying processed uranium products 
to western markets is the Kazakh company’s top development priority 
alongside cooperation with Russia in the supply of Soviet-type reactors. 
The production of fuel for western reactors at Ulba Metallurgical Plant 
by the Cameco JV will be a major contribution to the Kazakh company’s 
goal of producing processed uranium fuel. It has stated that the first 
output will be available in 2012.
South Korea is showing a keen interest in Kazakhstan’s nuclear 
complex. The two countries are exchanging scientific and technical 
expertise, and South Korea’s government has declared its interest in 
further cooperation with Kazakhstan.
China. No Kazakh-Chinese joint ventures have yet been founded in 
Kazakhstan, although Ulba Metallurgical Plant has a representative office 
in China. The Ulba-China JV company registered in the Waigaochao free 
trade zone near Shanghai in June 2004 to sell and market Ulba’s beryllium 
products in the Chinese market. In November 2004, KazAtomProm and 
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed a long-term strategic 
partnership agreement and a program of works in the nuclear industry. 
Negotiations are under way relating to the co-development of the Zhalpak 
field in the southern part of Kazakhstan.
The low interest rates on credit extended to KazAtomProm are 
testament to the keen interest that overseas firms are showing in its 
uranium industry. The company has raised loans from Citibank at 6.3%, 
from West LB loan at 7.7% and from Natexis Banques Populaires’s at 
6.7%.13
Prospects for Russian-Kazakh Cooperation amid Competition 
for Kazakh Uranium
In the first half of this decade, Kazakh uranium became a highly 
sought-after product, much scrutinized by the world’s leading uranium 
producers and consumers alike. This created an environment of intense 
competition, and has enabled Kazakhstan to be discerning in its choice of 
partners and investors. Nevertheless the country remained steadfast in 
its policy of diversifying its trade and economic relations in order to avoid 
dependency on any one partner, be it France, Russia or Japan.
Concurrent with this development, Russia, with its large production 
capacity and highly-competitive uranium refining technologies, had 
sought to restore its economic ties with Kazakhstan based on uranium 
recovery and the nuclear sector. Given its ambitious plans to develop 
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nuclear energy, with an all but depleted uranium stock, it is very much 
in Russia’s interest to pursue cooperation with Kazakhstan.
However, Russia will be competing in the uranium feedstock market 
with some highly accomplished competitors. As the cost of developing 
its own uranium deposits increases, and demand for nuclear fuel spirals as 
the role of nuclear energy expands globally, Russia will have to be resolute 
if it is to have influence in a strategically important region controlling a 
significant proportion of the world’s uranium stocks.
Russia does have a number of competitive advantages which will favor 
Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the nuclear sector.
• Both countries wish to further economic integration. They are 
members of EurAsEC, CSTO, SCO, CES and the CIS and are pursuing 
the creation of a customs union.
• The nuclear complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan complement 
each other: Kazakh uranium production feeds into Russian uranium 
enrichment; Kazakhstan produces elements and Russia fuel pellets. The 
joint development and construction of VBER-300 reactors is the logical 
completion of this vertically integrated nuclear production cycle.
• Many leading Kazakh scientists, businessmen and researchers in 
the nuclear industry studied in Russian higher education institutions and 
maintain close relations with their Russian colleagues. Scientific exchange 
programs and traineeships have been established in Russia, which may 
favor the selection of Russian technologies and cooperation with Russian 
partners.
Practical steps are being taken to launch an integration project in 
the nuclear sector. The foundations for this have been laid in the form of 
strategic partnerships already forged between Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in the use of nuclear energy.
Russia’s moves to enhance the integration of the Russian and Kazakh 
economies along the whole nuclear production chain is a crucial step in 
its quest to resolve its own energy problems. The Kazakh economy will 
benefit similarly from cooperation with Russia. One further benefit of 
this cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan in the construction and 
operation of a nuclear power plant is that it may lead to a breakthrough 
in the machine building industry.
6.	Cooperation	of	Russian	Federation	and	the	Republic	of	Kazakh-
stan
1998–2005: Post-Crisis Cooperation
The first steps towards Russian-Kazakh nuclear cooperation were 
made after the collapse of their integrated economic systems in the late 
1990’s. In 1998, the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
Russian Federation signed agreement on the integration of nuclear fuel 
enterprises (Moscow, July 6, 1998). The main provision of the agreement 
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was Russia’s purchase of a stake in Ulba Metallurgical Plant (as TVEL 
OJSC).
After the break-up of USSR, the Ulba complex was the only link in 
the nuclear fuel production chain to be located outside Russia. The plant 
began producing uranium pellets to be u sed in the downstream assembly 
of reactor fuel elements (fuel cells). Fuel cells are produced in Russia at 
a plant close to Novosibirsk, and pellets are made in Kazakhstan by Ulba 
Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
A joint venture to produce nuclear fuel for NPPs was one of the first 
projects founded since 2000 by KazAtomProm. Its partners were TVEL 
(Russia) and EnergoAtom (Ukraine). The three companies took an equal 
share in the JV and its USD 0.45 million charter capital. The venture 
was aimed at integrating the entire nuclear production cycle in a single 
enterprise: uranium production and processing, fuel assembly production 
and nuclear energy generation. In early June 2001, the agreement 
establishing the JV was signed.
In May 2003, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed a further JV 
agreement on joint production of fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors 
and the supply of nuclear fuel to Ukrainian NPPs. The agreement 
resulted in numerous orders for Ulba Metallurgical Plant and requests 
for it to produce nuclear fuel elements. Russia’s TVEL began producing 
fuel assemblies for Ukrainian NPPs and the National Nuclear Energy 
Company of Ukraine launched production of zirconium tubes for fuel 
assemblies.
The Beryllium JV was another big project established in September 
2002 by the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) and Moscow Non-Ferrous 
Metal Processing Plant (MZOTsM), each with a 50% share. The JV’s 
operations include the fabrication of ingots at UMP and the flat-rolling 
of these ingots at MZOTsM. These are widely used in hi-tech electronic 
instruments and in other specialist electronic components. The beryllium 
plant at Ulba signed contracts to supply Chinese consumers and made 
its first shipment to China. This UMP plant is the world’s second largest 
beryllium producer and performs the entire processing cycle from ore 
concentrate to beryllium metal and its alloys.
2006: Economic Integration within Nuclear Cycle
Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the civilian use of nuclear energy gained 
momentum in 2006. On January 25 that year, Russia’s President, Vladimir 
Putin, and the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, made a 
joint declaration on cooperation in the non-military use of nuclear energy. 
The declaration launched a number of initiatives aimed at integrating the 
nuclear industrial enterprises of both countries.
On July 25, 2006, MAEK-KazAtomProm held a meeting in the city 
of Aktau attended by Sergey Kiriyenko, the head of Russia’s Federal 
Nuclear Energy Agency. The meeting was called to discuss the strategic 
partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan on use of nuclear energy 
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for non-military purposes. This program was the outcome of the joint 
statement made by Putin and Nazarbaev in January.
The program outlines six major areas of cooperation:
• Cooperation in nuclear fuel production;
• Cooperation in the nuclear energy industry;
• Development of transport infrastructure to deliver uranium products 
to the world market;
• Improved regulation of Kazakh-Russian cooperation in the non-
military use of nuclear energy;
• Scientific and technical cooperation;
• Cooperation in training personnel to work in the nuclear industry.
Under the program for strategic cooperation in nuclear fuel production, 
a memorandum of understanding was signed between KazAtomProm 
(Kazakhstan) and TekhSnabExport OJSC (Russia) establishing two joint 
ventures.14
The first JV is established in Kazakhstan to produce natural uranium 
fuel for Russian-designed reactors.
The second JV is established in Russia to enrich uranium. Subject to 
completion of feasibility studies the partner companies will contribute 
equally to the initial asset base for the joint ventures: 
- uranium production facilities will be provided by Kazakhstan;
- uranium enrichment facilities will be provided by Russia.
At a meeting of the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan on October 
3, 2006 in the city of Uralsk, it was agreed that Kazakhstan would 
participate in the introduction of a Russian initiative to establish, in 
Russia and under IAEA monitoring, an international nuclear fuel services 
centre, including uranium enrichment. On October 12, 2006, Russian and 
Kazakh representatives signed documents in Moscow establishing three 
Russian-Kazakh joint ventures in the non-military use of nuclear energy. 
On May 10, 2007, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia witnessed the 
signing of the agreement which established the International Uranium 
Enrichment Center (IUEC) in the city of Angarsk.
Under the program of strategic development of the nuclear energy 
industry, a third JV of is due to be established between KazAtomProm 
and AtomStroyExport. This JV will design a Russian-Kazakh nuclear 
reactor with VBER-300 power units designed by OKBM. The charter 
documents were signed in October 2006.
A revolutionary new 300 MW generating unit is also due to be built 
in Kazakhstan. Although reactors now commonly generate 1000 MW and 
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more, these units are unsuitable for the extensive Kazakh grid because 
of the amount of reserve energy they require when the reactor is shut 
down for re-fuelling.
The new VBER-300 generator will be a key export opportunity for the 
Russian-Kazakh JV. Its principal design concepts were based on naval 
reactors which have accumulated over 6,000 reactor years of accident-
free operation.
The new reactor has no direct competitors, but this may change before 
long. The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), for example, has 
already completed the design concept for a 180 MW reactor. Also, the 
fast-breeder reactors designed in many countries will certainly be used 
well into the future (a 65 MW fast-breeder reactor designed with Russian 
assistance is due to be commissioned in China in 2008).
On the whole, Kazakhstan is likely to select both 300 MW Russian-
Kazakh reactors and, in the longer term, 1,000 MW Westinghouse 
reactors.
7.	Nuclear	Fuel	Cycle	Business	Chain
(1) Uranium Mining
Uranium mining, refining and export are the major activities of 
KazAtomProm. In 2005 the company mined 4,032t U of the total 41,000t 
U mined globally. Around 19% of estimated global uranium stocks 
(900,000t) are in Kazakhstan. Over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium can be 
extracted using mineshaft leaching, the cheapest and least environmentally 
damaging form of extraction. 
The Ore Mining Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of KazAtomProm 
founded in 2004, extracts uranium using the method of mineshaft leaching 
at seven sites: Uvanas, Mynkuduk, South Moinkum, Kanzhugan, North 
Karamurun, South Karamurun, and Irkol.
In 2005, Russia’s RosAtomProm mined 3,431t U, or 8% of global 
production. Its output comprised natural and converted uranium. Uranium 
mining in Russia has a much less certain future than in Kazakhstan. 
Deposits are exhausted in Russia, and if it is to expand its nuclear energy 
capacity, the way forward is based on Kazakh uranium supplies.
(2) Uranium Enrichment
Yellowcake (a chemical concentrate of natural uranium and an 
intermediate product) produced by the Ore Mining Company is refined 
at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical 
Combine.15
Kazakh uranium mined by the Russian-Kazakh Zarechnoye JV will be 
enriched in a dedicated part of the Angarsk Electro-chemical Combine.
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(3) Fabrication of Fuel Pellets and Fuel Elements
Ulba Metallurgical Plant, based in Ust-Kamenogorsk, is a leading 
producer of fuel pellets.
US businesses have expressed interest in this strategic enterprise. As 
mentioned above, the US Nuclear Energy Ministry and some American 
companies invested in a joint venture which makes fuel pellets by refining 
scrap containing uranium. The capacity of the JV is due to be expanded, 
and production of beryllium bronze alloy will be added.16
Russia’s TVEL, a world leader in nuclear fuel production, manufactures 
fuel assemblies (fuel elements). The Machine Building Works 
(Mashinostroitelny zavod) and Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant 
are Russia’s leading producers of fuel assemblies. Chepetsk Mechanical 
Plant and the Chemical Metallurgical Plant (Khimiko-metallurgicheskiy 
zavod) supply the construction materials, components and uranium 
products required by these companies.17
(4) Small and Medium Power Reactors
In October 2006, AtomStroyExport OJSC of Russia and KazAtomProm 
founded JV Nuclear Power Plants, a new joint stock company which will 
build small- and medium-capacity reactors. As yet, there is nothing to 
compete with this 300 MW reactor anywhere in the world. This project is 
currently in development. Designing a nuclear power plant which uses two 
VBER-300 reactors will take around three years and requires investment 
of USD 60-70 million, all of which will come from Kazakhstan.
High-capacity plants capable of producing 1,000 MW and more do 
not represent an optimal decision for the Kazakh energy system. When 
such nuclear reactors are re-fueled, equivalent reserve capacity must be 
made available, and this is not possible given the huge distances between 
Kazakhstan’s power plants. It is more economical for Kazakhstan to 
commission three 300 MW plants rather than a single 1,000 MW one, 
thereby reducing its energy losses when capacity is idle. This also reduces 
power losses incurred in long-distance power distribution.
It is likely that the first nuclear plant with a VBER reactor will be built 
in Aktau. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Mangyshlak did have 
a BN-350 fast-neutron reactor and also has good staffing levels. Secondly, 
a nuclear project stands a better chance of recouping its costs in this 
region. Mangistau Oblast takes its power from a gas-fired HPP plant 
with a capacity of up to 500 MW, which is rather expensive electricity for 
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Kazakhstan. To make gas affordable, the government has set domestic gas 
prices five times below the market value. According to a KazAtomProm 
estimate, the construction of a 500 MW nuclear plant will cost USD 600 
million and will pay for itself within five years. Our estimates run higher 
than that, probably closer to USD 1000 million.
Resolving the domestic energy deficit is a matter of urgency. At 
the same time, VBER-300 is likely to prove attractive if promoted in 
world markets, primarily to large and under-populated countries. Market 
research conducted by RosAtom suggests that the world market can 
potentially absorb 30-50 VBER-300s, creating revenue of USD 15-20 
billion. The Russian-Kazakh JV stands a good chance of becoming the 
leader in small-capacity reactor segment if the project is implemented 
successfully.
(5) NPP Construction
Russia. One of the primary goals of Russia’s FTP is “to speed up the 
development of the nuclear energy industry and provide geopolitical and 
energy security for Russian Federation by commissioning new generating 
units in nuclear power plants with a total capacity of over 2 GW a 
year…”.18
The following activity is planned on this basis:
- Two generating units with VVER-1000 reactors (Unit No. 2 at Rostov 
NPP and unit No. 4 at Kalinin NPP) will be commissioned in 2009 and 
2011 respectively.
- In 2007–2008, three new generating units with VVER-1000 reactors 
will be constructed at Novovoronezhsk NPP #2 and Leningrad NPP #2. 
These will be ready for commissioning in 2012-2013. From 2009 onwards, 
two new generators for NPPs with VVER reactors will be constructed 
annually; the completion of each will take five years.
Thus, upon completion of the program, ten new power units with a 
total power capacity of over 9.8 GW will have been commissioned at 
nuclear power plants. A further ten generating units will be at various 
stages of completion.
The program entitled “Transition to Innovative Technologies in Nuclear 
Energy Development” incorporates the following activity:
- generator #4 will be built at Beloyarsk NPP. This will have a BN-800 
reactor which works using closed nuclear fuel cycle technology; the BN-
800 unit will be supplied with MOX-fuel and is due to be commissioned 
in 2012.
The program requires investments totaling 1.47 trillion rubles (USD 
55 billion), including 674.8 billion rubles from the federal budget and 
796.6 billion rubles from industry funds.
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Kazakhstan. The first NPP with two generating units will be built at 
the MAEK site in Aktau. The first generating unit (300 MW out of a total 
600 MW) is to be commissioned in 2014. Earlier there were plans for a 
second NPP at Ulken near Balkhash.19 However, the choice was made in 
favor of a coal-fired HPP.
(6) Nuclear Waste Disposal and Refinery
It is possible and indeed essential for countries to cooperate in the 
processing and disposal of nuclear waste.
Cooperation between nuclear complexes in Kazakhstan and Russia 
along the entire nuclear energy production chain is necessitated both 
by the acute needs of both national economies and by the synergies 
which exist between their capacities and technological accomplishment 
at each stage of the nuclear fuel production cycle. These conclusions 
are borne out by national industrial development programs which focus 
on the complementarity and interdependence of the Kazakh and Russian 
nuclear complexes along the entire nuclear fuel production cycle.
8.	Nuclear	Energy	Industrial	Complex	Finaning:	Development	
bank	come	into	play
The nuclear sector is dominated by state-owned companies. The 
nuclear energy complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan are state-owned; 
Kazakhstan’s uranium assets are concentrated in the hands of the state 
company, KazAtomProm, while Russia controls uranium, nuclear energy 
and scientific and research assets through RosAtom. Both countries 
regard the nuclear complex as being of extreme strategic importance and 
state funding is allocated accordingly. The nuclear industry is financed 
by the following:
• The national budget. Financing under Russia’s Federal Target 
Program may reach USD 55 billion.
The federal budget is expected to provide 47% of this amount (USD 
26 billion). Funds from the national budget will not be required after 2015 
if the sector becomes self-financing, as expected.
• State companies maintain their investment programs by raising 
commercial loans. Owing to the nature of its business and the state 
support it receives, nuclear holdings are able to raise long-term credit on 
relatively favorable terms. For example, in 2005 KazAtomProm received 
loans from Citibank at 6.3%, from West LB at 7.7% and from Natexis 
Banques Populaires at 6.7%.
• Joint ventures with leading international companies can help to 
shape capital structure and technological progress.
• Funding from international and national development banks.
The financing of the nuclear energy industry by international and 
national development banks is of particular international interest. On the 
19 Business i Vlast, 29.12.2006, p. 4
Reports
Eurasian Development Bank
one hand, development banks can become one of the larges sources of 
financing for the sector (e. g., the World Bank has historically been the 
largest creditor of the hydro energy industry and has been allocating an 
average USD 1.25 billion to this sector annually for the last 60 years). 
On the other hand, there are obvious reasons why financing the nuclear 
industry represents a challenge: fear of nuclear accidents, the Chernobyl 
and Three Mile Island incidents in recent memory, nuclear waste issues, 
etc. However, public attitudes towards nuclear energy have been more 
positive in recent years. This has been encouraged by the growing energy 
deficit and relatively limited ecological impact of nuclear power plants 
(provided their safety is assured and waste issues are resolved).
The scale and duration of nuclear energy projects (billions of dollars 
of financing required, with a 10 to 15-year investment horizon) make 
them a highly suitable investment opportunity for development banks. 
The innovative nature of the sector adds to their investment potential. 
As outlined above, the nuclear energy production cycle incorporates 
uranium production, enrichment, the production of fuel pellets and fuel 
elements, the construction of nuclear reactors and NPPs, the operation 
of these NPPs, and finally nuclear waste processing and disposal. The 
processing elements of the chain have obvious potential. Furthermore, 
a number of developing countries, especially those which export oil 
and gas, face a pressing need to diversify their national economies. 
Therefore, the development of the nuclear energy complex, including its 
high-tech elements, is especially attractive. This is particularly the case 
for Kazakhstan and Russia in view of the competitive advantages both 
countries enjoy in this sector. 
The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) established by Russia and 
Kazakhstan in 2006 is committed to facilitating the sustainable economic 
growth of participating states and to expanding the trade and economic 
relations pursuant to its mission. The Bank offers long-term credit 
facilities to development projects in sectors prioritized by participating 
countries. Developing the innovative achievements of the nuclear energy 
complex and the hi-tech industries within it thus complies entirely with 
the mission of the EDB. The Bank regards the nuclear energy industry as 
one of its key priorities.
One of the Bank’s first projects was a USD 60 Million loan to the 
Zarechnoye JV founded by KazAtomProm and TekhSnabExport to develop 
the Zarechnoye uranium deposit in South Kazakhstan. The opportunities 
for integration represented by projects which bring together the nuclear 
energy complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan add to their suitability as 
investment targets for the EBD. The Bank is currently reviewing other 
projects undertaken by post-Soviet countries which also offer significant 
potential to expand mutual trade and investments.
The Bank has certain competitive advantages in relation to nuclear 
sector projects:
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• The nuclear sector is a strategic one for the Bank’s member countries 
and these countries therefore limit the amount of foreign equity that may 
be invested in it. The EBD offers borrowers long-term and relatively cheap 
loans (interest rates are commensurate with western financial institutions 
and below those of CIS banks).
• The Bank offers considerable political support to member states.
• There is minimal attendant political risk for borrowers working with 
the EBD.
The development strategies being applied within the nuclear complexes 
of Russia and Kazakhstan and the integration agreements between them 
can be facilitated by the Bank and the financing it is able to extend to all 
stages of nuclear technology cycle.
VEB (Russian Development Bank) and the Development Bank 
of Kazakhstan (DBK) have yet to participate in the development of 
this sector. However, the charter and other regulatory documents of 
these national development banks do not exclude their involvement in 
the nuclear energy industry. In fact, given the close interaction of the 
national development banks and relevant state entities, and the Banks’ 
role in enhancing the efficacy of targeted programs, both these financial 
institutions are expected to focus on the development of the nuclear 
energy complex. This is further corroborated by recent events: RosAtom 
and GasPromBank have opened discussions on the establishment of a 
large nuclear machine-building holding based on the AtomStroyExport 
CJSC (which builds NPPs overseas). RosAtom will own 51% of this 
enterprise and GasPromBank 49%. The holding will integrate the entire 
production process from nuclear plant design to supply of equipment. It 
will be co-owned by RosAtom, GasPromBank and the State Development 
Bank. VEB will hold 10-15% of the equity.20
Generally, the current status and the future requirements of the Kazakh 
and Russian economies will rely on the economically viable development 
of nuclear energy complexes and on close cooperation between the two 
countries. The development of this capital- intensive sector requires 
generous funding from a number of sources. In order to secure long-term 
credit facilities from international and national development banks, the 
electricity industry must be efficient, and the nuclear energy complex 
must remain innovative and diversified while offering opportunities for 
greater integration.
20 Kommersant, 06.11.2007
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1.	General	Conclusions
1. Issues related to joint utilisation of water resources and the water 
energy potential of the Aral Sea basin are increasingly arising as the 
focus of heated debate at summits of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation) and EurAsEC (Eurasian Economic Community). The 
reason for this is clear. Water is vital for Central Asian countries, and 
coordinating the shared utilisation of water is becoming more and more 
problematic.
2. Central Asian countries are closely interdependent in their water 
utilisation. Most of the water in the Aral Sea Basin is from upstream river 
waters, whereas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan water is 
mostly used for irrigation in downstream areas. Competing demands for 
water in the region have considerably exceeded supply for a long time. 
In the future, water shortages will only worsen in Central Asia because 
of the growing population, the development of industrial and agrarian 
production and the expansion of irrigation.
3. In such circumstances, regulation of the hydrological models of the 
Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya is becoming critically important. The countries 
located in downstream areas tend to take most of their water during 
summer for irrigation. Countries located in upstream areas have to use 
water for energy generation. Seasonal differences in demand for water 
have generated conflicting approaches to transboundary water utilisation 
between the two groups of countries. The problem is exacerbated by the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea, the consequences of which are felt globally, and 
winter floods caused by excessive reservoir drainage.
4. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have vast hydro energy capacity, but are 
heavily depend on the supply of hydrocarbons from other countries in the 
region. During winter 2008, public electricity and heating was completely 
cut off in Tajikistan; production of aluminum at the Tajik aluminum plant, 
the country’s main source of foreign currency, fell dramatically. 
5. The estimated renewable hydro energy potential of Central Asia is 
460 billion kWh per year, but at the present time less than 10 per cent 
of this potential is used. Energy is mainly produced in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.
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6. The low level of power independence and the potential of water 
resources explain the willingness of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to develop 
hydro energy in their countries. However, these countries do not have 
the resources to finance the construction of HPPs and are forced to 
seek external financing. The region’s countries have different attitudes 
to the construction of HPPs and this acts as a barrier to external 
investment in such projects. There are many examples across the world 
of successful cooperation in regulating water resources to the benefit of 
all participants.
7. Resolving the issues of shared utilisation of water and power 
resources in Central Asia has huge economic, ecological, political and 
international importance, since it is a major factor in preserving stability, 
economic prosperity and ecological security in this region. The most 
important issues in this regard are the management of water and energy 
resources and leverage of significant long term investment in hydro 
energy projects.
8. The Eurasian Development Bank recognizes the problems of the 
water and energy sectors and is studying the possibility of participating in 
hydro energy projects in Central Asia that address the conflicting needs 
of the river states and advance integration in the region. 
2.	Development	of	the	Hydro	Energy	Potential		
of	Central	Asian	Rivers
Water is vital to all human activity and, unlike other resources, is not 
restricted by boundaries. The water and energy nexus transcends national 
boundaries and binds countries in a single basin to their shared water 
source. Generally, each country has institutions that regulate different 
consumers’ demands for resources. However, there are no institutions 
to govern transboundary water courses. International competition over 
water usage will increase along with the increasing demand for it. The 
regulation of transboundary river utilisation is now one of the most 
significant problems that the international community faces and must 
be addressed by the establishment of institutions and the adoption of 
international legislation.
Water Resources in Central Asian Countries and Shared 
Utilisation of These Resources
The Aral Sea Basin is a unique ecological system. It is formed by 
two great Asian rivers – the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya – which rise in 
the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains and which link together six Central 
Asian countries, including Afghanistan. Geography and history have 
created unique conditions for the management and utilisation of water 
courses in this region.
The Central Asian countries are closely interdependent in their 
utilisation of water resources. Most of the water in of the Aral Sea Basin 
(up to 80%) flows from the upstream rivers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
(see Table 1)
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Furthermore, most of these water resources are used for irrigation 
in the downstream areas of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
where over 83 per cent of the irrigated land of the region is concentrated 
(see Table 2)
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Table	10.1		
Water Resources  
of the Aral Sea Basin 
(average water flow, km3 
per year)
Country
River Basin
Total for the Aral Sea 
Basin
Syr-Darya Amu-Darya km3 per cent
Kazakhstan 4.5 – 4.5 3.9
Kyrgyzstan 27.4 1.9 29.3 25.3
Tajikistan 1.1 62.9 64 55.4
Turkmenistan 
and Iran
– 2.8 2.8 2.4
Uzbekistan 4.1 4.7 8.8 7.6
Afghanistan – 6.2 6.2 5.4
Total for the 
Aral Sea Basin
37.1 78.5 115.6 100
Table	10.2		
Irrigated land in the Aral 
Sea Basin, thousand ha 
The demand for the water in the region has exceeded available 
resources for a long time. In the future, the water deficit is likely to 
worsen in parallel with the growing population, further development of 
industry, and the expansion of irrigated land.
Global warming worsens this forecast. Between 1957 and 2000, the 
water reserves in the glaciers of Pamir and Alay decreased by more than 
25 per cent, and they are still shrinking rapidly. 
Experts predict that by 2025, thousands of small glaciers in the Tajik 
mountains will disappear, the glaciated area will shrink by 20 per cent 
and ice reserves will decrease by 25 per cent. As a result, the total 
major river flow over Tajik territories (Zeravshan, Kafirnigan, Vakhsh and 
Pyanj) will decrease by 7 per cent.
Give these circumstances, the regulation of the hydrological models of 
Syrdarya and Amudarya is becoming critically important for the economy 
and population of the whole region. The countries in downstream areas 
use most of their water for irrigation. Countries located upstream use 
water to produce energy in winter. Although Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
have significant hydro energy potential, their economies are hugely 
dependent on hydrocarbon supplies from neighboring countries located 
downstream of the Amudarya and Syrdarya.
Years Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Total
1990 782 410 714 1339 4222 7507
1995 786 416 719 1736 4298 7955
2000 786 415 719 1714 4259 8101
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Seasonal differences in the demand for water have generated conflicting 
approaches to the utilisation of transboundary river resources in the two 
groups of countries. The problem is exacerbated by the infamous crisis of 
the shrinking Aral Sea, the global consequences of this disaster and by 
the winter floods caused by excessive reservoir drainage. Among other 
problems, this results in catastrophic flooding in downstream areas in 
winter and droughts in summer, acute power shortages in the upstream 
countries during winter and surplus energy generation in summer which 
is impossible to sell.
When the region was all part of one country with a planned economy, 
water distribution, energy exchanges and fuel and energy supply in the 
republics were structured quite efficiently. This generated the heavy 
interdependence and mutual complementarities of the region’s countries 
regarding water resources used for irrigation and energy production.
Geopolitical changes and the transformation of the regional economy 
dismantled stable systems of water utilisation and energy exchange. The 
region’s food and energy supplies also came under threat. These problems 
are critical for all Central Asian countries. 
Once the water resources of the Aral Basin rivers are exhausted (see 
Table 3), certain countries will only be able to expand their areas of 
irrigated land by deploying capital-intensive water-saving technologies, or 
depending on other countries to use less water. Therefore, competition for 
water in the Central Asian Region is expected to increase, and interstate 
relations may become more strained. However, understanding these 
issues may be the stimulus to settling such conflict, assisted by concerted 
action to regulate the shared use of the limited water resources of the 
Amudarya and Syrdarya transboundary rivers.
Table	10.3	 
Key indicators of water 
and land utilization  
in the Aral Sea Basin
Indicators Units 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Population
million 
people
14.1 20.0 26.8 33.6 41.5
Irrigated land
thousand 
ha
4510 5150 6920 7500 8100
Irrigated area 
per capita
ha per 
person
0.32 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.19
Total water 
utilization
km3 per 
year
60.61 94.56 120.69 116.27 105.0
of which for 
irrigation
km3 per 
year
56.15 86.84 106.79 106.4 94.66
Water 
utilization 
share of 
the annual 
average of 
many years
% 52.4 81.8 104.4 100.6 90.8
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The growing demand for water combined with the countries’ high 
interdependency with regard to hydrological supplies forces these states 
to use water fairly and rationally. As a rule, countries located upstream 
are more able to regulate water flow and consumption than countries 
located downstream. Given the region’s arid climate, a number of potential 
conflicts may be identified with regard to the sharing of water resources 
between the two groups of countries:
• Limited access to water resources: increasing water utilisation 
in the upstream countries limits access to water for the downstream 
countries and changes to the hydrological model increases the risk of 
drought.
• Negative impact on water quality and environment: new hydro 
energy complexes are being built, and any resulting industrial or sanitary 
pollution in the upstream countries may cause ecological damage in 
downstream countries. It is mainly upstream countries which benefit 
economically from the development of water resources.
• Regulation of water utilisation for HPPs: downstream countries 
need water for agriculture, while upstream countries tend to withhold 
water for electricity production during winter. When several reservoirs are 
drained simultaneously, it results in catastrophic flooding and waterlogging 
of the territories located below the HPP and water shortages during the 
growing season.
This last problem is most critical for Central Asian countries and is 
a key source of conflict between the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan), which exploit the energy potential of the rivers, and 
the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), 
which need water from the rivers for agriculture. Agriculture is the 
biggest consumer of water, so the water utilisation model in the upstream 
countries not only affects farmers in the downstream countries, but also 
all other related sectors: food, light industry, etc.
The social and economic importance of agriculture in Central Asia 
is paramount. For most of the region’s countries agriculture is their 
largest economic sector (see Table 4). Agriculture’s capacity to sustain 
Central Asia’s population is directly dependent upon the productivity 
and efficiency of irrigated land, since most people (from 43 per cent in 
Kazakhstan up to 75 per cent in Tajikistan) live in rural areas.
Table	10.4		
Agriculture’s 
contribution to GDP, 
percent 
Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1990 34 45 25 31 33
1995 19 45 21 16 32
2000 8.7 36.7 27.4 26 26
2005 6.9 36.1 24.2 – –
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It is hardly surprising that issues related to the construction of large 
scale hydroelectric complexes were so controversial for the Presidents of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the Heads of State Summit of the Shanghai 
Organisation for Cooperation on 16 August, 2007. The President 
of Uzbekistan insisted that “the construction of new hydro-electric 
complexes must be subject to independent audit to prevent any harm 
to our countries”. The President of Tajikistan, for his part, declared that 
Tajikistan “has never and will never construct hydro-electric complexes 
that prejudice our neighboring countries, and insinuations to the contrary 
have no basis in reality”.1 Whatever the arguments, it should be noted 
that there are no agreements between the CAR countries that define 
the procedures and conditions for the construction of energy complexes 
on transboundary rivers. Neither have all countries signed the relevant 
UN conventions. Proposals from international organisations and regional 
integration associations (EurAsEC) to render assistance in preparing such 
documents would do little to resolve the disputes between the upstream 
and downstream countries.
The main source of conflict between the countries is the poor 
management of water utilisation used for power generation, which is seen 
as the root cause of alternating winter floods and water shortages during 
the growing season. Since there are large-scale plans to develop the 
hydro energy in Central Asia, conflict between upstream and downstream 
countries over their water utilisation can only intensify.
The Development of Hydro Energy in Central Asia
Production and Consumption of Energy Resources in the Region. At 
present, the Production of Primary Fuel and Energy (PPFE) in the region 
relies mainly on hydrocarbon fuel (see Table 5). Natural gas represents 
almost a half of total energy resources and its reserves are mainly in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The second largest energy resource in the 
PPFE structure of the CAR countries is oil, up to 80 per cent of which 
is produced in Kazakhstan. Most of the energy used in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan is hydro energy. Hydro energy constitutes 83 and 96 per cent 
of the internal PPFE in these countries. However, it is insignificant as 
part of the region’s total fuel and energy balance (approx. 2 per cent).
Reports
1 Although the focus of controversy was never mentioned explicitly, it was clear to participants 
that they were referring to Tajikistan’s plans to build the Rogun HPP
Table	10.5		
Structure of the 
Production of Primary 
Fuel and Energy, percent
Gas Oil Coal Hydro Total
Kazakhstan 16 50 33 1 100
Kyrgyzstan 2 5 11 82 100
Tajikistan 2 1 1 96 100
Turkmenistan 83 17 0 0 100
Uzbekistan 84 13 2 1 100
Total 48 33 17 2 100
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In general, the region has abundant energy supplies. Internal production 
in 2004 was 1.8 times consumption (see Table 6). However, this indicator 
differs widely between the region’s countries. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan have plentiful energy supplies, producing more than is 
consumed domestically. These countries are net producers of energy 
resources. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan produce less power and are net 
importers of energy.
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Table	10.6		
Annual Production and 
Consumption of Primary 
Fuel and Energy
Source: Fuel and Energy 
Balance Statements, 
IEA, 2004
Low energy provision coupled with the potential of their water 
resources have persuaded Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to develop their 
hydro energy sector. According to the UN Program for the Economies 
of Central Asia (SPECA), the estimated renewable hydro potential of 
Central Asia is 460 billion kWh per year and only 10 per cent of this is 
actually used (see Table 7). Most of the hydro potential is in Tajikistan 
(69 per cent), and puts Tajikistan in 8th place in the world after China, 
Russia, USA, Brazil, Zaire, India and Canada. Kyrgyzstan accounts for 22 
per cent of the region’s total hydro potential.
Production. 
million tones 
fuel
Internal 
consumption 
million tones 
fuel
Production to 
Consumption 
Ratio
Turkmenistan 58.1 15.6 3.74
Kazakhstan 118.6 54.8 2.16
Uzbekistan 56.9 54.0 1.05
Kyrgyzstan 1.5 2.8 0.55
Tajikistan 1.5 3.3 0.45
CAR, Total 236.6 130.5 1.81
Resolving the problems of shared water usage and energy supply 
in Central Asia is of vital economic importance, and will have an 
environmental, political and international impact since these issues are 
fundamental to regional stability, economic prosperity and ecological 
Table	10.7		
Hydro Energy Potential 
of the Central Asian 
Rivers 
Countries HPP 
Installed 
capacity, 
MWt
Electricity 
production 
and HPP 
(2005), 
billion kWh
Economic 
hydro 
potential, 
billion  
kWh/yr
Utilization 
of hydro 
potential,  
per cent
Percentage 
of the Hydro 
Potential  
of the CAR
Tajikistan 4037 17.1 317 5 69
Kyrgyzstan 2910 14.0 99 14 22
Kazakhstan 2248 7.9 27 29 6
Uzbekistan 1420 6.0 15 49 3
Turkmenistan 1 0 2 0 0
Total 10616 45.0 460 10 100
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security. The most urgent problems are water and energy regulation and 
the need for long term investment in the construction of hydro-electricity 
complexes.
Because of the conflicting demands on water resources between the 
upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream 
countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), it seemed 
impossible that the Central Asian states would be able to formulate a well 
coordinated mechanism for the cooperative utilisation and development of 
the water and energy resources of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya Basin.
Interaction between the EurAsEC states in this sphere has been 
ongoing since 2003. Russia has played an active role in the development 
of hydro energy potential and regulation of resources from the Central 
Asian Rivers via bilateral Russian-Tajik agreements on the completion 
of the Sangtudin HPP-1 (JSC RAO UES of Russia) and Rogun HPP in 
Tajikistan. In April 2006, the government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 
proposed a revival of its energy partnership with the Russia’s JSC RAO 
UES on the construction of the Kambarata HPP-2. In 2007 Kyrgyzstan 
decided to continue the Kambarata HPP-2 project using its own finance.
Since 2003, the JSC RAO UES of Russia has been transferring 
energy surpluses (successfully and less successfully depending on the 
political situation) from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through the energy 
system of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russian Federation. The CAR 
countries supply each other with fuel and energy through water and 
energy exchange projects. Pending completion of hydro electric plants, 
there are plans to export electricity beyond the CAR to China, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.
It is apparent that even limited interaction regarding the development 
and shared utilisation of water and energy resources within EurAsEC 
has helped to balance the water and energy models of the Syr-Darya 
and Amu-Darya River Basins, meeting to a degree the needs of all the 
region’s countries and helping to enhance the potential for investment in 
Central Asian hydro energy complexes.
These tasks had been the work of the OCAC, which planned to create 
an international water and energy consortium. After the OCAC was 
incorporated into the EurAsEC and Uzbekistan entered the Community, 
new opportunities emerged for the resolution of the region’s complex 
water and energy issues.
The establishment of the Eurasian Development Bank is further 
impetus for the implementation of investment projects.
At the Sochi Summit (August, 2006), the Presidents of the Community 
laid the foundations of a strategy for the efficient utilisation of water 
and energy resources in Central Asia. This will define the targets and 
methods of regulating water and energy utilisation in the Syr-Darya and 
Amu-Darya Basin and developing its hydro energy potential. 
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Consequently, the assistance of the Eurasian Economic Community 
and the Eurasian Development Bank must be sought in devising 
investment strategies for joint hydro energy projects and water and 
energy regulation.
The strategy for the efficient utilisation of water and energy resources 
in Central Asia establishes the following fundamental principles:
1. The participation of all stakeholder countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and the involvement of 
Turkmenistan, or at least an awareness of its interests;
2. The need to pursue simultaneously investment activity and water 
and energy regulation;
3. The creation of permanent interstate regulatory and executive 
institutions to fulfill investment and control functions in the coordination 
of water and energy requirements.  
Given the interaction of demand from the river system for water and 
energy, regulation of energy should be closely linked to the regulation of 
water resources, especially in the Syr-Darya river basin. Since Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan will need water for irrigation from the area of the Naryn–
Syr-Darya series of HPPs, intergovernmental institutions (preferably 
EurAsEC) must balance the development of the river for irrigation and 
energy purposes. An approach that takes into account interests of all the 
region’s countries is obligatory if investment in the Central Asian River 
hydroelectric potential is to be made more attractive. Water and energy 
regulation is required before investment can be secured. This will balance 
the interests of the downstream and upstream states and protect the 
interests of investors.
The draft strategy for the efficient utilisation of water and energy 
resources in Central Asia has for the most part been approved by the High 
Level Group set up in 2007 to examine the issues coordinating water and 
energy regulation of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya basins. It is expected 
that the strategy will be accompanied by a draft EurAsEC Cooperation 
Agreement on the efficient utilisation and protection of the region’s water 
and energy resources, in which the signatories will establish the remit 
for the interstate regulatory and executive institutions implementing the 
strategy.
However, disagreements remain over significant elements of the draft 
strategy which can be resolved by politicians.
Hydro Energy Development Plans
The economically sustainable development of the hydro energy 
potential of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan currently resides upon the 
completion of the large-scale HPPs, initiated back in the Soviet period, 
and the construction of medium and small HPPs. The biggest HPPs to 
be constructed in Central Asia are Sangtudin HPP-1 and Rogun HPP in 
Tajikistan, Kambarata HPP-1 and HPP-2 in Kyrgyzstan, and a series of 
HPPs on Sary-Djaz (see Table 8).
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New large-scale HPPs will be constructed upstream of the transboundary 
rivers (the Nurek series on the river Vakhsh and the Toktogul series on 
the river Naryn), which provide water to the population and industries 
in the whole Central Asian region, and to the downstream irrigated 
region. All available water resources are being used and any change in 
the existing water consumption patterns may exacerbate the present 
conflict of interests between upstream and downstream countries. Plans 
to develop upstream hydro energy should take into account the present 
water utilisation in downstream areas and must not be detrimental to 
existing water utilisation systems, because irrigation is socio-economically 
essential to the region.
Experts are studying possible additions to the Rogun HPP, i.e., by 
raising the height of the dam, or by adjusting the plant’s throughput 
or operating model. Clearly, politicians and specialists in  downstream 
countries are worried about the possible consequences of changing the 
hydrological models of the river. However, according to calculations, all 
demand for resources should be addressed fairly if the energy and irrigation 
models of the Nurek and Tuyamuyun reservoirs are well regulated. This 
should also reduce the risk of artificial drought and increase water supply 
by 3-4 per cent. However, the situation may worsen if both Rogun and 
Nurek HPPs function simultaneously in power-generation mode. The high 
summer drainage rate may shift to winter (when energy consumption is 
highest) and cause artificial water shortages in summer in midstream and 
downstream of the Amu-Darya. In this scenario, agricultural losses may 
amount to USD 120–960 million out of the total agricultural production 
of USD 3.6 billion. The drying of the Amu-Darya River in summer could 
lead to ecological and health crises.
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Table	10.8		
The largest HPPs  
in Tajikistan  
and Kyrgyzstan
Name Location Status
Capacity, 
MWt
Average 
annual 
performance, 
billion kWh
Estimated 
cost, billion 
USD
Rogun HPP
r. Vakhsh 
(Tajikistan)
Project 3600 13.1 2.2
Nurek HPP
r. Vakhsh 
(Tajikistan)
Operational 3000 11.2  
Dashtijum 
HPP
r. Pyanj 
(Tajikistan)
Project 4000 15.6 3.5
Kambarata 
-1 and -2 
HPPs
r. Naryn 
(Kyrgyzstan)
Project 1900+360 7 2.0
Toktogul 
HPP
r. Naryn 
(Kyrgyzstan)
Operational 1200 4.4  
Series of  
5 HPPs on 
Sary-Djaz
r. Sary-Djaz 
(Kyrgyzstan)
Project 1500 5.0 2.5
Eurasian Development Bank
It is important, therefore, to coordinate decision-making regarding 
large-scale HPPs in the transboundary river basins, to reach compromise, 
and to maintain a strong political will and trust in other parties.
Central Asian Cooperation in the Utilisation of Water and 
Energy Resources
The international regulation of transboundary water-course utilisation 
consists of general international agreements, basin agreements covering 
a certain region and bilateral agreements between certain countries of the 
region. The Central Asian States are in the process of creating a similar 
system.
International agreements have not been used as a legislative basis 
in regulating the utilisation of water from Central Asia’s transboundary 
rivers. Of all the Central Asian countries, only Uzbekistan declared 
(in August 2007) a desire to join the 1997 UN Convention on Non-
Navigational Usage of International Rivers.
In 2001, Kazakhstan signed up to the Convention on the Protection 
and Utilisation of Transboundary Rivers and International Lakes 
(Helsinki, 1992), the only existing international legal instrument relating 
to the shared use of water resources which also covers the Central Asian 
Region. In August 2007, Uzbekistan also said it would sign up to this 
convention.
Since 2001, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been signatories 
to the Convention on Evaluating the Environmental Impact in the 
Transboundary Context (Espo, 1991) that came into force in 1997.
The importance and politicization of environmental problems in 
Central Asia (the Aral crisis) has led to a ruling that ecological impact 
assessments must be carried out for all international water utilisation 
projects, even if they are being executed by states which did not sign 
up to the Conventions. Under the 1997 UN Convention, and to satisfy 
notification procedures laid down by the World Bank, the results of the 
environmental impact assessment for each project must be disseminated 
to those states who will be affected by the project.
The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision Making and Access to Justice on Environmental Issues 
(Aarhus, 1998), which came into force in 2001, was signed by Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
Central Asian countries have also signed up to a number of multilateral 
agreements relating to the protection and utilisation of water resources.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance for Wildlife. 
Nine protected areas in Central Asia are included in the Ramsar list 
of Wetlands of International Importance. The responsibilities assigned 
by the Convention, including those relating to transboundary water and 
swamp regions and transboundary water systems, may substantially 
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influence the results of the ecological survey for some of the planned 
water utilisation projects.
The UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Affected 
by Severe Drought and/or Desertification, especially Africa was 
signed by 172 countries, including all the Central Asian countries. This 
Convention aims to reverse the process of desertification. It emphasizes 
measures for improved fertility, restoration, protection and rational 
utilisation of soil and water resources. The impact of international water 
utilisation projects on desertification in countries sharing the same water 
resources must also be covered by the ecological survey.
The General Principles of Interaction in Rational Use and Protection 
of Transboundary Water-bodies of the CIS Member States was signed in 
Moscow in 1998 and came into force in 2002. This agreement generally 
includes the same provisions as the Helsinki Water Convention of 
the UN ECE, but it applies a stricter approach to the assessment of 
damage to water bodies and failure to manage water resources which 
may adversely affect the environment and water bodies, and in defining 
general principles of water utilisation and division of water resources. 
Tajikistan has been the only Central Asian country to sign up to the CIS 
transboundary water agreement (other CIS signatories include Belarus 
and Russian Federation), so its impact on international legislation on 
shared utilisation of water resources in the region is not significant. The 
Agreement was not signed by other CIS countries and the problems 
of utilizing and protecting transboundary water resources has shifted 
to integration unions, i.e., the problems are addressed via bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between CIS countries.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the five newly-independent 
countries faced the urgent task of replacing the region’s centralized water 
and energy regulation system with joint regulation in the context of 
regional cooperation.
Central Asian countries signed multilateral regional agreements and 
bilateral agreements on the utilisation of international water resources.
In 1992, the heads of the Water Economy ministries of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed the 
Cooperation Agreement on the Joint Regulation, Utilisation and 
Protection of Water Resources from Inter-state Sources, preventing 
potential conflict between the countries over division of water from the 
Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya during the growing season. The agreement 
also helped to avoid a long-term conflict caused by the division of water 
resources from the River Indus, which had been running in South Asia 
since British India was divided into India and Pakistan in 1947.
In March 1993, Central Asian presidents signed the Agreement on 
Joint Action to Find Solutions to the Problems of the Aral Sea and the 
Aral Sea Region, and on Ecological Rehabilitation and Socio-Economic 
Development of the Aral Region, (which confirmed the validity of the 
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1992 agreement) and created the International Fund for Saving the Aral 
(INSA). The 1992 agreement temporarily consolidated the principles and 
practices of water distribution applied during the Soviet period to the 
Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya. The signatories also made a commitment to 
deliver a guaranteed volume of water to the river delta and Aral Sea in 
order to rescue the ecological situation there. In this case the Aral Sea 
was viewed as a discreet issue under the agreement.
The Agreement on the Utilisation of Water and Energy Resources 
in the Syr-Darya River Basin (March 1998, signed by Tajikistan in 
June 1999) temporarily eased the bitter interstate disputes over water 
utilisation in the Syr-Darya river basin. In Soviet times, the regulation of 
this river using the Naryn-Syr-Darya series of reservoirs, and particularly 
the Toktogul reservoir, was adjusted for irrigational use in response to 
demand for irrigation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Water discharge 
was set at maximum during the growing season while more was retained 
in the reservoirs during winter. Following independence, the Central 
Asian countries stopped supplying fuel and electri city to Kyrgyzstan as 
compensation for electricity generation shortages at the Naryn-Syr-Darya 
Series of HPPs during winter. From 1993 onwards, therefore, water 
discharge increased from the Toktogul reservoir during winter in order to 
produce electricity at the Toktogul HPP for Kyrgyzstan’s domestic use. 
Water outflow decreased during spring and summer in order to refill the 
Toktogul reservoir (see Table 9).
Changes to the water flow mode of the Toktogul water reservoir 
had adverse and at times catastrophic consequences in downstream Syr-
Darya regions. Floods occurred in the downstream territories of the river 
Syr-Darya during winter. In addition, irrigation areas were scaled back 
and farming stability was undermined by the reduction in water delivery 
in summer, with no guarantee of its timely delivery.
The agreement had a very positive effect in coordinating water and 
energy exchanges between countries located in the upper part of the river 
basin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and countries located in the middle and 
lower parts of the Syr-Darya river basin (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). In 
fact, this was a legally based attempt to revive the Soviet mechanism of 
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Table	10.9		
Inflow and outflow  
of water at the Toktogul 
reservoir
Indicators 
Annual 
average
1985–1991 1995–2007
Winter Summer Winter Summer
Inflow to the 
reservoir, km3
12.06 2.77 9.29 3.21 10.23
Outflow from 
the reservoir, 
km3
11.46 3.53 7.93 8.50 5.44
Water balance, 
km3
+0.6 -0.76 +1.36 -5.29 +4.79
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compensation to the upstream countries for electricity output losses at 
HPPs working in irrigation mode of increased outflow from reservoirs.
The provisions of this agreement were implemented with great difficulty 
and frequent transgressions. The exact volumes of water outflow from 
the Toktogul reservoir and the related energy supply conditions were 
to be established by annual protocols. However, in reality, though the 
protocols were signed, there were threats of water shortages when the 
downstream states tried to secure guaranteed access to water from the 
Toktogul reservoir.
In the Amu-Darya basin, the most difficult period was the two-year 
water shortage in 2000-2001 when the downstream water flow reached 
only 52 per cent of the agreed volume (see Table 10)
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Table	10.10		
Territorial Water Deficits 
in the Amu-Darya Basin 
in 2000
Part of the basin
Volume of deficit, 
km3
Deficit as a 
percentage of agreed 
volume
Upstream 0.7 11
Midstream 2.7 17
Downstream 7.7 52
Basin, total 11.1 30
Although regional cooperation in the shared utilisation of the water and 
energy resources of transboundary Rivers in the Aral Sea basin needs to 
be developed further, the legislative basis for water regulation established 
during the transition period has helped to avert serious conflicts and 
interstate disputes.
Work on new regional agreements relating to the utilisation and 
protection of the region’s water and energy resources is continuing, 
supported by international organisations in Central Asia The following 
agreements have been drafted: (1) the Agreement on the Creation and 
Administration of National, Basin and Regional Databases relating to the 
Utilisation and Protection of the Water Resources in the Aral Sea Basin; 
(2) the Agreement on the Utilisation of Water and Energy resources 
in the Syr-Darya River Basin; (3) the Agreement on the Protection of 
Transboundary Waters, and Rules Governing the Monitoring of Their 
Quality and the Protection of Ecological Stability in the Region, and 
(4) the Agreement on Consolidating Organisational Structures of 
Management, Protection and Development of the Transboundary Water 
Resources of the Aral Sea Basin. However, they were not signed by the 
region’s governments in time. Follow-up on this agreement was recently 
resumed under the ABR Project, but has so far yielded no results.
The High Level Group created in 2006 by EurAsEC to work on issues 
relating to the development of a coordinated water and energy regulation 
system in the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya river basins, is planning an 
agreement on cooperation between the EurAsEC member states concerning 
the efficient utilisation and protection of water and energy resources in 
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the Central Asian Region. Currently, the group is drafting the concept 
for the efficient utilisation of water and energy resources of Central Asian 
Region, which will define the principles of future agreements.
The OCAC, supported by IFCA, adopted a number of documents 
relating to water and energy regulation in the CAR. These are due to be 
adapted for the EurAsEC, as agreed at presidential level by the Interstate 
Council of EurAsEC.
In addition to the common agreements on the region’s transboundary 
water resources, the Central Asian countries also adopt bilateral agreements 
specific to certain river basins or parts of basins. One example of this 
type of legal document is the Agreement between Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan “On Cooperation in Water Conservation” (Turkmenabat, 
1996) and the Agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the 
Chu and Talas rivers (2000).
These regional and bilateral agreements determine the framework 
and procedures for utilisation of the water and energy resources of the 
international rivers of the CAR. There are additional intergovernmental 
agreements on joint investment projects.
In particular:
• The Agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and 
the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on the Completion of the 
Rogun HPP on the river Vakhsh in the Republic of Tajikistan (Moscow, 
April 13, 1994). In 2006, the Republic of Tajikistan unilaterally 
renounced the agreement. Russia, even thought it had not ratified the 
agreement itself, did not agree with Tajikistan’s actions.
• The Agreement on Long-Term Cooperation between JSC Russian 
Aluminum and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan of October 16, 
2004. The parties agreed that between January 1, 2005 and December 
31, 2009 they will jointly execute the first stage of expansion of the 
hydro energy complex of the Rogun HPP, commissioning two HPP units 
with a capacity of approx. 4 billion kWh per year. The Government of 
the Republic of Tajikistan is studying the possibility of implementing 
this project with the help of an international consortium. In August, 
2007 it unilaterally cancelled the cooperation agreement.
• The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan and the Government of Russian Federation on procedures and 
conditions for the participation of Russian Federation in the construction 
of Sangtudin HPP-1, signed on October 16, 2004.
According to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Construction 
of Sangtudin HPP-2, signed by the governments of two countries on June 
11, 2005, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a soft 
loan of USD 180 million for the construction of Sangtudin HPP-2.
On April 27, 2005, the Government of Republic Tajikistan and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan signed an Agreement on 
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Cooperation in the energy sector, which related to the joint development 
of power resources of the river Pjandzh and the construction of interstate 
power transmission lines.
On March, 30, 2005, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of 
Tajikistan and the Ministry of Water and Energy of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Mutual Understanding on Cooperation 
in the field of water and energy engineering. Memoranda and Cooperation 
Protocols were also signed with companies of the People’s Republic of 
China, Turkey, Ukraine, India and other countries.
3.	The	Rogun	HPP	and	the	Kambarata	HPP-1	and	HPP-2:	the	need	
for	international	cooperation
The construction of the Rogun HPP on the river Vakhsh in Tajikistan 
and the Kambarata HPP-1 and 2 on the river Naryn in Kyrgyzstan now 
represent the most problematic projects undertaken as part of the joint 
development of the energy potential of CAR rivers. However, they also 
promise to be the most economically efficient projects. The plants are 
described in greater detail below.
The River Vakhsh, which rises in Tajikistan, provides essential water 
resources to the downstream countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
The river supplies about 25 per cent of the Amu-Darya river basin. The 
construction of the Rogun HPP on the Vakhsh is now the largest hydro 
energy project in Central Asia. In certain conditions, the complex can 
influence the flow of the river Vakhsh and, consequently, the volume and 
utilisation mode of water resources flowing to neighboring countries.
It is universally acknowledged that absolute sovereignty of upstream 
countries over available water resources is inadmissible under international 
law.
Insertion 10.1 Development of the Hydro energy potential of the River Vakhsh
The River Vakhsh accounts for about half of all 
the energy potential of the Republic of Tajikistan. 
At present, there are five hydroelectric power 
stations on this river, which produce about 15 
billion watts/hour of electricity per year (2005). 
In the long term, 4 HPPs can additionally be 
constructed on the river Vakhsh with general 
capacity of 5240 MW. The largest of them is 
the Rogun HPP (3600 MW). On the one hand, 
the construction of large scale HPPs increases 
the chances of long lasting regulation of the 
water discharge that meets the interests of all 
the states of the river basin. On the other hand, 
there is a risk of deterioration of relations with 
neighboring countries if the series of water 
basins is operated in the energy mode for the 
energy supply in Tajikistan.
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The existing agreement on water-division adopted by Central Asian 
countries in 1992, does not assume that the countries with major rivers 
will automatically approve the construction of hydro complexes on 
transboundary rivers. Therefore, it is vitally important that the region’s 
countries cooperation closely to prevent the possible negative effects that 
the construction of hydropower plants may have on downstream countries. 
Cooperation within the framework of conventional international law, 
including cooperation on transboundary water resources, is an obligation 
shared by all the countries.
Project Scale and Attracting Investment
Financial resources are very limited and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
need external financing in order to develop their energy potential. 
International experience shows that, when implementing large scale 
projects (for example, the construction of the Kamabartin and Rogun 
HPPs), successful procurement of external investment depends to a 
large degree on the nature of relations between the host country and its 
neighbors. The reasons for this are as follows:
(1) Successful cooperation between the countries on the use of water 
resources is a positive sign for international investors; 
(2) One major precondition for involving international financial 
institutions (such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, etc.) 
in a project is that the initiating country must have circulated notification 
of its intention to construct the HPPs and have received no objections 
from the downstream countries;
(3) The participation of neighboring countries in the development 
and implementation of projects which promote shared utilisation of 
transboundary water resources is an accepted practice worldwide.
The region’s interest in implementing projects by securing foreign 
investment is a key factor in forging mutually beneficial agreements on 
water utilisation. Interstate cooperation in the development of the energy 
potential of the Senegal and La Plata river basins is an excellent example 
of the significant role which joint cooperation institutions can play in 
striking a compromise between partners. In particular, they can organize 
discussion forums, collect and distribute data relating to the river basins, 
and can follow up on the implementation of agreements, since contracts 
between countries do not always guarantee cooperation.
The independence enjoyed by cooperation institutions in technical, 
administrative and financial decision-making can substantially enhance 
the benefits countries derive from cooperation and reduce the risk of 
emergent crises. Following this model of cooperation in Central Asia is 
one the ways of resolving disputes between the countries upstream and 
downstream of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers.
An accurate estimation of project cost is crucial for feasibility studies, 
sourcing external funds and preparing tender documents. International 
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experience demonstrates that construction costs for hydro units at HPPs 
are frequently underestimated initially (see Figure 2), and the real cost 
to project partners may be higher than budgeted for. Calculations for the 
Rogun project were carried out under different political, economic and 
social conditions, which considerably increases the risk that construction 
costs will turn out to be much higher. Where external investors and 
contractors are involved, the earlier technical studies have to be re-
appraised by independent experts.
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Insertion 10.2 Cost Estimates for the Construction of Large Dams
The construction of dams and related 
infrastructure involves huge investment. 
Errors in budgeting, especially where there 
is a lengthy construction period, may have a 
considerable impact on the financial position 
of the project participants. According to the 
World Commission on Dams, large scale dam-
building projects tend to exceed budgets. Of 
the projects analyzed, actual construction 
costs exceeded amounts budgeted in 75 
per cent of cases. On average, construction 
expenses were 56% per cent higher than 
initially estimated.
Actual construction costs of large-scale dams  
(per cent of estimated cost) 
Source: WCD Cross-Check Survey
Large scale HPPs are seen as playing an important role in the 
economic development of nations (new jobs, regional and industrial 
development, growth of export potential, etc.). More recently, the world 
has also begun to acknowledge the increasing influence of large hydro 
complexes on society and the environment. In considering the options for 
dam projects, equal (if not greater) importance should be placed on the 
social and ecological effects of the project as on technical and economic 
considerations. In the past, the ecological role of water resources, even 
the fact that water is needed to sustain natural habitats and eco-systems, 
was barely acknowledged, and therefore there is an urgent need to carry 
out ecological audits of hydro energy projects, especially ones as large 
as the Rogun and Kambarata HPPs.
The total cost of the construction of the Rogun HPP is estimated to 
be as high as USD 2.9 billion USD. The Government of Tajikistan has 
calculated that USD 800 million of work has already been executed. 
The completion of the project requires USD 2.1 billion of financing. The 
economic situation in Tajikistan (the cost of the project is equal to the 
annual GDP of Tajikistan and 4.6 times cumulative budget revenue) 
limits the potential for independent implementation of this hydro energy 
project, despite the improvement in public finances in recent years. 
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The Rogun HPP Project is based mainly on estimates calculated 
back in 1978, in particular the technical and engineering estimates of the 
geological, hydrological and seismological elements of its construction. 
Today the project needs additional and updated documentation, namely 
engineering specifications, financial analyses, additional safety audits, and 
environmental impact assessments for all countries of the river basin.
The Kambarata HPP-1 and HPP-2 in Kyrgyzstan. Conflicts have 
arisen between states regarding the water utilisation models in the Syr-
Darya River basin. In the past, the flow of this river was regulated by the 
Naryn and Syr-Darya series of dams, mainly Toktogul, with priority given 
to agriculture in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Since 1993, the annual 
rates of Toktogul reservoir outflow had to be modified in accordance 
with Kyrgyzstan’s domestic demand for electricity generation, with more 
water being discharged during winter and retained during summer.
Interstate agreements on compensating Kyrgyzstan for power lost 
during the winter, summer water supply from the reservoir for irrigation 
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the transmission to these countries 
of surplus electric power, have not been observed. In 2003, for example, 
as a result of mismatching water outflow rates from reservoirs on the 
Toktogul HPP dams, about 1.0 billion m3 of water were dumped, which 
corresponds to 877 million kWh of lost electricity. Unplanned dumping 
can be catastrophic for the midstream and downstream regions.
According to preliminary estimates, the construction cost of the HPP-
1 (1900 MWt) will be about USD 2100-2200 million. The Kambarata 
HPP-2 (360 MWt) will cost about USD 400 million. The construction 
period for the HPPs is 8-10 years.
The Kambarata HPP-1 and HPP-2 will produce about 2.2 billion kWh 
in winter. Surplus energy generated (about 3.5-4.0 billion kWh) can 
be sold to Russia, China, and Central Asia. It will operate by reducing 
winter outflow to the downstream rivers. In its long-term operating mode 
it will conserve water for irrigation in winter and discharge the water 
saved during the summer. The Toktogul reservoir will hold 6.0-6.5 billion 
m3 over the winter conservation period. A separate audit needs to be 
carried out on the distribution of electric power to domestic and export 
markets.
If they is to run as envisaged, the operations of the Toktogul HPP and 
Kambarata HPP must be well managed. Water in the Kambarata HPP-1 
reservoir should be discharged to produce electricity for Kyrgyzstan in 
winter, but should be retained in the Toktogul reservoir to meet summer 
irrigation demand.
These conditions can be met only if power stations’ operations are 
coordinated. Hence, potential investors must examine the Kambarata 
HPP- 1 and 2 projects as part of the entire Toktogul series of 
HPPs, whose operations are coordinated to satisfy demand from the 
downstream countries.
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The construction of the Kambarata HPPs will benefit Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan only if the operating modes of the whole series of HPPs are 
coordinated.
In all these projects, Russia has a number of possible roles: (1) major 
investor (2) consumer of electricity produced at the Kambarata HPP 
during the summer period (3) supplier of power during winter shortages, 
and (4) facilitator of interaction between Central Asian countries in water 
and energy matters.
In addition to investment agreements, these projects require the 
signing of multilateral contracts, establishing the operating models of the 
river Syr-Darya during the construction of the Kambarata HPP and after 
it is commissioned.
These conditions are perhaps best met by setting up a consortium 
of approved companies from the participating countries (Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan) and appointing a company which would 
project-manage the building of Kambarata HPP and operate the Naryn 
and Syr-Darya series of HPPs.
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Figure	10.1		
Location map of 
Kambarata HPP-1  
and HPP-2
The dangers of rejecting international cooperation
There are around 60 million inhabitants in the basins of the Amu-
Darya and Syr-Darya. Agriculture and cattle farming have always been 
the livelihood for most of this densely populated region, and water has 
been the main limiting factor. Shared utilisation of the resources of 
transboundary rivers can become the foundation of fruitful cooperation on 
the one hand, but it can also sour international relations. Most conflicts in 
the world arise in connection with changes in the use of river water and 
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the construction of new infrastructure (HPPs above all) which ultimately 
bring about such changes. This is the situation now faced by the whole 
of the Central Asian region.
Most water problems occur in the downstream Amu-Darya and Syr-
Darya regions where there is an acute water shortage in normal and dry 
years and the water supply is generally insufficient for the eco-system 
of the wetlands and the Aral Sea. In spite of efforts to distribute water 
resources among consumers, it is impossible to avoid completely the 
very uneven water consumption even in one country, especially in the 
midstream and downstream territories of the Amu-Darya.
Different seasonal requirements and the uneven distribution of water and 
power resources create conflict and may substantially affect the economy 
of the CAR countries and other regions. The close interdependence of 
Central Asian countries does not only affect water and energy, but also 
concerns other branches of the economy. Therefore, unilateral action 
on the part of the upstream countries, refusal to appoint independent 
consultants to review the construction projects of hydro power stations 
and obstructing regional cooperation may adversely impact development 
in a number of ways. This in turn may undermine the political and 
ecological stability of the region as well as the security of social and 
economic development of Central Asia. The major risks are:
• Damage to ecological stability;
• Restricted external trade;
• Isolation from transport links;
• Refusal of external investors to finance the project;
• Risk of international litigation.
Damage to ecological stability. Poor maintenance of hydraulic 
constructions can lead to ecological disaster. This is especially true of 
the unique, very vulnerable and fluctuating nature of water and energy 
supply, which affect lives, safety and economic stability over huge areas. 
Water discharge can inundate flood defenses, cause mud slides and 
flood the hydraulic installations. Therefore, adequate financing for these 
constructions is essential in maintaining their technical integrity.
The uncoordinated regulation of transboundary waters affects 
the stability of agriculture and may damage water quality and health 
and thus lead to social breakdown. The regulation of water discharge 
is a major problem in the regulation of transboundary watercourses, 
because uneven outflow into the rivers and significant deviations from 
the established hydrological models of the rivers may exacerbate the 
effects of drought and flooding in the downstream countries and cause 
irreversible desertification (as happened during the drought of 2000-2001 
in the downstream areas of the Amu-Darya). These circumstances may 
force the countries suffering such ecological, social and economic damage 
to take “reciprocal action”.
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Reaction to the poorly managed construction of hydro units on 
international rivers or changes to the hydrological models of rivers is 
often influenced by trading preferences and restrictions, transport links, 
transit tariffs, and visa regulations. Reaching a coherent decision demands 
concessions from each side, and depends on the state of political relations 
between the countries located in the international water basin. If relations 
between the countries of a single basin are tense and beset by other 
unresolved issues, it is unlikely they will adopt a positive attitude to the 
proposed project.
There is also a need for close examination of the issues related to 
the ecological stabilization of the Aral region and preservation of the 
Aral Sea as a natural phenomenon. In order to maintain the ecological 
equilibrium of this zone, the Water Committee decided to limit of water 
intake from the rivers for each specified year, and it is expected that some 
of the water resources of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers will be 
transferred to the Aral sea.
Restricted external trade. Over the ten-year period 1994-2003, the 
external trade revenue of Tajikistan increased 11.1 times from USD 131.1 
to 1459.3 million. Exports were 11.6 times higher at the end of the 
period than the start. Import increased 10.7 times. Food items are the 
major import while raw materials are the country’s main export. In 1999-
2000, the foreign trade balance was positive. Over the last few years, 
however, due to the rapid growth in imports, the export to import ratio 
has changed dramatically.
Trade between Tajikistan and other countries of Central Asia is 
characterized by a high dependency on the monopoly supply of key 
commodities. For example, the Republic of Tajikistan imports all its gas 
and mineral fertilizers from Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan provides more than 
70 per cent of all Tajikistan’s grain imports and 95 per cent of its flour 
imports. Tajikistan also has to import electricity from Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to supply the Tajik aluminum plant during winter. Electricity 
supply between the energy-sufficient south of the country and the 
energy-deficient north is also carried out via Uzbekistan’s network, which 
prompted Tajikistan to construct the LET-500 kV “South-North” power 
line with the help of a loan from China (USD 300 million). Uzbekistan 
accounted for 38 per cent of Tajikistan’s total imports in 2006 and 21 
per cent of its exports (See Table 11). During 2005–2006. Tajikistan 
exported 4.1–4.2 billion kWh of summer surplus electricity to Uzbekistan 
(99 % of all its electricity exports), and the winter supply of electricity 
in the same year from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan amounted to 4.3–4.4 
billion kWh. In order to diversify its sources of energy and to improve 
its energy security, Tajikistan planned to construct a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan. However Uzbekistan impeded these plans by refusing to 
allow the pipeline to cross its territory. Now, Tajikistan is studying the 
possibility of importing electricity from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan’s 
infrastructure.
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It is clear that the unilateral actions of Tajikistan with respect to 
the construction of the Rogun HPP and poor management of the Amu-
Darya’s resources may persuade Uzbekistan to restrict or even halt the 
delivery of gas and mineral fertilizers to Tajikistan and direct its exports 
to other markets. Uzbekistan’s gas is in demand from Russia in particular, 
and fertilizers can, most likely, be exported to other Asian countries and 
abroad. In fact, Uzbekistan has already applied such measures against 
Tajikistan more than once.
Reports
Table	10.11		
Tajikistan’s Export  
and Import Relations 
with the Countries of 
the Eurasian Economic 
Community,  
2005–2006,  
million USD
Export Import Balance
Percent against 
2005
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 Export Import
Belarus 1.1 2.0 13.7 19.0 -12.6 -17.0 176 139
Kazakhstan 19.7 27.8 168.3 186.7 -148.6 -158.9 142 111
Kyrgyzstan 3.2 11.2 20.6 28.1 -17.4 -16.9 346 136
Russia 82.8 65.4 256.6 423.7 -173.8 -358.3 79 165
Uzbekistan 66.5 67.4 152.9 176.1 -86.4 -108.7 101 115
Total 173.3 173.8 612.1 833.6 -438.8 -659.8 100.3 136
Trade between Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries 
Asia is also characterized by dependency on monopoly suppliers of key 
commodities. For example, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan imports all its gas 
from Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan supplies coal, grain and flour. Kyrgyzstan’s 
negative foreign trade balance with the EurAsEC member states amounted 
to USD 330.6 in 2005, and this increased to USD 569.4 in 2006 (see 
Table 12).
Table	10.12		
Kyrgyzstan’s Export 
and Import Relations 
with the Countries of 
the Eurasian Economic 
Community,  
2005–2006, million USD
Export Import Balance
Percent against 
2005
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 Export Import
Belarus 1.4 0.9 7.1 18.7 -5.7 -17.8 62 264
Kazakhstan 116.1 162.6 174.4 199.8 -58.3 -37.2 140 115
Russia 134.4 153.8 378.9 652.2 -244.5 -498.4 114 172
Tajikistan 22.9 23.9 2.0 2.8 20.9 21.1 104 140
Uzbekistan 17.1 27.9 60.1 65.0 -43.0 -37.1 163 108
Total 291.9 369.1 622.5 938.5 -330.6 -569.4 126 151
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Kyrgyzstan exported 2.508 billion kWh of electricity to Russia and 
Kazakhstan in 2006 (against 3.381 billion kWh in 2004) (see Table 13).
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Table	10.13		
Kyrgyzstan’s Electricity 
Export and Import 
Operations with 
the Countries of the 
Eurasian Economic 
Community 2004–2006 
(million kWh)
Years Total To Countries Including the countries
CIS EurAsEC Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan
Export
2004 3382 3381 3381 - 1258 - 1800 323
2005 2685 2684 2684 - 1531 - 936 217
2006 2509 2508 2508 - 2086 - - 422
Import
2004 54 54 54 - - - - 54
2005 0.2 0.2 - - - - - -
2006 0.2 0.2 0.2 - - - - -
The unilateral actions of Kyrgyzstan with respect to the construction 
Kambarata HPPs and the poor management of the resources of the river 
Syr-Darya may prompt Uzbekistan to restrict and even halt gas deliveries 
to Kyrgyzstan and to direct its exports towards other markets.
Isolation from transport links. After the states of Central Asia 
became independent, the regulation of all branches of the transport 
infrastructure of the region was decentralized. The dismantling of the 
system disrupted commodity trade, counteracted economic interests and 
customs barriers between the countries and substantially increased the 
price of transportation services and consumer goods.
If the countries located downstream of an international water 
regulation project do not support it, they may prevent its construction 
by virtue of their geographical location. Virtually all the transport routes 
which connect the upstream countries to the world beyond go through 
the downstream countries (or, at least most of them). Therefore, when 
relationships become strained, these countries can mount a transport 
blockade.
For example, all Nepal trunk routes pass through the territory of 
India. In the mid-1990s, when Nepal attempted to get support from 
the international community for the construction of several HPPs on 
the upstream river Ganges, bypassing cooperation with India, India 
introduced restrictive measures on transport links with Nepal. The 
transportation sanctions introduced by India negatively damaged 
social conditions in Nepal and forced it to abandon construction of 
the HPPs.
Measures which can be used to put pressure on the upstream country 
include increased transit tariffs on the building materials, machines and 
equipment used in building the HPPs and a refusal to allow large cargoes 
(turbines, generators, transformers, etc.) to pass through the territory 
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with the pretext, for example, that railway infrastructure need modernizing 
before such cargoes can be allowed to travel on the system.
Railway transportation is of key strategic importance to Tajikistan. 
According to available data, 65 per cent of all freight was shipped by rail 
in 2003. The role of the railway is even greater with regard to foreign 
trade: 87 per cent of over-land imports, and 92 per cent of such exports, 
were transported by rail. Tajikistan’s railway links to the outer world all 
pass through the Uzbek-Tajik border, therefore all freight and passenger 
transit out of Tajikistan must go via Uzbek territory.
The following passenger train routes out of Tajikistan pass through 
the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Dushanbe-Moscow (twice 
weekly); Kulyab-Moscow (once a week); Khojend-Saratov (twice weekly); 
Dushanbe-Kanibadam (twice weekly); Kurgan Tyube-Kanibadam (once a 
week). In addition, repairs to Tajikistan’s rolling stock are also mainly 
carried out in Uzbekistan. Uzbek enterprises repair Tajik railway company 
rail cars and locomotives.
Meanwhile, goods and trains from the central part of Uzbekistan, the 
Ferghana and Surkhan-Darya valleys, go through Tajikistan. To reduce 
its dependency on Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has initiated some expensive 
projects over the last few years in order to build a wholly internal freight 
system.
The majority of Kyrgyzstan’s freight is transported by rail, and 
railways are particularly important for this country’s foreign trade. The 
major part of its over-land import and export transportation is by rail. The 
railways linking Kyrgyzstan with the world beyond all pass through the 
Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, therefore all freight and passenger transit out of 
Kyrgyzstan must go through Kazak territory.
Downstream countries may also refuse to allocate land for the 
construction of high-voltage transmission lines to carry electricity from 
the HPPs to an external market, or may introduce high tariffs for the 
transit of electricity via existing networks. In such circumstances, the 
project may become unviable, if the internal consumption in the energy-
producing country is insignificant and access to foreign markets is cut off. 
If power transit tariffs are set unfeasibly high, this would make electricity 
uncompetitive in foreign markets.
Judging from experience in other countries, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan may find that building the Kambarata and Rogun HPPs, or 
any other large hydro complexes that change transboundary water flow, 
is perceived by other countries as a threat to their national interests. 
Consultation and negotiation with downstream countries can only be 
dispensed with in the following circumstances:
• If the project is financed entirely from a country’s own internal 
budget, with no loan capital from international institutions or donor 
countries;
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• If transport links from suppliers of goods and services to the 
construction site lie entirely within the country’s own territory;
• If all or most of the energy produced is consumed in the domestic 
market or is exported to other countries from its own territory without 
transiting the downstream countries;
• If domestic electricity tariffs make the project viable;
• If the country can communicate independently in the event that 
other countries introduce sanctions;
• If the country is not highly dependent on export and import trade 
with its neighbors.
When all these conditions are met, or when electricity is produced, 
transported and consumed within one country, neighboring countries on 
the same river are unable to hinder the construction and operation of a 
hydro-complex. If not all these conditions are met, then the project becomes 
vulnerable both at the construction stage and once it is operational, and 
the risk of delayed return on investment becomes higher.
Refusal of external investors to finance the project. The Republics 
of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have adequate domestic resources 
to finance the construction of the HPP and they will have to bring in 
external financing. If some of the region’s countries refuse to participate 
in the coordination of construction, this may be an obstacle to external 
investment.
When international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and 
other regional development banks, make decisions on whether or not 
to finance projects on international rivers, they act in accordance with 
established rules and procedures. First of all, the financial institution 
consults the countries that the proposed project would affect. If only one 
of the countries using the river has a justified objection to the project, on 
the grounds that it may be detrimental to this country, the project will be 
rejected. If the project is agreed, this may be because proposals include 
measures to mitigate the negative impact or to pay compensation.
An international financial institution may refuse financing to a 
project if negotiations, sometimes with an intermediary party, are not 
successful and agreement is not reached. They may also reject proposals 
if independent international consultants confirm that the project could 
have a significant negative impact on countries downstream of the 
international watercourse.
Risks of International litigation. The risks listed above are mostly 
regional. However, if relations between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the 
downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) 
worsen, there may need to be recourse to international organisations 
(or parties may even bring a case to the International Court of the UN). 
In this case, the findings of the international organisation would depend 
on existing agreements and contracts relating to transboundary water 
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utilisation. The main provisions of such documents include the principles 
of fair and reasonable utilisation and avoiding harm. They also reflect 
the universally accepted norms of common law which place the onus 
on countries of a single basin to reach agreement on issues relating to 
the utilisation of transboundary water resources and forbid the use of 
water as a bargaining tool between nations. The UN’s International Court 
decision with respect to the only transboundary water case it has tried 
(Gabchikovo-Nadmarosh) was that, where the provisions of international 
agreements were breached, sovereign states must pay compensation to 
the injured party for the damage caused by its unilateral actions.
The risks described above can exacerbate political tensions and 
even result in serious international disputes. Unilateral actions do 
not bring significant benefits to any of the parties involved, especially 
when the region’s countries are at roughly the same stage of economic 
development. The pursuit of cooperation between countries, and an ability 
to compromise, are the best way to find a solution.
During the last half century, there have been more than 500 
disputes and about 40 mutual cases verging on international dispute 
over transboundary water resources. Meanwhile, most countries have 
generally tended to settle disputes over transboundary water resource 
utilisation using the conventions of international legislation. Over the 
same period, more than 200 contracts relating the utilisation of water 
resources have been signed. The River Nile basin would serve as one 
example to Central Asian nations. Countries there have recently swung 
from bitter confrontation with one other to close cooperation.
Tajikistan has the potential to become the world’s third-largest 
manufacturer of hydro-electric power. However, this potential will not 
be realized without cooperation between countries. This could provoke 
disputes, resulting in the refusal of international financial institutions to 
grant loans, which in turn would discourage individual foreign investors 
from participating in the project.
Conclusions and Recommendations for the Implementation of 
HPP projects in Central Asia
Water is vitally important to the social and economic development of 
the Central Asian countries. In downstream regions, water shortage has 
an adverse impact on their ecology as well as their economy. In the long 
term, water shortage will become more acute as demand rises and rivers 
become shallower because of climatic changes. Sustainable development 
of the region is possible only if the countries broaden their cooperation to 
resolve the problem of shared utilisation of water resources.
The complex issues raised by hydro-power projects can only 
be addressed through the cooperation of countries affected. The 
construction of the Kambarata and Rogun HPPs, the largest of all the 
hydro complexes planned in Central Asia, is one of the key projects in the 
development of the participating countries’ energy potential. Completion 
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of these HPPs is very important for the future economies of the countries. 
However, under certain circumstances, the implementation of these 
projects could have a negative effect on the economies of neighboring 
downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), 
especially with regard to the productivity of irrigated agricultural land. 
The political situation in the whole Central Asian Region is therefore at 
stake. Given the lack of effective strategies for resolving the issues of 
joint water utilisation, and the limited finances of the region’s countries, 
the development of the energy potential of the Syr-Darya and Amu Darya 
rivers basins seems a distant prospect without the participation of the 
international community.
The weight of the international community is becoming an important 
factor in cooperation. When regional cooperation institutions are weak 
and domestic funds are not sufficient, the support of the international 
community becomes vitally important for Central Asian countries. Clearly 
the upstream countries need to bring in external funds if they are to 
build an HPP on their territory. The involvement of international financial 
institutions will reduce the cost of leveraging this money, and is an 
incentive for individual investors with respect to the whole project. The 
downstream countries, meanwhile, can appeal to international organisations 
to protect their interests if they fear they could suffer damage as a result 
of the implementation of upstream hydro energy projects.
International law demands concerted action in the development 
of the hydro energy potential of transboundary rivers. Therefore, 
according to international law, an upstream country is prevented from 
exercising absolute sovereignty over available water resources.
According to provisions laid down by international organisations, 
countries have to reach an agreement before taking decisions to implement 
hydro energy projects on transboundary rivers. International agreements 
on financing hydro energy projects adopted by international financial 
institutions require participating countries to follow standard procedures 
as a compulsory precondition for the construction of an HPP in Central 
Asia.
The international practice of implementing joint projects on 
transboundary rivers has established a standard set of procedures: 
preparation of the correct project-scope documentation (feasibility report 
and ecological impact assessment), notification of the countries located 
on the river about the project and consultation and negotiation with them, 
which implies mandatory cooperation between countries with regard to 
hydraulic construction.
The project-scope documentation being presented to neighboring 
countries must include complete specifications so that the region’s countries 
can evaluate the possible consequences of the planned construction of the 
HPP. In addition, neighboring countries must also be provided with the 
results of ecological impact assessments. To enhance the objectivity and 
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reliability of the data presented, the study and ecological evaluation of the 
project should be conducted in partnership with independent experts and 
representatives from other countries in the basin. These requirements are 
currently in effect for the projects under discussion.
Cooperation between countries in the construction of hydro projects 
is dependent upon timely notification of other countries in the river 
basin of intention to execute a project. This obligation is laid down in 
the Helsinki Rules for the Utilisation of Water from International Rivers 
and the UN Convention on the Law on Non-Navigational Utilisation of 
International Rivers. The World Bank requires notification as one of the 
obligatory elements of financing hydro energy projects.
If the region’s countries have objections to the construction of the 
HPP under these international obligations on cooperation (if any), and 
which are acceptable according to international water legislation, the 
countries which are planning to implement the hydro energy project must 
open consultations with the countries located on the river, study the 
issues raised by those neighboring countries and propose a solution that 
would take the concerns of these countries into account. The countries 
in a transboundary river basin should negotiate with the aim of resolving 
the problems of the HPP’s construction.
By following an action plan, the region’s countries have a basis 
for cooperation with regard to the development of a hydro energy 
project. Generally, the responsibility to cooperate is incumbent on all 
the states, and must be observed in all areas of international relations, 
including those related to transboundary water resources. Otherwise, the 
implementation of hydropower projects in the region will be at risk, and 
if downstream countries decide to apply economic pressure via trade 
sanctions, increased transit fees for freight crossing their territory, etc., 
this will strain relations between the countries.
These guidelines should also be followed prior to a decision being 
made on the construction of the Sangtudin HPP-1 and HPP-2 on the 
river Vakhsh. As these projects do not greatly affect the flow of the 
Amu-Darya, the downstream countries did not formally object to it. 
However, it seems likely that the downstream countries reached their 
own conclusions Tajikistan’s intentions to implement the Rogun HPP 
project in the same way, and this led to a sharp exchange of rhetoric at 
the August summit of the SCO in Bishkek (2007).
The Kambarata and Rogun HPPs are the first joint hydro energy 
projects undertaken in Central Asia. It is vital that the correct 
procedures relating to HPP project coordination in Central Asian 
countries are followed since this will be the precedent in the whole 
process of integration. Furthermore, experience of this kind can inform 
the decision-making process for other hydro energy installations in the 
region, and will promote trust and cooperation in the Aral Sea basin. This 
approach will facilitate the process of attracting international financial 
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institutions, donor countries and private investors to projects which are 
accelerating the development of the rich hydro energy potential of Central 
Asia, establishing a common energy market and ensuring a stable supply 
of electricity to foreign markets, thus increasing the profitability of the 
projects themselves.
4.	Appendix.	International	Cooperstion	in	the	Sphere		
of	Transboundary	Water	Resource	Regulation
(1) Utilisation of Transboundary Rivers: International 
Experience
When countries become interdependent with regard to water supply, 
cooperation between them is essential. Up to the present day, more than 
3,600 multilateral and bilateral agreements have been struck relating to 
rivers and watercourses. Since the middle of the 19th century, no less 
than 400 agreements have been drawn up regulating the utilisation of 
water as a natural resource. The Convention on Navigation on the River 
Rhine (1868), the Border Waters Convention between Mexico and the 
USA (1889) and the Border Waters Convention between the USA and 
Canada (1909) are considered to have been the first attempts to legislate 
on the exploitation of transboundary rivers.
The regulation of transboundary rivers can be governed by the 
universally accepted principles of international law, and by special 
agreements between the countries supplied by the river itself. Fundamental 
principles such as sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, international 
cooperation, etc., define the relationships between nations in many 
areas, including in the sphere of joint utilisation of transboundary river 
resources. These shared principles should facilitate the transition from 
national policy and unilateral action to a shared strategy and multilateral 
cooperation.
Competing demands on water resources led to the creation of 
agreements on international rivers which define relations between the 
users of these rivers. These include industry, agriculture, people, dams, 
reservoirs and hydropower plants. The increasing pollution of rivers by 
industrial waste led to the inclusion in agreements of measures to prevent 
pollution of international aquatic resources. There is an increasingly urgent 
demand for the public to participate in the management of international 
rivers, especially with respect to the reduction of poverty and gender 
inequality.
(2) The History of International Water Legislation
The first attempt to establish common rules for the utilisation of 
international watercourses came in 1923 with the League of the Nations 
(the predecessor of the United Nations) Convention on Hydro energy 
from Watercourses Significant to Several States. The convention came 
into force on June 30, 1925, but was not observed widely. The last 
ratification of the Convention was in 1940, when only 11 countries signed 
up to it.
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Today, the utilisation of transboundary rivers is regulated by the 
following international treaties:
• The Helsinki Rules on the Utilisation of Water from International 
Rivers
• The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Utilisation of 
International Rivers
• The Convention on the Protection and Utilisation of Transboundary 
Rivers and International Lakes
• The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context
The Helsinki Rules for the utilisation of the waters of international 
rivers (1966) was a relatively successful systematization of international 
legal instruments governing the development of the water resources of 
international rivers. This document was prepared by the Association of 
International Law (AIL) and took 22 years to draft.
The Helsinki Rules are only recommendations and are deemed to 
reflect international common law emerging from the interaction between 
nations. In many respects they became the basis for a large number of 
bi- and multilateral agreements, and they regulate utilisation modes and 
the protection of water in “an international water basin”. The basis of 
legislation on the water resources of a single river basin is the principle 
of “reasonable and fair use” according to which each of the states 
bordering the river has the right to receive a reasonable and fair share of 
benefit on their territory from the use of the waters of this basin. This 
principle refutes unrestricted territorial sovereignty with respect to the 
waters of transboundary rivers.
It is assumed that “a fair share” means each country of the basin 
deriving the maximum possible benefit from this water, using it to meet 
the needs of its economy and society (even if the countries are not able 
to use the water in the most efficient way) in a manner which causes 
minimal prejudice to others.
The parameters of “reasonable and fair” use should be defined by 
the evaluation of all factors influencing the water supply, including 
hydrographic, hydrologic and climatic conditions, utilisation of the waters 
in the past and in the present, the economic and social needs of each state 
in the basin, etc. In this way, no individual form of water utilisation will 
be deemed to have an automatic priority over any other form of use.
The Helsinki Rules contain provisions relating to the prevention and 
control of pollution, river navigation, timber rafting, and for the prevention 
and resolution of international disputes arising in connection with the 
rights or other interests of the basin countries.
Water relations have continued to evolve, and thus the practical 
relevance of the Helsinki Rules has diminished. However, they remain 
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an important resource of international law for experts in the field of 
international water resources.
The first universal document which set out to determine how 
international regulations on the utilisation and protection of international 
water resources, including the Helsinki rules, should be applied, was the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.
This Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on May 21, 1997, and is still open to signatories. At the 
51st Session of the General Assembly, 103 states voted to adopt the 
Convention, three countries voted against (China, Turkey and Burundi) 
and 27 states abstained. However, as at May 20, 2000, it had not been 
ratified by 35 states and therefore the Convention has not come into 
force. At present, the Convention is still open to signatories. By the 
end of 2006 it had been signed by 16 states, and ratified by only nine 
countries, therefore it is highly unlikely that the Convention will come 
into force in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is the most comprehensive document in its definition 
of international water law, and its regulations, especially the principles 
of fair and reasonable use and causing minimal prejudice to others, 
which are applied even by non-member states. However, even if the 
Convention were validated, its provisions would only be obligatory in 
those countries that adhere to it. The convention does not establish any 
system for the enforcement of its content, except for possible redress in 
the UN International Court. However, since its creation in 1946, the court 
has examined only one case concerning the utilisation of international 
watercourses. This involved a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia 
regarding the Gabchikovo-Nadmarosh project on the River Danube.
The provisions of the Convention act as a general framework for 
agreements relating to certain rivers which are used by two or more 
countries.
Despite the fact that there are no universal agreements at the global 
level for utilisation of the resources of international rivers, there are 
regional agreements in Europe, Latin America, the southern part of Africa 
and other regions. The most comprehensive of these is the Convention 
of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations (UN 
ECE) on the Protection and Utilisation of Transboundary Rivers 
and International Lakes. This Convention was signed by 25 UN ECE 
member countries in Helsinki in 1992 (so it is frequently referred to 
as the Helsinki Water Convention). It came into force on October 6, 
1996, having received a sixteenth ratification, adoption or statement of 
intention to join.
The aim of the Helsinki Rules is to establish the legal basis for 
cooperation in the protection and rational utilisation of transboundary 
waters in the region. The UN ECE has been joined by the countries 
of Europe, North Africa, Central Asia and Israel. Today 34 states and 
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the European Union adhere to the Convention. Of the Central Asian 
countries, only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have joined the Convention 
up to now (August, 2007).
The purpose of the Helsinki Water Rules is to protect of transboundary 
watercourses (including surface and underground waters) and it has two 
categories of obligation. The first category covers general obligations 
and applies to all the states that adhere to the Convention. In this part, 
the guiding principles are related to safety, the penalisation of polluters 
and the sustainable utilisation of water resources. The second category 
of rules covers the countries which border the river (the Convention 
signatories which have common transboundary waters). The major 
responsibility of the countries who share the river is the conclusion of 
bilateral, multilateral or other agreements related to the rivers they share, 
the establishment of supranational authorities to collect and evaluate 
data on pollution, and the development of joint programs to monitor the 
quality of transboundary waters, establish limits for waste dumping and 
the criteria for water quality, and initiate a coordinated action plan to 
reduce pollution.
Part III of the Convention, called “planned measures”, contains a 
number of recommended procedures relating to activities in one state 
that can have significant adverse consequences for other states which use 
the international waters.
The legal content of the Convention is constantly evolving, for example, 
through the adoption of obligatory international regulations, reports and 
other advisory normative documents that supplement the Convention.
Transboundary environmental impact assessments in the UNECE 
area are regulated by the UNECE Convention on the Assessment of 
Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context, signed on January 
25, 1991 and validated on September 10, 1997. According to the 
Convention, which is commonly called the Transboundary Environmental 
Impact Assessment Convention, the environmental impact assessment 
procedure should be undertaken on at least 17 areas of activity.
In the course of developing its Environmental Impact Assessment 
Convention, the UN also drafted the Protocol on Strategic Ecological 
Assessment (signed on May 21, 2003 by representatives from 36 member 
states of the UNECE and the European Union). According to the protocol, 
“the Strategic Ecological Assessment” (SEA) is an assessment of probable 
ecological consequences, including those related to health. It also defines 
of the scope of an ecological report and its method of preparation, which 
must involve the public. The report states that an ecological impact 
assessment of any plan or program must be completed before a decision 
can be made about proceeding with these plans or programs.
The protocol states that it is particularly important to carry out a SEA 
on water conservation programs which establish the basis for licensing 
such projects in the future.
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Today, ecological impact assessments are also carried out in the 
Central Asian countries. However, before making a final decision on the 
construction of large hydro energy complexes in international waters, 
countries must also consider the provisions of the Convention on the 
Assessment of Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context and 
the SEA Protocol.
Among other international legal instruments which apply to 
transboundary river projects in the states of Central Asia, the following 
UNECE conventions are perhaps the most worthy of note, i.e., the 
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and 
the Convention on Access to Information and Public Participation in 
the Decision-Making Process and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters. The Water Directive of the European Union is also of international 
importance.
The UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents was signed in Helsinki on March 17, 1992 and came into force 
on April 19, 2000. The convention does not apply to dam collapse, but does 
contains a number of obligations with respect to notification, cooperation 
and mutual aid following industrial accidents. These obligations can 
be included (with modification) in agreements on the construction and 
exploitation of large dams located on international watercourses.
The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in the Decision-Making Process and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters was signed on June 25, 1998 in Aarhus 
(Denmark) and came into force on October 20, 2001. The Aarhus 
Convention established the rights of the public to participate in the 
drafting and implementation of ecological policy. According to the 
Convention, ecological information should be accessible to the public, 
whose opinion should be sought as part of the decision–making process. 
The provisions of this convention can also be applied to hydro energy 
projects on international watercourses.
The framework Water Directive of the European Union (Directive 
2000/60/EC of October 23, 2000) is an important supplement to 
international legal instruments, although it does not have legal significance 
for non-member countries of the European Union.
The purpose of the Directive is to establish a uniform legal and 
organisational framework for the protection of surface, underground and 
coastal sea waters in European Union countries. It consolidates territorial, 
sectoral and issue-related actions and legal instruments. The directive is 
based on the principle that an integrated approach to water resource 
management should be applied in each river basin and establishes the 
basis for coordinating the activities of countries located on the European 
rivers.
The Framework Water Directive may also encourage the drafting of 
more comprehensive water resource regulations and facilitate greater 
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international cooperation in water-related matters beyond the European 
Union.
(3) The Construction of Large Scale Hydro Complexes and 
the Role of International Financial Institutions
Less developed countries are often unable to exploit their hydro 
energy potential because they do not have the funds to build HPPs. 
Loans and credits for such projects are limited in the international market 
by the somewhat strict legal and ecological requirements which financial 
institutions apply to international water projects.
In general, investment in water conservation infrastructure has fallen 
significantly since the mid-1990s. International financial establishments 
all but abandoned their support for new, large-scale hydro energy projects 
in developing countries in the face of pressure from organisations and 
the public who believed that huge dams and reservoirs cause irreparable 
damage to the environment and can have serious negative social 
consequences. The construction of large-scale dams (dams with a 
height of over 15m are classified as large-scale dams by the International 
Commission) continues, however, in countries which have used external 
funding in order to finance them. Several years ago, China built 245 
large dams, India – 475, Iran – 88, Turkey – 230 and Japan – 1.102.
The report of the World Commission on Dams (created in 1997 
with the support of the World Bank and the International Union for the 
Protection of Nature) called “Dams and Development” (2000) emphasizes 
the huge importance of dam hydro-installations in generating electricity, 
developing irrigation agriculture, preventing flooding and droughts and 
improving water supply. Although the construction of a hydro-installation 
is frequently considered to be highly economically advantageous, there is 
still the caveat that if all vital precautions are not followed, many water 
conservation projects, including dams and reservoirs, can be harmful to 
the environment and can have negative social consequences. The report 
was instrumental in reviving interest in hydro energy and in changing 
the attitude of international financial institutions with regard to investing 
in large hydro complexes with dams located on internal and international 
rivers.
The World Bank contributed to the funding of several large hydro 
energy projects on international rivers. The most well known of these 
is the construction in the 1960s of a series of dams and canals to divide 
the river Indus between India and Pakistan. However, owing to the lack 
of agreement on such projects between countries bordering the rivers, 
the World Bank refused to finance projects such as the Asun dam on the 
River Nile in Egypt and the Yusef Pashi dam on the River Euphrates in 
Syria, the implementation of which would have affected the utilisation 
model of the rivers in question.
Long-running disputes between countries regarding the utilisation of 
the resources of a number of international rivers, and the lack of precise 
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and unequivocal international laws, led the World Bank to conclude 
that it should adhere to very strict criteria when financing projects on 
international rivers. In 1956, the Bank adopted the Guidelines for Bank 
Personnel on Issues Relating to Projects on International Rivers. These 
have been reviewed several times since then, reflecting trends in the 
evolution of international water legislation. The latest revision of the 
Guidelines was in 2001 in the light of provisions incorporated in the 
UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses adopted in 1997.
In the process of considering funding applications for projects located 
on international watercourses, the Bank firstly verifies whether countries 
bordering the river have drafted all necessary agreements relating to the 
whole watercourse or any of its parts. If there are no such agreements 
in place, the Bank is often prepared to assist the relevant parties in 
preparing them. If disputes between the state which is proposing the 
project (the beneficiary state) and other countries bordering the river 
cannot be settled, before allocating any funds to a project, the Bank 
requires that the beneficiary state acts as the initiator of negotiations with 
the other countries on the river in order to reach necessary agreements 
or arrangements.
If existing agreements between the countries located on the river as to 
the terms on which the river is to be shared are deemed to have inadequate 
provision for the possible consequences of the project, the Bank requires 
that changes or additional agreements are drafted accordingly.
The Bank requires the beneficiary state to notify the other states 
bordering the river of its intention to execute the project located on the 
international river and to circulate available data. If the potential borrower 
informs the Bank of its refusal to notify other countries along the river, 
then the Bank undertakes this notification process. If the beneficiary state 
objects to this, the Bank refuses to consider the project.
The Bank also defines the scope of activity and the function of existing 
cooperation institutions regarding cooperation in the international water 
basin and the nature of the Bank’s possible participation in the proposed 
project as a way of determining whether it is necessary to notify these 
other institutions.
If countries bordering the river object to the proposal, the Bank may 
appoint independent consultants to study the reasons for this. If the Bank 
decides to continue evaluating the project, the Bank informs the states 
on the river of its decision.
An exception to the aforementioned procedure is only made when 
changes to a project are relatively minor and do not involve actions that 
may expand the original project, change its nature or increase its scale 
so that it becomes, in practice, a new or different project. In addition, 
no element of the plans should have an adverse impact on the quality 
or volume of water flowing into other countries along the river, and 
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the project itself must not be subject to any negative effects of water 
utilisation in other countries bordering the river.
World Bank procedures relating to projects located on international 
watercourses also establish the approval process and other internal 
procedures of the Bank according to how countries along the river respond 
to the notification of the project they receive.
World Bank policy on projects located on international watercourses is 
based on the two principles enshrined in international law, i.e., the right 
to fair and reasonable use and the principle of causing minimal prejudice. 
The first principle is based on the premise that every country situated 
on the river has the same rights as any other to reasonable and fair use 
of international watercourses. The second principle is that all countries 
have the right to use the rivers within their territory only as long as that 
does not cause significant harm to other countries using the river. The 
principle of causing minimal prejudice has priority and is fundamental to 
the Bank’s policy.
The principle of causing minimal prejudice, selected as the World 
Bank’s fundamental criterion, does to a degree favor countries located 
downstream of international rivers. However, in the Bank’s opinion, this 
principle is more easily and appropriately applied without diminishing the 
importance of the principle of fair and reasonable use.
The fundamental prerequisite to gaining World Bank financing for any 
project is the completion of an ecological impact assessment (EIA) which 
proves that project’s ecological integrity and sustainability and takes into 
account all potential social consequences.
Securing World Bank financing for projects located on international 
watercourses, or for even a small part of such projects, opens the door 
to further investment from other sources, since the project will then be 
considered to have met international legal requirements. Investors do 
not need to assess the project for themselves because they trust the 
conclusions of the World Bank.
Over the last 15 years, the World Bank has not participated in the 
financing of any new hydro installations on international rivers and only 
recently granted a modest loan to the Nam Teun II HPP on the Nam 
Teun international tributary of the river Mekong in Laos.
The World Bank is known to have tried to intervene in the resolution 
of disputes and in encouraging cooperation on the shared utilisation of 
international watercourses in various parts of the world. In particular, the 
Bank has supported moves by the Central Asian states to mitigate the 
effects of the Aral Sea crisis. Backed by the International Fund to Save 
the Aral, and making use of its presence across Central Asia, the Bank 
helped to prepare and finance part of a major project to ensure the safe 
supply of drinking water in Central Asia. The participation of the World 
Bank in these projects has enabled them to secure finance from other 
international financial institutions and donor countries.
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Furthermore, in 2002-2004, acting on a request from the Organisation 
of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), the World Bank conducted 
relevant studies and published a Draft Proposal for the Creation of the 
International Hydro Energy Consortium, whose functions would include 
the development of the hydro energy potential of the transboundary 
rivers of Central Asia. Although this proposal was widely approved by 
the Presidents of the OCAC member states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) in October 2004, no further measures to set 
up the consortium were undertaken.
The Asian Development Bank’s program entitled “Water for All: the 
Asian Development Bank’s policy on Water Resources ” identifies the 
promotion of regional cooperation as its primary goal. Emphasis is placed 
on supporting activities to regulate transboundary water resources, 
creating the mechanism for cooperation, the evaluation of resources and 
the exchange of information. With regard to projects on international 
rivers, the ADB generally follows the operational policy and procedures 
of the World Bank.
In 2003, the ADB allocated USD 0.7 million to the Central Asian 
states to improve the regulation of transboundary watercourses. With 
this financial assistance, work to prepare several regional agreements on 
water resources is under way. The Draft Agreement on the Utilisation of 
the Water and Energy Resources of the Syr-Darya River Basin is also in 
preparation thanks to this money, and it has helped to support the recently 
created commission of the Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on 
the utilisation of water conservation installations as part of their joint 
exploitation of the Chu and Talas Rivers.
Since the mind-1990s, neither the ADB nor the World Bank have 
granted loans for the construction of new hydro energy units on 
international rivers. After a long interval, in April 2005, the ADB issued a 
credit to Laos to finance the construction of the Nam Teun II HPP.
The European Union finances a small number of projects beyond its 
borders. Credit is extended via the European Investment Bank, which 
usually acts as co-investor in a project together with other financial 
institutions. For example, the European Investment Bank is part of the 
consortium of investors in the Nam Teun II HPP.
In selecting projects to finance, the European Investment Bank requires 
that the project should be subject to thorough ecological audit.
The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), in which all the countries 
of Central Asia have interests, is considered as one potential source of 
financing for international river projects. The purpose of the IsDB is to 
assist in the economic and social development of the IsDB member states 
and Muslim communities according to Shariya principles. The IsDB’s 
international legal and ecological requirements with regard to projects 
on international rivers may be different from the those of the World bank 
and the ADB.
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Developed countries, including the USA and the European countries, 
adhere to the stipulations of the World Bank regarding participation in 
financing projects on rivers. The commercial banks of these countries 
may apply a more flexible approach. In the case of the Nam Teun II 
project, nine European commercial banks and seven commercial banks 
in Thailand created a consortium to invest more than USD 1 billion even 
before the World Bank, the ADB and the European Investment Bank 
had issued loans to Laos for this project. The determining factor was a 
long term agreement between Laos and Thailand that the latter would 
purchase almost all the electricity generated by the Nam Teun II HPP.
When countries and commercial banks make investment decisions 
regarding hydro-units on international watercourses without following 
the formats and procedures of the World Bank strictly, they nevertheless 
remain prudent, to ensure that their participation in the project does not 
complicate relations with other countries situated on the river.
(4) Examples of cooperation between countries in developing 
the hydro energy potential of transboundary rivers
There are many examples worldwide of successful cooperation in the 
regulation of shared water resources which has benefited all participants. 
European Union countries improved the quality of water resources through 
cooperation; joint programs in Southern Africa were hugely beneficial 
for Lesotho and improved water quality in southern Africa; Brazil and 
Paraguay have developed their electricity industry jointly. Meanwhile, 
Central Asian countries have borne huge losses in agriculture and power 
generation because of their failure to cooperate. Experts confirm that 
even very large scale investment in the development of the hydro energy 
potential of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya would pay for itself in the 
relatively short term providing the operating models of reservoirs are 
coordinated, thus deriving the maximum benefit from stable agriculture 
and electricity generation. The damage wrought by floods and droughts 
will decrease, the quality of drinking water will improve and the ecology 
of the Aral Sea Basin will be stabilized.
However, experts and politicians also fear the prospect of war over 
water resources. During the last 50 years, according to the UNDP, there 
have been 39 such conflicts (30 of these in the Middle East), many 
of them only minor confrontations. Over the same period, at least 200 
contracts have been signed regarding water resources.
There are examples of cooperation over water resources which are 
of particular interest to Central Asia given the similar context of their 
execution.
The Division of the River Ganges between India and Bangladesh. 
The source of the river Ganges is in Nepal in the Himalayas. The length 
of the river is about 2500 km, the total area of the drainage basin, 1090 
thousand km2. The flow of the Ganges is estimated at 380 km3, which 
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falls to about 15 per cent of this figure is during the dry season (January-
May). The area of irrigated land in the Ganges river basin exceeds 14 
million hectares, the majority of which is in India. More than 400 million 
people live in the Ganges river basin.
In the face of violent objections from Pakistan (and Bangladesh, since 
1971), in 1961, India began the construction of the Farraka Barrage, 
18 km from border of Eastern Pakistan, and a series of installations to 
divert the flow of the Ganges via a 38 km channel to the river Hooghly 
(a branch of the river Ganges) on which Calcutta, India’s largest port is 
situated. The project was conceived as a means to improve Calcutta’s 
water supply, to maintain navigable depths in the river Hooghly during 
the dry season, and to irrigate land in the state of West Bengal. Since 
1976, water has flowed through this channel at a rate of 1130 m3/second. 
The volume of water flow was about 10 per cent of the annual flow of the 
Ganges. During the dry season Bangladesh suffered acute shortages of 
drinking water and water for irrigation because of the dramatic reduction 
in water flow during this period.
Bangladesh raised the issues of water division at many international 
conferences, but the crisis was only addressed in 1996 after new political 
parties came to power in both countries and the 30-year Contract on 
Division of the River Ganges was signed. In this case, the political will 
and aspiration of the governments of both countries to improve mutual 
relations between their countries resulted in the conclusion of agreements 
and an easing of tensions.
The Utilisation of Water Resources in the River Euphrates Basin. 
Turkey built the Ataturk complex to generate power and for irrigation. 
It was the largest international upstream project on the river Euphrates, 
build in spite of vociferous protests by the downstream countries – Syria 
and Iraq.
The river Euphrates (with an average annual flow of 36 km3) and 
the river Tigris (49 km3), merge into the river Shatt-al-Arab, and their 
tributaries are the vital arteries of Western Asia. The upstream waters 
flow into the arid southern zone via these rivers, bringing life to the 
deserts of the Middle East. More than 100 million people live in the 
basins of these rivers, which cover an area of 780 thousand km2.
The economically under-developed regions of Turkey are located 
upstream and midstream of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. These areas 
are mainly populated by Kurds, who wish to create an independent 
Kurdistan. In the late 1970s, the Turkish government began implementing 
the South East Anatoly regional development project. The purpose of the 
project is to develop the economy of the area in order to reduce the 
separatist tendencies.
The project covers 10 per cent of the country and with public 
investment of USD 32 billion is the Turkey’s largest national investment 
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program. By 2004, about half of this money had already been invested. 
The project includes the construction of 22 dams and 19 HPPs, and an 
expansion of irrigated land by 1.7 million ha. The core element of the 
project is the Ataturk hydro-electric plant on the river Euphrates, which 
has been operating since 1993, and which is of huge importance not only 
for Turkey but also for the downstream countries of Syria and Iraq.
Prior to the Ataturk project, Turkey had constructed the Keban hydro 
plant (1974) and the Karakaya hydro plant (1988), which had had a very 
limited effect on the flow of the river Euphrates, and had not caused 
noticeable problems for other countries on the river. The Ataturk unit, 
worth USD 4 billion, consists of a 184m-high stone-clad dam creating 
a reservoir of almost 20 km3, a HPP with installed capacity of 2400 
MW and installations for irrigation outflow. The capacity of the reservoir 
exceeds half of the annual drain of the river Euphrates and allows the 
complex to regulate the long-term flow and the hydrological models of the 
downstream part of the river.
The Euphrates was dammed in January 1990 to fill the reservoir and 
for 27 days no water was allowed into the lower reaches of the hydro 
complex. The volume of water flowing into Syria and Iraq was drastically 
reduced. During this period, relations between Turkey and Syria became 
extremely tense. Syria and Iraq protested, and negotiations resulted in 
Turkey declaring that the flow of the river at the Turkish-Syrian border 
would be maintained at the level of 500 m3 per second, or 15.75 km3 per 
year, which is only half the flow of the river.
Syria and Iraq have accused Turkey of illegal unilateral use of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, without giving them prior notification of 
new projects, and they have proposed that water distribution quotas are 
established so that each country may use about one third of the flow. 
Turkey has made reference to the fact that about 98 per cent of the flow 
of the river Euphrates is generated in its lands, and believes that it can 
therefore take all the water for its own needs. To support its position, 
Turkey also claims that its share in the utilisation of river waters is a 
little over 50 per cent.
As the project evolved, the attitude of international financial 
institutions towards the financing of its construction changed. The Keban 
hydro complex, completed in 1974, was built exclusively for electricity 
generation with a 1330 MW HPP located upstream of the river. It was 
financed by the European Investment Bank and the governments of the 
USA and some European countries, without any complications. However, 
the Karakaya hydro unit, located lower down the river, with a 1800 MW 
HPP and irrigation drainage installations, took much longer to attract 
external investment and was built only in 1988.
Meanwhile, efforts continued to secure financing for the Ataturk 
unit, located further down the HPP series. The World Bank refused to 
participate in financing the project because of disagreements between 
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the countries in the region and the danger that it could have a negative 
impact in downstream territories. Nevertheless, the Export and Import 
Bank of New York and a West German bank lent USD 111 million 
dollars to the construction of the hydro unit, and a group of European 
banks allocated credits of about USD 400 million in the form of “tied” 
contracts for the purchase of equipment. The majority of funds for the 
complex, built in 1990, were advanced by the Government of Turkey and 
commercial organisations in the country.
The next unit to be built was Bicherek, which was completed in 2001. 
It was financed by international consortium via the WOT scheme. The 
construction cost of the hydro unit, which includes a 672 MW HPP, is 
estimated at USD 1.2 billion.
Development of hydro energy potential in the upstream waters of 
the river Mekong, China. The river Mekong is the longest and most 
abundant river of Southeast Asia. It is about 2600 km in length and its 
estimated average annual flow is 475 km3, 16 per cent of which flows 
from China itself.
The downstream waters of the Mekong are used for the cultivation of 
rice. The estimated hydro energy potential of the River Mekong Basin is 
53 million kW, of which around 30 million kW could be generated in four 
countries of the downstream Mekong basin (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 
and Thailand). In these countries, the total installed capacity of HPPs on 
tributaries of the Downstream Mekong is about 1.6 million kW, or 5.3 
per cent of the hydro energy potential. The construction of several large 
HPPs in the main valley of the Downstream Mekong was, but for various 
reasons these projects have not been realized.
The estimated hydro energy potential of the upstream Mekong is 23 
million kW, which China began to exploit in the 1980s. At present, on 
the main river, the HPPs in operation are the Manwan (1500 MW) and 
the Dachaoshan HPP (1350 MWt). The second largest HPP of the series, 
Xiaowan (4200 MWt), and the Jinghong HPP (1500 MWt) are under 
construction. The construction of four further HPP units with a total 
capacity of 7000 MW is planned.
The first two hydro units to be completed were financed domestically 
with no external resources. However, the construction of the Xiaowan 
and Jinghong HPPs was partially financed by Thailand through credit 
which will be partially repaid in electricity from these stations.
China began building the series of hydro power units without notifying 
or consulting other Mekong basin countries. In the downstream countries, 
objections to the construction of the series were especially intense during 
the drought of 2004, when the construction of two upstream reservoirs 
led to a drought in the downstream areas. Recently, the countries 
have relaxed their opposition. There have been appeals for cooperation 
between China and the Mekong Commission, and requests that rules 
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be drafted governing the exploitation of the series of upstream HPPs. 
Plans for downstream power projects are being studied, and international 
organisations and donors are apparently willing to allocate funds for the 
further elaboration of and feasibility reports on these plans. However, 
donors do not seem to want to finance the construction itself because not 
all countries are in agreement on certain issues.
Reports
EDB Strategy and Research Department  “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia:  
Development and Utilisation Issues. EDB Industry Report no.2”
0 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2007
Institutional	Integration
Major events of political and economic integration in the region 
took place in the second half of the year. October 2007 signified several 
important political initiatives and cardinal decisions taken in accordance 
with the results of the summits, sessions and meetings of integration 
agencies, which were held in the FSU countries. The Heads of the CIS 
countries were also active in reaching certain important conclusions 
and in tackling different decisions in an economic and political way. In 
Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, on 5-6 October 2007, the “trilateral 
summit” meeting of the leaders of the CIS countries (Commonwealth 
of Independent States), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) took place. On the 16th of 
October 2007 in Tehran, the Summit of Caspian States was held. Later, on 
the 17th of October in Almaty, a meeting of a committee of senior officials 
was held at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in 
Asia and was devoted to the 15th anniversary of the forum initiated by the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. 
The key decisions taken as a result of the summits are the basis 
for the real integration of the countries. First of all, they relate to the 
establishment of the Customs Union within EurAsEC, the MoU concluded 
between CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Russia’s 
initiative on the sale of the Russian arms and special machinery to CSTO 
countries at the local prices, and the adoption of the Declaration from 
the Summit of Caspian States where the parties have undertaken not to 
provide their territories to any third-party countries for aggression against 
any of the littoral states. 
The involvement of new countries into the management process of 
the activity of integration unions and entities is an important factor 
in institutional integration. The сhange of the General Secretaries of 
EurAsEС and CIS, Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship at the next CIS summit, 
as well as at the CSTO session in 2008, and Tajikistan’s chairmanship in 
EurAsEС can all be labled as evidence that the interests of small, non-key 
countries in the integration organisations have started to be more widely 
considered. 
EurAsEС Summit
The most important conclusion of the EurAsEС Summit on 6 October 
2007 in Dushanbe was the decision to establish the customs union 
between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (for details see Establishment 
Nazira 
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of the Customs Union). With this, the important issue was the decision 
on the establishment of the legal base of the Customs Union1 and the 
signing of the package of documents concerning it. The Presidents of 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus signed the treaty on the establishment 
of the Customs Union, its commission and the unified customs territory2. 
The signing and ratification of additional agreements is expected to be 
completed in 2010. 
Another important outcome of the EurAsEC Summit in Dushanbe 
was the change of the Secretary General of the organisation. 
Instead of Grigoriy Alexeevich Rapota, the new General Secretary 
Tair Aimukhametovich Mansurov will represent the organisation. Т.А. 
Mansurov is Kazakhstan’s representative and he was appointed this 
post on 6 October 2007. Born in 1948, he graduated from the Kazakh 
Polytechnic Institute, Higher Party School in Moscow, with a PhD 
in political sciences. After the institute he worked according to his 
specialty: he was a concrete worker, an engineer, and then a senior 
engineer in the construction division “AlmatyCentroStroy”. He was also 
a manager in the public administration agencies in Almaty, Karaganda, 
and Moscow. From 1994 to 2002 – Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Russia; from 1996 to 2002 – Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Finland (jointly); in 
2002-2003 – ambassador at large (MFA RK), advisor to the President of 
Kazakhstan. From 2003 to 2007 he was the akim of North-Kazakhstan 
Oblast.
The summit of the Eurasian Economic Community set further objectives 
for the organisation’s activity. The activity of EurAsEС agencies for 2008 
will be aimed at the establishment of the Customs Union and the Single 
Economic Space. This is mentioned in the budgetary statement of the 
EurAsEС Inter-State Council “On Budget Policy for 2008”, which was 
approved by the heads of the Community’s membercountries. The statement 
notes that one of the objectives in the Community’s further development 
in 2008 will be to further elaborate on inter-state target programmes for 
the establishment of the unified transport territory, the common energy 
market and the efficient use of the water and power resources of the 
Central Asian region. Included amongst the main priorities of EurAsEC 
are: the development of peaceful use of nuclear power, progression in 
the fields of modern science and technology, information technologies, 
biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, microelectronics, alternative power 
sources etc. EurAsEC will aim to continue working on the development 
and improvement of cooperation in the social and humanitarian area 
and in the area of migration policy. As the budget statement mentions, 
the budget policy in 2008 “must be implemented with the consideration 
of the basic activity directions of EurAsEC in the real economy sector 
1 Resolution No. 346 “On Establishment of the Legal Base for the Customs Union within 
EurAsEС” (http://www.evrazes.com/ru/main/infopage/190/).
2 Resolution No. 1 “On Establishment of the Legal Base for the Customs Union within EurAsEС” 
(http://www.evrazes.com/).
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and must support the deeper economic integration of the Community’s 
member states”. In 2008 the budget policy, with regard to revenues, 
will be aimed at the current and full payment of the countries’ shares 
to the Community’s budget in accordance with the obligations outlined, 
as well as at not letting them fall into debt. With regard to expenses, 
it is necessary to use the Community’s budget funds strictly according 
to the target use, including the financing of EurAsEC agencies, inter-
state target programmes and investment projects. As mentioned in the 
document, great significance in the financing of investment projects and 
programmes will achieved by cooperation with the Eurasian Development 
Bank. The statement highlights that “at the same time it is necessary 
to observe the principles of transparency when spending the budget of 
funds”. The document also states that due to the integration of CACO 
in EurAsEC and the Republic of Uzbekistan joining the Community, the 
EurAsEC budget in 2006 will increase from 109 million to 145.4 million 
Russian roubles. In 2006 the growth of the member states’ economies 
continued, and practically all of the basic social and economic indicators 
improved. Thus, gross domestic product increased in comparison with 
2005 by 7%, production of consumer products by 4%, and production 
of agricultural products by 3%. According to a preliminary assessment, 
mutual trade constituted 70 billion USD. 
Session of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
Security Council 
A Session of the CSTO Security Council was held on 6 October 2007 in 
Dushanbe. During this CSTO Session the heads of the membercountries 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan) approved the package of documents on joint peacemaking 
activity, and came to an agreement on the development of the military-
economic cooperation. According to the results of the session, the decision 
was reached to establish two coordination councils: on the fight against 
illegal migration and on emergencies. 
The MoU between the SCO Secretariat and CSTO was signed. 
In accordance with the MoU, interaction between the two organisations 
will be implemented in the following areas: provision of regional and 
international security, stability; counteraction to terrorism; fight against 
(and prevention of) illegal drugs and weapons trafficking; counteraction to 
organised transnational crime; and in other spheres that represent mutual 
interest. Thus, the CSTO countries set new priorities and extended their 
capacity, thanks to cooperation with SCO on security issues.
With regard to the fight against illegal migration, the member countries 
of CSTO intend to cooperate with EurAsEC. It was supposed that in 
the very near future, the coalition council of the heads of migration 
services would be established, and its tasks would include regulation 
of the labour migration, harmonisation of the countries’ legislation and 
adoption of measures on prevention of illegal migration from third-party 
countries. Thus, the CSTO member-countries decided to focus their efforts 
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on separate areas of cooperation, with both SCO and EurAsEC having 
excluded duplication in the above-mentioned areas of interaction and thus 
encouraging enhanced performance of the organisation. 
The main outcome of the CSTO summit was the signing of the 
Cooperation Agreement on Security Issues with Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. This document consolidates the common 
targets and directions of the bilateral activity of the international Eurasian 
organisations. According to this document, SCO and CSTO will now 
exchange information, hold consultations, lay out joint programmes and 
measures for the development of cooperation on securing regional and 
international security and stability, and aid each other in the counteraction 
of terrorism, illegal drugs and weapons trafficking, and transnational 
organised crime. The Cooperation Agreement between CSTO and SCO is 
aimed at the liquidation of duplicating agencies and the establishment of 
a unified security system from Belarus to China. 
During the session of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, 
Russia offered the member-countries the option to buy Russian arms 
and special machinery for their armed forces and special services at 
local Russian prices. Moscow also expressed the wish that other CSTO 
members – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or 
Uzbekistan – should take more active roles in international peacemaking 
activities. 
The outcome of the session was that the Declaration of the heads 
of the states was adopted, which developed the main conclusions of 
the organisation’s aim in supporting peace and stability within the area 
of its responsibility, and which stated the priority directions of these 
activities. The CSTO document appeals for fulfillment of the obligations 
stipulated by international agreements, and for peaceful settlement of the 
Iranian nuclear problem. It also prevents the forced settlement of frozen 
conflicts. One of the key components in the agenda of the Session of 
the CSTO Security Council was the issue of establishing peacemaking 
forces. According to the Deputy Minister of Defense of Tajikistan Ramil 
Nadyrov, the establishment of peacemaking forces in the CSTO format will 
allow the Organisation’s member-countries to take part in peacemaking 
operations under the banner of the UN – not only in the territory of the 
organisation’s member-countries, but also in the territory of other states. 
A full package of the documents discussing the establishment of the 
CSTO peacemaking forces has already been coordinated. The General 
Secretary of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha expressed the opinion that the 
CSTO peacemaking forces could be positioned in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. So far it is expected that the peacemaking forces will take part 
in operations in accordance with UN mandates and will be used upon 
the decision of the CSTO Council. During the CSTO session Kazakhstan 
also offered a few initiatives. In particular, the President of Kazakhstan 
made the proposal to include the issues of ecological and power security 
into the list of issues, because they are transnational and directly relate 
to the interests of all member-countries. According to N.Nazarbayev, 
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the “provision for collective power security will be encouraged by the 
adoption of the Eurasian Pact of Stability of Power Supplies”. 
Initiatives in the area of provision for global power security were also 
mentioned by the President of Kazakhstan during the work of the 62nd 
Session of the UN General Assembly in New-York in September 2007, 
when the President of Kazakhstan stated his idea of developing the Global 
Power Ecological Strategy. 
The Summit of the Leaders of Caspian States on October 16, 2007
Relying on dialogue to solve problems in the strategically significant 
post-Soviet territory – Caspian region – was a success during the summit 
of the leaders of Caspian States in Tehran, held on October 16, 2007. The 
Presidents of the five neighbouring states to the Caspian Sea: Russia, 
Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan discussed the most 
significant components of regional policy and the different approaches 
used in tackling the problems that were rising due to the legal status of 
Caspian Sea. A Joint Declaration was accepted following the results of 
the summit. Its signing became a critical point in the negotiations that 
have already lasted 12 years. The adopted document is not final, as the 
Convention on Legal Status of the Caspian Sea will become the full and 
official document. 
The final declaration or “Pact of Political Stability” in the region, as the 
mass media dubbed it, consolidated the current political level agreements 
of the States on the general issues of the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea, such as the security and stability of the sea, and on the problems 
concerning the position of the Caspian States according to separate 
aspects of international relationships (consolidation of the role of the 
UNO, International Atomic Energy Agency, non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, international terrorism). The Declaration especially stresses the 
necessity to activate the negotiation process for these problems. As a 
result, the following decisions were taken: the Heads of the States agreed 
to conduct a summit once a year and to hold meetings on the level of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs twice a year. The Declaration also states that 
the Caspian Sea shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that 
the five states should decide any problems on the sea using only pacifistic 
methods. In addition, they agreed on the establishment of expert groups 
to solve the problems of stability and safety, joint biological resources 
conservation, reproduction and preservation of ecological safety of the 
Caspian Sea. 
In the process of the Caspian Summit, the President of Kazakhstan 
proposed to revise the existing mechanism of allocating quotas for 
biological resources, where Iran possesses 45%, Russia 27%, and 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 28%. Moreover, the President 
of Kazakhstan pointed to the necessity of holding back the item discussion 
on free transit through the sea in the forthcoming Convention on the 
Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. In this case it concerns not only the 
vessels but also the transit of energy carriers. With this method, the 
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routes of the pipelines will be coordinated with the territories of the 
countries. The decision made by the summit’s participants to deny the use 
of their territory to third-party countries for aggressive purposes against 
costal states became the main and strategic result of the summit. The 
appearance of this item in the text of the Declaration could be interpreted 
as a diplomatic success for Iran. The signed Declaration finally settled 
all the geopolitical claims of the world players. It actually forbids the 
presence of the West in the Caspian region. 
Participants of the summit also raised questions concerning the 
establishment of new international routes to transport cargoes on the 
Caspian Sea and from the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Azov and the Black 
Sea. Particularly, the ability to develop the international “North-South” 
transport corridor was discussed. 
One more important result of the summit was the agreement of closer 
economic integration for the five Caspian States. This fact is attested by 
the decision of the Heads of the Caspian States to conduct the Conference 
on Economic Cooperation in Russia in summer 2008, where they plan 
to discuss the problems of development of sea, railway transport, trade, 
tourism, biological resources conservation and reproduction. The next 
summit of the Caspian States will be held in Azerbaijan in 2008. 
The proposal of the President of Iran, Mahmud Akhmadinezhad, to 
establish a new Caspian integration structure is symbolic. This proposal 
brings about the conclusion that mechanisms of problem solving in the 
process of integration meetings about the Caspian Sea are implemented. 
This fact clearly illustrates that the leading country-players of the region 
realise the need and potential that these integration structures have to 
solve unsettled, disputable intergovernmental problems within water area 
of the Caspian Sea, where geopolitical interests of leading world forces 
meet. 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in 
Asia held on October 17, 2007
The meeting of the representatives of another integration union, in 
which coverage is wider than post-Soviet territory, was held on October 
17, 2007. On October 5, 2007, 15 years after the day when the President 
of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, initiated a meeting of the Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICMA) from 
the UN chair. Pursuant to the decision of the second summit of the 
Heads of the States and Governments of CICMA, the 5th of October was 
declared an official holiday – the Day of CICMA. 
A solemn meeting of the Committee of senior officials of CICMA was 
held at the level of the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Almaty. In 
the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Marat Tazhin, general efforts by CICMA achieved the next stage of its 
development – the execution of confidence-building measures among 
member states in humanitarian, economic and ecological areas, and in 
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the sphere of the struggle against new challenges and threats. The idea of 
calling the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures 
in Asia resulted in the establishment of a notable international forum, the 
area for the dialogue and search of mutually acceptable measures to find 
a solution to the problems and conflicts in the region. It is expected that 
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia 
will soon receive the status of rightful observer under the UN General 
Assembly. Today the forum integrates 18 states, occupying 90% of the 
territory of Asia, and their population amounts half of the population of 
the Earth. Other countries also desire to become rightful members of the 
Conference. This fact is witnessed by the global community, which widely 
acknowledges the purposes and activity of CICMA. 
The Summit of the States of CIS
The Summit of the States of CIS was held on October 5, 2007, and 
the result of this was that 17 agreements were signed. The Presidents 
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Head of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine took part in the summit. 
The prospective of the further development of the Commonwealth 
was one of the main agendas of the summit. It was agreed that one main 
theme would be chosen once a year. Migration became the first theme in 
2007 (for more details see the section Problems of migration in CIS). 
It is evident that this is very considerable problem for all the states of 
the CIS, including the Russian Federation. An agreement was reached 
to establish a special body for coordinating positions on migration3. The 
Declaration on Coordinated Migration Policy of the States of the CIS was 
accepted.4 Cooperation on security resulted in the adoption of draft legal 
documents.5
Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan refused to sign the 
Declaration on Coordinated Migration Policy. However, the document for 
the support of the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 
OSCE did not cause discord and was signed unanimously. The proposal 
of the Head of Kazakhstan for the establishment of the Economic Union 
of Central Asian states will be noted among the other initiatives of the 
Kazakhstan party in the summit held in Dushanbe. In the opinion of 
the President of RK, the necessity of such integration was caused by 
the requirement “to permit the strong 50-million region to establish an 
independent market, applying both economic and political means”. 
3 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N00700505
4 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700504#dekl
5 Decision on the Program of cooperation of the member states of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States in the struggle with terrorism and other violent manifests of extremism for 2008-2010; 
Decision on Intergovernmental Program of joint measures to struggle against crime for 2008-
2010; etc.
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The prospects of CIS development are rather multifaceted and 
diversified. It is not by accident that the heads of the states have insistently 
returned to the question of the model of further CIS developments during 
the last two years. In the process of the previous CIS summit held 
on November 2006, its Chairman, N.Nazarbaev, proposed the Concept 
of CIS Reforming, which included the understanding of the CIS as an 
independent space of post-Soviet integration. The Concept proposed then 
by the President of Kazakhstan, or as it was called during the October 
summit, the Concept of Further Development and Improvement of 
the CIS6, and the Plan for its Implementation were the main items 
on the agenda for the October summit of the Commonwealth. 
The affirmation of the concept of further development in the 
Commonwealth and the plan of main actions for its implementation is 
a significant step forward from dissociation and centrifugal trends to 
centripetal tendencies. The conception provides for the long-term 
successive reform of the CIS and is designed to transform the CIS into a 
capable organisation and to enable its future development. Today, the major 
purpose of CIS development is the formation of integrated economical and 
political association of interested states, providing effective development 
of every its participant in long-term prospective.
The majority of its participants, excluding the President of Georgia, 
M. Saakashvili, signed the documents of the summit. Turkmenistan also 
refused to sign the concept document, which reduced the level of its 
participation in CIS to associated membership some years ago. Azerbaijan 
took a special position on the problem of future CIS development. The 
President of Azerbaijan, I. Aliev, signed the concept of further CIS 
development but reserved special opinion. This means that Azerbaijan 
will participate in the execution of the document, but only selectively. 
Other states also keep to such practices, as membership in CIS does not 
assume any obligations. 
Pursuant to the accepted concept, the increase in efficiency of the 
Commonwealth’s activity will be the main purpose of the forthcoming CIS 
development stage. It will be required to achieve a singular understanding 
of the legal status of decisions of CIS agencies, and must be able to enable 
the states to execute taken obligations, and monitor their execution. 
The concept provides for the evolutionary improvement of existing 
structures without abruptly breaking of what was already acquired, therefore 
keeping a wealth of experience. The main purposes of the Commonwealth, 
and the total vision of their achievement, and the mechanisms of the 
Commonwealth’s functioning body and its organisational enhancement, 
are outlined in the concept document. 
The main purposes of CIS development are:
• To support social and economic stability and international security;
6 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700503#kocep
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• To strengthen good-neighbourly relations between the member 
states of CIS, based on mutual respect of interests;
• To increase the competitiveness of the member states, to ensure 
their entrance into the global economy to achieve progress and prosperity 
in the territory of the Commonwealth and in the member states of the 
CIS;
• To achieve maximum efficiency in joint solutions of the problems 
caused by the globalisation, use its advantages;
• To increase the living standards and welfare of the citizens of the 
member states of the CIS;
• To contribute to the access of every member state of CIS to the 
World Trade Organisation;
• To oppose traditional and new threats and challenges;
• To develop cooperation in the humanitarian sphere; 
• To implement basic international principles and standards in area of 
democracy and human rights;
• To bring together further national legislations of the member states 
of the Commonwealth in different spheres of multilateral cooperation, 
basing on admitted principles and regulations of international law;
• To provide efficient dialogue area on all the levels to implement 
above mentioned purposes and prepare the Commonwealth to new stages 
of advanced cooperation.
When elaborating the methods of further CIS development, the member 
states will proceed from the necessity to keep achieving and strengthen 
their existing positive experience. A new qualitative level of interaction 
will be reached gradually and step-by-step. The Commonwealth will 
be entrusted with a large volume of the work at every stage, which it 
should fulfill successfully in the interests of all the member states. With 
it, the diversified character of CIS unlimited with separate spheres of 
cooperation will be preserved. All new and existing spheres of interaction 
will be developed harmonically. 
Priority directions of the activities of CIS such as: the development 
of economic integration, cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, and the 
provision of stability and security, are also affirmed in the document. 
Today, economic cooperation is the top-priority task in the CIS. 
Fully-fledged trade and economic interaction of the member states of 
CIS is a necessary condition for the stable development of the states 
of the Commonwealth. Economic relations within the CIS will be based 
on market principals, mutual respect and mutual benefit. The economic 
purpose of the CIS on the current stage will become the completion of 
the formation of the free trade zone and its further improvement pursuant 
to the principles, rules and regulations of the WTO. It is necessary to 
take complex measures in this area and elaborate the Strategies of CIS 
economic development, the mechanism of economic cooperation of the 
member states of the CIS, the appointing of priorities directed to assist 
thet development of national economies, the close cooperation in mutually 
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beneficial economic areas, the establishment of new investments and 
technical bases of production in essence, the provision of progressive 
structural transformations in economy, and the strengthening of the 
scientific and technical potential of the states of the Commonwealth. 
With it, pursuant to the document, the main role will be given to 
activities according to the following priority directions:
• The completion of the introduction of a full-scale regime of free 
trade;
• The liberalisation of the conditions and further development of 
mutual trade, and cancellation of current restrictions and withdrawal 
from the regime of free trade, including those concerning the import of 
raw materials and export of ready products to provide free access of for 
the products of national manufacturers to the markets of the member 
states of the CIS;
• The development of a conformed line for energy resources and 
transport services, development of common markets for separate types of 
production – firstly, agricultural products;
• The development of interaction in areas of transport, including 
the formation of the network of international transport corridors in the 
territory of the CIS; the increase of efficiency of tariff policy and the 
removal of affection on national level of fiscal and administrative barriers, 
when implementing international freight traffic; the increase of the level 
of interaction between various types of transport in transit transportation; 
the harmonisation of national systems of air traffic organisation of the 
states of the CIS according to the standards and regulations of international 
organisations of civil aviation;
• The intensification of cooperation in areas of energy to increase the 
reliability of power supply and to optimisation of fuel and energy resource 
use;
• The multilateral cooperation in areas of extraction, transportation 
and transit of hydrocarbons;
• The development of production cooperation relations between the 
enterprises and the technologically related productions, the development 
of intergovernmental programmes on technical re-equipment, innovation 
technologies, the interaction on the advanced directions of scientific and 
technical cooperation;
• The development of military and economic cooperation of interested 
states with the help of interaction of national military-industrial complexes, 
when developing, updating, maintaining, providing exploitation and 
utilisation of military products, and diversification and conversion of 
military production;
• The development and implementation of big large-scale joint 
investment projects, in the first place in area of transport, energy and 
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telecommunications, providing significant influence on development of 
economies of the states of the Commonwealth;;
• The establishment of efficient mechanisms of payment and account 
relations;
• The establishment of financial and industrial groups, transnational 
companies, joint enterprises and other forms of economic cooperation;
• Integration with the world economy;
• The establishment of the network of information and marketing 
centres for the promotion of goods and services to national markets of 
the member states of the CIS;
• The creation of favourable legal, economic and organisation 
conditions for an extension of leasing the activity in the CIS.
• Adjusting methods of exchanging opinions on key global policy 
problems, the development of cooperation in the observation of elections 
and referendums, the establishment and development of contacts 
and mutual benefit cooperation with other regional organisations and 
integration consolidations are planned in the political sphere. 
It is expected that the Plan will define the methods of approaching 
the national laws of the member states of the Commonwealth in various 
areas of multilateral interaction, based on the accepted principles and 
regulations of international law, within the area of intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
Humanitarian cooperation is the most important element of interaction 
within the Commonwealth. The Plan of the Conception implementation 
contains measures for further development of total educational, scientific, 
information and cultural spaces, health care, sports and tourism. Forums 
for communication and interaction with the representatives of social 
organisations, mass media, academic circles, creative intellectuals, 
business, local government and citizens on key directions and questions 
about Commonwealth activities will serve for this purpose.
The Plan provides for the development of various target programmes 
to increase the information awareness of society, the strengthening of 
the peaceful culture, the practice of intercultural dialogue, and tolerance 
in national and religious questions in area of security. The most basic of 
measures is directed to activate the efforts of the member states of the 
CIS in the area of the struggle against international terrorism and other 
manifests of extremism and international organised crime, including the 
illegal turnover of weapons, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 
in counteraction to corruption, legalisation (laundering) of profits gained 
illegally, human trafficking, information technology crimes, in the 
registration and protection of national borders. 
To raise the effectiveness of the Commonwealth, it is planned to 
appoint national coordinators from high officials to monitor the execution 
Chronicles,	Digests	and	Book	Reviews	
Eurasian Development Bank
of the decisions of the high agencies of the Commonwealth pursuant to 
national law in the member states of the CIS. 
Development of Security Legal Base on October CIS Summit 
The states of CIS, as well as the world community, have to oppose 
various global challenges and threats. It is impossible to struggle effectively 
against the growing levels of international terrorism, organised crime and 
drug dealing without coordinated collective efforts. 
Cooperation development of law-enforcement machinery of the states 
of CIS received a new impulse, when the heads of the states signed 
the Agreement of the member states of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States of counteraction to legalisation (laundering) 
of criminal profits and finance of terrorism7, which focused on 
the improvement of the legal base and cooperation in this sphere, 
and the Agreement of cooperation of the member states of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States on counteraction to the 
theft of cultural artefacts and provision for their return8, which 
was developed to implement coordinated measures to prevent, suppress, 
reveal, or disclose infringements of the law concerning the theft of cultural 
artefacts, their search and provision for their return.
The experience of integration development of CIS shows the theme 
of cooperation in area of security is one of the most topical. Today 
the Commonwealth possesses the complex of base agreements and 
programs on joint counteraction to current challenges and threats, 
which are implemented successively. The Presidents approved the 
Intergovernmental Programme of Joint Measures of Struggle 
against the Criminality for 2008–2010, the Programme of 
Cooperation of the Member States of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in the Struggle against Illegal Turnover of 
Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors 
for 2008–2010 and the Programme of Cooperation of the 
Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
the Struggle against Terrorism and Other Violent Manifestations 
of Extremism for 2008–201011 for the change of implemented 
programmes. 
The Deputy UN General Secretary and Executive Director of United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, who took 
part in the summit as an observer, spoke to the heads of the states on 
the subject of narcotic drugs and possible ways of cooperation in this 
direction.
7 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N00700508
8 http://cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N00700512
9 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700509
10 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700510
11 http://cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700511
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He noted that the flow of narcotic drugs coming from Afghanistan 
promised not only consequences in healthcare but would also bring in 
big revenue to extremists and finance terrorism. According to his figures, 
approximately 70% of Afghan opium is raised in southern regions of 
the country and controlled by the Talibs, and about 20% of heroin is 
produced in Central Asia and passes through this country. It amounts to 
over 200 tonnes. The UN representative expressed regret of the fact that 
just 4% from the total volume of Afghan narcotics is withdrawn. He also 
expressed confidence that the CIS may play a key role in the resolution 
of the problem by blocking the northern route of narcotic traffic.
The heads of the states also approved the Protocol of affirmation 
of the Provision for the organisation of interaction of border and 
other agencies of the member states of the CIS in assisting in 
the initiation and adjustment (liquidation) of crisis situations 
on external borders, which aims to discover bases of organisation and 
mechanisms of interaction, the order of joint actions and decisions of 
concerning disputable questions, and legal status of the group. 
The Presidents signed the Agreement of social and legal guarantees 
to the staff of CIS Collective Peace-Keeping Forces, elaborated to 
provide security and protection of the staff of the CIS Collective Peace-
Keeping Forces (CPKF), when executing peace-keeping operations on 
the territories of the member states of the CIS, and including complex 
measures aimed to keep CPKF in operational readiness, creation of 
favourable conditions for them to implement assigned tasks appropriately, 
and to strengthen social and legal protection of the staff of the CIS 
Collective Peace-Keeping Forces and members of their families. 
Appointment of S.N. Lebedev to the Post of the Executive Secretary 
of CIS
Sergei Nikolaevich Lebedev was appointed to the post of the Chairman 
of Executive Committee, the Executive Secretary of CIS, on October 5, 
2007. S.N. Lebedev was born on April 9, 1948 in Dzhizak town (Uzbek 
SSR), and finished secondary school with a gold medal in 1965. When 
he graduated from Chernigov subsidiary of Kiev Polytechnic Institute 
in 1970, he stayed at the Institute, and was elected as the Secretary 
of Chernigov City Committee of Komsomol in a short time. Lebedev 
served his military obligations in the Kiev military district in 1971-1972, 
then worked in the Chernigov regional committee of VLKSM. He served 
in state security agencies from 1973 and in foreign intelligence (the 
First Main Department of KGB of USSR) from 1975. Lebedev passed 
his counterintelligence preparation (Kiev school of KGB) and intelligence 
training (Krasnoznamenniy Institute of KGB). He graduated from the 
Diplomatic Academy of MFA of USSR with honours in 1978. S.N. Lebedev 
speaks both German and English. He was the official representative of 
the foreign intelligence service in the USA between 1998 and 2000. He 
was appointed the Director of SVR by the Decree of the President of RF 
on May 20, 2000. His military rank is Army General. He possesses many 
state awards.
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 Results of Industrial Council Work of CIS for the year
52 documents, introduced by the agencies of industrial cooperation, 
were accepted into the meetings of the Council of the Heads of States of 
the CIS, the Council of the Heads of the Governments, the Council of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Council of the CIS in 2007. 
They include the following: the Agreement of the formation of general 
electric energy market of the member states of the CIS12, Actions on 
development of leasing for agricultural equipment, machinery and devices 
in the member states of CIS for the period till 2010, the Protocol of 
amendments to the Agreement of coordinated policy for standardisation, 
metrology and certification dated March 13, 1992, Intergovernmental 
programme of joint anti-criminal actions for 2008–2010, Program of 
cooperation of the member states of the CIS in the struggle against 
the illegal turnover of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their 
precursors for 2008–2010 and others.
The Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Governments of CIS 
Held in Ashgabat
Delegations of Moldova, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia participated in the regular meeting of the Council of the Heads 
of the Governments of the CIS on November 22, 2007. 27 and their 
questions were presented for discussion. The participants focused their 
attention on the development of cooperation in the areas of fuel and 
energy complex, finance, and border and interregional interaction. 
Problems on transport and transport infrastructure were emphasised. 
They did not succeed in reaching a full unity of positions. The Russian 
Federation refused to sign an agreement on the market of motor transport 
services in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Russian experts noted an infringement of Russia›s interests in this 
proposal. Despite this, a record attendance of the Prime Ministers for 
the last years was fixed in Ashgabat, they demonstrated the readiness 
to take serious decisions, and openness to the discussions on disputed 
issues. Undoubtedly, the participation of the President of Turkmenistan, 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who negotiated with Victor Zubkov for 
a relative extension of trade and economic cooperation between Russia 
and Turkmenistan, gave weight to this meeting. 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov called the heads of the Governments 
to participate in one of the most large-scale projects in the transport and 
communication sphere, the establishment of transport corridors combining 
railway and sea routes. “If the ferry service connects sea ports between 
Astrakhan, Turkmenbashi and Aktau (Kazakhstan), and the railways 
connect Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, significant possibilities will 
be opened for foreign transportation on the North-South, West-East routes 
for the states of the CIS”, the President of Turkmenistan stressed. 
12 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N00700600
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Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Anti-terror maneuvers “Peace Mission-2007” were held within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in August. As it was mentioned above, 
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the secretariats 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation in Dushanbe. Also two packages of the documents on the 
regulative and organisational formation of mechanism of peacemaking 
activities within the CSTO and on enhancement of regulative legal base 
of activity of Intergovernmental Committee on Military and Economic 
Cooperation (ICMEC) were signed at the same summit of the member 
states of the CSTO. 
The meeting of the Council of the Heads of the member states of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was held on August 16, 2007 in 
Bishkek. Pursuant to the agreement achieved on the anniversary meeting 
of the Council of the Heads of the member states of SCO (Shanghai, June 
15, 2006), the Heads of the states signed the Agreement of long-term 
neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation of the member states of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The leaders of six countries signed 
the Bishkek declaration and affirmed the Plan of actions for the member 
states of SCO on provision of the international information security (IIS), 
elaborated as development of the Statement of the member states of 
the SCO on IIS dated June 15, 2006. The authorised representatives 
of the member states of Organisation signed the Agreement between 
Governments of the member states of the SCO of cooperation in the 
area of culture. Significant agreements between financial and economic 
structures of the SCO, Business Council and Interbank Association were 
signed. 
The Memorandum of Understanding Signed between EurAsEC and 
Two UN Regional Committees 
The secretariats of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific Ocean (UNESCAP) 
and secretariat of Integration Committee of Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) concluded the Memorandum of Understanding on 
May 23, 2007. A Reporter of the agency “Interfax-Kazakhstan” testified 
that the document was signed in Almaty during the 63rd session of 
UNESCAP. The Executive Secretary of UNESCAP, Kim Khak Su, the 
Executive Secretary of UNECE, Marek Belka, and the General Secretary 
of EurAsEC, Grigoriy Rapota, signed the Memorandum. 
Integration of Organisation “Central Asian Cooperation” with 
Eurasian Economic Community 
Uzbekistan ratified the Protocol of integration of the “Central Asian 
Cooperation” organisation with the EurAsEC on April 3, 2007. The 
Law “On Ratification of the Protocol of Integration of the Central Asian 
Cooperation organisation with the Eurasian Economic Community” 
(Minsk, January 25, 2006), signed on the eve by the President Islam 
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Karimov, was published in official mass media on Tuesday and came into 
force” – “Interfax” was informed by the press service of the President. 
Earlier the Legislative house had accepted it on January 26, 2007 and 
the Senate approved the document on the plenary meeting on March 
30. The press service remarked that the adopted law contains proviso 
of non-usage relatively the Republic of Uzbekistan of stated documents 
in the annexes concerning use of water and energy resources of Naryn-
Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs in 1998 and 1999, the execution term 
of which is expired, and of the activity of the Central Asian Bank of 
Cooperation and Development (CABCD) in connection with the fact that 
its subsidiary bank “Tashkent” ceased its activity in 2003. Provisos were 
made according to Article 24 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
“On international treaties of the Republic of Uzbekistan”. 
Cooperation of Russia and Kazakhstan
In the process of an official visit of the President of the RF to Kazakhstan 
on May 10, 2007, prospective of further cooperation between the RF and 
RK actually on all the questions of bilateral interaction was discussed and 
planned. The highest priority directions of cooperation are research of the 
space, transport, industry, fuel and energy complex, cooperation between 
regions of two countries. 
The plan of actions for cooperation in 2007–2008, which defines special 
directions of bilateral cooperation, terms of their implementation and 
responsible representatives of the parties, including the solution of social 
problems of population of Baikonur, was affirmed. This plan of actions 
creates a good basis for complex development of integration processes. 
The agreements on the establishment of an international centre 
for uranium enrichment, on establishment of subsidiaries of trade 
representative offices of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation were signed. The signed agreement on cooperation in the 
nuclear area, in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is an 
extremely significant decision for cooperation between Kazakhstan and 
Russia. 
Agreements on the joint use of Baikonur, enhancement of transport 
and energy infrastructure, simplification of regimes in control points on 
Russian and Kazakhstan border will be reached in the near future. 
The President of Kazakhstan raised the problem of the possible extension 
of the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC). Agreement of admissible prices 
for gas was achieved on existing joint project of extension of Orenburg 
gas and condensed fluid processing plant at Karachaganak field. 
Relations between Russia and Belarus
The President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin visited, in an official 
capacity the Republic of Belarus on December 13–14, 2007
In the process of negotiations of the President of Russian Federation 
V.V.Putin, with the President of the Republic of Belarus and regular 
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meeting of High State Council of Union state, the Parties discussed 
a wide range of Russian and Belarusian relations, considering the 
development of integration processes within the union, building and 
actual international problems. Priority attention was given to Russian 
and Belarusian cooperation in trade and economic, fuel and energy 
areas. A memorandum of the current stage of development between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, concerning importance 
of implementation of bilateral agreements in the economic sphere and 
provision of the Republic of Belarus with governmental loan by the 
Russian Federation, was signed. 
The parties expressed their support of the rapid establishment of an 
actual customs union, extension of interregional relations, intensification 
of industrial cooperation and establishment of highly-efficient joint 
ventures, including implementation of union cooperation programmes. It 
was noted that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus will 
take agreed actions concerning accession to the WTO, coordination of 
tariff and nontariff policy and extension of mutual trade.
The heads of the two countries stressed the significance of the 
execution of the Agreement of provision of equal rights of the citizens 
of Russia and Belarus for freedom of movement, choice of residence 
on the territories of the member states of the Union State, concluded 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Efforts will 
be applied to implement the concept of the social development of a Union 
State, provision of agreed approaches in areas of education, healthcare, 
science, sports and culture. It is necessary to execute the agreement 
of the property of the Union state, which shall fix joint status of the 
property created within the union building and deal with basic questions 
of its use. In the area of military and military technical cooperation, the 
Presidents of Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus marked high 
level interaction between Russia and Belarus, stressed the significance 
of strengthening of collective security, including within the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation, and the efforts of all the international 
community on counteraction to new global threats and challenges.
Evident progress was not noted in the building of the Union between 
Russia and Belarus. The most important decisions were noted in the 
Statement for the press along with answers for questions according to the 
results of the meeting of High State Council of Union state of Russia and 
Belarus on December 14, 200713. To provide gradual transfer of bilateral 
energy cooperation to universal market principles, provided the parties 
shall obligatorily execute previously signed agreements and contracts, 
the Russian Federation took the decision to provide Belarus with state 
credit to the amount of $1.5 billion. It was declared Gazprom prices for 
gas supplied to Belarus would not be increased. Gazprom will execute in 
full volume all obligations of the Agreement concluded between Gazprom 
13 http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/12/14/2241_type63377type63380type63381_154348.
shtml
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Public Corporation and Beltransgas Public Corporation dated December 
31, 2006 of volumes and conditions of natural gas supplies to the Republic 
of Belarus and transit of gas through the territory of the Republic of 
Belarus in 2007–2011.
In the result of the meeting of the High State Council of the Union 
State of Russia and Belarus, the following documents were signed:
• The Memorandum of the current stage of development of economic 
cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Belarus. 
• Joint statement according to the results of negotiations of the 
President of Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and the 
President of the Republic of Belarus Aleksandr Grigorievich Lukashenko.
• Agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Belarus on the development of cooperation 
in production and mutual supply of medicines. 
• Agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and 
the Government of the Republic of Belarus on the establishment of equal 
conditions in pricing policies for railway transport. 
• Agreement between the banks Vnesheconombank and 
Belvnesheconombank on providing Belarus banks with a subordinated 
loan.
Russia and Belarus concluded the Agreement of provision of 
Russian stabilisation credit to the amount of 1.5 billion USD, 
based on the Memorandum signed on December 20, 2007 in Moscow. 
Funds of stabilisation credit are provided with one tranche for 15 years 
under the rate LIBOR+0.75%. Belarus is provided with a 5-year grace 
period for payments of principal debt. However, percents shall be paid 
during this period. 
Russia and Belarus planned the budget of Union state for 2008 in 
amount of 5 billion Russian roubles, it amounts 14.9% more than the 
level of 2007.
Functional	Directions	of	Integration
Establishment of Customs Union
Integration processes in EurAsEC will receive strong impetus after the 
establishment of a customs union, the agreement of which was signed by 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This agreement was planned to conclude 
within the CIS with participation of Ukraine, but its government refused 
to participate in it after many years of negotiation. Customs Union is 
supposed to become the most important step in formation of single 
economic zone in the post-Soviet space: it is open for other states to join. 
Central Asian states already declared their intention to join, however, 
there is the issue of unsatisfactory status of control over movement of 
people and freights. 
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Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed international legal documents 
defining the structure of customs union management, mechanism of 
attachment of other states to it, establishment of single customs territory 
in an October meeting of the Interstate Council of EurAsEC. Plan of 
actions on forming of customs union under EurAsEC also was affirmed. 
Formation of Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
will be completed by 2010. 
Contractual basis was established in 2007. Four documents were signed 
by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. These are: the Treaty of Establishment 
of an Integration Committee. Agreement of single customs territory, 
etc. The Protocol of amendments of basic agreement of establishment of 
EurAsEC was signed. Pursuant to this protocol functions of the superior 
body of Customs Union shall be transferred to tariff regulation national 
agency – Interstate Council. The total number of documents forming the 
customs union is 22 to be signed in 2008–2009.
The process of domestic procedures and harmonisation of drafts of 
international treaties forming the legal base of the customs union started 
in 2007. The drafts of such documents as the Agreement of indirect 
taxes charge on exporting and importing goods and providing services 
in Customs Union; the Agreement of defining of customs cost of goods 
transported through the customs border of the customs union; the 
Agreement of single rules of identification of country of origin of goods; 
the Agreement of single measures of nontariff regulation concerning the 
third countries were discussed and approved. 
The Members of EurAsEC Will Integrate Transit Controls 
Customs officers of the member states of EurAsEC will work on 
the common technological basis. The Council of the heads of customs 
agencies under Integration Committee of EurAsEC approved the draft of 
the conception of interstate program on establishment of Customs transit 
control system. 
This system provides for the elimination of internal barriers, preventing 
movement of goods through the territory of EurAsEC states. Integration 
Committee of EurAsEC explained that the Customs transit control system 
implies unification of data of freight, following as transit through several 
countries. Every border shall possess data on freight. “Information which 
Kazakhstan customs officers fixe accepting freight from China shall be 
transferred, for instance, to Brest on the border with Poland in order for 
the customs officer to close transit. This shall be done automatically. “We 
already take measures in this direction”, the employees of the committee 
noted. 
Interaction of Revenue Services
The Chief of Russian Federal Revenue Service, M.P. Mokretsov, was 
in charge of ХXI meeting of the Council of Heads of Revenue Services 
under Integration Committee of EurAsEC conducted on June 1 in Kazan. 
Results of the activity of the Council, analysis of main indices of work of tax 
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systems and changes in tax legislation of the member states of EurAsEC 
in 2006 were heard, and the Conception of bases of tax legislation of the 
member states of EurAsEC was formed at the meeting.
The results of information exchange between Revenue Services on 
entities and natural persons, gaining incomes from the sources in the 
member states of EurAsEC, export and import transactions between 
business entities of the Community were considered.
Recommendations for improvement of taxation of small business 
enterprises were prepared, based on the results of analysis of taxation 
indices of small business in the member states of EurAsEC. 
Experience was exchanged on questions of control on subjects of 
shadow economy, use of indirect taxation methods. Enhancing the method 
of formation of basic Revenue Service indices.
Migration in the CIS
The history of the states of the Commonwealth, cultural relations of 
nations, general traditions, lack of language barriers generate the basis 
for the active movement of population. Concering this issue, proposals on 
coordinated migration policy of the CIS member states was one of key 
points in the agenda of the summit of the CIS. 
In general, necessary legal and organisational base for cooperation 
of the states concerning regulation of migration flows of population in 
the CIS already exist. However, significant periods of time expired after 
the acceptance of majority of normative legal documents, during which 
both internal and external conditions for the CIS member states changed 
significantly. States gradually formed various approaches to the solution 
of population migration issues. As a result, national legislations of the 
CIS states differ on many parameters.
Today, two agencies of industrial cooperation (the Consultative 
Council on labour, migration and social protection of population, and the 
Joint Committee of the member states of the Agreement of cooperation 
of the member states of the CIS in counteraction of illegal migration) 
deal with questions of migration. The Consultative Council is responsible 
for preparation of proposals on work force migration regulation; the Joint 
Committee deals with counteraction to illegal migration. As a result, 
these agencies, acting parallel, solve the urgent problems of migration 
cooperation in their spheres. At the same time, a complex approach to 
the solution of cooperation questions in this area, is lacking as specified 
industrial agencies act separately from each other. The situation becomes 
more complicated because the questions of migration regulation are 
treated by specialists of various departments.
Despite the fact that, starting from 2000, the volumes of officially 
registered migration increased, actual number of migrants remains much 
higher, according to various expert assessments, than reports of migration 
services, statistic agencies and other bodies involved in the process of 
Chronicles,	Digests	and	Book	Reviews	
Nazira Tiuliundieva “Chronicle  
of Eurasian Regional Integration 2007”
 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2008
population migration regulation show. Lack of actual indices and efficient 
interaction of the parties on elimination of the gaps in this direction 
results in spontaneity of migration flows and distortion of the balance of 
social and economic interests of the countries of the Commonwealth; this 
immediately influences the big picture of migration cooperation.
To execute the Decision of the Council of the heads of states of 
the CIS dated June 10, 2007, the Group was established to elaborate 
proposals on coordinated migration policy. In the result of such work, 
raw documents, regulating interaction of the states in this area, were 
submitted to the Presidents. The heads of states signed the Declaration 
of coordinated migration policy of the CIS member states on the summit 
in Dushanbe on October 6. However, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan refused to sign the document. Moreover, the Council 
of the Heads of the Governments received a slew of assignments: to 
elaborate on the complexities of the first-priority measures directed to 
practical implementation of the principles, provided in the Declaration, 
make decisions on the draft of the Convention of legal status of working 
migrants and members of their families on behalf of the Council of the 
heads of states, and consider the draft of the Convention of migration 
policy of the member states of the CIS, proposed by the Republic of 
Tajikistan, in the stated order. 
The Agreement of establishment of the Council of the leaders of 
migration agencies of the member states of the CIS, signed by the 
Presidents, shall contribute to the solution of the migration problems. 
The Plan provides for actions directed to increase the level of 
interaction of migration agencies of the member states of the CIS to solve 
the migration problems. The activity of the existing and reasonability 
of new structures is supposed to be considered in the definition of the 
coordinated migration policy. The list of joint actions for prevention of 
illegal migration and regulation of labour migration was also formed. 
Formation of General Energy Markets
One of the most crucial tasks for post-Soviet states is the establishment 
of a single energy space. Interaction on problems of energy policy and the 
provision of protection to the interests of the states producing gas started 
from the May Central Asian tour of the President of Russia in 2007, 
when agreements on the building of the Caspian gas pipeline were 
achieved. 
“The Agreement of formation of general energy market of the CIS 
member states” was signed within the CIS on May 25, 200714. Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia signed the 
document. Establishment of the general energy market implies first of all 
development of relations concerning purchase and sale of electric power 
and associated services on the basis of general rules and appropriate 
agreements. General energy market is created to form single energy market 
space, based on the principles of equal rights, honest competitiveness and 
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mutual benefit. Its establishment is aimed to increase service quality 
and provision of reliable electric power supply to the consumers in the 
member states of the CIS, based on economic, technical and technological 
advantages of the parallel operation of electric energy systems.
The Agreement is the fundamental document for the development of 
normative legal documents of formed general electric energy markets in 
the member states of the CIS. It was agreed that competent agencies 
of the member states of the CIS (after signing of the Agreement) will 
submit their own schedules of main measures, directed to preparation and 
accession to the general electric energy market of the member states of 
the CIS to the Execution Committee of the Electric Energy Council of 
the CIS within a year. The Execution Committee of the Electric Energy 
Council of the CIS will prepare an aggregate schedule of the formation 
of a general electric energy market of the member states of the CIS on 
their base and submit it to the Electric Energy Council of the CIS for 
affirmation. 
Formation of the general energy market of the states of EurAsEC 
assumes solution of the problems of the several levels: political, economical 
and social, based on the principles of complementing and balance of 
interests. Generality of tasks shall be expressed also in harmonisation 
of legal provision. General principles shall result not only in interstate 
treaties, but also in certain measures on unification of the norms of 
national legislations concerning regulation of fuel and energy complex. 
The necessity of the establishment of the Energy Club of the SCO as 
soon as possible was stressed at the meeting of Prime Ministers of the 
member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in November 
2007 in Tashkent. It will assist, institutionally, to coordinate actions 
of gas producing countries of the SCO on regional and world energy 
markets, and also develop cooperation between producers and consumers 
of gas within the organisation, and, at last, elaborate coordinated 
strategy, harmonizing economy of gas complexes of these states with 
their geopolitical interests. Bilateral and multilateral energy projects are 
implemented between the countries of the former USSR (in the areas of 
oil and gas, generation and supply of electric power, etc.). 
The proposal of the President of RK on design of the project of 
other energy strategy – Asian energy strategy, made at the anniversary 
summit of the SCO on June 2006 in Shanghai, was also implemented 
in 2007. The draft of the Asian energy strategy was presented by the 
Kazakhstan party on the second meeting of the SCO Forum on June 15, 
2007 in Almaty. The main purpose of the designed project of the Asian 
energy strategy is to enable global energy balance and energy security 
of entire Central Asian region. The leaders of ministries and agencies 
responsible for the fuel and energy complex (FEC) of the member states 
of the SCO discussed this project on their first meeting on June 29, 
14 http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N00700600
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2007 in Moscow. The draft of the strategy is coordinated between the 
member states of the SCO. The establishment of the Energy Club of the 
SCO, which will become the starting point on the way to acceptance of 
the Asian energy strategy by SCO states will contribute to formation of 
integral energy infrastructure within the SCO. 
Establishment of Three Joint Enterprises in Nuclear Power Sector
Three joint enterprises were established within strategic cooperation 
of RF and RK in the nuclear power complex in 2006-2007. Firstly, JV 
“Zarechnoe” was established on the territory of Kazakhstan to extract 
natural uranium to supply reactors designed in Russia with fuel. The JV, 
financed by Eurasian Development Bank, started extraction of uranium in 
2007. Secondly, the Presidents of RF and RK agreed to involve Kazakhstan 
to the implementation of Russian initiative on the establishment of the 
International center for provision of services on nuclear fuel cycle, including 
uranium enrichment on the territory of Russia under International Atomic 
Energy Agency control at the meeting held on October 3, 2006 in Uralsk. 
The representatives of Russia and Kazakhstan signed articles of association 
of three Joint Ventures concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy on 
October 12, 2006 in Moscow, and the agreement of establishment of 
a Uranium enrichment international centre was signed in Angarsk in 
presence of the Presidents of RF and RK on May 10, 2007. Thirdly, the 
third JV was established between “Kazatomprom” and “Atomstroyexport” 
within the program of strategic cooperation for the development of atomic 
energy. The generation of Russian and Kazakhstan nuclear reactors with 
power units of the new type VBER-300, designed by Experimental design 
bureau of machine building named after Afrikantov, will be the result of 
work on this JV. Power units VBER can be used in the building of a new 
Nuclear power plant in Aktau. Reactors with power units of the new type 
may have a strong export position of Russian and Kazakh JV. 
Cancellation of the Cooperation Agreement between the Government 
of Tajikistan and Rusal
The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmon, signed the cancellation 
of the agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and the Russian 
company Rusal building of Rogun hydro power plant on September 2007. 
The Tajikistan party declared “non-fulfillment of obligations by Russian 
company” as the reason of such decision in the publication of the press 
service of the Tajik President.
Tajikistan established the “Rogun Hydro Power Plant” Public 
Corporation for the construction of the plant. However, undoubtedly, 
other foreign investors will be attracted. Authorities of the republic also 
declared they succeeded to raise their own funds in amount of 50 million 
USD.
Construction of the dike was started in 1987; its height reached 40 
meters by 1993. However, construction was suspended, and the dike was 
washed out with flood water, when the Soviet Union collapsed. Rusal 
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owned by Oleg Deripaska, concluded the agreement with Tajikistan about 
the completion of the Rogun hydro power plant with a capability of 3.6 
thousand megawatt in 2004. The project was estimated to cost 1.3 billion 
USD. However, the construction of the hydroplant was not started due 
to technical disagreements between the company and the Government of 
Tajikistan concerning type and height of the dike. 
The company “Russian Aluminum”, formed by merging the companies 
“Rusal”, “SUAL” and Swiss trader “Glencore”, received notification of 
cancellation of the agreement from Tajikistan. Experts agree that it 
will be difficult for Tajikistan to find other investors after cancellation 
of the agreement with one company. China, Russia and Kazakhstan 
show relative interest in Rogun hydro power plant as economic benefits 
from the production of electric power in Rogun hydro power plant are 
significant. Nevertheless, Russian companies are likely be involved in the 
project possibly under much stricter terms. 
EurAsEC: Single Educational Standards 
Single educational standards will be introduced in the states of 
Eurasian Economic Community. An appropriate agreement was signed 
on May 18, 2007 in Bishkek during the 12th meeting of the Council of 
mutual acknowledgement and equivalence of documents of education, 
academic degrees and titles under Integration Committee of EurAsEC. 
The agreement contains acknowledgement of requirements to the order 
of state certification of educational institutions, acknowledgement 
of educational standards of the states of EurAsEC. The authorized 
representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan took part in the meeting in Bishkek. The long-term 
purpose of the Council under the Integration Committee of EurAsEC is 
to establish single educational space. 
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International and Regional 
Development Banks in Central 
Asia: Overview of Activities
Natalia 
Maqsimchook, 
EDB
An examination of the integration process that is now so prevalent 
in the global economy reveals two distinct trends: firstly, the continuing 
growth in the number of countries which are members of international 
economic unions and other international and regional organisations; and, 
secondly, a worldwide improvement in the processes of global economic 
integration. These observations suggest that globalisation is gaining 
momentum in terms of both quantity and quality.
The focus of this overview is on the operations of financial institutions 
in four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. The overview covers the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the World Bank (WB), the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). 
This report is based on information from public sources, including the 
websites and annual reports of these development banks. Direct comparison 
is not always possible due to objective reasons. In particular, the banks 
use different classifications of their activities, and their reporting format 
and periods vary. However, it is possible to identify common trends and 
gain an insight into the areas and scope of operations of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) in the region. 
The role and functions of these institutions are well known. By providing 
financial aid to member countries for socioeconomic development and 
balance of payments support, IFIs play an important role in organising 
international credit relations and maintaining the stability of international 
settlement operations. 
Just as importantly, international and regional development banks 
facilitate cash flows to those countries whose access to capital markets 
is limited, and mitigate the effects of global financial markets instability. 
IFIs are important providers of general and specialist expertise in matters 
of development and economic growth for the member countries.
Though they work towards shared development goals, each IFI has a 
unique mission and specific sectors of engagement. For example, the WB 
provides loans and technical assistance (TA) for projects and structural 
reforms in the area of sustainable development and poverty reduction. The 
WB’s main partners are the governments of recipient countries (in this 
case, excluding the International Finance Corporation). The ADB supports 
its member countries’ efforts to reduce poverty and improve quality of 
life of the population. The majority of ADB loans are disbursed to the 
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public sector or governments of the recipient countries, but the bank also 
provides direct assistance to private companies through equity participation 
and equity investments, credits and credit guarantees, depending on the 
country’s level of development. The EBRD was established to assist the 
transition of post-Socialist European nations to an open market economy 
and in the development of private sector initiatives. The main recipients of 
EBRD loans are private companies, privatised state-owned companies and 
newly created businesses including joint ventures. Finally, the IDB aims 
to assist the socioeconomic development of its member states through 
equity participation and lending to public and private sectors with a focus 
on agriculture and infrastructure development projects.
The forces of political transformation, economic liberalisation and 
globalisation have opened up new opportunities and prospects, but they 
have also raised enormous challenges for many countries. Problems 
relating to the stability of the global economy; the depletion of non-
renewable resources; energy; poverty; unemployment; food shortages; 
spread of HIV/AIDS; and the environmental situation all pose new risks 
for development, and have forced IFIs to take new commitments and 
search for new approaches.
In 2007, the WB had 185 member countries; the ADB had 67; the 
EBRD had 63; and the IDB had 56. A number of Central Asian states are 
now among this community of member states through their shareholdings 
in IFIs. 
Table	12.1  
Central Asian countries’ 
IFI membership
ADB WB EBRD IDB
Kazakhstan 1994 1992 1992 1995
Kyrgyzstan 1994 1992 1992 1993
Tajikistan 1998 1993 1992 1996
Uzbekistan 1995 1992 1992 2003
As Central Asian countries have become more experienced and 
developed their own strategies for cooperation with IFIs, they have 
reduced their borrowing. This is in no sense a denial of the fact that many 
loans and TA projects have benefited these countries enormously. 
IFIs in CA region identify generally similar priorities for country 
assistance, but there is certain differentiation in the functional sectors 
which they target. IFIs will continue to be key providers of expertise 
and consultancy with regard to economic reform, good governance, 
public administration, social protection, poverty reduction, private-sector 
development, banking, investment and trade. 
Traditionally, the WB is the leading consultant in matters of structural 
reform, public finance and banking sector reform. At present, the WB’s 
most diverse loan portfolios are those in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In 
these countries, the Bank’s portfolios cover industry, trade, public-sector 
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governance and law, health and social protection. Public administration, 
good governance and legal reform are key priorities for the WB and 
governments alike, and these sectors are systematically favoured in 
the allocation of loan funds. Energy and mining are the priorities for 
the WB in Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the majority of the projects are 
being implemented in agriculture. The WB also pays close attention to 
infrastructure development. For example, the Bank allocates considerable 
resources for the development of the transport sector in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the Bank supports projects to improve access 
to safe drinking water in rural areas. Kazakhstan is a leading country in 
terms of cumulative WB lending. In all these countries, borrowing has 
been declining and investment projects have been on the rise for several 
years. 
The ADB was somewhat late in establishing its presence in Central 
Asia, but it has now found its niche in the region in transport and 
infrastructure development projects. The ADB is the region’s leading 
IFI in terms of support provided for construction and rehabilitation of 
roads and tracks. In each of these Central Asian countries, the ADB’s 
portfolio includes a large transport and communications segment: $177.8 
million (29%) in Kyrgyzstan, $105.3 million (28.3%) in Tajikistan, and 
$265.3 million (24%) in Uzbekistan. Other ADB’s priorities in Central 
Asia are agriculture and natural resources. The largest beneficiary in this 
sector is Uzbekistan ($245.4 million), whilst Kazakhstan ranks second 
in agricultural loans ($140 million). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan receive 
substantial support for the development of the financial sector (45% 
and 11% of cumulative lending, respectively). The ADB is also active in 
the energy sector, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ($30 million 
and $75.5 million, respectively). Generally, Uzbekistan is the largest 
beneficiary of sovereign loans, whilst Kazakhstan is the leader in non-
sovereign operations. 
The EBRD focuses on private-sector operations and small- and medium-
size businesses. At the same time, the Bank maintains a political dialogue 
with governments aimed at improving the business and investment 
environment. In terms of net operations in 1992–2008, the four countries 
are ranked as follows: Kazakhstan (€1700 million), Uzbekistan (€449.8 
million), Kyrgyzstan (€119.2 million) and Tajikistan (€63 million). A large 
portion of the EBRD’s portfolio in the region is devoted to the corporate 
sector (agribusiness, industry, real estate and tourism), especially in 
Tajikistan (31%) and Kyrgyzstan (28%). Commitments to the financial 
sector account for 44% in Kazakhstan, 27% in Uzbekistan, and 19% in 
Tajikistan. The EBRD is also active in the energy sector in Kyrgyzstan, and 
participates in infrastructure development projects (including transport) 
in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Shared priorities in Central Asia’s countries, and sectoral differentiation, 
enable IFIs to promote regional cooperation initiatives in Central Asia. 
External assistance could be instrumental in enabling this region to realise 
the full potential of such cooperation. 
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The management of water resources is one of key areas of regional 
co-operation in Central Asia. The facilitation of trade and transit is 
another priority for the region. IFIs, together with other international 
development agencies, are well placed to promote regional co-operation 
by providing technical assistance, acting as intermediaries in multi-lateral 
negotiations, providing financial resources to compensate for losses to 
negotiating parties and eliminating other barrier to regional cooperation.
Asian	Development	Bank
Table	12.2  
Loan, TA and grant 
approvals in 2007  
($ million)
Source: Asian 
Development Bank, 
www.adb.org,  
2008 Factsheets
In 2007, all the countries except Kazakhstan were in receipt of 
sovereign loans. The largest amount of TA was provided to Tajikistan, 
whilst Kyrgyzstan was the leading grant beneficiary. This is explained 
by the way in which these countries are being categorised. Generally, 
grants are allocated from concessionary Asian Development Fund (ADF) 
resources.
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is the ADB’s 18th largest borrower and one of the top 
ten recipients of non-sovereign loans, i.e. loans provided to the private 
sector. Since 1994, cumulative lending and cumulative disbursements 
to Kazakhstan totalled $726.6 million and $610.7 million, respectively. 
A total of 16 credits were approved, three of which are now active. 
Partnership between Kazakhstan and the ADB focuses on support for 
the private sector, sustainable development and environmental protection 
and regional co-operation. As of 2007, the ADB had extended loans in 
the framework of 17 projects in agriculture, natural resources, education, 
finance, transport and communications, water supply, sanitation, and 
irrigation. As government resources expanded, Kazakhstan’s external 
borrowing needs fell: to date, active loans portfolio includes only two 
sovereign loans, both in rural water supply and management sector. 
The majority of active ABD projects are private-sector operations that 
were successfully commenced in 2006. By the end of 2007, these projects 
totalled $550 million. The ADB responds to the increasing demand for 
infrastructure financing by providing long-term, fixed-interest loans in 
local currency. The ADB became the first supranational issuer of tenge-
denominated bonds, and has assisted in the development of a full-scale 
securitisation market in Kazakhstan. 
Countries
Loans
TA Grants Total
Sovereign
Non-
sovereign 
Kazakhstan - 100.0 0.7 - 100.7
Kyrgyzstan 15.0 - 1.7 53.6 70.3
Tajikistan 71.7 - 3.3 22.8 97.6
Uzbekistan 126.0 - 1.4 - 127.4
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The ADB has also been assisting the National Bank of Kazakhstan to 
introduce an inflation-targeting monetary policy regime and to strengthen 
financial governance through a TA project which is developing a new, 
quarterly inflation-forecasting model. 
Private-sector activities will continue to be the main focus of future 
ADB operations. The public sector lending programme will be directed 
mainly towards transport, rural water supply, irrigation and sanitation.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan became a member of the ADB and a beneficiary of 
ADB aid in 1994. Initially co-operation strategy covered four areas: 
(i) agriculture (including rural finance), (ii) public services, (iii) 
human resource development (especially education), and (iv) physical 
infrastructure (especially energy and roads). Further assistance strategies 
were broadened to include support to the financial sector, with the main 
emphasis on reducing poverty. Since 2005, concessionary ADF resources 
have been allocated to Kyrgyzstan under the 50% grant scheme, in view 
of the country’s heavy indebtedness. In September 2007, a new grant 
framework was approved by the ADB’s Board of Directors, which enables 
Kyrgyzstan to receive 100% of its annual ADF allocation in grants. Total 
grant assistance for 2007-2008 is about $46 million. 
Figure	12.1		
Cumulative lending  
($ million)
Source: Asian 
Development Bank, 
www.adb.org/
kazakhstan, as at 31 
December 2007
Figure	12.2		
Cumulative lending  
($ million)
Source: Asian 
Development Bank, 
www.adb.org/
kyrgyzstan, as at  
31 December 2007
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In the transport sector, the ADB provided three loans totaling $140 
million to reconstruct the Bishkek–Osh road, the country’s major transport 
corridor and part of the international road network linking Central Asia 
with China and Russia. These loans were also used to repair the regional 
Almaty–Bishkek road and a section of the Osh–Sarytash–Irkeshtam road 
which links the Fergana Valley with China. 
Co-operation in the social sector includes projects to improve basic 
education, health, and childcare at home and in the community. The 
education project builds on the achievements of the first ADB initiative 
which was aimed at modernising the core curriculum by providing a 
new generation of textbooks and learning materials. The project is also 
upgrading facilities and equipment in 90 rural schools. 
The ADB helped to implement a programme to improve the policy, 
regulatory and institutional capabilities of the banking sector. The ADB 
is also seeking to enhance supervision of the securities market, to 
improve market transparency and investment conditions, and to protect 
investors.
The ADB’s lending reached a peak of $89.2 million in 1997, and 
declined thereafter as the Government’s debt-reduction strategy limited 
the size of its externally funded Public Investment Programme to about 
3% of GDP. 
In 2007, grants for a total of $53.6 million were distributed as follows: 
$10 million for modernising and reforming the tax administration system; 
$25.6 million for the CAREC Regional Road Corridor Improvement 
Project; $5 million for the southern agricultural area development project; 
and $10 million for the development of a vocational education system. 
Two grants worth $3 million were received from Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction. Also in 2007, three TA projects totaling $1.7 million were 
approved; these will help to improve the skills of government employees 
involved in tax administration and agricultural land improvement.
As at 31 December 2007, the ADB’s cumulative lending was $603 
million, cumulative disbursements totalled $525 million, total number 
of loans – 26, including 10 on-going loans. ADF grants totalled $66.1 
million and TA grants 39.7 million. 
At the present time, the ADB, the WB, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, Swiss Co-operation and 
various UN Agencies are finalising a Joint Country Support Strategy for 
Kyrgyzstan.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan joined the ADB after a protracted civil war in the country, 
and is classified as a Category A developing member country eligible 
only for assistance from concessionary ADF resources. The ADB’s first 
Country Assistance Strategy and Programme (CSP) for Tajikistan covered 
the period 2004-2008. Acknowledging the country’s weak institutional 
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capabilities and limited capacity for external borrowing, the CSP focused 
upon rural development, regional cooperation, governance, and the social 
sector. Regional projects are also funded from the sub-regional ADF. 
Figure	12.3		
Cumulative lending  
($ million)
Source:  
Asian Development Bank 
and Tajikistan, http://
www.adb.org/Tajikistan
Financial resources have been distributed to the five key sectors of 
the economy as follows: energy – 20.3%, transport and communications 
– 28.3%; agriculture and natural resources – 26.7%; industry and trade 
– 5.6%; and multi-sector projects – 12.1%.
Tajikistan belongs to the category of countries which receives funds 
only under sovereign guarantee. However, grants made up a substantial 
proportion of the financial resources allocated to Tajikistan in 2007. 
Allocations for TA projects in 2007 totalled $22.8 million. Of the total 
commitment of funds in 2007 of $57.9 million (including loans and 
grants), $38.3 million was disbursed under 14 ongoing projects. 
Since the start of its co-operation with Tajikistan, the ADB has funded 
a number of projects which have had a significant impact on the country’s 
economic rehabilitation and social development. 
In 2006, Tajikistan’s transport and communications sector benefited 
from the ADB’s $20-million Road Rehabilitation Project, which upgraded 
the road from Dushanbe to Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab in southern 
Tajikistan. Both towns are important commercial centres. In 2003 and 
2005, the ADB approved a total of $44.5 million for the Dushanbe–
Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation Project. The road is the only link 
between the Rasht valley and the capital, Dushanbe, and is part of an 
international corridor to Kyrgyzstan and China. 
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Tajikistan hosted the sixth CAREC Ministerial Conference in 
November 2007, which endorsed, inter alia, the CAREC Transport and 
Trade Facilitation Strategy – a ten-year plan to develop six transport and 
trade corridors linking the CAREC countries to each other and to major 
international markets.
In 2006, the ADB approved a $21.5 million loan to the energy sector 
for the Regional Power Transmission Interconnection Project to enable 
the export of clean energy from Tajikistan to Afghanistan. This project 
will link the hydro-electric plants on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan to 
Pul-e-Khumri in Afghanistan with a 220-KWt dual-circuit transmission 
line.
In 2007, the ADB provided funding for a Rural Development Project 
($8.8 million in loans and $8.3 million in grants); the Khatlon Province 
Flood Risk Management Project ($22 million in loans); and a regional 
CAREC transport corridor project ($40.9 million in loans and $12.5 in 
grants).
Also in 2007, the ADB continued its efforts to resolve the issue 
of cotton farm debt and drafted an Agri-cotton Sector Restructuring 
Programme. The Rural Development Project approved in 2007 is designed 
to encourage private investment in non-cotton cash crops and to develop 
the agribusiness infrastructure. 
TA funds in 2007 totalled $3.3 million, including three advisory and 
two loan-preparation projects.
Since joining the ADB in 1998, Tajikistan has received $372.5 million 
in loans, $33 million in TA and $39.5 million in grants. 
Uzbekistan
Since joining the ADB, Uzbekistan has received $1.1 billion in loans 
(26 loans in total) and $35.5 million in TA. 
The current cooperation programme focuses on rural development; the 
private sector; regional transport corridors and customs administration; 
and the improvement of public services. The Government is using TA 
funds to develop a strategy for the transport sector and an institutional 
reform programme. 
About 26% of ADB lending was to education, with the Basic 
Education Textbook Development Project a good example of private sector 
participation. Rural investments support market-oriented agricultural 
reform to boost income, maintain irrigation systems and arrest land 
degradation. In the transport sector, two railway projects have overhauled 
660 km of track on a key regional transport corridor and rehabilitated 341 
km of track on the Samarkand–Bukhara–Khodjadavlet route and parts 
of the line between Djizakh and Samarkand. Loans have been used to 
purchase modern track-laying and maintenance equipment and to install 
an optical-fibre telecommunications system and computerised accounting 
system. 
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Regional cooperation projects are aimed at developing regional 
transport corridors and modernising customs administration in order to 
help Uzbekistan gain access to markets in neighbouring countries.
Figure	12.4		
Cumulative lending  
($ million)
Source: Asian 
Development Bank, 
www.adb.org/
uzbekistan, as at 31 
December 2007
Lending in 2007 totalled $127.4 million. A loan of $20.7 million, 
approved in June 2007, will support further reform of public financial 
management. Two more projects were approved in 2007: a $75.3 million 
loan to the CAREC Regional Road Project to develop strategic international 
highways and improve road quality in Uzbekistan, and a $30 million ADF 
loan to the Rural Education Project. 
Up to 70% of the lending programme is earmarked for environmentally 
sustainable rural development projects, specifically those supporting 
increased agricultural productivity, private businesses and rural 
infrastructure. 
World	Bank
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Approved 
projects
12 14 15 2
Loans*
$367.9 
million
$165.1 
million
$139.9 
million
$55.0 
million
* – commitments
The WB supports Central Asian countries’ efforts to reduce poverty, 
especially in rural areas, and government programmes to improve the 
quality of social protection (health, education, access to safe drinking 
water) and modernise basic infrastructure (water supply, heating and 
power). In general terms, this region is seeing a move away from loans 
for structural reform, and is set to gain more from targeted investment 
projects. 
Table	12.3		
Lending in 2002–2008 
(as at 30 June 2008) 
Source:  
www.worldbank.org,  
Country lending 
summaries 
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In the 2008 fiscal year (July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008), the WB’s most 
diverse loan portfolios were those for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Public-
sector governance and law are key priorities for the WB and governments 
alike, and these sectors are systematically favoured in the allocation of 
loan funds. However, an examination of the overall structure of the 
WB’s commitments by sector confirms that co-operation programmes are 
individually tailored to each country. 
Kazakhstan
The WB has supported a number of sectors in Kazakhstan since this 
country joined the Bank in 1992. The WB has assisted projects to upgrade 
and modernize the country’s power transmission systems, to increase 
agricultural productivity by overhauling ageing irrigation systems, and 
to nurture the business skills of the rural community by encouraging 
diversification into non-traditional activities. In addition, people in the west 
of the country, who have suffered from a shortage of clean water, now 
enjoy better health as a result of improved water supply and sanitation. 
As Kazakhstan’s need for external financing has decreased, the WB’s 
programme has shifted towards focused investment loans, knowledge 
transfer, and policy dialogue. Now, the WB’s strategy focuses on the 
country’s development priorities, including the prudent management of 
oil revenues and increased public-sector efficiency; improvement of the 
business and investment climate; enhanced competitiveness through 
investment in human capital and basic infrastructure; and sustained 
growth through focus on the environment. 
As of 2008, the WB’s commitments to ongoing projects totalled $607.8 
million. New targeted investment loans totalling $149.6 million were 
approved for three projects: Health Sector Technology Transfer and 
Institutional Reform; Technology Commercialization; and Customs 
Development.
Figure	12.5		
Commitments by sector 
in 2008 ($ million) 
Source:  
www.worldbank.org, 
Country Briefs
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Kyrgyzstan 
Since the Kyrgyz Republic joined the WB in 1992, the Bank has 
helped the country transform its mainly rural economy. It has assisted the 
country’s land reform programme and has allocated loans for overhauling 
irrigation systems; improving access to safe drinking water and better 
sanitation in rural areas; extending the availability of rural credit; and the 
rehabilitation of power, heating and other infrastructure in small towns. 
In addition to investment projects and structural reform, the WB has 
also provided TA for the preparation and implementation of projects and 
the strengthening of institutions. Several donors, principally the Japanese 
Government, are setting up trust funds for Kyrgyzstan. 
As part of its programme to reduce poverty, Kyrgyzstan is reducing 
its external borrowing in line with a State Programme of External 
Debt Management and Fulfilment of Obligations in the Fiscal Sector. 
Reflecting the overall trend in the region, large structural reform projects 
are yielding ground to smaller investment projects. 
As of 2008, the WB’s commitments to ongoing projects totalled 
$199.2 million. In 2008, new targeted investment loans totalling $21 
million were approved for two projects: Agricultural Investments and 
Services; and the Bishkek and Osh Urban Infrastructure Project. These 
projects are concerned with water supply (46%), agriculture (43%) and 
transport (11%).
Tajikistan
Since Tajikistan joined the WB in 1993, the Bank has allocated this 
country $532.65 million in grants and concessionary loans. As a country 
of low-income and low per-capita-GDP, Tajikistan receives concessionary 
financial resources from the International Development Agency (IDA). 
Through soft loans and grants from the IDA, the WB has helped 
Tajikistan to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the civil war and 
has supported economic reform. The WB’s loan portfolio covers rural and 
agribusiness development (including the cotton sector); improvement of 
water supply in rural areas and Dushanbe; maintenance and modernisation 
of municipal infrastructure; water resources management in the Fergana 
Valley; mitigation of commercial losses in the power and gas supply 
systems; and reforms in public sector governance, health and education.
The Strategic Partnership between the Tajik Government and the 
WB for 2006-2009 focuses on: (1) supporting private businesses; (2) 
enhancing and preserving the quality of human capital; and (3) exploiting 
the country’s hydropower potential. The loan portfolio includes 15 
investment loans and two policy-development grants. Rural development 
and environmental projects account for more than half of the loan portfolio, 
and infrastructure and energy projects for two thirds. One quarter of the 
portfolio is devoted to the development of human potential (education, 
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health and the reduction of poverty), and the remaining 8% is earmarked 
for economic management. 
As of 2008, the WB’s commitments to ongoing projects totalled 
$161.4 million. Loan commitments in 2008 of a total $16.6 million go to 
two new projects: a policy development programme ($10 million) and a 
project to enhance the reliability of heating and power systems in winter. 
These complex projects cover many sectors including trade and industry; 
transport; health and social protection; energy and mining; and public 
administration and law.
Uzbekistan
Since Uzbekistan joined the WB in 1992, 14 loans have been approved, 
seven of which are ongoing. The portfolio totals $588.5 million, about 
two-thirds of which has been disbursed. Lending under ongoing projects 
totals $223.0 million.
Assistance from the WB has helped Uzbekistan to improve primary 
health care facilities in rural areas and access to safe drinking water in 
rural parts of western Uzbekistan. Funding to improve water supply in 
Bukhara and Samarkand is ongoing, and a project to improve drainage 
downstream of the Amu Darya is being implemented. 
In June 2008, the WB’s Board of Directors approved a new Country 
Assistance Strategy. Ongoing projects will be continued, but no new 
loans will be approved. The Strategy focuses on TA, analysis, research 
and consultancy. 
Table	12.4	 
Lending in 1992–2008 
(as аt 1 January, 2008) 
Source:  
Country references, 
www.ebrd.com 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Number of 
projects
97 47 31 44
Net business 
volume
€1.7 billion
€119.2 
million
€63.0 
million
€449.8 
million
Total project 
value
€3.4 billion
€215.4 
million
€102.8 
million
€1,169.9 
million
Gross 
disbursements 
€1.4 billion
€104.4 
million
€39.0 
million
€338.1 
million
Share in 
private sector 
81% 66% 74% 58%
Additional 
mobilisation
€1.7 billion
€89.3 
million
€30.4 
million
€704 
million
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
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According to EBRD classification, agribusiness, industry, real estate, 
tourism and telecommunications are all included in the corporate 
sector. The infrastructure sector includes municipal and environmental 
infrastructure and transport. The financial sector comprises trade finance, 
equity funds, banks and non-bank financial institutions. The energy sector 
includes natural resources and energy. Micro- and small businesses are 
financed through intermediary financial institutions. 
In Kazakhstan, the EBRD is the largest investor in sectors not 
connected with oil and gas. The EBRD’s priorities are the promotion 
of domestic and foreign investments; operations in the financial and 
infrastructure sectors; and support to small- and medium-size businesses. 
In 2007, the EBRD approved 20 new projects at a total cost of €532 
million, including three projects in each of the agribusiness, bank credit 
and natural resource sectors; two projects in manufacturing; one each 
in small-business finance; bank equity investment; non-bank financial 
institutions; real estate and tourism; and energy; and four equity funds 
projects.
 In Kyrgyzstan, the EBRD focuses mainly on private business, the 
financial sector, basic infrastructure and consultation with the Government 
on investment policy, privatisation in the telecommunications sector and 
the reform of banking supervision. In 2007, the EBRD’s commitments 
in Kyrgyzstan totalled €12 million and covered 10 new projects, four of 
these in small businesses financing; two projects in bank lending; one 
project in a real estate and tourism sector; and one equity fund project. 
The EBRD’s Strategy for Tajikistan is mainly targeted at private sector 
development. As in Kyrgyzstan, to achieve this goal, the EBRD employs 
the programme financing mechanisms which are appropriate to the early 
stages of a country’s transition to a market economy and designed to 
stimulate trade. These include direct lending and equity investment, 
Figure	12.6		
Commitments by sector
Source:  
Country references, 
www.ebrd.com
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credit lines in local commercial banks for micro-, small and medium-size 
businesses, and the facilitation of direct foreign investment, including co-
financing. Having approved nine new transactions in 2007, the EBRD’s 
operations in Tajikistan totalled €26 million, including three agribusiness 
projects; five small business financing projects; a public-sector transport 
project; and one equity fund project. 
In Uzbekistan, the EBRD’s total annual operations increased to €17 
million in 2007 after a sharp decline in 2006 caused by the introduction 
of restrictions on public sector projects. Eight new projects are being 
implemented, mainly under Early Transition Countries Initiative: three 
agribusiness projects; one project in real estate and tourism sector; one 
bank equity project; and one equity fund project. The EBRD’s Direct 
Lending Facility proved to be very effective in responding to the needs 
of small businesses. The EBRD has sought to involve the Government of 
Uzbekistan in consultations on political and economic reform, including 
full-scale privatisation; the liberalisation of trade and state procurement 
prices for agricultural products; lifting restrictions in relation to the 
circulation of cash; and the introduction of market tariffs for utilities in 
all sectors of the economy. 
The EBRD’s portfolios for each Central Asian country notably 
include projects which are classed as regional investments. One such 
beneficiary is the Centras direct investment fund, which invests in the 
capital of companies operating in or exporting their products or services 
from Kazakhstan, Russia and Central Asia. Besides this project, there 
are seven other regional projects in Kazakhstan investing in real estate, 
environmental protection, the introduction of environmental safety 
standards, health and safety in Lukoil divisions which represent equity 
investment funds in companies in Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Mongolia, 
the Baltic, Georgia and Armenia. In general, these are examples of EBRD-
funded projects that facilitate regional co-operation among businesses. 
Islamic	Development	Bank
Between 1 January 2007 and 9 January 2008, the IDB Group approved 
financing for this region (including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) totalling $221.5 million. This 
includes nine loans for a total $206.4 million; three TA projects at a 
total cost of $0.7 million; and three projects to be funded by the Islamic 
Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector ($14.4 million). 
Loans approved in fiscal year 2007 nearly doubled the previous year’s 
total. Since the start-up of the IDB’s activities in the region, it has 
allocated $1,231.7 million to 173 projects.
Azerbaijan is the region’s leading beneficiary (receiving $335.1 
million), with Kazakhstan ranking a close second ($315 million). 
However, Kazakhstan was the largest recipient of IDB financing in 2007 
(71.4% of all ordinary financing). Uzbekistan merits attention since the 
first allocation under the Sukuk facility was made there. 
Natalia Maqsimchook  “International and 
Regional Development Banks in Central Asia: 
Overview of Activities”
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Kazakhstan
Total IDB Group funding of the public and private sectors in Kazakhstan 
exceeds $300 million – one of the highest figures in Central Asia. The 
IDB’s projects and operations include the construction of the Almaty–
Gulshad road and the Astana–Karaganda road; purchase of equipment 
for the Syzganov hospital; modernisation of Kazpost; and a rural 
water-supply project in Karaganda Oblast. The IDB Group also helped 
private companies purchase farm machinery and drilling equipment. A 
number of commercial banks participated in credit lines for small-and 
medium-size businesses, including a new $150-million project involving 
Kazkommertsbank, TuranAlem Bank and Khalyk Bank. 
The IDB’s non-credit operations in Kazakhstan relate to institutional 
development; the development of human potential through training; 
consultancy; training seminars and trips; and student grants. Examples 
of capacity-building TA include training of Kazakh officials in strategic 
planning, WTO accession, industrial development and Islamic banking 
and finance. 
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan joined the IDB in November 1993. By 2007, the country’s 
loans from the Bank included seven loans for a total $60.9 million and 
two operations on instalments for credit sales totalling $18.5 million. Of 
the projects benefiting from these credits, five were completed, two were 
cancelled and two projects are being implemented. The IDB does not 
provide programme loans. 
After a six-year period during which no loans were extended, in February 
2007 the IDB approved a $17.3 million loan for the reconstruction of 
the Osh–Irkeshtam road. Kyrgyzstan had been an inactive borrower 
prior to this because of the difficulties it had in servicing its loans and 
applying disbursements, which persuaded the Government to pursue a 
debt-reduction strategy.
In 1995, the IDB allocated just $1.9 million in loans to Kyrgyzstan, 
but in 1998, lending to this country peaked at $20.5 million. Since 1998, 
the IDB has allocated financial resources to Kyrgyzstan on concessionary 
terms only. Under the terms of an IMF loan, Kyrgyzstan is unable to 
benefit from other forms of financing, such as credit sale, leasing or 
istisna. 
Kyrgyzstan hopes the IDB will increase its lending programme to $34 
million in 2007 to cover two projects, namely the reconstruction of the 
Osh–Irkeshtam road and construction of a 110–KWt power transmission 
line. According to a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government and the IDB, loans totalling $51.4 million are to be allocated 
in 2006-2008. 
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Tajikistan
Tajikistan joined the IDB in November 1996, in the category of 
IDB’s Least Developed Member Countries, which includes 28 countries. 
Tajikistan has a 0.04% share in the IDB’s subscription capital. In 1996-
2007, net approved lending totalled $127 million.1 The IDB’s strategy 
prioritises the eradication of poverty and the development of infrastructure, 
the private sector, trade (e.g. inter-regional trade), Islamic banking, the 
banking sector and human potential. 
The IDB regards transport as a key sector in Tajikistan and in Central 
Asia generally. In the energy sector, the IDB’s portfolio includes projects 
to build power transmission lines and power plants, and to improve 
environmentally sustainable water resources and energy management. 
It also includes irrigation and projects to improve the management of 
agricultural water resources. 
Tajikistan is a member of the Islamic Corporation for the Development 
of the Private Sector (ICD). This enables the country to access financial 
products such as direct financing through equity investments, credit 
facilities with national commercial banks and consultancy for private and 
state-owned companies. 
As part of the CAREC programme, the IDB has participated in the 
financing of several regional initiatives, mainly in the energy and transport 
sectors.
1 http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/
CM/Publications/ Member_Countries_Facts_Figures/FF_2008.pdf, available as of September 
2008
Natalia Maqsimchook  “International and 
Regional Development Banks in Central Asia: 
Overview of Activities”
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The	first	EDB	Round	Table:	Perspective	Areas	and	Mechanisms	of	
Regional	Integration	of	EurAsEC	Member	States	
On November 15-17, 2007, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) 
held its first Round Table in Almaty on Perspective Areas and Mechanisms 
of Regional Integration of EurAsEC Member States.
Among crucial problems that have emerged in the region, the round 
table discussed mutual trade and mutual investment between EurAsEC 
member states, the globalisation of the economies of EurAsEC countries, 
the Central Asian water and energy sector and the development of cross-
border infrastructure in EurAsEC.
“We regard the round table, which was the first international forum 
organised by the Eurasian Development Bank, as a practical step 
towards developing the EDB’s research programme and analytical work,” 
said Vladimir Yasinskiy, member of the EDB Board. “We consult our 
participants on issues relating to economic development, the efficient 
use of resources and the expansion of trade and economic ties. In 
accordance with the Strategy for 2008-2010, the Bank aims to become a 
leading intellectual centre offering analytical and information support to 
integration processes in member states.”
Well-known experts in economic and political intra-regional relations 
attended the round table; among them were CIS Deputy Executive 
Secretary Yevgeniy Novozhilov, EurAsEC Deputy Secretary-General 
Serik Primbetov, Director of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Ivanter, Head of the Centre 
for Comparative Studies of Transformation Processes at the Institute of 
Economy of Russian Academy of Sciences Leonid Vardomskiy, Acting 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea Sulton Rakhimov, and international financial experts 
and EDB officials.
International experts identified a number of barriers to integration 
processes in EurAsEC.
“Unless we create a proper infrastructure, our sentiments about 
business will not lead anywhere. It will perform to its capacity only and 
when an energy system, a road and railway networks and many other 
First and Second EDB 
Round Tables on Regional 
Integration, November 2007 
and May 2008
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things are put in place. However, this alone is not sufficient either; there 
is another form of infrastructure which is absolutely necessary, and that 
is a financial infrastructure. Without it, business – except for largest, 
oligarchic structures – will not be able to work,” said Academician Viktor 
Ivanter, director of the Institute of Economic Forecasting at the Russian 
Academy of Sciences.
“In the performance of banking systems in EurAsEC member states, 
as in the whole post-Soviet space, over the past few years we can point 
to both successes and persisting problems,” noted Anna Abalkina, 
senior research fellow at the Centre for Problems of Globalisation and 
Integration at the Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences. 
Banking systems have significantly advanced in their development over 
the past 15 years. For example, reforms in this sphere have led to a 
two-tier banking system and a growth in the capitalisation of banks 
in EurAsEC countries. In the past year alone, their combined assets 
grew by over 60%. Growing transparency and the increasing role of 
foreign capital, which facilitates competition on the market and improved 
corporate standards in the banking sector have become a positive result. 
Russia and Kazakhstan’s banks have been active in condacting their IPOs 
in recent years.
“It is premature to create a formal single financial market at the 
moment. It is more promising to take measures to strengthen stability 
of national financial systems, increase their capitalisation and develop a 
regional capital market,” Ms Abalkina said.
Another important aspect of integration problems was examined 
by Leonid Vardomskiy of the Russian Institute of Economy in his 
presentation entitled “EurAsEC Among Post-Soviet Integration Groups: 
Incentives and Barriers to Development”. He believes that, compared to 
other integration blocs, EurAsEC holds the most promise because of the 
absence of significant contradictions in the foreign policies of member 
states, external threats which are largely common and national leaders’ 
understanding that many major problems related to socioeconomic 
development and global positioning can be solved by expanding mutual 
cooperation. A recent agreement on the creation of the Customs Union 
as part of EurAsEC by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia means that “the 
community has switched to a two-tier system for regulating foreign 
trade relations” which makes it possible to address the difference in 
the preparedness of members for a higher level of cooperation, which 
emerged during integration. A group of the most developed countries in 
EurAsEC has completed the stage of recovery growth and is entering the 
stage of active modernisation, demanding deeper reforms of economic 
partnership. Meanwhile, other members of the community are not ready 
for the Customs Union because of the state of their economies. Some 
have not completed the recovery stage (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); 
others are lagging behind in terms of economic institutions and foreign 
trade cooperation (Uzbekistan). They will cooperate with one another and 
with the Customs Union countries at the level of a free trade zone.
First and Second EDB Round Tables on Regional 
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Using a two-tier model in EurAsEC is a step forward in creating a 
successful regional bloc. At the same time, we should be aware of a 
number of threats posed to this project. One of them is linked to the fact 
that the modernisation and diversification of the economies of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia are based above all on technologies obtained from 
third countries. This may complicate the formation of the Customs Union. 
Gains for national economies from the Union (the mutual openness of 
commodity markets, the coordination of customs, foreign trade and 
currency policies, scale of production and so on) may not compensate 
them for losses inflicted by collective protectionism (the appreciation 
of imports, the poor quality of regional products and so on). Another 
problem is created by the founding countries’ desire to join the WTO. 
Despite declarations of simultaneous movement towards two aims, at a 
certain stage the countries will have to choose their priorities and this 
will have an impact on the terms and conditions of fulfilling the aim, 
which will be pushed into second place, the expert believes.
G. Kasymov of the Department of Transport Policy and Market 
Infrastructure at the Secretariat of the EurAsEC Integration Committee, 
raised the problem of the discrepancy between transport infrastructure 
and a growth in freight, the inefficiency of using transport potential 
and the inadequacy of conditions for transiting between the Asia-Pacific 
region and Europe through EurAsEC. The expert outlined priorities for 
the formation of a single transport space. This concerns drafting and 
implementing proposals to create rational schemes for building logistics 
centres; planning direct container routes; defining problems in the 
development of transport infrastructure to remove barriers to the free 
movement of transport through member states; coordinating efforts 
of transit countries to bring transport links in line with international 
standards; organising multimodal shipments; developing the main transport 
network and improving traffic controls within it; devising mechanisms to 
jointly develop transport infrastructure; implementing a set of measures 
to improve transport safety; and creating mechanisms to charge for the 
use of transport infrastructure.
Sulton Rakhimov, acting chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, pointed to the significance 
of work in the sphere of managing water resources in the region, being 
conducted with assistance from international organisations, and the 
need to pursue cooperation with the aim of finding mutually-acceptable 
solutions in this sphere. At this stage, issues relating to the rational use 
of water and energy resources are mainly discussed within the framework 
of two regional organisations – the International Fund for Saving the Aral 
Sea and EurAsEC. The fund has been dealing with these issues since 
1993, whereas EurAsEC, realising the importance of this issue in the 
region, started dealing with it only recently. However, the activity of both 
organisations, as well as their desire and direct efforts, give grounds to 
hope that this issue will be solved soon and, therefore, help socioeconomic 
growth and sustainable development in Central Asia.
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First and Second EDB Round Tables on Regional 
Integration, November 2007 and May 2008
The following problem was raised at a follow up press conference on 
the results of the round tabe: how lawmaking on integration in EurAsEC 
could be combined with Russia’s policy to encourage immigration from 
member states, which is actually draining specialists from the neighbouring 
countries. Russian experts acknowledged that labour migration processes 
in the Community were complex and needed regulation and harmonisation. 
The year 2008 may be declared the year of “finding a solution to this 
problem”.
The	second	EDB	Round	Table:	Developing	Cross-Border	
Infrastructure	in	the	Eurasian	Space
The Eurasian Development Bank held its second Round Table in 
Moscow on 15–16 May, 2008. Heads of executive bodies of the CIS 
and EurAsEC and national government agencies, leading scientists and 
experts from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
took part.
The meeting discussed topical regional problems relating to institutions 
and conditions for integration in the sphere of infrastructure and transport 
corridors, common energy markets, the experience and mechanisms 
of cooperation in the basins of cross-border rivers, the development of 
the Central Asian water and energy sector, financial integration and 
investment in cross-border infrastructure and border cooperation.
Participants in the meeting welcomed the EDB’s initiative to develop 
the mechanism of the round table as a regular platform for the wide, 
unbiased and objective discussion of acute topical and long-term topics 
and for preparing recommendations on expanding integration processes. 
Joint efforts by round table participants may well turn these meetings 
into an efficient and informal instrument for developing integration 
interaction.
The main conclusions and recommendations drawn up at the round 
table were:
In the electric power sphere:
• despite remarkable activity in the past few years, mutual investment 
in energy sector remains at a low level and is characterised by a unilateral 
structure. Practically all investment has been made by Russia and its 
entities. Insignificant mutual trade in electricity and the low level of 
mutual investment are not in line with the great potential the sector has 
to offer;
• the creation of a common electric power market is facing a number 
of barriers. A major obstacle is incomplete liberalisation on the Russian 
market, which is the largest market in the CIS and forms its backbone;
• the logic of a common electric power market demands expansion 
beyond the relatively narrow limits of the post-Soviet market. The incentive 
to expand the zone of the common power market is a specific aspect 
of this sector. Both Russia and Kazakhstan, which act as locomotives 
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of economic integration in the region, and other countries – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan – are showing an interest in this. Almost all CIS countries 
can gain real advantages as countries exporting and transiting power if 
the mechanisms for a common power market involving Eurasian giants 
such as China, Iran, India, Turkey and EU states are launched.
In the sphere of transport corridors and transport infrastructure:
The formation of a single transport space requires the following tasks 
to be resolved:
• drafting and implementing proposals on the best transport routes 
to transport passengers and freight, including the creation of rational 
schemes to build international logistics centres, planning direct (rapid) 
container routes and attracting freight that is appropriate in that particular 
region;
• defining the most topical problems in developing transport 
infrastructure with the aim of eliminating barriers to the free movement 
of transport in Eurasian countries and utilising the countries’ transit 
potential;
• coordinating efforts of transit countries to bring transport 
communications into line with international standards;
• developing cooperation between different types of transport and 
organising mixed (multimodal) shipments;
• eliminating natural barriers which have a negative impact on 
shipments by developing the main transport network and improving 
traffic control in it;
• forming financial mechanisms for the joint development of transport 
infrastructure;
• implementing a set of measures to improve transport safety (above 
all, road safety);
• creating efficient mechanisms to charge for the use of transport 
infrastructure.
In the water and energy sphere:
In the sphere of cooperation in solving the Aral Sea problem and water 
and energy cooperation in the Aral Sea basin, the following priorities 
exist:
• continuing work to ensure and restore the system of monitoring 
cross-border waters to take efficient measures to use and protect water 
resources from depletion and pollution;
• strengthening regional cooperation on the basis of international 
practice in managing cross-border rivers. One prospect for improving 
water relations between Aral Sea countries is to initiate their rapid 
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accession to the 1992 UNECE Helsinki Convention of the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes;
• speeding up the development and adoption of appropriate 
intergovernmental agreements on the basis of a concept for the efficient 
use of water and energy resources in the Central Asian region drafted 
under EurAsEC to create efficient interstate institutional, legal and 
financial mechanisms for the joint use of water resources in cross-border 
rivers and the development of their hydrotechnical potential;
• maintaining a balance of interests between irrigation and hydro-
energy generation. National interests of the countries in the upper areas 
are based on using the water flow to generate power, while countries in 
the downstream areas need it for irrigation. Their interests in the Syr 
Darya river are assured by the framework agreement adopted on 17 
March 1998, which is not binding. An international water and energy 
consortium with the appropriate functions and powers could solve this 
problem;
• strenthening the status and efficiency of the activities of regional 
cooperation structures under the auspices of the International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea.
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Book Review: Boris Kheifets 
and Aleksandr Libman 
“Corporate Integration.  
An Alternative  
for the Post-Soviet Space”
Kheifets B. and Libman A. (2008) Corporate 
Integration. An Alternative for the Post-Soviet Space, 
Moscow: LKI
The book discusses corporate integration, which is quite a new 
phenomenon in the post-Soviet space.
Corporate integration in CIS countries is boosted by the expansion of 
economic activities by enterprises beyond certain CIS countries. Many 
firms from CIS countries export their products to other countries and 
import resources from their, and in order to improve the efficiency of their 
activities they build business chains by buying enterprises in other CIS 
countries or using a system of trade loans. The acquisition of stakes by 
enterprises and the use of the system of trade loans are perfect examples 
of corporate integration of CIS countries. As a result, the need has 
emerged to analyse various approaches to bringing about integration and 
study foreign experience and, based on it, draft the most efficient means 
of corporate integration in the post-Soviet space.
The authors of the monograph, Boris Heyfets and Alexandr Libman, 
have been working on this topic for many years. In 2006, they published 
a monograph entitled “Expansion of Russian Capital to CIS Countries” 
(Moscow: Ekonomika). In this book, based on revised and updated 
information, the authors compare the advantages of corporate integration 
with the strengths of so-called formal integration and analyse their 
mutual relations. In other words, they compare bottom-up integration 
with top-down integration. On the basis of this analysis, they conclude 
that corporate integration and formal integration are not adversaries. 
On the contrary, thanks to its greater efficiency corporate integration 
supplements and creates conditions for developing formal integration.
The book also provides a historical and regional review of different 
approaches to corporate integration taking place in the world and 
analyses the advantages and shortcomings of different types of corporate 
integration and their applicability in the post-Soviet space.
Yerzhan 
Moldabekov 
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Among types of integration, particular attention is paid to investment 
expansion, because this is the most widespread type of integration in 
the post-Soviet space. Based on statistical data, the authors analyse the 
flows of different types of investment between CIS countries, and study 
examples of the acquisition of stakes by companies in the post-Soviet 
space. In addition, the authors describe the main investment strategies 
adopted by enterprises in the post-Soviet space and specify their positive 
and negative aspects.
The monograph also discusses other types of corporate integration such 
as production and scientific cooperation, international strategic alliances, 
labour migration and mutual economic relations between regions. The 
authors show that production and scientific cooperation in the CIS has 
a significant foundation thanks to a common production and technical 
infrastructure inherited after the break-up of the USSR. It also scrutinises 
the reasons for labour migration and its importance in the context of 
corporate integration in the post-Soviet space.
The book also analyses the competitive environment in the CIS 
(competition between companies from CIS countries and other countries) 
and its influence on corporate integration in the CIS.
Compelling qualities of this book include the clarity and consistence 
of presentation as well as the application of a large amount of illustrative 
data on the flows of investment between CIS countries and the acquisition 
of stakes by various enterprises in companies from other CIS countries.
Book Review
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The Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration is a quarterly academic and analytical journal published 
in Russian by the Eurasian Development Bank. The members of the Editorial Board and Advisory 
Council are distinguished academicians, practitioners and renowned experts in regional integration. 
Eurasian Economic Integration brings together academic and analytical articles, reviews of books 
relating to regional integration, interviews and quarterly chronicles of regional integration. 
With its focus on economics, the journal is a rich source of material  addressing a broad range of 
issues specific to Eurasian integration. These include integration theory and its relevance to the 
development context; economic integration (trade, investment, financial institutions); institutional 
integration; cooperation issues in the post-Soviet space; and international experience of regional 
integration. The first issue was published in the third quarter of 2008.
Requirements for submissions. Papers should be sent by e-mail to editor@eabr.org for blind review. 
There are no strict limitations on the length of articles. However, the editorial board recommends 
authors to adhere to 6,000-8,000 words or 30,000-40,000 characters. In addition to the main text, 
authors must submit a brief author(s’) biography (100-150 words), executive summary (100-150 
words) and bibliography. These materials must be attached in a separate file. 
Industry Reports
 
The following Industry Reports have already been published and distributed:
• Nuclear Energy Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan: Prospects for Development and Cooperation. 
April 2008. In Russian and English. 
• Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia: Utilisation and Development Issues. April 2008. In 
Russian and English. 
• The CIS Common Electricity Market.  August 2008. In Russian and English.
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• Economic and legal analysis of integration agreements and institutions in the Eurasian space; 
• The operations and activities of development banks in the CIS countries and issues relating to 
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